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ԵՐԵՎԱՆ

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The current issue of the “Bulletin of the Institute of Oriental Studies” includes studies on the ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary history of the countries of the South-west Asia, as well as issues of source studies. A considerable part deals with the ongoing developments and processes in the Eurasian region. The periodical may be of interest for the orientologists, specialists in the field of Armenology and international relations.

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ARTICLES

ISSUES OF THE HISTORY OF THE EARLY HITTITE KINGDOM*

Robert Ghazaryan

Abstract

The Hittite state is closely related to the kingdom of Kanesh by historical ties. Its background could be understood through the study of the last stage of the history of the city-state Kanesh or Nesa in the second half of the II millennium BC. It is also essential to understand how the transition of the state system from Kanesh to Hattusa took place. It is equally necessary to find the connection between the kings of the Old Hittite Kingdom and the Kanesh dynasty and the influence that the state system of Kanesh had on the Old Hittite state. The article discusses the above-mentioned issues, as well as a number of other issues of the history of the Early Hittite state.

Keywords: Anitta, Kanesh, Old Hittite Kingdom, Hattusili I, Kussar, Hattusa, Asia Minor, Early Hittite Kingdom, Labarna.

Introduction

The city-states of Asia Minor in the II millennium BC were mainly political units occupying a small area and were in conflict with each other. In the XVIII century BC, that struggle led to the victory of the city-state Kussar in the region. Pithana, the king of Kussar, conquered Kanesh (Nesa), then his son Anitta (2nd half of the XVIII century BC) conquered Zalpuwa, Purushanda, Salatiwara and Hattusa (most of the central and eastern regions of Asia Minor). The residence of the king of Kussar was temporarily located in Kanesh. Hattusili I, considered the founder of the Old Hittite Kingdom (XVII-XV centuries BC), was also mentioned as a descendant of Kussar. The connection between these two kings (Anitta, Hattusili) and the dynasties has not been established, but Kussar was important to both and seems to have been the seat of the dynasties.

Sources

The main sources for the article were the “Cappadocian” texts, the Old Hittite written sources, and partly archaeological materials [28; 32; 22; 1; 19: 32-63].

Among the preserved written sources, the so-called “Anitta text”¹ and the texts relating to the period of Hattusili I and his ancestors can be singled out in terms of

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¹ The text is considered the oldest written source in the Hittite language. It was kept in Hattusa as an important state document. Probably, the original text was attached to or placed on the royal gates, as mentioned in lines 33-35 of the text. Most likely, the original language of the text was Akkadian, and then it was translated into Hittite [27; 36: 24-29; 9: 71-74].

their importance. Among them the “Annals of Hattusili” are of great importance as well [29: 73-84; 25: 1-22; 17: 293-297; 24: 45-60; 19: 40-42]. The activities of six years of Hattusili I’s rule are presented there. It is not clear whether the annals reflect the first years of his reign or describe the most significant events of his reign.

Another important source is Hattusili’s “Testament” [CTH 6; 24: 1-24; 8: 7]. It depicts an assembly convened in the city of Kussar at the end of Hattusili’s life, attended by members of the *pankus* (consultative body of the Hittite king) and high-ranking officials called ^{LÚ.MES}DUGUD². It is a unique appeal to the Hittite army and officials. In his speech, the king calls on the nobility and army to take care of his heir, the next king.

Another significant source regarding the years of Hattusili’s rule is the “Edict” [CTH 5; 5: 79-81]. In this bilingual (Hittite and Akkadian) document, Hattusili I addresses the Hittite army and council, introducing to them Mursili, the new heir to the throne. He also tells about the riots in the state and the events that took place within the royal family.

The “Edict of Telipinu” is important as well [CTH 19; 16; 15: 3; 19: 43]. This historical document also contains a brief chronological account of the era preceding King Telipinu, a description of Hattusili, his ancestors and successors.

From among the archaeological materials, one can single out the bronze dagger found in one of the buildings near the royal palace of Kanesh, with a cuneiform inscription on it which reads: “Palace of Anitta, the king” (É.GAL *A-ni-ta ru-ba-im*) [31].

Anitta - king of Kanesh

The city-state of Kanesh had existed since at least as early as the end of the III millennium BC. From the “Anitta text” it becomes clear that in the 2nd half of the XVIII century BC Pithana³, king of Kussar⁴, conquered the city of Kanesh [27: 10-11], in fact uniting the two states under his rule. Anitta⁵ was appointed governor of Kanesh (Akk. - *rabi simmiltim*⁶) and after Pithana’s death was mentioned as king⁷.

² Governor of the city, high-ranking official [19: 91].

³ The name Pithana was also mentioned in the “Cappadocian” texts *kt n/k 76; kt e/k 164; RA 59, N 18*. They concern a certain Pithana who was not a king, which means that it was a common name in the region.

⁴ The city of Kussar (according to “Cappadocian” sources - Kussara) was probably located northeast of Kanesh, in the region of the Anti-Taurus Mountains. There was a trade station (Akk: *wabartum*) of Assyrian traders in Kussar [12: 1391-1395].

⁵ See the following “Cappadocian” texts: *TC 3 214a; kt s/k 3*.

⁶ In the “Cappadocian” text *TC 3 214a* (a divorce contract, found in Kanesh) Pithana is mentioned as king and Anitta as *rabi simmiltim* (the title of *rabi simmiltim* is translated from Akkadian as the “Chief of the Staircase”, probably referring to the “staircase that led to the city or the main gate”). That official was actually the governor of the citadel, probably also the governor of the court, and he was the second in rank in the states of Asia Minor. Very often that position was held by the crown prince as well. On the position of *rabi simmiltim* see [13: 16].

Probably, the invasion of Kanesh by Kussar also concerned its subject territories, which became part of the unified state of Kanesh-Kussar.

There is an interesting episode in the “Anitta text” that after conquering Kanesh, Pithana, king of Kussar, ordered not to harm the inhabitants; moreover, “made them his mothers and fathers” [27: 10-11; 6: 35-36]. This sentence indicates that most of the people of Kanesh and the people of Kussar belonged to the same ethnic group. This could also mean that Pithana’s ancestors were from Kanesh and thus, the king of Kussar was declaring that the people of Kanesh were not strangers to him⁸.

After Pithana’s death, some of his subordinate cities revolted and Anitta had to suppress those movements. Among them was the Kanesh rebellion⁹. Later, from Kanesh, Anitta started his policy of conquest in Asia Minor. He conquered Zalpuwa¹⁰, Purushanda¹¹, Salatiwara¹². During the wars, Zalpuwa’s King Huzziya was taken captive. He was brought to Kanesh along with the statue of a god taken from Kanesh by Zalpuwa about a century ago. It is important to note that Anitta called the god of the people of Kanesh “our god = ^DSi-ú-sum-m[i-in]”¹³. Probably, that god was worshiped in Kussar as well.

During one of the campaigns, Anitta defeated Piyusti, king of Hattusa and conquered Hattusa, the center of the Hittian state as well¹⁴. The city was destroyed on Anitta’s order. Anitta threatened [27: 12-13] all those who would dare to settle there after all this or restore the city with divine retribution. However, after Anitta’s death the city was restored and later became the capital of the Hittite state.

⁷ The name of King Anitta was also mentioned in the texts discovered in the archaeological site of Alişar (the Hittite city of Ankuwa, located in the Yozgat region of present-day Turkey) (*Alişar No. e 844; Alişar No. b 1600*) [20: 161-162]. During the reign of Anitta a certain Peruwa is mentioned as *rabbi simmiltim* (see “Cappadocian” texts *kt 89/k 371; OIP 27 49a*). Given that princes could also hold that position, it can be assumed that Peruwa was one of Anitta’s sons.

⁸ It can be assumed that before that the two cities competed to achieve the leading position in the region, to dominate the trade routes and to achieve the leading role in the “Hittite world”.

⁹ In this passage of the “Anitta text” it is also mentioned that the king of Kussar had captured the king of Kanesh. It is difficult to state exactly who was the king of Kanesh at that time, perhaps someone appointed by Anitta. On the kings of Kanesh see [13: 14-15].

¹⁰ The city of Zalpuwa or Zalpa was located on the southern coast of the Black Sea or in the nearby territories. For its location, see RGTC VI: 490-492.

¹¹ Purushanda (Burushattum) was probably located on the present-day archaeological site Acemhöyük (in present-day Aksaray province of Turkey), see RGTC VI: 323-324.

¹² Salatiwara was situated in the areas south-west of Kanesh, probably closer to Purushanda. For the location of the settlement, see RGTC VI: 333-334.

¹³ [27: 12]. It is likely that by saying “our god” Anitta was referring to Anna, the principal deity of Kanesh. An ancient temple dedicated to that god in Kanesh was probably destroyed when Uhna, king of Zalpuwa, attacked Kanesh (mid XIX century BC). Uhna had also taken the statue of the god from Kanesh as an important trophy, which Anitta returned after defeating Zalpuwa, building a new temple in honor of the aforementioned god.

¹⁴ Probably the conquest of Hattusa took place in around 1730 BC, as the last “Cappadocian” contract found in the *kārum* (a trade organization, colony of Assyrian traders) of Hattusa dates back to around 1735 BC [37: 35].

Anitta overcame the resistance of the city of Salatiwara, and then marched his troops towards the kingdom of Purushanda. The local king welcomed him with gifts and the two kings became allies. The king of Purushanda gave the king of Kanesh an iron throne and a scepter as gifts¹⁵. He was supposed to sit on the right side of the king of Kanesh in the throne room, which indicates that he was given an important place in Anitta's court. Probably only after these events did Anitta begin to bear the title of great king, which was previously held by the king of Purushanda. According to one of the "Cappadocian" texts, Anitta's power probably extended over Ankuwa city as well¹⁶.

Anitta also started construction in Kanesh, rebuilding city fortifications, building temples in honor of his patron Weather God of Heaven, "our god" (the god Anna) and the god Halmasuit. He made offerings to those temples and had many wild animals brought to the city. Perhaps those animals were also intended as offerings to the gods¹⁷.

In fact, the state of Anitta temporarily united most of the eastern and central regions of the peninsula.

After Anitta's death (probably in 1725 BC), King Zuzu¹⁸ is mentioned in Kanesh. It is difficult to find out the connection between Zuzu and Anitta. Besides, Zuzu is also known as the king of the city of Alahzina¹⁹. Like Anitta, he held the title of great king. After Anitta's death Zuzu probably managed to unite those two city-states (Kanesh and Alahzina) into one state. Thus, the last recorded king of Kanesh is Zuzu. He was mentioned in "Cappadocian" sources both as a king and as a great king. It could mean that after ascending the throne, he was able to expand the borders of the state and earn the title of "great king". The seal of the great king Zuzu ("Cappadocian" text *kt 89/k 369*) has also been preserved. It depicts a bull, the symbol of the deity of Weather God of Heaven. It can be assumed that this god was his patron god, as it was Anitta's.

According to archeological data, Kanesh was destroyed and abandoned in between around 1710-1700 BC (end of Kanesh's archaeological Level Ib)²⁰. It was,

¹⁵ They were expensive gifts because iron was a rare metal at that time. The first iron objects were probably made from meteoric iron [27: 14-15; 9: 71-74].

¹⁶ The "Cappadocian" text *OIP 27 49* mentions the name of the city of Ankuwa and the seal of Anitta [21: 197-198].

¹⁷ According to the text, about 120 wild animals were brought to Nesa on Anitta's order. Probably, all of this was done as one of the indicators of the royal power, as a "spectacle" for the common people and to show off to the people of Kanesh [27: 12-15].

¹⁸ Ratifications of contracts by King Zuzu were found in Kanesh. See "Cappadocian" texts *kt j/k 625*; *kt 89/k 369*. During his reign, Ishtar-ibra was mentioned as *rabi simmiltim* [10; 20: 161-162].

¹⁹ The city of Alahzina was probably the same as the city of Lihzina mentioned in later Hittite sources (Lihzina is mentioned in the prayer text of the Hittite King Muwattali II, see CTH 381; RGTC VI, 247-248).

²⁰ There is also a hypothesis that Kanesh was not inhabited later or was partially inhabited because the climatic conditions in the region changed. The river near the city had dried up or shallowed, as a result of which swamps formed near the city [23: 86, 92].

in fact, the end of Assyrian international trade in the region²¹. The royal family of Kanesh probably had to leave the citadel of the city. It is difficult to say exactly in which direction they left and who was the last king of Kanesh. One of the likely destinations could be Kussar. Most likely, a significant part of the people of Kanesh also managed to go to the east and north. Probably, the state archive of Kanesh was taken out of the city as well, and later found its place in the state archive of Hattusa.

From Anitta to Hattusili I

The issue of succession between Anitta and the kings of the Hittite Old Kingdom is still unclear. Different reconstructions have been proposed by various Hittitologists regarding the reign of Hattusili I (ca. 1650-1620 BC), the king and his immediate successors are currently considered the founders of the Hittite Old Kingdom²².

Based on the few existing sources, the following reconstruction can be proposed. Some time after Anitta and Zuzu, the city of Sanahuitta²³ was ruled by Tudhaliya I²⁴, who managed to leave Kanesh and then settled in Sanahuitta in the north. Sources later mention his son Pu-sharruma, whose sons were Pawahtelmah (Hattusili I's father, who was probably deprived of the right to inherit the throne) and Labarna I [14: 87].

Later, a power struggle started between the two brothers, Labarna I and Pawahtelmah, culminating in the usurpation of the throne by Pawahtelmah in Sanahuitta²⁵. Labarna I left for Hattusa, where he married Tawananna²⁶, the daughter of the king of Hattusa (probably Huzziya²⁷). She was also believed to be

²¹ The reason for the end of the international trade of Assyrian traders in Asia Minor could also be the strengthening of the Hurrian states in Northern Mesopotamia, as well as the dependence of Assur on Babylonia during the reign of Hammurabi (1728-1686 BC).

²² On the succession of kings who ruled before Hattusili, see also [2: 51].

²³ Sanahuitta was situated to the north-east of Hattusa. The city was known from the period of Assyrian trading colonies (in "Cappadocian" sources it is mentioned as Sinahuttum). It was one of the important political centers of the region in the above-mentioned period [1: 286-291; RGTC VI, 342].

²⁴ The name Tudhaliya is also found in the text of Pithana, king of Kussar ("Cappadocian" text *kt* 89/k379), where he is mentioned as the chief cupbearer (Akk: *rabi šāqē*), as well as later, with King Zuzu (see "Cappadocian" text *kt j/k* 625). If it is the same person, then he probably belonged to the royal family. That name was later common in the Hittite dynasty.

²⁵ This is evidenced in the "Testament" of Hattusili, where it was stated that instead of Labarna, the people of Sanahuitta made Pawahtelmah their king: "He (meaning his grandfather) appointed Labarna to the city of Sanahuitta. But later his servants and the city council disregarded his words and made Pawahtelmah their king" [5: 81; 6: 66; 14: 87-88; 19: 80].

²⁶ The names of Tawannana and Labarna are also mentioned on the so-called "Cruciform Seal" after Huzziya. This may be considered an argument in favor of the assumption that over time these personal names became titles of kings and queens (cf. the Roman title Caesar from the name of Julius Caesar) [15: 13; 6: 65].

²⁷ At one point Anitta defeated the king of Zalpuwa named Huzziya. The name Huzziya is on the so-called "cross-shaped seal" as well. The seal was made during the reign of Mursili II (1321-1295 BC)

Labarna's sister, as Labarna was adopted by the king of Hattusa. That is probably the reason why Hattusili referred to himself as Tawananna's nephew [29: 78; 25: 7]. Probably, Hattusili had also left for Hattusa with Labarna.

The power of the king of Hattusa extended over Hurma (Hurama)²⁸, which meant that most of the central and eastern regions of Asia Minor, including the cities of Kanesh and Kussar, were under his rule, i.e. the state he created took the place of Anitta's kingdom in the region.

At that time, with the help of the king of Hattusa, Labarna was able to become the king of Sanahuitta. It is unknown what happened to Pawahtelmah who ruled the city before. And Pu-sharruma was appointed ruler of the state of Hurma. In his turn, Labarna I adopted Hattusili (Labarna II²⁹), the son of Pawahtelmah.

Later, probably during the early years of Labarna I's reign or before his accession to the throne, his power extended over more limited territories. Many cities were probably out of the king's control. This is implied by the text, which notes that Labarna's state was small at first, then it expanded and he appointed his sons as governors of various cities (Hupisna, Tuwanuwa, Nenassa, Landa, Zallara, Parsuhanta, Lusna)³⁰.

If we follow this "game of thrones", it turns out that the fragmentary information of the Hittite sources makes it possible to note that during the reign of Hattusili, considered the founder of the Hittite Old Kingdom, and during the reign of his ancestors, at least four centers - Sanahuitta, Hattusa, Kussar and Hurma - were of importance. Between the period of Pithana-Anitta (2nd half of the XVIII century BC) and the accession of Labarna I to the throne (1st half of the XVII century BC), there are mentions of at least three cities that were the centers of Hittite kings: Kussar, Kanesh, and Sanahuitta. In addition, it is clear that the dynasty of Sanahuitta strengthened its ties with the dynasty of Hattusa; and Hattusili I (or Labarna II) united the dynasties of Huzziya and Tudhaliya. There was a rapprochement and mixing of the Hittian-Hittite elite. On the other hand, it is obvious that in later centuries the language of the state of Hatti was called Nesian the language of Nesa (Kanesh). This indicates that the elite of the state of Hatti had a connection with Kanesh, and, besides, part of the population of Kanesh had probably migrated to Hatti. Apart from the local deities, the deities of Kanesh were

and also contains information on the early period of the Hittite state. King Huzziya's name is mentioned first [15: 13]. Other, later Hittite kings also bore the name Huzziya.

²⁸ The city of Hurama or Hurma was probably located in the areas southeast of Kanesh, in the present-day Elbistan Valley, not far from Tegarama [1: 180-187].

²⁹ The Hittite queen Kaddusi is mentioned in one of the sources as Labarna's wife (KUB XXXV 120), and in another place as Hattusili's wife (KBo XIII 43). Taking this into account, one can assume that Hattusili I can also be referred to as Labarna II, as another Labarna had adopted him and can be referred to as Labarna I.

³⁰ [16: 12-15]. The countries listed in that part of the text were in the "Lower Country", south of the river Halis (Hittite: Marasantiya) [11: 62].

worshiped in Hattusa as well³¹. Although the city of Kanesh had declined, the “Land of Kanesh” continued to be mentioned even during the New Hittite Kingdom³². It is difficult to make assumptions about what connection Hattusili had with the city of Kussar, since the city is not mentioned in the information about his ancestors. It only appears along with the events of the last period of Hattusili’s rule. Hattusili refers to himself as a “Man of Kussar”, which means that he was also the ruler of Kussar [6: 68]. And it could be that his lineage was connected with the rulers of Kussar and it was important for him to mention his and his family’s cradle city. It is no coincidence that Hattusili gathered the nobility in that city when appointing a successor to his throne.

Due to the scarcity of sources, it is quite difficult to describe in more detail what happened during the time of Hattusili’s ancestors. It can be assumed that after Anitta’s conquests, Hattusili’s ancestors, as members of the dynasty, were appointed rulers of Sanahuitta, or that under Hurrian pressure the rulers of Kussar and the dynasty withdrew to the more secure Sanahuitta.

The explanation of the word *labarna*³³ is of interest as well. It was the title of the Hittite kings in the later period; besides, this personal name no longer appears in the Hittite royal list. The word *labarna* or *tabarna* [34; 19: 79-80] was used by Hattusili I, as well as all succeeding Hittite kings, as a title, from which this confusion could arise³⁴. It can be assumed that the initial name of Hattusili was *Labarna* and only after Hattusili did it become a royal title.

During the reign of Hattusili I the Hittite state, having conquered most of Asia Minor, for the first time attempted to expand beyond the peninsula to the south, into Syria. Hattusili also made Hattusa his capital city, and in its honor the king received his name “the man from Hattusa”.

In the very first year of his reign, Hattusili launched two campaigns, one against the city of Sanahuitta, which was important to his dynasty, and the other against the city of Zalpa. The first campaign was not a great success, as the king was able to invade and destroy a part of Sanahuitta’s subordinate settlements. He then conquered the city of Zalpa, confiscating the temple property and distributing it among the temples of various gods of Hatti [6: 70].

³¹ The names of the following deities of Kanesh were mentioned: Kamrusepa, Pirwa, Hassusara (“Queen”), Aslasepa (“Genius of the Gate”), Suwatyat, Halki, Hassam(m)ili, Siwat (“Day”), Ispant (“Night”), Assiyat, Ilali(yant), Maliya, and Darawas [35: 30-31].

³² Later Hittite kings also mentioned Kussar, but they did not mention the names of Pithana and Anitta, the rulers of Kussar. For example, the Hittite king Hattusili III (1267-1237 BC) considered Hattusili to be the ancestor of his dynasty, and also believed that the royal dynasty originated from the city of Kussar [30: 4-5].

³³ In the “Cappadocian” text *ICK 1 178* we come across the personal name *Labarna* in the form *Labarsa* as well. *Labarsa* is also the name of the earliest dated ruler (1970-1840 BC) of Asia Minor in “Cappadocian” sources [20: 156-158].

³⁴ In the “Annals”, the full series of titles for Hattusili I reads as follows: “*great king tabarna, Hattusili, great king, king of the land of Hatti, man of Kussar, reigning in the land of Hatti, nephew of Tawananna*” [29: 78; 25: 7].

In the second year of his reign, the king marched towards the northern Syrian region south of the Taurus Mountains [29: 78]. The first Syrian invasion of the Hittites did not bring any real benefit to the Hittite state. The destruction of Alalakh (referred to as Alalha in Hattusili's "Annals")³⁵ and other city-states and the spoils taken were just a passing success. In addition, the long siege³⁶ of Urshu (Warsuwa) demonstrated the difficult problems that Hattusili could face if he set himself the goal of establishing dominance over that region. Urshu was supported by the people of Aleppo and the Hurrians [6: 72-73].

Almost the same situation is recorded during Hattusili's campaign in the western direction as well. In his "Annals" the raid on Arzawa in southwestern Asia Minor is mentioned in the year following the Syrian war. This is the first mention of that political unit in the Hittite sources [29: 78]. From the part depicting the campaign it can be concluded that it could have been just a looting or perhaps a retaliatory campaign, in response to some earlier actions of the Arzawians. However, even at the time of this invasion, or at a later period, Arzawa could have been under the rule of Hatti [6: 74].

In the "Annals", the campaign to Arzawa is followed by riots within the state and the attack of the Hurrians. According to it, the entire territory of the Hittite state had passed into the hands of the rebel countries, except for the capital [29: 78]. And the Hurrian invasion was a direct response to Hattusili's campaign of Syria two years back. The Hurrians managed to reach the western regions of Asia Minor, Arzawa. However, their army suffered greatly due to a widespread disease, which resulted in the death of several of their generals as well. Before that, the Hurrian army had also made an unsuccessful attempt to invade the city of Hurma [18: 89-93]. Some sources have been preserved mentioning that Hattusili entered into a confrontation with the state of Purushanda. The Hittite text describes the king's victory over Purushanda.

Hattusili managed to recapture the rebel cities in the central regions of the state (Nenassa, Ulma-Ullamma, and Sallahsuwa), and the next year the king marched to the city of Sanahuitta again. After a six-month siege, the city was conquered, following which all the other rebel cities voluntarily submitted to Hattusili [29: 79; 19: 87].

After regulating the issues of Asia Minor, Hattusili set out to conquer the North Syrian region³⁷. A second Syrian invasion is mentioned in his "Annals" [29]. It was quite successful for the Hittites. Hattusili mentions that in addition to spoils,

³⁵ It was located in the northern Syria, in the territory of the present-day Tell Açana archaeological site.

³⁶ One of the important sources of the period of Hattusili's rule is the text conventionally called "The Siege of Urshu" [17: 299-301; 24: 25-44; 3:23-34]. The city was situated to the south of Hurma. For the location of Urshu, see RGTC VI:475-476.

³⁷ The north Syrian invasions, particularly the invasion of Aleppo, are also mentioned in a New Hittite Kingdom text ("Treaty between Muwattalli II and Talmi-Sharruma") [4: 88-89].

he also took the kings of the cities of Hahha (Hahhum)³⁸ and Hassuwa³⁹ to Hattusa. These successes were probably of great importance to Hattusili, because in the relevant part of the text he compares himself to the Akkadian King Sargon I, who had also crossed the Euphrates. However, unlike Sargon, Hattusili records that he succeeded in conquering the city of Hahhum [29: 83; 6: 78].

It is not clear whether Hattusili's conquests in Syria were limited only to the cities of Hassuwa and Hahhum. In any case, it cannot be ruled out that the geography of the Hittite invasion was wider than presented in the "Annals". Hattusili's letter⁴⁰ addressed to King Tuniya (Tunip-Teshub in other sources) of the city-state Tikunani in northern Mesopotamia discusses joint military operations. The text of the letter directly states that Tikunani was a subject of the Hittite king and that its king was obliged to help him in the war against Hahhum. In that case, the Hittite invasion could have included the areas further east of Hassuwa, i.e. approximately the area of modern Diyarbakir. Based on this, it can be assumed that Hattusili was trying to find allies in the Syrian region against the Yamhad kingdom and its allies [19: 88-89].

Probably, the aim of the Hittite campaigns was to gain access to and control over the trade routes passing through Syria. In this way, Hattusili could be trying to ensure a stable connection to the trade of tin exported from Mesopotamia, which was of great economic importance for the production of bronze. In the past, even after the fall of Assyrian trading colonies, this connection with Mesopotamia was blocked [6: 81-82].

After the second Syrian campaign, Hattusili undertook several more campaigns, first to Arzawa and then again to Syria. Information about them comes from various sources and is fragmentary. In particular, we come across it in the so-called "Treaty of Aleppo", signed between Muwatalli II and King Talmi-Sharruma of Aleppo, in the historical introduction of which Hattusili's victory over Aleppo is described⁴¹.

However, Hattusili faced ordeals within the state. According to Hattusili's "Testament", the sons of the king who were appointed rulers of the conquered countries showed disobedience. At least two of them, Huzziya who ruled in the city of Tappassanda⁴², and Hakkarpili who ruled in Zalpa, rioted, and the king had to suppress the riots and depose his sons. After those events, his daughter rioted against her father. The center of the riot was Hattusa, where the princess and her

³⁸ For the location of Hahhum, see RGTC VI: 61-62.

³⁹ Hassuwa was situated in the territories north of Kargamis [11: 58].

⁴⁰ The Hittite king had launched military operations against the city of Hahhum and was reminding his vassal of his duties. In the letter the king introduces himself as Labarna, the great king. Many Hittitologists believe that this Labarna was Hattusili I. The document is considered to be the oldest preserved epistolary Hittite inscription [6: 78-79; 19: 88]. The land of Tikunani was near the state of Nihriya, in the basin of the upper Euphrates [7: 80-81].

⁴¹ CTH 75.

⁴² RGTC VI: 400.

family had substantial authority. The daughter's name has not been preserved, and this is not due to damage to the text, but is intentional. According to the text, there was a great bloodshed in Hatti. Hattusili suppressed that riot as well. Then the king deprived his daughter of all the privileges deriving from her status and expelled her from the capital. Hattusili's daughter's sons also rioted against their grandfather. Hattusili deprived them of the right to inherit the throne as well [5: 80-81]. It can be concluded from the text that the riots of Hattusili's sons and daughter took place because of the issue of the succession to the throne.

Distrust of his own heirs forced Hattusili to declare his sister's son ("young Labarna") heir to the throne. Yet seeing the great influence of the members of the royal family on him and the indifference towards his person, Hattusili abandoned this plan and expelled him from the capital, to the great dissatisfaction of his sister (Tawananna). After all this, Hattusili adopted his grandson (probably the son of one of his sons), young Mursili, and at the assembly in Kussar made the Hittite nobility and army recognize him as heir to the throne [5: 79-80]. Hattusili appointed his brother Pimpira [33: 86], the ruler of the city of Nenassa, as Mursili's regent. At that time Hattusili was already ill. A lady named Hastayar was also with him in Kussar. She was probably his wife in the last years of his life. Hattusili I died in Kussar, leaving the throne to Mursili I, the future conqueror of Babylon.

Conclusions

In late III millennium BC - early II millennium BC, there was still no unified state established by the bearers of the Indo-European Anatolian languages (Hittites, Luwians) in the territory of Asia Minor. There were a number of states, among them the kingdoms of Kussar and Kanesh. During the reign of Pithana, king of Kussar, these states were united. During the reign of Anitta, Pithana's son, the state of Kanesh-Kussar expanded further, including the central, eastern regions of Asia Minor and some western regions of the Armenian Highland. After the kings Anitta and Zuzu, the political center of the state moved first to Sanahuitta and then to Hattusa. Kanesh was in decline, and Kussar, although maintaining some of its political weight, never again became the capital. Later Hittite kings did not mention Anitta's name among their ancestors; however, the connection between the Kanesh-Kussarian and the Sanahuitta-Hattusa dynasties is evident. In this sense, that phase of the Hittite state, until the beginning of Hattusili I's reign, can be called the period of the Early Hittite Kingdom (2nd half of the XVIII century BC - 1st half of the XVII century BC).

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ABBREVIATIONS

CTH - Laroche E., *Catalogue des textes hittites*, Paris, 1971; Editions Klincksieck, 267 p.

JCS - *Journal of Cuneiform Studies* (New Haven).

KBo - *Keilschrifttexte aus Boğazköi* (Leipzig/Berlin, 1923ff).

KUB - *Keilschrifturkunden aus Boğazköi* (Berlin, 1921ff.). REL - *Revised Eponym List*.

MDOG - *Mitteilungen der deutschen Orient-Gesellschaft zu Berlin*.

PIHANS - *Publications de l'Institut historique et archéologique néerlandais de Stamboul* (Leiden).

RGTC VI - Del Monte G.F., Tischler J., *Répertoire Géographique des Textes Cunéiformes*. Band 6. *Die Orts- und Gewässernamen der hethitischen Texte*, Wiesbaden, 1978, 596 S.

StBoT - *Studien zu den Boğazköy-Texten* (Wiesbaden), 1965ff.

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ԽԵԹԱԿԱՆ ՎԱՂ ԹԱԳԱՎՈՐՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՊԱՏՄՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՀԻՄՆԱՀԱՐՑԵՐ

Ռոբերտ Ղազարյան

Քանալի բառեր՝ Անիտտա, Քանեշ, Հին խեթական թագավորություն, Խաթթուսիլի I, Կուսսար, Խաթթուսա, Փոքր Ասիա, Վաղ խեթական թագավորություն, Լաբարնա:

Խեթական պետությունը պատմական կապերով սերտորեն առնչվում է Քանեշի թագավորության հետ: Նրա նախապատմությունը վեր հանելու համար, հարկավոր է ուսումնասիրության առարկա դարձնել մ.թ.ա. II հազարամյակի II կեսի Քանեշ կամ Նեսա քաղաք-պետության պատմության վերջին փուլը: Կարևոր է նաև հասկանալ, թե ինչպես է տեղի ունեցել պետական համակարգի անցումը Քանեշից դեպի Խաթթուսա: Հարկավոր է նաև պարզել կապը խեթական Հին թագավորության արքաների և քանեշյան արքայատոհմի միջև և այն, թե ինչ ազդեցություն է թողել Քանեշի պետական համակարգը Հին խեթական պետության վրա: Հոդվածում քննարկման առարկա են դարձել վերոհիշյալ խնդիրները, ինչպես նաև Վաղ խեթական պետության պատմության մի շարք այլ հիմնախնդիրներ:

THE SETTLEMENTS OF IŠUWA IN THE II MILLENNIUM BC*

Aram Kosyan

Abstract

In the cuneiform Hittite texts there are attested 21 place-names located on the territory of Išuwa. The investigation of archaeological sites of the region shows that their number was definitely incomparably more.

In the article are collected place-names of Išuwa attested by name. The list is assorted according to their appearance in the texts. In numerous archaeological sites there have been registered cultural layers which cover a long period of functioning from the Early Iron Age to Middle Ages that testify in favor of continuity, regardless the ethnic affiliation of their population (Hinzuta-Andzit, Pališna-Palin, Tahhiša-Degiq).

Keywords: Upper Euphrates valley, Išuwa, place-names, Hinzuta, Pališna, Tahhiša.

The Upper Euphrates region was one of the earliest centers of the historical Armenian Highland where the process of urbanization took place at quite an early date, along with the Kura-Araxes (Early Transcaucasian) culture. The first urban centers of this region date back to the Chalcolithic period (V mill. BC)¹. During the succeeding periods (Early and Middle Bronze Ages), archaeological excavations carried out at the Upper Euphrates sites both to the east and west of the river (especially in Arslantepe-Malatya) unequivocally testify in favor of the assumption that in most of them cultural continuity is apparent.

With the rise of the Hittite kingdom and appearance of cuneiform texts, - our knowledge of the area under study has significantly increased. In the earliest Hittite texts which go back to the very beginning of the Old Hittite kingdom some localities of later Išuwa are mentioned (^{URU}Hatra and ^{URU}He/inzuta, see below, in the text).

The Hittite cuneiform texts report on the existence of small chiefdoms of the Upper Euphrates region from the end of the XV century BC until the end of the XIII century in the context of the eastern expansion of Hatti. These political entities usually appear under the general designation of Išuwa. The texts point to the existence of a wide network of settlements in the region. Although the settlements of Išuwa were mostly small in size, the rich natural resources of this region² and favorable conditions for the development of agriculture³ would seem to support the

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¹ For the sites where the earliest layers have been identified, see [28].

² For the map of Išuwa-Malatya, - see 2: Karte 4. Rich deposits of metals are located in Išuwa and neighboring regions: copper (Erganimaden), iron (Divriği and Hasançelebi), and tin (Malatya plain, Keban, Elaziğ-Kharberd, and Baskil) [30:103].

³ The plains of Malatya and Altınova possess with excellent agricultural potential. For example, still in the first half of the XIX century the British diplomat J.Brant who visited this part of the Ottoman

view that their economic potential was quite significant. Furthermore, Išuwa was located on the junction of Eastern Highlands, Asia Minor, and Syria-Mesopotamia, that is it was an important contact zone. None of the migrations of antiquity directed from East to West and from north to south bypassed Išuwa and, consequently, it resembles a unique link between the ancient Near Eastern centers of civilization (on the role of Išuwa as a contact zone see [19]). The consequences of this geographical position of the Upper Euphrates region could apparently be observed in the linguistic situation of the region when one tries to study the onomastic data of Išuwa attested in the Hittite texts. Among these materials names belonging at least to several linguistic groups could be distinguished⁴. Definitely, a part of migrants moving through the territory of Išuwa should have settled down here, a reality that is fully attested archaeologically first from the late Early Bronze Age, and later at the close of the Late Bronze Age [22].

Toponyms of Išuwa

Two lists of the settlements of Išuwa dated to the first half of the XIV century BC are preserved in the texts of the Hittite kings Arnuwanda I and Šuppiluliuma I, not to mention those attested in later texts.

First list - KUB XXIII 72+⁵ (the order of the toponyms is given according to their enumeration in the text).

^{URU}Šullamma, ^{URU}Zanzaliya, ^{URU}Lillima, ^{URU}Hinzuta, ^{URU}Wattarušna, ^{URU}An(?)/[.....], ^{URU}Tahhiša, ^{URU}Alatarma, ^{URU}Pališna, ^{URU}[.....], ^{URU}Mararha, ^{URU}Tahišna, ^{URU}Halma.

All these place-names are supplied with the determinative URU (“city, settlement”) [6; 16] for all attestations and suggested locations). Among these toponyms four are attested also in other Hittite texts (Šullamma, Hinzuta, Wattarušna, Alatarma). In regard to ^{URU}Alatarma, let us mention that in one of his early papers J.Miller suggested a more southerly location in the upper flow of the River Balih [25:33].

In another passage of this same text five more place-names are listed. They only partially correspond to the above-mentioned list. These are:

KUR ^{URU}Išuwa
 KUR ^{URU}Pahhuwa
^{URU}Zuhma
 KUR ^{URU}H[urri]
^{URU}Maldiya

Empire, wrote that in the plain of Kharberd wheat yields 1:12-16 [3:207]. More favorable conditions for agricultural activities could be found in the Malatya plain, since here the climate is milder and the landscape is flat.

⁴ For multilingual character of the personal names reported in the Hittite texts, see [18].

⁵ For the full edition of this text see [17; 23:9-44; 29].

Three toponyms of this second list are preceded by the determinative KUR “country” (KUR^{URU}Išuwa, KUR^{URU}Pahhuwa, KUR^{URU}H[urri]⁶), which probably indicates that they represented not a single place-name but rather bigger administrative units (“countries”). KUR^{URU}Zuhma has been compared with ^{mat}Suhme of Assyrian texts [16:104-105]. As to ^{URU}Maldiya, its identity with Malatya (modern Eski-Malatya to the west of the Euphrates) could not be doubted.

If we consider that Pahhuwa, Zuhma and H[urri] could hardly belong to Išuwa, then it could be assumed that the place-names of the first list might represent the part of Išuwa of the second list.

Second list - KBo XVI 42⁷.

^{URU}Malitiya, ^{URU}Manzana, [^{URU}Hin]zuta, ^{URU}Šinuwa, ^{URU}Arihuwa, ^{URU}Mezzari, ^{URU}Hatima

Two place-names of this list are attested in the first one (^{URU}Malitiya = ^{URU}Maldiya, [^{URU}Hin]zuta = ^{URU}Hinzuta). Only one of the remaining five is attested in other Hittite texts - ^{URU}Šinuwa, which appears in KBo IV 13⁸, in the context of the AN.TAH.ŠUM festival.

Of special interest is ^{URU}Mezzari which in the dictionary of Hittite toponyms since long has been erroneously compared with the Hittite form of Egypt - ^{KUR}Mizri [6:274]. For this toponym the possible identity with Mazara of the Peutinger map has been suggested [20:313f.]. The latter was located about 40 km to the east of the crossing of the Euphrates. Actually, none of the place-names of this second list, except ^{URU}Malitiya, could be located with confidence ([16] for references on texts and suggested locations).

In sum, based on the proposed locations of these two settlements (^{URU}Malitiya, [^{URU}Hin]zuta), this list includes the territories to the west and east of the Euphrates.

Besides two lists, in other Hittite texts two more place-names are preserved.

1. ^{URU}Hatra (KBo II 46 Obv. 15'; KUB VI 45 Obv. II 64/VI 46 Rev. III 31; KBo IV 13 I 44'; KBo VI 3 III 15; KBo VI 6 Obv. 20'; KUB XXVII 1 Obv. I 56; KBo VI 2 III 12; KUB XLVII 64 II 26?). The location in Išuwa seems proved, but there remain some concerns regarding its exact location.

2. ^{URU}Kuwarpiša (IBoT II 129). Currently any location could not be suggested.

Summarizing the place-names of Išuwa attested in the Hittite texts, one should mention that their number reaches 21 (including one of the first list whose name is lost due to the damage).

⁶ But see [10:3] who reads it as Ku[m]maha].

⁷ The nature of this text remains obscure to date. H.Klengel suggested that it is a report of some Hittite dignitary addressed to the Hittite king where he describes the situation in Išuwa [15:85]. He also dates the text with the period of Šuppiluliuma I. But later this date was doubted and the period of Arnuwanda I or Tudhaliya II was proposed [31:396-397, also 7:79]. It seems that in this badly damaged text the author describes some military operation. For the full edition of the text see [8:581-585].

⁸ This text lists the gods of several regions and settlements located in the zone of the influence of the Hittite Empire, among them the “gods of Šinuwa” (KBo IV 13 I 45').

In later periods (Classical, Medieval, and modern) the names of some of these toponyms continue to figure at least linguistically. Indeed, their proposed identity with the II mill. BC place-names could not be taken as proof that they correspond geographically. Anyway, some such correspondences deserve attention.

^{URU}Hinzuta. It has since long been identified with the early medieval Armenian province (*H*)anzit in the neighborhood of modern Elazığ [1:32].

^{URU}Pališna. It most probably corresponds to the region of modern Palu (medieval Armenian Palin)⁹. It was compared with the Byzantine *Palines* /*kastron Palios* [11].

^{URU}Šinuwa. = *Sinis Colonia* of Roman sources to the north of Malatya, modern Söyütlü [11; 9:119, Anm. 11]¹⁰.

^{URU}Tahhiša/Tahišna. Classical *Digisene*¹¹, which back in the XIX century was compared with the early medieval Armenian province *Degik'* in Sophene (final *k'* is a plural suffix).

In addition to the written sources, the impressive list of those archaeological sites on the proposed territory of Išuwa should be attached with the representation clear layers of the Bronze Age occupation.

Studies of these sites which had begun with the salvage archaeological excavations carried out in 1968-1970 (which precedes the building of the Keban and Karakaya dams on Karasu and Muradsu)¹² show that the territory of Išuwa was a heavily populated region not only in the Late Bronze Age but in the Early Bronze Age as well. Most recently, during the archaeological investigation of the sites in this region, particularly in the area lying to the south and east of Elazığ, the existence of 17 new sites (in total 38 sites are located in Uluova district)¹³, was established, not to mention those which currently remain under the waters of the Keban reservoir [28].

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⁹ First proposed by N.Adontz who regarded it as the early form of later Classical *Balavitene* and Armenian Balahovit [1:30].

¹⁰ This suggestion was proposed earlier in [13:190].

¹¹ The Classical form looks identical with Dī-gi₅-ša-na/Dī-ki-ša-na of Cappadocian tablets [24:419 n.294; 27:35], refers to Tomaschek in Pauly-Wissowa 1905: 543f.).

¹² For the results of archaeological excavations and surveys see [12] (*Norşuntepe*); [32; 33; 4; 5] etc.

¹³ “Elazığ Prehistoric Archaeological Survey” project [28].

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ԻՍՈՒՎԱՅԻ ԲՆԱԿԱՎԱՅՐԵՐԸ Մ.Թ.Ա. II ՀԱՉԱՐԱՄՅԱԿՈՒՄ

Արամ Քոսյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ Վերին Եփրատի ավազան, Իսուվա, տեղանուններ, Խին-ձուտա, Պալիսնա, Տախխիսա:

Մ.թ.ա. II հազ. երկրորդ կեսի խեթական սեպագիր աղբյուրներում հիշատակվում է 21 տեղանուն, որոնք տեղադրվում են Իսուվայի տարածքում: Ըստ հնագիտական ուսումնասիրությունների, դրանց քանակը անհամեմատ ավելի մեծ պետք է լիներ:

Հողվածում ներկայացված են վերոհիշյալ տեղանունները՝ խմբավորված ըստ հղվող տեքստերի: Իսուվայի պեղված բազմաթիվ հնավայրերում արձանագրված են վաղ երկաթեդարից մինչև միջնադար ընդգրկող մշակութային շերտեր, ինչը կարող է վկայել ակնհայտ շարունակականության մասին: Դրանց պետք է հավելել որոշ իսուվական տեղանունների հիշատակությունները նաև անվանաբանական մակարդակով (օրինակ՝ Խինձուտա-Անձիտ, Պալխնա-Պաղին, Տախխիսա-Դեզիք):

THE “COURTESY” (COMITAS) OF KING VONONÈS*

Ruben Manaseryan

Abstract

The Parthian king Vononès (8-12), being full of benevolence and courtesy towards his subjects, was however driven out by his nobility. This fact was the consequence of the opposites of the political mentality of the Roman and Parthian societies. Vononès, who returned to the Parthian throne after a long stay as a hostage in Rome, tried to transfer the way of leadership of republican Rome to a tribal society based on the principles of collectivism and personal leveling. In the ideas of the Parthians, the king (*vir magnus* - Just XLI,6.1) is the embodiment of physical masculinity and exercises power by means of readiness for violence, threats and, accordingly, stimulating fear in his subjects. The fear of the monarch is an incentive to implement his will. The “courtesy” (*comitas*) of Vononès, which Tacitus speaks of, being a characteristic feature of the political communication in republican Rome, was introduced by him into relations with the subjects. It denied the traditional principles of exercising power by the Arsacids on interpersonal level, and destroyed traditional ideas about the king-lord. We could presume that Vononès practically abolished fear as a means of exercising supreme power.

Emperor Claudius, who pursued a policy of terror against the Senate and *equites*, urged the pretender to the Parthian throne the prince Meherdat to follow the official ideological setting of the principate - an ideal relationship between the ruler (*rector*) and citizens and not rule as a despot of slaves. These words to Meherdat expose a calculation that the pursuit of these political precepts will only lead to further unrest within the Parthian Empire identical to that which overthrew Vononès.

Keywords: Vononès, Arsacids, Parthia, comitas, Emperor Claudius, Cicero, Principate, political culture in Ancient East.

The Hellenistic period in the Near East was marked by the processes of autocratic state formation among the peoples - main actors of the region: Graeco-Macedonians, Parthians, Armenians, Jews. Their practices of state building were quite distinct in their means of exercise and in their results. The fundamental distinction consisted in the first place in the nature of power relations, manifested in the framework of inter-individual relations with its various gradations [16:13-14] between the holder of power and its object, or, in other words, at the microsociological level.

The data of Trogue Pompey, of Tacitus, and of Plutarch reflect the successive policy of the Parthian monarchs in order to create a centralized state with despotic power. The execution of Surena by order of Orodes (53 BC) had as its task the establishment of unlimited domination over the all-powerful military clan chiefs, to reduce them to the state of domesticity [13:77-82].

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At the same time (II - I centuries), the Seleucid monarchy recognized a certain autonomy of the courtier (“friend of the king”), generally originating from the civil community and considering as primordial his devotion to his local fatherland compared to his obligations towards the monarch [12:29-38]¹.

Our task would be to consider the peculiarities of the perception of the elements of Greco-Roman political culture at the Parthian court as well as the reasons for its refutation by the Parthian tribal and seminomad society. On this level, the reign of Vononès (8-12) is significant. Being Parthian king and then Armenian king, brought up in Rome where he was sent as a hostage at the age of tender childhood by his father Phraates IV, he was after a brief reign repudiated by his Parthian subjects. His collision with the Parthian aristocracy is told by Tacitus. “The Parthians had repudiated a king as a foreigner” (*ut externum asperabantur*), he wrote, although he was of the Arsacid dynasty. It was Vononès delivered by Phraates to Augustus as a hostage (*Is fuit Vonones obses Augusto datus a Phraate*)...[20:384]. The Parthians soon felt shame. They are degraded from having solicited for them a king impregnated with the way of life of the enemies (*hostium artibus injectum*). Vononès himself nourished this animosity. Alienated from ancestral traditions (*ed ipse diversus a majorem institutis*), he rarely went hunting, avoided horse riding, appeared in cities in the palanquin and disdained the great feasts admitted to his country...Simply approachable (*sed prompti aditus*), he demonstrated unreserved courtesy (*obvia comitas*). These virtues unknown to the Parthians were only extraordinary vices in their eyes (*ignote parthis virtutes, nova vitia*) ...” [20:387].

Vononès’ conflict with his court is usually treated in passing, emphasizing the fact that he was a creature of Augustus. However Tacitus [20:384-387] and Josephus Flavius say nothing about any of his actions for the benefit of Rome [6:22]². At first glance, it is clear that such a characteristic of Vononès’ communication with his subjects as “*comitas*”, the “accentuated courtesy” did not correspond in any way to the stereotypical representations of the monarch (*vir magnus*) among the Parthians. Yet this trait of his behavior has not been considered specifically in the context of difference political notions of the Romans and Parthians. Thus R. Hanslik only mentioned in passing the “römisch-hellenistischen Gebahren” (Roman-Hellenistic behavior) and “Leutseligkeit” (courtesy) [9] of this monarch.

The *comitas* and the accessibility of Vononès, “indicted” to him, were essential characteristics of the culture of political communication in Rome. Suetonius marks the *comitas* of Augustus during his contacts with the simplest of the Romans. (“*Promiscuis salutationibus admittebat et plebem, tanta comitate adeuntium desideria excipiens...*”) [18:208]. According to Cicero, *comitas* is a characteristic

¹ The growth of individualism in the Hellenistic period is considered in the work of A.F. Losev [10:29-38].

² Diakonoff M. M., opined that “Vonones’ pro-Roman policy evidently aroused the irritation of the Parthian nobility” [6:22]. This claim is not confirmed in the sources. Dąbrowa E., rightly mentions the “romanization” of Vonones, but without specifying the content of this term [2:33]; see also [3:174].

feature of the politician's conversation with people ("comitas affabilitas que sermonis") [1:216]. With such moral virtues as the faculty of softening, "clementia atque mansuetudo", the comitas is an important part of the moral image of the ideal citizen (*vir bonus*) of the doctrine of Cicero [1:88-90]. We could also remark briefly that gentleness (mansuetudo), a moral quality of the Roman man, was according to Trogue an inferior trait in the eyes of the Parthians, specific to feminine behavior. In answer to the question why the "comitas" had aroused strong repugnance towards the monarch, it should be emphasized that it was incompatible with such a normative characteristic among the Parthians as the "violentia", the basis of their representation of the virility.

"Men should be disposed to violence, while women - humble", writes Trogue ("*Quippe violentiam viris, manifestationis mansuetudinem mulieribus adsignant*") [11:229-230]. With this report on the manifestations of the customary behavior of a tribal society fits perfectly his famous formula of power relations among the Parthians: "they submit to the prince not of consideration but of fear" (*principibus metu non pudore parent*). The Arsacid monarch - incarnation of virility is the holder of its main characteristic, that of the constant disposition to violence, to physical coercion which logically engenders fear as a motive for obedience. (Thereby following the data of Trogue leads to the following formula of power relations: "violentia" -- threat of physical violence --> "metus" (fear) = desired effect) [23:101]³.

Violentia, the threat of coercion, is a negative stimulus, aimed at the subject's emotion and accepted as the norm. Given these realities of the political organization of Parthian society, it would have to be admitted that the "comitas", this accentuated courtesy, raised to the norm of relations between the monarch and the subject, denied the principles of the exercise of power at the interindividual level, and ruined the image of the king-master. Knowingly or unknowingly, Vononès suppressed fear as a means of submission. The case of Vononès also highlights the peculiarity of the understanding of royal etiquette at the Arsacide court. Unlike the political culture of the Principate - of a regime which had elevated hypocrisy to the rank of official policy [21:210], the formalities of etiquette at the Arsacides court were to accentuate the unlimited character of the supreme power, the real political situation of the courtier. We have good reason to conclude that with his simple style of communicating, Vononès imitated the official ideology of the Principate and grasped to the letter the doctrine of the prince, implemented by Augustus [17:77-78]. He followed it probably without realizing its inconceivability to the Parthian political tradition, as well as the fact that this way of managing in Rome was intended to conceal unlimited personal power, based on the waves of the great terror (years 43,41 etc). In this context attention should have been paid to the notion of "pudor" (consideration), indicated by Trogue as a motivation for obedience and the opposite of "metus" (fear). The "pudor" inspired by the prince should

³ It is obvious that this mode of exercising power among the Parthians is identical to M. Weber's thesis on the "monopole de la violence physique légitime comme définition de l'État" [23:101].

transform power relations into bilateral volitional interaction. “*Pudor*” already presumes a certain dependence of the will of “A” on the disposition of “B”, on the moral determination of the latter. There is little doubt that the pudor evoked by Trogue belongs to the domain of the official ideology of the Principate. Certainly this “*pudor*” could only be realized in the form of conversation, dialogue as well as the “*comitas*” - courtesy, introduced by Vononès to his court. It should be noted that this comitas was, according to Cicero, inalienable from dialogue (*sermo*). The effect of “*pudor*” and “*comitas*” (consideration and courtesy) is the reciprocal esteem of the parties, an external equality.

Official Roman doctrine accentuated the opposition of the power relations of the great rival powers. On this point, the speech of the Emperor Claudius at the Senate session on the occasion of sending his hostage Meherdat, son of Vononès [19], to the Parthian throne is very revealing. Claudius urges the young Parthian heir not to consider himself master and his subjects as slaves, but to be “*rector*” of citizens (“*civium*”). We cannot overlook the evidence that the emperor identifies himself with the “*rector*”, leader of the citizens and uses this republican term in order to conceal his unlimited power [22:214-217]⁴. Claudius refers to the opposition of the master (*dominus*) and the slave as being absolutely hostile to the mode of governance in the Roman Empire. The official harmonic pair of the “*rector*” and the “*civis*” was intended to camouflage the true transformations of the relationship between the emperor and the representatives of the privileged orders. (Claudius applied of his own free will the law of majesty whose victims were 35 senators and 200 *equites*) [15:292]⁵. As for the Parthians, the relationship of unlimited domination and unreserved submission was in fact an officially recognized norm which found its expression in the words of Tiridates to Nero: “Master... I am your slave” [5:142;13; 5:296]⁶.

⁴ As Utchenko S.L., designates, the term “*rector*” was coined by Cicero and never meant monarchical power. “*Rector*” is the ideal statesman [22:214-217].

⁵ Suet. Claud.29[18] According to the opinion of Y. Roman, under Claudius “l’aspect désormais monarchique du système ne pouvait plus être dissimulé” [15:292].

⁶ Dio. Cass [5:142]: ἐγώ, δέσποτα...σὸς δὲ δουλὸς εἰμι... In detail [13]. There, it would be appropriate for us to touch in passing on the question of the essential distinction in the practices of political terror in Rome and in the Parthian Empire. The Principate, absolute power coated with republican institutions, recognized all the same the supremacy of the law, all of the private rights (“*jus*”), and the repressions should have a legal and legitimate foundation. However, it must be admitted that the notion of state crime was not developed in the codes of the societies of the classical Orient (see [7:296]). The king punished as he pleased or according to custom for the offense against his power. This reality is explicitly declared by Darius I the Achaemenid in the Behistun inscription. Darius determines of his own free will which of his subjects was the loyal, which was the evil, and punishes or rewards them for his arbitrariness (translation by R. Frye [8:363]). In the same way, without referring to the law, the Parthian king decided the fate of his subjects. Mithridates II the Great (122-87) had put to death Orobasus, his ambassador to Sulla, simply for his clumsiness during negotiations. The latter had to take the seat opposite Ariobarzanes, Roman client-king, while Sulla sat between the two, emphasizing the preeminence of Rome. As for Rome, one can notice without dwelling particularly on the problem,

However, Claudius's remarks testify to the political hypocrisy of the emperor who, having established an arbitrary monarchical regime, recommends that Meherdat introduce into his kingdom ideal relations between the rector and the citizens. It is hardly necessary to believe that Claudius could not fail to realize the unreality of this recommendation. In truth, these words to Meherdat reveal a calculation that the pursuit of these political precepts only leads to new troubles within the Parthian Empire identical to those which overthrew Vononès.

In the fourth year of his reign Vononès was driven out by his aristocrats. Vononès found his salvation in Armenia. First king of the Arsacid dynasty on the Armenian throne, he reigned there for about four years (12-16). One may wonder whether he had learned from the failure of his Parthian reign.⁷ The facts come to prove that he continued to avoid the great hunts and did not like the banquets, bringing together the monarch with his aristocrats. He had a competitor, a Greek Zenon, son of Polemon, king of Pontus⁷. According to Tacitus, he succeeded in winning the sympathy of the Armenian population by his devotion to their customs and way of life (big hunts, feasts, etc.). Why did Vononès persist in his errors? Because of his political blindness? Or did he consciously want to follow his political ideas, that reflection of official Roman ideology, there, where they could not be accepted? We cannot know. Yet an evidence proves to the researcher: with respect to a society with its antiindividual values Vononès defended his identity and his morality. It would also be appropriate to note a curious detail: in the series of coins with the effigies of the anonymous Arsacids, Vononès was the first monarch who indicated his own name [14:84].

that despite all its excesses in the 1st century AD, the imperial power did not attempt to eliminate the personal autonomy of the citizen - holder of civil rights.

⁷ Vononès left the Armenian throne in 16. In 18, in Artaxata Germanicus laid on Zenon the signs of royal power. Josephus Flavius [10:40] states that after the expulsion of Vononès from Armenia, Artabanus, the King of kings, "gave Armenia" to his son, Orodes. On this issue N.C. Debevoise believes that Artabanus of Parthia "sent his son Orodes to fill the vacant place" [4:153], but without indicating the result of this action. The enthronement of Orodes in Armenia in 17 and the preliminary open intervention of Artabanus in Armenian affairs are the important events that could not have gone unnoticed by Tacitus. Tacitus claims the opposite: "after the removal of Vonones, the Armenians did not have a king" [20:474]; see [3:171-189]. It is important to emphasize that reporting on the mission of Germanicus to Armenia, with the aim of enthroning Zenon, Tacitus does not speak of the need to remove the Parthians from this country. Tacitus also represents the internal political situation created in Armenia by the arrival of Germanicus. He notes the growing popularity of Zenon among the Armenian people, ("sed favor nationis inclinabat in Zenonem"); Zenon "proceres plebemque iuxta devinxerat" [20:474]). Thus, Zenon, before his coronation in 18, became a recognized contender for the throne of Armenia. Another circumstance seems obvious: Zenon did not arrive in Armenia with Germanicus, but was already in the country. The assimilation of Armenian customs by him, which determined his popularity, is even attributed by Tacitus to the period of his childhood. Probably he had long been considered by part of the Armenian nobility as a candidate for the throne, but Vononès could outstrip him. It could be concluded that the massive support of Zenon by the Armenian population and the intervention of Rome were a decisive obstacle to the realization of the intentions of Artabanus to put his son on the Armenian throne in 16-17.

The reigns of Vononès should be considered within the framework of the contacts of the opposite political cultures: that of the Graeco-Roman world and that of the traditional tribal society, being an example of their immediate collision at the level of interhuman relations.

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ՎՈՆՈՆ ԹԱԳԱՎՈՐԻ «ՔԱՂԱՔԱՎԱՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ»

Ռուբեն Մանասերյան

Քանալի բառեր՝ Վոնոն, Արշակունիներ, Պարթևստան, Comitas, Կլավդիոս կայսր, Յիցերոն (Կիկերոն), Պրինցիպատ, իշխանությունը Արևելքում:

Հռոմից պարթևների հրավերով Արշակունիների գահին բազմած Վոնոնը՝ Հրահատ IV-ի որդին, յուրացրել էր դեռևս հանրապետական Հռոմում ձևավորված քաղաքական մշակույթը՝ կառավարման գործելակերպը: Այն հիմնված էր անձի՝ քաղաքացու իրավունքների հարգման սկզբունքի վրա և իշխանավորից պահանջում էր իր գերակայությունը չչեշտող մոտեցում, արտաքնապես իրավահավասար հարաբերությունների պահպանում: Պրինցիպատի միապետական վարչակարգը որդեգրել էր այդ քաղաքական հանրապետական համակարգը սոսկ ձևապաշտորեն՝ իբրև դաժան բռնաճնշումների վրա հիմնված, իրական իշխանության հարաբերությունների պաշտոնական ծածկույթ: Կտրված այդ իրողության ըմբռնումից՝ Վոնոնը փորձեց Հռոմի հանրապետական քաղաքական մշակույթը փոխադրել արևելյան ավանդույթապահ հասարակության մեջ, որի պատկերացումներով արքան՝ բռնություն գործածելու միշտ պատրաստակամ տիրակալը, անմիջապես վախ պիտի ներշնչեր իր հպատակներին (*metus*) որպես իր կամքի կատարման խթան:

Իր հպատակների հետ անմիջական հարաբերությունների մեջ Վոնոնը՝ հավատարիմ իր քաղաքական պատկերացումներին, ներմուծեց նրբանկատ սիրալիրությունը, նաև անձնական մատչելիությունը: Դրանով իսկ նա մերժում էր վախը թագավորի հետ հարաբերություններում, փաստորեն քանդում թագավորի մասին կարծրատիպային պատկերացումները: Նման գործելակերպը ավագանու կողմից մեկնվեց իբրև հռոմեական կայսրից յուրացված ստրկական վարվելակերպի դրսևորում: Վոնոնը գահընկեց արվեց: Վոնոնի պատմության մեջ արտացոլվեց Հռոմի և տոհմացեղային քաղաքական մշակույթների իրարամերժությունը, որի հիմքում էին մարդու, անհատի մասին հակադիր պատկերացումները:

THE DOGMA OF THE HOLY TRINITY IN THE LETTER OF EZNIK OF KOLB “TO THE BLESSED ARCHIMANDRITE MASHTOTS”*

Arthur Matevosyan

Abstract

“The Book of Letters” contains Eznik of Kolb's letter “To the Blessed Archimandrite Mashtots”, which is one of the key documents reflecting the creed of the Armenian Church of the 5th century. The dogmatic system of the Armenian Church is based on the Niceno-Constantinopolitan creed, according to which God is one essence and three Hypostases. It means that the one God is eternally personified in the Hypostases of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Each Hypostasis contains the fullness of the divine essence, so the three Hypostases are equally perfect God, yet not three Gods, but one God. It is so, because the divine essence is one and does not exist independently of the Hypostases. The Christian doctrine of the God-Man makes sense only if the divine nature of the Incarnate Word in Jesus is recognized. For this, it is necessary that all the Hypostases of the Holy Trinity are consubstantial and equally perfect. The Son is as much God as the Father and has all the attributes attributed to the Father. Although the Father is the cause of the Son's existence, the birth of the Son cannot in any way be considered the result of an act of the Father's will. It is an eternal and ineffable birth that necessarily takes place in the transcendent depths of the divine nature. The only begotten Son is begotten of the Father in eternity, and has all the attributes of the Father except that He is not begotten. In the same eternity, the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father. There is no temporal sequence between the Hypostases. They are coeternal and have the same nature, power and will.

Keywords: Book of letters, St. Cyril, Nestorius, Apollinarius, the Holy Trinity, Hypostasis, the Word, Christ, the Holy Virgin.

The “Book of Letters” preserves a letter by Eznik of Kolb “To the Blessed Archimandrite Mashtots”, which is one of the key documents reflecting the doctrine of the Armenian Church of the 5th century. The Armenian Church believes, according to the Niceno-Constantinopolitan creed, that God is the Holy Trinity, the one essence of three Hypostases. “Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Ghost”. (Matthew 28:19) These three divine Hypostases have one essence, one will, kingdom, power and glory. They are neither less nor greater than one another, but equally powerful and worthy of veneration. Each Hypostasis contains the fullness of the divine essence, so the three Hypostases are one essence, and it is not three Gods, but one God [10:47]. This is so because the divine essence is one and does not exist independently of the Hypostases.

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In order to justify the divine nature of Christ, and therefore the reality of the salvation performed by Him, the idea of “consubstantiality” was proposed during the First Ecumenical Council, which provided an opportunity to combine the biblical monotheism and the New Testament revelation about God having three Hypostases [12:64]. It was quite a bold innovation, since this term was not only absent in the New Testament, but was also discredited by the heretic Paul of Samosata, who used it to denote the identity of the Father and the Son, which was categorically rejected by the Church [15:40]. In the late 3th - early 4th century, Sabellianism became widespread. His supporters were especially numerous in North-East Africa. At the same time, Arianism emerged as a peculiar reaction to Sabellius’ schism. Arius’ doctrine was as follows. God is one, and there is no other God with Him. He alone is unborn, beginningless, eternal, ineffable and unknowable. He is the Cause and Creator of everything. These attributes constitute His essence. His activity is creation, the synonym of which is “birth”. God creates not by His nature, but according to His free will. Therefore, God was not always the Father, for then the creatures would be eternal. To them the nature of God cannot be communicated, for otherwise it would not be sinless. Wisdom and Word are characteristic of this God as impersonal powers inseparable from Him; besides them, there are many created powers. Before the existence of the world, God, according to His free will, created a being of his own as an instrument for creating other creatures, called Wisdom, Son or Word, which, like all creatures, was created from nothing and had a beginning [14:8]. Therefore, there was a time when the Son did not exist. Thus, the Son is a separate being by nature, essentially distinct from the Father; they have different natures and no properties in common [11:466]. The Son has free will and is subject to change, but by choosing the good, he thereby acquired immutability. Thus, the Son is not true God; his divinity is acquired and partial. Because He is not eternal, His knowledge is not perfect, so He does not deserve equal worship with the Father. But He is different from other creatures, because by Him all things were made. He has a special divine grace, and God gave Him majesty before He could justify it by His works. With God’s help and due to his own efforts, He became God, so He can be called “The Only Begotten God”. This Son really took on a human body, and since Christ did not have a human soul, the passions he felt testify that the Word was not perfect, but only aspired to perfection.

Opposing Arius, St. Athanasius showed that the latter’s ideas contradicted the very essence of Christianity, because it differed from Judaism and paganism precisely in that in Christianity God became a man, which was unacceptable to both Jews and pagans. The idea of the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son proposed by S. Athanasius, which became the cornerstone of orthodoxy, was necessary to justify the deification by the incarnate Word of human nature, because without it the salvation accomplished by Christ would have been impossible [13:76]. Arianism was rejected by St. Athanasius, and the Church accepted his point of view, precisely because without the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, there can be no possibility of the deification and salvation of human nature.

According to St. Athanasius, if Christ is God, and only God can act as Savior, then He cannot be a creature under any circumstances. Because the divine nature of Christ is sinless, then his existence is not conditioned by the existence of the world. Thus, the idea of God saving people must be different from the idea of the world. Since the Godhead is unity, and the Son has nothing to do with the world, then He must be inseparable from the eternal principle of unity, that is, the Father. The name of the Father proves that the Godhead also has a second Hypostasis. God has always been a Father, so He has always had a Son. Thus, the Son is not created, as Arius believed, but is born of inner necessity from the essence of the Father like light from the sun. To be begotten means to be in communion with the nature of the Father, and the Father does not undergo any change as a result. Thus, the claims of the Arians are false. The Son is as eternal as the Father; He is of the same nature as the Father, so they are consubstantial. They do not differ from each other in nature, but they differ according to the quality of being born or not born. The Father is the cause, and the Son is the effect. The union of the Word of God with human nature was perfect from the beginning.

Eznik of Kolb fully shares the orthodox understanding of the trinitarian dogma. “We confess one God—rebuke to the many-named false gods—self-sufficient, without cause, simple, ineffable, Creator, all-powerful, all-creator, creator and maker of the visible and invisible. And from Him, and with Him, and to Him, there is one Birth—uncreated, creating, equal, cooperative. And one Holy Ghost of God—forever proceeding from Him and with Him, creating and equal to the Father and the Son. Thus, confesses the holy and universal Church the perfect Holy Trinity—the incorporeal, invisible, immaterial, foreknowing, known before all creatures, and established in the one kingdom and one Deity of the three perfect Hypostases. For the Hypostasis of the Father is not the Hypostasis of the Son, for He is not the Father of His Hypostasis. And the Hypostasis of the Son is not the Hypostasis of the Father, for He is not the Son of His Hypostasis. And the Hypostasis of the Holy Ghost is not the Hypostasis of the Father or of the Son, because He is not the Ghost of His Hypostasis, but of the Spirit of God” [1:29].

By saying that the Trinity is one God, Eznik of Kolb means that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have the same name, the same dignity, and eternity. The Father is God, uncreated and eternal. The Son and the Holy Ghost are the same. The Father is infinite, the Son and the Holy Ghost are also infinite. The difference lies in the characteristics of the Hypostases. The Father is not begotten; the Son is begotten, and the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, and all three are one perfect God. The only begotten Son is the wisdom and power of God. The fact that the Son is born of the Father does not mean that He follows the Father in time; the same can be said of the Holy Ghost who proceeds from the Father. Every act of God is always done by the Holy Trinity, not just one of His Hypostases.

The Christian doctrine of the God-man makes sense only when the divine nature of the Word incarnate in Jesus is recognized. It is therefore quite logical that for Eznik of Kolb the trinitarian dogma is inseparably linked to the christological

dogma. As we know, the Christology of the Armenian Church is based on the teaching of St. Cyril of Alexandria [8:195]. The nucleus of the doctrine is the dogmatic formula "the One Nature of God the Incarnate Word" which refutes the Nestorian heresy. The Chalcedonites, wishing to discredit it, declare that it actually belongs to Apollinarius of Laodicea. He was a staunch supporter of Nicene orthodoxy, an opponent of Origenism and pagan Neoplatonism. Apollinarius, being a follower of St. Athanasius of Alexandria, was convinced that the union of the Word in one essence with the Father and of a perfect human nature inevitably leads to the idea of the existence of two sons of God, the first of whom is Son by nature, and the second by adoption [2:105]. A perfect God and a perfect man can never form one being. According to him, the Word in Christ was not united with a complete, but with a flawed and incomplete human nature. Christ had a physical body and an animating soul, but He had no self-conscious rationality, which in Greek is called *nous-intellect*, in place of which the divine Word took [4:180].

This was, of course, a blatant heresy condemned by the Church. However, even if the St. Cyril's formula does belong to Apollinarius, this is still no reason to reject it, for there have been cases in Church history when confessional formulas of heretical origin have become orthodox through their radical reinterpretation. The Cyrillic understanding of the one nature, also accepted by the Armenian Church, does not mean that the two natures, having mixed together, became one nature, but that the two natures, preserving their characteristic features, were united in Christ, the one and indivisible [9:408]. Speaking of the one nature of the incarnate Word, the Armenian theologians did not mean the absence of human nature in Christ, nor the diminution of the perfection of His divine nature. Unity means that Christ's human nature, while fully preserving all its characteristics, was not ontologically independent of His divine nature, as the Nestorians believed, but was initially inseparable from His divinity, without which it could not exist. In other words, the Word, having become incarnate, retained all His perfection, did not mingle with the human nature of Jesus, and entered into an inseparable ontological relationship with it. The two natures became one, fully preserving all their unique qualities. There is, of course, a logical contradiction here, but it is an ineffable mystery to be accepted on faith. The laws of logic simply do not apply in this area.

One of the important components of Cyril's Christology was the naming of the Virgin Mary as the Mother of God, which was directed against Nestorius who called Mary the Mother of Christ [7:130]. This concept was based on Antiochian Christology. The Antiochians, far from opposing the Nicene orthodoxy, which affirmed the incorruptibility of God the Word, nevertheless believed that the fullness of human nature, perceived by the Word, had a decisive role in the history of our salvation. And so in their interpretations of the New Testament they emphasized the human qualities of Jesus as much as possible, while his divinity receded into the background. The relationship between humanity and divinity in Christ they imagined was analogous to the temple, that is, Jesus' body was the temple in which God the Word dwelt [7: 252]. They did not draw any heretical conclusions from

this thesis, but they followed from it with logical necessity. Within the framework of Antiochian Christology the Blessed Virgin could not be called the Mother of God, because what was born of Her was not God incarnate, but only the temple of God. This conclusion was reached by Nestorius, the disciple of Theodore of Mopsuestia, whose name was given to the Christological heresy condemned by the Third Ecumenical Council. For Nestorius and his teachers, the man Jesus brought salvation, and the Word residing in him only contributed to this. It was a manifest heresy, firmly rejected by the Church.

If Christ's body was not an illusory body, but a real human body, united from the beginning with the Word, then the Holy Virgin, from whom Christ received this body, was really the Mother of God, not the Mother of Christ [3:292]. Christ's humanity was born of the Holy Virgin, and her only difference from the humanity of others was that it was united to God the Word from the very beginning, from the moment of conception and during his nurture in the womb. It is from this fact that one should call the Virgin Mary the Mother of God, for Jesus Christ is the only begotten Son of God and the perfect God. Of course, this does not mean that the Holy Virgin gave birth to the divine nature of Christ, for that is eternal and uncreated. She gave birth to the human nature of Christ, which was initially one with the divine nature of the Word. His body was not the body of man, but of the Word, without ceasing to have all the qualities of human nature except sinfulness.

Eznik of Kolb was entirely in favor of this idea. "And the same God the Word at the end of time put on flesh, and became man for our sake, without change or fall of his divine nature, and was born of the Holy Virgin a perfect man according to the fleshly birth, and the Virgin is called and is the Mother of God and the Virgin, who gave birth to God and a perfect man" [1:28].

Eznik's letter to Mashtots was taken into consideration. In 435, the Second Church Council was convened in Ashtishat by the initiative of Catholicos Sahak I Partev and Mesrop Mashtots in order to officially adopt the resolutions of the Ecumenical Council of Ephesus (431) and solve a number of problems connected with the spread of Nestorianism in Armenia. Nestorians were also present in Armenia, where they actively propagated their ideas and translated the works of Diodorus of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia into Armenian. The main advocates of orthodoxy of that time, Cyril of Alexandria, Proclus of Constantinople, and Acacius of Melitene were deeply concerned about that. According to Koryun, "And as they drew near Constantinople they joined Eznik, and as most intimate companions, together they performed their spiritual tasks. Then they came to the land of Armenia, having brought authentic copies of the God-given book and many subsequent traditions of the worthy church fathers, along with the canons of Nicaea and Ephesus, and placed before the fathers the testaments of the Holy Church which they had brought with them" [5: 120]. The council of Ashtishat approved them, and then engaged in Nestorianism. Along with Theodore of Mopsuestia, the Nestorians were anathematized, and the delegation was sent to Proclus, the patriarch of Constantinople to seek his opinion about the rightness of the resolutions

adopted in Ashtishat. After listening, Proclus wrote a letter to the Armenians, in which he condemned the Nestorians for introducing two persons to Christ.

In summary, we can characterize the dogmatic concept contained in Eznik of Kolb's letter "To the Blessed Archimandrite Mashtots" as follows. God is the Holy Trinity with three Hypostases and one essence. The Hypostases are consubstantial and equal. One of the Hypostases, God the Word, was incarnated from the Holy Virgin and became a perfect man, having all the fullness of human nature, except sin. He had one divine-human nature, but by no means only a divine nature. Christ was in deity one with the Father, and in humanity one with the Holy Virgin and all men. In Christ, Deity and humanity were one, but each retained its own characteristics, and were not mingled with the other. At the same time, we should not think that the body of Christ was like the temple in which God the Word dwelt, as the Nestorians thought. Christ will return again to earth to judge the living and the dead, to give eternal life to the righteous, and to torment sinners forever.

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Ս. ԵՐՐՈՐԴՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԴԱՎԱՆԱՆՔԸ ԵՋՆԻԿ ԿՈՂՔԱՑՈՒ «ԱՌ ԵՐԱՆԵԼԻ ՄԱՇՏՈՑ ՎԱՐԴԱՊԵՏ» ԹՂԹՈՒՄ

Արթուր Մաթևոսյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ Գիրք թղթոց, Սուրբ Կյուրեղ, Նեստոր, Ապողինար, Սուրբ Երրորդություն, Անձ, Բան, Քրիստոս, Սուրբ Կոյս:

«Գիրք թղթոց»-ում պահպանվել է Եզնիկ Կողբացու «Առ երանելի Մաշտոց վարդապետ» թուղթը, որը 5-րդ դարի հայ Եկեղեցու դավանանքը արտացոլող կարևոր փաստաթղթերից է: Ամփոփ, Եզնիկ Կողբացու «Առ երանելի Մաշտոց վարդապետ» թղթի մեջ պարունակվող դավանաբանական հայեցակարգը կարելի է բնութագրել այսպես: Հայոց Եկեղեցու դավանաբանական համակարգի հիմքում ընկած է Նիկիո հանգանակի այն դրույթը, որի համաձայն Աստված մի էություն է և երեք Անձեր: Աստված Սուրբ Երրորդություն է, որն ունի երեք Անձ և մեկ բնություն: Այս երեք Աստվածային Անձերն ունեն մի էություն, մեկ կամք, զորություն, թագավորություն, ուժ և փառք: Անձերը մեկը մյուսից ոչ փոքր են, ոչ մեծ, բայց նույնքան հզոր, համագո և համապատիվ: Հայր Աստված չի ծնվել, Որդին ծնվել է Հորից, և Սուրբ Հոգին բխում է նույն Հորից: Անձերից մեկը՝ Բան Աստված, մարմնացավ Սուրբ Կոյսից և դարձավ կատարյալ մարդ՝ ունենալով՝ բացի մեղքից, մարդկային բնության բոլոր հատկանիշները, այսինքն՝ հոգին, մարմինը և միտքը: Նա ուներ մեկ աստվածամարդկային բնություն, բայց ոչ մի դեպքում միայն աստվածային բնություն: Հիսուս Քրիստոս Աստծո միաձին Որդին է ու կատարյալ Աստված, ուստի Նրան ծնած Ս.Կոյսը պիտի կոչվի Աստվածածին: Իհարկե, դա չի նշանակում, որ Ս.Կոյսը ծնել է Քրիստոսին ըստ Իր Աստվածության, քանզի վերջինս հավիտենական է և անստեղծ: Նա ծնել է Քրիստոսի մարդկային բնությունը, որն ի սկզբանե միեղեն էր Բանի Աստվածային բնության հետ: Ուստի Սուրբ Կոյսին պետք է անվանել Աստվածածին, այլ ոչ թե Քրիստոսածին, ինչպես դա անում էր Նեստորը: Նրա

մարմինը ոչ թե մարդու, այլ Բանի մարմին էր՝ չդադարելով ունենալ մարդկային բնության բոլոր հատկությունները՝ բացի մեղսականությունից: Քրիստոս աստվածությամբ նույնական էր Հոր հետ, իսկ մարդկությամբ՝ Սուրբ Կոյսի և բոլոր մարդկանց հետ: Քրիստոսի մեջ աստվածությունն ու մարդկությունը մեկ էին, բայց նրանցից յուրաքանչյուրը պահպանում էր իր առանձնահատկությունները, և նրանք չէին խառնվում միմյանց հետ: Միևնույն ժամանակ, չպետք է ենթադրել, որ Քրիստոսի մարմինը նման էր տաճարի, որտեղ բնակվում էր Բան Աստված, ինչպես հավատում էին նեստորականները: Քրիստոս ևս մեկ անգամ կվերադառնա երկիր՝ ողջերին ու մեռելներին դատելու, արդարների հավիտենական կյանք պարգևելու, իսկ մեղավորներին հավիտենական տանջանքներին մատնելու համար:

ON ONE SERIES OF THE VI CENTURY AD IRON ONE-PIECE ASIAN HELMETS*

Adam L. Kubik, Oleg A. Radyuš, Leonid A. Vyazov

Abstract

The article describes a series of helmets of a type that probably spread across Asia and Eastern Europe in the middle to the second half of the VI century AD. These helmets are characterised by a very particular construction: they have a bowl hammered from a single piece of iron, with an additional band in the lower part, connected to the inside or outside edge of the helmet. Additionally, a chainmail collar was attached to the lower part of the helmet. The attached chainmail provides additional protection around the entire circumference including the forehead above the eyes. This characteristic would remain unpopular in European armaments for quite a long period and was only popularised in central and eastern Europe around the XVI century AD [1: 130]. This article analyses a possible Iranian provenance of the helmets of this type as well as hypothesizes about the possible reason for the spread of these helmets on the territory of Eastern Europe and Asia.

Keywords: helmets, armament, Xosrow I Anuširwān, Sasanian state, artefact, army, Caucasus.

Introduction

Helmets with a bowl made from a single piece of metal were one of the most popular forms of head protection in the ancient period. Considering period of interest, namely late antiquity, this sort of armament is commonly associated in the European realm with the Roman Empire. During the III century AD, there is a major change in the forms of Roman armament. The phenomenon of the abandonment of one-piece iron construction in Roman helmets has become an important topic of arms and armour study strongly influencing current studies on Euro-Asiatic armament [2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; and others]. It is widely accepted that the centuries-old tradition of European armour was replaced by new eastern multi-segment construction in an attempt to equip its armies in a more cost-effective manner, partly due to the economic problems of the Roman Empire in this period. The appearance of *fabricae armorum* and changes in Roman military system, which took place in the end of III and the beginning of the IV century AD [9; 10; 11; 12; 13; 14; and others], not only caused a change in the tradition of armaments, it actually changed the whole system of thinking about it. Previously highly individualised and decorated forms of arms and armour, made to specific orders and tailored to the needs of the

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individual, were replaced by mass production and a system of arms and armour management closer to the modern battlefield than to what we know from ancient or medieval times. Some return to individualised weaponry in Europe undoubtedly occurred during the medieval period. This is undoubtedly a period of return to single-piece bowl helmet designs, with the well-known so-called Norman helmets [15; 16; 17; 18: 64; 19; and others]. This raises the question of what happened to similar constructions on the territories of the enemies of the Roman Empire and further states of Europe? Can similar developmental patterns also be observed on the frontier of the Roman empire? The following paper will attempt to answer some of these questions. Some aspects of the use of one-piece helmets in Asia in the Islamic period were analysed in 2017 by D. Nicolle [20]. Since then, however, there have appeared new finds of similar armour and, currently, some of the finds analysed by D. Nicolle may be subject to a narrower chronology. We will try to analyse a group of objects that are, in our opinion, a series produced in a relatively short chronological period. They also belong to the pre-Islamic period, filling a gap in our knowledge of the development of a similar type of armour. These observations, in our opinion, also help to understand the late return to similar constructions in early medieval Europe.

A series of one-piece bowl helmets

The helmets the current authors will try to analyse belong to one very narrow type. Their bowl consists of a single piece of iron with an additional inner rim attached to the lower edge. On the lower band is attached a chainmail aventail, fixed onto the loops hanging from the line of decorative rivets. The chainmail is also situated above the eyes of the wearer. A similar characteristic is known from later head covers spread across Eastern and Central Europe from Ottoman Empire, after the medieval period. In Slavic countries occurring under the name *misiurka* (in Polish) or *misyurka* (in Russian and Ukrainian), these helmets undoubtedly appear in Central and Eastern Europe under the influence of contemporary oriental armament [1: 130]. In the case of these much later head protections, this attachment occurred directly to the small bowl. In contrast, the appearance of massive rivets arranged in a pearl pattern running along the entire circumference is one of the characteristic elements of the late antique / early medieval helmets this paper focuses on. These rivets were used to attach a chainmail aventail, creating a system of loops, separating the chainmail from the other structural elements of the helmet.

The first known find of this type is a helmet that is now in the collection of the Hermitage Museum (fig. 1). It was found at the very beginning of the XX century, along with a chainmail habergeon and a sword, during work at the so-called Velsov plant in Perm Governorate. The length of the straight edged sword, including the tang, was 87 cm [21: 92-93]. Its current condition is unknown; unlike the helmet, it is not on display. The authors were also unable to obtain information on whether the sword still remains in the museum.

The helmet from the Hermitage Museum consists of two structural elements: a spherical shaped bowl with slight lateral flattening, and a lower band riveted to the inner side of the bowl. The height of the helmet including the lower band is 18 cm. Its upper part has been preserved in almost perfect condition, with a small longitudinal loss in its side. Around the whole perimeter of the lower band there are massive, decorative iron rivets. These rivets attach loops also probably made of iron, and were used to attach the chainmail aventail. A fragment of the aventail is still attached to the helmet. In the case of all aventail remains from helmets discussed below, including the above find, all chainmail rings are woven in a 4-in-1 pattern, which is the predominant construction form in antiquity [22: 211]. It consists of a combination of riveted and solid rings [21: 92]. All rings are clearly flattened, including riveted ones. It is possible that the solid rings were punched from an iron sheet.

The helmet was originally dated to the XIII-XIV century AD due to its one-piece construction, but it is now displayed in the museum as a XII-XIII century AD helmet of Western European provenance. This dating of the object has already been criticised [7: 14].

Another well-known find is a helmet now in the collection of one of the local museums of the Tomsk Oblast (fig. 2,3). In August 1983, it was donated by a *kol-khoz* employee to the local historical museum of Kolpaševo, the administrative centre of Kolpaševsky district, Tomsk Oblast, Russian Federation [23: 114], where it is still located.

Along with the helmet, a sword was brought to the museum, which to the present day has not been subjected to serious comparative analysis. It consists of a 66 cm long blade and 13 cm straight form tang. According to Yu. Ožeredov's study, the blade was slightly curved [23: 115]. Ožeredov had a problem dating the objects, initially suggesting it be dated to the V to X centuries AD. At the same time, he narrowed this dating to the VII to X centuries without giving a more precise explanation [23: 119]. M.V. Gorelik without any further analysis date this helmet to the VII century AD [24: 273]. From the objects listed above, the sword draws particular attention. An interesting element of the sword is the hilt made of two halves. From the side view, it can be seen that it has a rectangular form, widening slightly towards its ends [23: ris. 1]. Its rhomboidal cross-section was deformed by flattening one of the ends. This rare characteristic probably appeared in the case of another find from western Siberia, namely on the sword from the Mokinskiy cemetery [25: 26-27; 26: 12, il. 2.2]. Excavations near the village of Mokino on the left bank of the lower Mulyanka River have been carried out since the second half of the 1980s, first under the leadership of V. Oborin and then of other researchers. They studied 310 burials of IV-V centuries AD, referred to as the so called late Gladenovsky period [27]. It can be concluded that the finding of the Tomsk Oblast site most likely belongs to a similar or close historical period to the Mokino find in which cross guards of a similar form were present. However, in order to refine the dating of the find, further comparative analyses are necessary.

The helmet from the historical museum of Kolpaševo consists of two structural elements: a hemispherical bowl with slight lateral flattening, and a lower band riveted to the inner side of the bowl. Ever since the first publication of the object, the absence of the upper part of the bowl has been clearly visible. Its condition appears to be stable and has not changed significantly to the present time. The height of the helmet is 16 cm, the bottom length from front to back is 22 cm, the width laterally is 20 cm. A 3.5 cm high band, attached to the bottom part of the helmet bell, consists of two uneven parts. It was covered with a row of rivets made presumably of iron (with visible corrosion, analysis has never been carried out), with a diameter of about 1 cm. These run along the entire circumference of the helmet bowl. These rivets attach loops also probably made of iron, and were used to attach the chainmail collar. Inside some of the loops, fragments of wire have been preserved. It is difficult to determine conclusively whether these are fragments of the chainmail rings or of the wire on which the chainmail was hung. The suspension system of the browband will be analysed later in the article.

A find that has significantly changed the outlook on this type of armament is a helmet discovered during archaeological work in the city of Petra, Georgia (fig. 4,5,6). It was published by D. Mindorashvili in 2020 [28; 29], along with information about the discovery of another helmet in the Petra fortress area. According to the publication, a second helmet was discovered in the burn layer, in the 1960s [29: 69]. The fate of this find or its form is unknown to the authors.

The object published by Mindorashvili in 2020 has an unambiguous archaeological context. It was in the remains of a tower located between the double-wall that connects the north and south hills of Tsikhisdziri acropolis which was built on the west side of the city wall [28: 205; 29: 69]. The aforementioned tower was destroyed and possesses a trace of a burnt layer due to military activities. The defenders of the tower were unable to take anything out and were also unable to even leave the tower themselves. The clear evidence of this fact is the discovery of a large number of burnt human remains, weapons, and armour. After the demolition of the tower, there were no traces of attempts to rebuild it [28: 206]. 98 silver coins were found in the tower. Four of them were scattered in different places, while 94 in the form of a hoard were found in the centre of the fallen building in a small pit cut into the ground floor. The earliest is a coin of Peroz (458-488). Then come the Wardāxš (484-488) and Kawād I (488-531) coins. The most recent are those of Xosrow I Anuširwān (531-579) [29: 73]. Along with the coins, given the historical background, data from written sources, and parallels to the artefacts found in the tower, the excavation material should be considered to date to the middle of the VI century AD, namely to the year 551. According to the coins the identities of the tower guards are also clarified: all 98 coins are Sasanian and have not been mixed with any other [28: 231]. Mindorashvili states that these coins in his opinion were intended as payments to the Iranian garrison of the fortress and were allegedly hidden before the battle by an Iranian officer [28: 232]. The archaeological context clearly points to events that happened in Petra during the siege by Justinian's army of a fortress defended by a Persian garrison [29: 75] described by Procopius:

(...) These were all burned to death, and their charred bodies fell, some inside the wall, others outside where the engines stood with the Romans about them. Then the other Romans also who were fighting at the fallen part of the wall, since the enemy were giving way before them in utter despair and strove no longer to resist, got inside the fortifications, and Petra was captured completely.

So about five hundred of the Persians ran up to the acropolis, and seizing the stronghold there remained quiet (...) (Procopius, *Bella VIII*, 11.62-63, [30: 171])

(...) Then, as the flames spread in great volume, the barbarians, with disaster before their eyes and knowing full well that they would speedily be burned to ashes, and having no hope, nor yet seeing any possibility of saving themselves by fighting, still even in that situation would not consent to fall into the power of their enemy, but they were immediately burned to death, every man of them, together with the acropolis, while the Roman army marvelled at what was taking place (...) (Procopius, *Bella VIII*, 12.16-17, [30: 177])

The events described by Procopius, as well as the archaeological context, clearly indicate that this helmet belonged to one of the burned defenders of Petra, a soldier belonging to the Sasanian army of Xosrow I Anuširwān. This is an extremely important find in the context of knowledge regarding the armour used by the Sasanian army. Until now only one Sasanian helmet has been subject to such strict dating, namely the find from Dura Europos [3; 31: 104, fig. 47; 6: fig. 90-91].

The helmet from Petra is made of two components: a one-piece bowl and a lower rim attached to the inner edge of the helmet bowl. At present, we are only dealing with the lower part of the helmet, as the upper part has not survived. We need to be aware that the helmet, along with other items found in this location, were squashed by fragments of the falling defence tower. The bowl was thus slightly deformed. Based on Mindorashvili publication, the remains of the helmet are 12 cm tall and 25 cm long [29: 20]. Only limited measurement was possible due to the fact that the helmet was not preserved in its entirety. It is difficult to say unequivocally whether we are dealing with the width or the length of the helmet. Due to the exposure to very high temperatures and severe corrosion, which led to the fragmentation of the helmet, it is difficult to observe the joining of the lower band which could suggest that back part of it has been preserved. To determine this conclusively, an X-ray would have to be taken. On the lower rim there is a clearly visible line of the massive decorative rivets made of copper alloy (green patina) running around the entire circumference of the helmet. These rivets attach the loops used to suspend the chainmail aventail. In addition, the bottom edge of the bowl was decorated with a thin copper alloy band (green patina). One visible chainmail ring from the collar, rusted to the lower edge of the helmet, has survived. It has a visibly flattened cross-section. According to the archaeological context, it reached Petra with the Iranian garrison at the very end of the second quarter of the VI century AD. It can be considered as a form of armour used by Xosrow I's army during his campaigns.

One more helmet of this type was found in the south of Tatarstan around 2018 (fig. 7,8,9). It was placed for auction on the black finds' website Rewiedetector.ru. After a search and apprehension, the helmet was seized from the looters by Russian state intelligence services in 2019. In 2020, it was transferred for storage and restoration to the Samara Regional Historical Museum. In November 2020, the authors were given access to the find and studied it prior to restoration. The authors would like to thank all the people and organisations involved in the recovery of the object, and the possibility to study it.

In 2019, based on information reported by the looters to the Russian state services the site of the find was surveyed by a group of archaeologists, L. Vyazov, Yu. Salova, and D. Petrova. They explored the area and localized the exact location of the illegal excavations. The site is situated near the village Butaikha, at the source of the Kairpy gully, watered by a small unnamed stream, the right tributary of the river Bolšaya Sulča, the right tributary of the river Bolšoy Čeremšan, the right tributary of the Volga. No archaeological sites were previously investigated in this area, except for a hoard dated to the Medieval Volga Bulgaria [32]. The Butaikha surroundings are covered by deciduous forest that has been subjected to logging activities. This poses significant challenges for surface investigations due to the presence of numerous shrubs and young trees that obscure previous clearings. The survey revealed a cluster of multi-phase occupation sites, including large promontory hillfort with earthen fortification system characteristic for the Volga Bulgaria period (920-1250 CE). The soil surface within the hillfort area has suffered considerable disturbance due to the illicit activities of treasure hunters. From the plateau side of the hillfort, a group of dwelling-pits was recorded, rectangular in shape, 8x8 meters in size and up to 1meter depth, surrounded by shallow embankment, marking the occupation area of the Migration period settlement attributed to the Imen'kovo archaeological culture [33; 34; 35; 36; and others). Preserved dwelling-pits of the Imen'kovo population were recorded in various forested and scarcely ploughed locations of the Mid-Volga region [see: 37, for a LIDAR plan of one of those]. This observation supports the idea that the Volga Bulgarian hillfort was established on the area of previous fortification of the Imen'kovo culture, as it was usual in the Mid-Volga region.

Based on surviving photo documentation made by treasure hunters as well as information provided by the field survey we conclude that the helmet was probably found at the area of the Imen'kovo culture settlement. We can also state that in one pit there was found a short-sleeved chainmail (fig. 10), the remains of a chainmail aventail, a helmet, and a belt buckle. At the moment, we are not able to say with certainty that the buckle was found together with the helmet. It is difficult to regard the information obtained from the looters as unquestionably reliable. The photographic documentation taken clearly shows the finding of the assembled chainmail and the helmet that was laid on top of it. If the buckle was indeed found with the chainmail and helmet, then it can be used to date the objects. We note that various artefacts, including buckles and belt plates, were destroyed in the past as part of the

widespread funerary traditions of the Imen'kovo population [38]. These items were later recovered by illegal excavations and looters at the Butaikha sites with signs of destruction. It can be hypothesized, therefore, that the robbers discovered and disturbed an Imen'kovo burial site located in close proximity to the settlement area. This type of spatial organization, where burial grounds with cremations are situated between settlements, is characteristic of the Imen'kovo population. Similar arrangements have been observed at other clusters of Imen'kovo culture sites, such as Maklašeevka, Komarovka, Roždestveno, and others [34]. In this particular case, it is reasonable to assume that the helmet and chainmail were part of the grave goods associated with this burial site.

The copper-alloy buckle, which was possibly found together with the helmet and chainmail, was cast in a solid-form (fig. 11). It consists of a B-shaped loop, 3 cm long, 1.9 cm wide, and a rhomboid plate that is 1.5 cm in width, with a clearly marked "onion shape" ending. It has a rounded hole in the central part, through which a short rectangular tongue is inserted. The tongue extends slightly beyond the contours of the buckle and is not bent at the end. The buckle was inspected prior to restoration, so the presence or absence of ornamentation has not been established. Judging by the size, it could have been used for straps or a harness or, less likely, a shoe buckle.

B-shaped buckles appeared in Eastern Europe in the Late Roman period, within the chronological horizon D, according to K. Godlovski (350-400 CE), as derivative forms from the Late Roman buckles with zoomorphic endings. In the Early Middle Ages they can be considered as derivatives of the Early Byzantine one-piece forms [39: 546-551]. According to L. Traikova, they belong to the Ca-Cb types dated to the IV century AD [40: 76-77, Tab. 47]. At the same time, on the territory of Eastern Europe solid-form buckle construction is not very typical for such an early period. Such forms became more widespread in later centuries. The later forms of this group continue developing until the early VII century AD [41; 42; 43]. Closer analogies to the buckle under discussion were found close to the Ščerbet-Ostrovnoe settlement (Spassky district, Republic of Tatarstan); the dating of the find in the publication of E.P. Kazakov was slightly overestimated to VII century [44: Fig. 6:2]. Judging by the morphology of our specimen from Nurlatsky district of Tatarstan they belong to the earlier "pre-Heraldic" period. The most common dating of such belt buckles is the second half of the V century AD - first half of the VI century AD, i.e. the post-Hunnic period and the period up to the Avar invasion. The earliest closed complexes are dated to the second half of the V century AD (457-483) (Hynysly, Republic of Azerbaijan). On the whole, this type is widespread throughout Eastern Europe, including in the inventory of warrior burials of post-Hunnic period in the North Caucasus, north-eastern Black Sea region, Crimea, the middle part of the Oka River, the Kama region (Durso, Lermonovskaya, Kugul', Saharnaya Golovka, Borok, Undrikh, Zarečye, Podboloty and others).

Based on the above, we can conclude that the helmet and chainmail found at Butaikha were located in the occupational area of the Imen'kovo culture settlement

and dated to 450-550 CE. This period is associated with the Imen'kovo population in the region.

The earliest sites attributed to the Imen'kovo culture were introduced to the Mid-Volga not later than in the II century CE [45], when they are recorded only in the Samara Luka area on the right bank of the Volga. At that time, the Imen'kovo was one of the many competing cultural groups in the forest-steppe area of the region. In 250-400 CE, the Trans-Volga was occupied by the sedentary population of Mid-Volga Kyiv cultural group [46] while the Cis-Volga evidenced a mosaic pattern of the Imen'kovo sites, sites of the Lbisče type, and some other types. All these groups were involved in intensive interaction with the Late Sarmatian nomads, which is evidenced in many other excavated sites by inhumation burials with cranial deformations in storage pits of the settlements, and specific Sarmatian-like pottery. The Lbisče hillfort at the Samara Luka is the only fortified settlement that existed in the Mid-Volga region before the Hun invasion of East Europe. Noticeably, it is the only one that yielded blacksmith tools, while all other simultaneous sites even hardly contained iron slags.

The Hun invasion at the end of the IV century deeply impacted the Mid-Volga and destroyed the symbiosis of the sedentary groups with the Late Sarmatians that existed during the previous period. Not later than 450 CE, the three processes started:

- 1) rapid construction of numerous (100 are known at the moment) well-fortified hillforts;
- 2) increase in iron metallurgy and blacksmith production;
- 3) shift of population from low terraces and floodplains to elevated and forested riverbanks and gulleys.

Instead of chains of settlements elongated on the banks of small rivers, a new spatial pattern was based on clusters of small but long-habituated settlements, clustered around well-fortified hillforts. The manner how those hillforts were fortified supports the idea that they were unlikely to be effective as shelters or military fortresses but probably served as symbols of power and political independence of the local groups. At least some of those groups grew into local centres of political power. We can name at least several clusters of occupation sites that are associated with prestigious ornaments, markers of trade and craft, which could serve as political centres. Two of them were situated at the Kama-Volga confluence. The Komintern cluster is well known after the rich necropolis with inhumations [44], and the Ščerbet' cluster contained a rich cemetery, Novoslavka-2 [47], and a craft centre on the Ščerbet' Island site, where dozens of narrow-bladed shaft-hole axes and rod-shaped brass ingots [48] illustrate the commodity production in quantities beyond local demand. The Ščerbet' sites as well as the Komintern-2 burial ground are dated to 450-550 CE, based on the seriation of artefacts and some radiocarbon dates. Another centre to be observed was established in the middle reaches of the Belaya River, where several mounds neighbouring the Ufa-2 hillfort contained numerous luxury items and ornaments. Some of the sites associated with local centres of

power in the Mid-Volga region yielded evidence of interaction with Iran or with the areas impacted by Iranian influence. Those contacts are marked by finds of Sasanian drachmas at the Karmaly, Troitsky Uray, and Imen'kovo [49], (map 1), and even more brightly by the golden plates of the parade belt from the Komintern "hoard" - a set of illegally collected items suspected to provenance from one of the destroyed burials of the Komintern burial ground [50]. All centres of power were associated with multicultural, and maybe also multinational populations. In Komintern and Novoslavka, the bi-ritual funeral rites are non-typical for the Imen'kovo population, who used cremation rather than burials. In the Ufa-2 surroundings, the distinct nomadic presence is evidenced by kurgan burials while the variety in pottery in the occupational layers detects mixed sedentary groups.

The military equipment of the Mid-Volga military elite included a bow with bone or antler plates and a knife. Only after Avarian migration and the replacement of the military elite a new set of weapons was introduced to the region, including spears, Avar-type single-bladed long swords, and armours made from small plates [38].

A brief look at the other regions of the forest-steppe zone of East Europe demonstrates a universal character of this type of social and political organization that spread after the Hun invasion. Among the centres of production and trade formed in 370-450 CE, Tanais on the Lower Don, the Čertovitskoye-Zamyatino group of sites on the Middle Don, and the Stayevo archaeological site complex could be mentioned. Their production included iron tools and weapons, ingots and artefacts made of bronze and brass, as well as ornaments. They were interconnected by trade routes [51], which were paths of movement not only of goods, but probably also of groups of craftsmen, creating a network of cultural communication. These observations make possible to suggest the existence of one of the local centres of power in Butaikha. Alongside with others, this centre was established by mixed population included Hun military elite and local sedentary groups, and influenced by Sasanian Iran. The distinctive Hunnic presence in the nearby area is marked by finds of two Hun-type cauldrons as close as at 20 km from the Butaikha site [32].

The last find clearly of this type known to the authors was sold to a private collection at domongol.ru site auction (fig. 12). It was most likely discovered during illegal excavations in the Russian Federation. Along with the helmet, according to the previous owner, a chainmail aventail, three bracelets, and a Sasanian coin of Xosrow I Anuširwān were discovered (fig. 13). Based on auction photographs of the object, we can conclude that the helmet construction consisted of two components: a one-piece helmet bowl and a lower band riveted to the inner part of the bowl. Massive, decorative rivets made of copper alloy (green patina visible) were spread along the entire circumference of the lower band. These rivets attach loops also probably made of copper alloy (green patina visible), and were used to attach the chainmail aventail. Judging by the photos of the helmet, the aventail's rings were flat. It is likely that they were of the same form as the ones known from the

Hermitage Museum object. The photos also show the remains of fabric that has rusted to the outer part of the chainmail. It is hard to say conclusively if the chainmail was covered with textile, the helmet was deposited on textile, or whether it was packed in some form of bag. Unfortunately, the subsequent fate of this helmet is currently unknown to the authors.

Two other finds that may relate to this series of helmets

During archaeological work carried out by Kyoto University at the site of the fortified village of Chaqalaq Tepe in Northern Afghanistan, in Kunduz province south of the Oxus river, situated about 6 km south-west of Kunduz city, some interesting objects were discovered. During the archaeological survey conducted by Kyoto University in 1964 [52], an iron helmet of oblong form was discovered. Unfortunately, authors of this publication provide only brief information about the discovered object:

A helmet which has an oblong bowl-like shape: length 25 cm, width 18 cm, the original height 11 cm. Found upside down in the layer of the Middle Period J8. [52: 17]

It should be noted that the upper part of the bowl is missing and based on the published photographs [52: 13, il.1-2], we can also conclude that the object may be deformed due to its state of preservation. Based on the size of the finds analysed above, we cannot exclude the possibility that we are dealing with the upper part of a helmet, namely the helmet bowl, with a missing lower rim. According to the information in the publication, the term J8 [52: 17] refers to the trench placed in a central J-sector of the fortified village. Based on further information it was found in so-called room i, placed somewhere between sector K14 and K13 [52: 6-8]. Based on the Authors description, in this area researchers discovered a great quantity of potsherds, stone tools such as rotary-querns and saddle-querns, a stone Buddha head, two post-Sasanian coins, copper coins, an iron helmet, and iron and glass objects. It should be noted that the items listed refers to the entire trench. The helmet, on the other hand, has been identified as coming from the middle period. There is some problem in defining what the author actually meant by the middle period. At the same time authors moves quite seamlessly between the ceramics' chronology classifications and the dating of Dyakonov and Gardin [53; 54; 52: 10], showing also a classification of Bactrian art divided into four periods [52: 27]. At the same time, they conclude that based on the examined material, including coins, Chaqalaq Tepe was occupied from about the IV until the VIII century AD [52: 26]. If we can consider the middle period as between the V and VII century AD, given the dating of the previously analysed objects, the possible helmet from Chaqalaq Tepe can be considered chronologically analogous. Its dimensions are similar to those of the helmet bowls of the discussed type. Based on the chronology and measurements we cannot exclude the possibility that we are in fact dealing with the remains of the helmet of the discussed series.

The last helmet which may relate to the aforementioned type was published in 1999 by A. Berdimuradov and M. Samibaev [55]. During the work carried out on

the temple Jartepe II in Uzbekistan, located in the countryside on the caravan route from Samarkand to Penjikent in the area that in ancient times was called Rustak Varagšar, a significant amount of weaponry was discovered. It is interesting to note that at this point we are not dealing with a fortified area or a battle site, these items were deposited as donations to gods. The collection of gifts thus created has largely survived in the remains of the temple despite the events of the early VIII century AD that brought it to an end, which can be linked to the Islamisation of these territories [55: 7]. Among the excavated objects, an unusual piece seems to be the one labelled by Berdimuradov and Samibaev as a helmet. In room 3 of complex VI, belonging to the fifth period of the temple, an iron object with a slightly deformed form was discovered. Its dimensions were 23 cm long by 18 cm wide and 12.5 cm high. According to the information given by the authors chainmail rings were rusted to the lower edge of the helmet. Interestingly, they were visible around the entire circumference of the helmet [55: 47, ris. 83,13]. It must be admitted that dating the objects stored in the temple appears to be problematic. The rebuilding of the temple, achieved without first destroying it, may have involved the relocation of gifts that had been stored for many years. Similar cases are well known to scholarship. As an example, we can mention the Ossetian temple of Rekom situated in the Tsei valley near Georgia [56: 88]. Pieces of medieval weaponry donated to the temple were kept there until the XIX century. According to Berdimuradov and Samibaev's work, the Jartepe II temple functioned from the V century AD until the very beginning of the VIII century AD. It cannot be excluded then that this helmet was deposited in the temple during any period within the range given. Both the dating of the object, its size and the observed chainmail remains attached around the entire circumference of the bowl indicate that the object may relate to the discussed helmet series. Unfortunately, the current authors have not been able to determine where the find is currently located. According to the information available to us, this helmet went missing after one of the local exhibitions. It is therefore impossible to observe if we are dealing here with a deformed helmet or just with a deformed helmet bowl. According to the information given by Samibaev, in the bottom part there were visible holes. In addition, the entire lower edge was covered with severe corrosion. However, it is impossible for now to tell whether these were holes used to attach the lower band, rivets, or if those holes had some other function. Based on chronology and measurements once again we cannot exclude the possibility that we are in fact dealing with the remains of a helmet of the discussed type.

Evolution of this type in Asia

An interesting aspect of the above analysis is the dating of the objects. Assuming a certain degree of scepticism and taking into consideration that the helmet that could be dated the earliest from those mentioned above, i.e. the find from Chaqalaq Tepe, would have come from the earliest period of the middle stage of the fortified settlement, we can state that in the VI century AD some events occurred in Asia

that led to the spread of similar helmets. Based on this dating, we obtain the information that iron one-piece bowl helmets appeared in Asia long after Rome had abandoned similar solutions. However, do we actually have a sudden return to these constructions? It is difficult to state this unequivocally. Unfortunately, the level of knowledge about armaments in so-called Greater Iran is decidedly unsatisfactory. Similar discoveries like the one from Petra [29: 69], or earlier from Dura Europos [3], should be considered revolutionary from the point of view of our knowledge of Iran's armament. They allow us to compare those objects to specific groups of archaeological finds, mostly with numerous archaeological finds from European territories. Thus, we cannot exclude the possibility that, for the moment, we simply do not have knowledge of the earlier evolution of iron one-piece bowl helmets in Asia during the Parthian and early Sasanian periods. Some evidence that a similar evolution may have occurred is the finding from the Kušān period city of Sirkap on the bank opposite to the city of Taxila, Punjab, Pakistan (fig. 14), approximately 25 km northwest of the Islamabad–Rawalpindi metropolitan area. It was published by J. Marshal in 1951 [57]. Based on information provided by Marshal the helmet belonged to the stratum II finds and should be dated to the I century AD [57: 538, 550]. He wrote that it was found with a cheek-piece rusted to one side, attached seemingly by a hinge, making it movable. There was just one side of the helmet still preserved, the other one was missing. The helmet bowl was made of one piece of iron, beaten out like an oval bowl and afterwards deepened by means of horizontal bands hammered on it. On the summit there was a finial intended for the attachment of a ring, spike or crest [57: 550]. Based on his further information he wanted to see foreign importations in the appearance of the helmets, armour for men, horses and elephants found in the Taxila area. Those were supposed to be attested by firstly the appearance of conical and three-bladed arrowheads in Sirkap stratum II, which in his opinion were introduced by the Parthians [57: 208]. The Taxila find shows us that at the same time as the still popular one-piece iron helmet designs in Europe, similar solutions were used in the Parthian period in the territory of Central Asia. What happened with similar structures in the territory of Kušānšāhr in the period between the I and supposedly the V or VI century AD? At present, we do not know the answer to this question. The current authors cannot exclude the possibility that there was a gradual evolution of iron one-piece bowl helmets, which eventually evolved into the form of analysed finds. The current authors hope that future finds will emerge to answer this question and will fill this chronological gap.

A number of later findings provide us with interesting conclusions. Two studies on early mediaeval one-piece bowl iron helmets were published in the works of Nicolle and Kubik in 2017 [20; 7: 13-17]. The authors therefore see no need to analyse all objects of this type from the early Islamic period. The most important from the point of view of close analogies seem to be two helmets.

The first helmet was published in 1992 by D. Alexander [58: 302]. The object belongs to the famous Nasser D. Khalili Collection of Islamic Art. According to

the publication, it is an Iranian helmet from the VIII-IX century AD. It's hard to say unequivocally what was the basis for such dating of the helmet. It is possible that Alexander was aware of details about the location of the find or the archaeological context, which may have influenced his statements. Interestingly, he states that the helmet made of one-piece of iron is decorated in relief with large and small strap-work roundels inhabited with animals and birds carrying branches. He also pointed out that such decoration is based on clear Sasanian influence and relates to the designs depicted on textiles of the period [58: 302]. This helmet has interesting dimensions. Its length is 21 cm, while its height is about ~13 cm. If we compare its size with the other objects discussed above we can say that the bowl has not been deformed. Its low height of ~13 cm, comparable to the upper part of the helmets discussed above, allows us to speculate that we are dealing not with a helmet but with its upper part – the main helmet bowl. The helmet was therefore found during the production process or with the lower band removed. It should be noted that A. Kubik in 2017 pointed out that the geometry of the helmet from The Nasser D. Khalili Collection of Islamic Art appears to be the same as geometry of the drawings of the aforementioned helmet from the temple Jartepe II [7: 15, rys.2]. Comparing it with the other discussed helmets we can state that the helmet published by Alexander is unusual because of the decoration. It has a strongly individualized form and because of that it was not included in the analysed series. Still, its form and size seem extremely similar to the helmets under discussion, and it is possible that it represents the closest later analogue to the series of finds in question.

The second helmet to be mentioned here is a find firstly published in the 2011 in the work of H. Tofighian, F. Nadooshan and S. Mousavi [59: 17, ris. 4]. It was recovered from a shipwreck off the Iranian coast at Bandar Rig in the Persian Gulf. It was initially recognized as a helmet of the Sasanian period. In 2017 D. Nicolle, however, published another one-piece helmet undoubtedly of a similar type to the find from the shipwreck [20: 224-225, 233-237]. So, it is not possible to disagree that we are dealing with a find from the early Islamic period. In D. Nicolle's opinion it should be dated to the VIII-IX century AD. The current authors do agree with this theory, while adding that the finial of the Bandar Rig helmet shares some similarities with the one known from the helmet found close to the Kazazovo settlement [60: 148-158]. Based on O. Komar's work, the find from Kazazovo should be dated to the VIII century AD [61: 178]. Despite the differences between the helmet discovered in the Persian Gulf shipwreck and the type in question, it still shares some similarities indicative of continuity of the Sasanian armament tradition in the early Islamic period. Namely, to the single-piece bowl of the helmet, there is attached a lower rim, in this case to the outside part of the edge. It is covered by a silver plate decorated with a pattern in the form of two rows of pyramidal spikes running around the entire circumference of the helmet. Thus, it can be said that both construction and aesthetic influences similar to the helmet series under discussion are still visible in this helmet. It should be noted, however, that the bowl of the helmet from the Persian Gulf is visibly higher, which has resulted in the lack of a

need to extend the length of the bowl with a chainmail aventail. Based on the finds from The Nasser D. Khalili Collection of Islamic Art and the Persian Gulf find we can conclude that there was a gradual evolution of this type of protective weaponry in early Islamic Iran.

Discussion of the technical aspects related with this form of helmets

Below is an illustrative table of the mentioned helmets indicating their similarities in size, while also highlighting some marginal differences.

nr	Finding location	High [cm]	Length - forehead to occiput [cm]	Length - between the temples [cm]	material from which decorative rivets and loops were made	Presence of an additional bronze strap on the lower edge of the helmet bowl
1	Velsov plant, current settlement Vels, Krasnovižersky District, Perm Krai, Russian Federation	18 [including lower rim]	?	?	iron	no
2	Current settlement Staritsa, Parabelsky District, Tomsk Oblast, Russian Federation	19 [including lower rim]	22	20	iron	no
3	Petra Fortress, current settlement Tsikhisdziri, Adjara region, Kobuleti municipality, Georgia	12 [lack of upper part of the helmet bowl]	25(?)	?	copper alloy	yes
4	Butaikha village, Republic of Tatarstan, Russian Federation	17	23,3	21	copper alloy	yes
5	? Russian Federation, sold on domongol.ru auction	18 [including lower rim]	23	20	copper alloy	no
7	Chaqalaq Tepe, close to the	11 [without lower rim,	25	18	?	?

	Kunduz city, Kunduz Province, northern Afganistan	judging by the photos about a third part of the helmet has been lost]				
8	Jartepe II, Samarkand Region, Uzbekistan	12,5 cm [? based on the size we are dealing just main bowl]	23	18	?	?

Tab. 1. Summary of known sizes.

Based on the table above, bearing in mind that some of these helmets have severe cavities and may have been subject to deformation, we can state that these helmets were not significantly different from each other. The height of the helmet bowl varied around 13 and 15 cm, and including the lower band around 17 and 19 cm +/- 1 cm. The length from frontal to occipital part varied between 22 and 25 cm +/- 1 cm, noting that the included object from Chaqalaq Tepe was deformed. The length between the temples varied between 18 and 20 cm +/- 1 cm, noting again that objects with a size of 18 cm were also deformed. The measure may have deformed by 1 or 2 centimetres. In each case, the aventail is attached to the helmet rim all the way around, on the loops attached by decorative rivets. In all analysed objects the bottom rim is riveted to the helmet bowl from the inside. The aforementioned decorative rivets, placed on the lower rim, can vary and can be made of copper alloy or iron. In addition, there may be a decorative element in the form of a thin copper alloy band riveted to the bottom edge of the bowl. This element only appears in the case of two helmets and only when copper alloy rivets are present.

From a technical point of view, an important element of these helmets is their relatively short main bowl. The presence of the lower band, as well as the chain-mail collar running around the entire circumference of the helmet, are clearly an element used to extend the height of the helmet bowl. Bearing in mind that it was also necessary to use some form of padding or cap to absorb energy of the impacts, the helmet was therefore slightly raised in relation to the head of the wearer. A 13 cm bowl +/- 1 cm would not guarantee protection of the head. According to the current authors, the form of a series of these helmets indicates some technological problems of being able to produce taller bowls hammered from a single piece of iron or indicates a desire to speed up the production process. This impression is intensified when comparing the height of the analysed group of objects with other Sasanian helmets. For example, the height of a helmet from Dura Europos is 25 cm (rim to top of the skull [3: 123]), the height of a helmet from Nineveh, currently held in The British Museum of London, mus. Nr. 22498 is 23 cm (at the brow-band), the height of a helmet from Nineveh, currently held in The British Museum

of London, mus. Nr. 22497 is 22 cm. As mentioned above the tallest helmets in the type analysed are 3 cm lower than the helmet from Nineveh BM 22497. In contrast, the difference between the height of the helmet from Dura Europos and the almost completely preserved helmet discovered in Tatarstan is as much as 8 cm(!). Based on this characteristic, we can conclude that we are in fact dealing with a kind of proto-*misiurka* head protections.

An interesting feature of the construction of helmets of this type is the chainmail mounting system. It is attached to the bowl by loops mounted with decorative rivets. At the moment, it is difficult to say conclusively whether the chainmail was mounted directly to the loops or, what seems more likely, was mounted via a wire threaded into the loop line. In the case of at least the helmet from the Hermitage Museum, its first descriptions indicate a direct attachment on the loops. On the other hand, the loops visible on helmets of this type appear to be made of very thin metal sheets. Although some of them have been preserved in excellent condition, the vast majority of them bear no trace of chainmail rings in them. As will be mentioned below the chainmail aventail consisted of flattened half solid rings and only half riveted rings. It would then be expected that the removal of an aventail attached directly by the loops should only occur by breaking the loop system. We can consider this method to be extremely non-functional. In the case of a helmet found near Staritsa settlement some remains of the fragments of the wire are still preserved (fig. 17). And although these are small fragments it is rather unlikely that in this case we are dealing with a torn and bent piece of chainmail ring, especially despite the lack of damage to the surrounding loops. Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility that we are dealing with repairs or experiments in the evolution of this kind of suspension system and that those two systems of suspension, at least for a period of time, coexisted. The system of suspending armour elements to the helmets on wire stuck into loops riveted to the bowl also appears in Sasanian art. We can observe it on the well-known heavily armoured rider from *Ṭāq-e Bostān* [62: pl. XXXV-XXXIX; 63: 67, fig. 12; 64; 65; and others], (fig. 16). It also appears in Vendel-era Scandinavia, for example in the famous helmet from the Valsgärde-8 burial [66]. Similar forms of chainmail helmet attachments have been known since at least the V century AD.

An extremely interesting item found with the helmets is the chainmail. As stated earlier, they are made of rings with a flattened rectangular cross-section. It should also be noted that, in the case of the Nineveh helmet, currently held in The British Museum of London, mus. Nr. 22495, a fragment of a chainmail with similar characteristics has also been preserved, rusted to the lower edge of the bowl (fig. 15). We must say here that a fragment of a chainmail shirt with similar characteristics and apparently flat rings was also found in the mentioned fallen tower from Petra. The construction in question therefore applies not only to chainmail coifs but to body armours as well. We can conclude that a similar method of making chainmail in Iran must have been popular. Half of the rings were most likely punched [22: 197-199] and solid. A further batch of rings were made to rivet together the

previously created solid rings. It is difficult to say unequivocally how the rings used for joining construction were made, those also are clearly flattened. It should be noted that the flattened form of the rings gives the impression of reducing the empty spaces between them. We cannot exclude the possibility that the way in which those chainmails were produced is not only related to the production difference associated with Sasanian Iran. The presence of solid rings, as well as their flattened form, undoubtedly increased the resistance of this type of armour against arrows and pole weapons. The form of the chainmail may therefore be related to the necessary functionality associated with the form of conflict, the type of opponents and the weapons they used. It is difficult to say unequivocally when armour in such form began to be used in Iran. Unfortunately, the chainmail fragments from Dura Europos in their condition at the time they were found did not allow similar observations [3: 126; 22: 236]. Currently we can unquestionably conclude that similar forms of chainmail armour were used in Sasanian Iran from at least VI century AD. We should state here that similar forms of armour, consists of combination of riveted and solid clearly flattened rings, also appear outside Greater Iran territory. For example, such chainmail remains were found at the mountain pass Gurzufskoye Sedlo in Crimea, dating to the I century BCE to I century AD [67: 276]; close to the Fedorovka village, Samara Oblast, and date to the Hunnic period [68: 136]; or Stari Jankovci village in Croatia date to the IV-V century AD [22: 288, 374]. Interestingly, at present we are unable to confirm any other form of the chainmail aventail was used in the type of helmets under discussion. Furthermore, based on the Nineveh find, we can conclude that a similar form of neck guard was used on various types of helmets in late Sasanian Iran, and it is not known whether any other form of the chainmail than 4-in-1 pattern, consists of combination of riveted and solid clearly flattened and most likely punched rings, were used on the territory of Greater Iran in that particular period.

Conclusion and spread of this type of helmets

Based on the objects mentioned above we can try to determine the provenance as well as a period of popularisation of this type of helmet. The most important object here for our analysis is the helmet from Petra because its archaeological context clearly indicates by whom the artefact was worn, as well as clearly identifying the date of the historical event to which it is associated - a warrior in the Sassanid army burned in the Petra fortress in 551. We must also note that the helmet sold at auction on domongol.ru was discovered with a coin of Xosrow I Anuširwān, indicating the presence of links to Iran (direct or indirect) at the site where the object was found.

The dating of all the objects, their geographical occurrence, as well as their later analogies, allow us to propose the hypothesis that we are dealing here with a series of helmets used and produced for the army of Xosrow I Anuširwān in the VI century AD, for the armed conflicts he conducted. In the case of the helmets from Jartepe II and Chaqualaq Tepe, we are dealing with the territory of the so-called

Greater Iran. Their geographical distribution undoubtedly coincides with Xosrow I's war policy and his campaigns resulting in the recapture of the Empire's eastern frontiers and the Caucasus conflict [69: 141-147; 70: 115-122; 71: 532-550; 72; 73; 74: 72; 75: 118-121 and others], (map 2).

The distribution of helmets can be found in two different environments: Siberia, and the border regions of the Sasanian state in Central Asia and the Caucasus. It should be borne in mind that finds of arms and armour in the case of the Roman Empire are concentrated along borders, as exemplified by the finds of *spangenhelm* type helmets [76; 77; and others]. This is related to the fact that most of the found weaponry is associated with battle sites, places of military concentration and sometimes with cataclysmic events in the form of massive fires or earthquake collapses [see for example: 78]. On the other hand, we can say that most of the finds come from the eastern part of what is known as Greater Iran. It is difficult to say unequivocally whether this is related to the production of similar helmets in the eastern territories. The Petra find, however, clearly indicates that similar weaponry was used in the event of conflicts with Rome. The level of our knowledge of the distribution of similar armour pieces is undoubtedly influenced by the level of archaeological investigation of sites associated with the armed conflicts waged by Sasanian Iran, which we may consider unsatisfactory.

If this theory is correct then it changes the outlook on Iran's army during this period. As we have tried to demonstrate, these objects bear the signs of mass production. The dimensions appear to be similar and, unlike the more commonly known finds of complicated, decorative forms, they do not significantly differ from each other. We cannot consider the change in rivets as a significant difference, nor the thin copper alloy band riveted to the bottom edge of the bowl. It could be concluded that those wearing similar helmets were not particularly different from each other, creating the impression of a certain unified unit. Can we hypothesize then, that there were some kind of armaments factories created by Xosrow I Anušīrwān in a form similar to Roman *fabricae armorum*? We cannot exclude this possibility. We must remember that after the Mazdakid revolt, Xosrow I Anušīrwān undertook a series of reforms aimed to reduce the power of the great feudal lords [79; 80; 81; 82; and others]. His tax reforms significantly increased revenues to the central budget [83: 367; 82: 237-239, 279-284). A series of Xosrow's military reforms [83: 364-373; 84; 85; 86; 87: 240; 75: 118; 72: 93-95; and others] lead to the creation of new elite and cavalry units directly dependent on the ruler and paid, at least during campaigns, by the state. He thus created what we could call the foundations of a regular military formation or professional army [82: 228]. Is it possible that we are dealing with helmets belonging to a new centrally dependent military formation formed as a result of Xosrow I's reforms? Was mass production of unified armaments for these units established during this time? We cannot exclude this, however currently the authors of the publication are not aware of sources that could prove such a theory.

The question remains as to how they spread beyond the territory of so-called Greater Iran to Siberia? It is difficult to answer conclusively on that question. It is possible that we are dealing with trade relations. Nor can we exclude the possibility that, according to the information provided by Procopius, we are dealing with the effects of the conflict in the Caucasus and the use of mercenaries described by Procopius as Sabiri Huns by both warring sides:

(...) Now by some chance it so fell out that there were in this Roman army a small number of the barbarians called Sabiri, for the following reason. The Sabiri are a Hunnic nation and live in the region of the Caucasus, being a very numerous people and properly divided among many different rulers. And some of the rulers from ancient times have had relations with the Roman emperor, and others with the king of Persia. (...) (Procopius, *Bella VIII*, 11.22-24, [30:157])

(...) And Huns also came to them as allies from the nation of the Sabiri, as they are called, to the number of twelve thousand. But Mermeroës, fearing lest these barbarians, being in such numbers, would not only be altogether unwilling to obey his commands, but would actually do some terrible thing to the Persian army, permitted only four thousand to march with him, while he sent all the rest away to their homes after making them a generous present of money (...) (Procopius, *Bella VIII*, 13.6-7, [30: 189])

We should also state that according to the information presented by Procopius, during the Sasanid-Byzantine wars in the Caucasus, considerable amounts of Persian arms and armour fell into the hands of the Romans. This is described, for example, in the cited events of the capture of the fortress of Petra:

(...) And at that time it became manifest how much importance Chosroës placed upon Lazica; for he had chosen out the most notable of all his soldiers and assigned them the garrison of Petra, and deposited there such an abundance of weapons that when the Romans took possession of them as plunder, five men's equipment fell to each soldier, and this too in spite of the fact that many weapons had been burned on the acropolis (...) (Procopius, *Bella VIII*, 17, [30: 177])

It is difficult to clearly state who the Hun tribes described by Procopius fighting on the side of Rome actually were and whether the Huns fighting on the side of the Sasanid army actually came from the same tribes and geographical regions. In the case of the Roman army, he mentions tribes living in the Caucasian region (we can suggest that he meant those living on the territory of the North Caucasus), while at the same time stating that numerous tribes ruled by many different rulers participated in mercenary armies. It is not hard to imagine that a long conflict attracted all kinds of warriors looking to make money from participating in it. We can state that armaments as trophies or gifts, depending on the side of the conflict, returned behind the Caucasus along with the warriors on their return home from campaigns. Being of a high material value, it could therefore have been resold or deposited in the burials of so-called Hun warriors involved in the Caucasian war or their relatives.

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Fig. 1



Fig. 2



Fig. 3




Fig. 4



Fig. 5




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


Fig. 7



Fig. 8



Fig. 9



Fig. 10



Fig. 11



Fig. 12



Fig. 13



Fig. 14



Fig. 15




Fig. 16



Fig. 17



Map 1



Imenkovo culture sites

- hillfort
- ⊕ burial ground
- open settlement
- ▲ find

Bakmutino culture sites

- Bakmutino culture sites

Turbasly culture sites

- ▲ Turbasly culture sites

Huns finds and burials

- ⊕ burial
- ✳ cauldron
- ▲ jewelry


Multi-cultural sites

- hillfort
- ⊕ burial ground

Sassanian imports

- Sassanian imports

Map 2



VI դարի ասիական ամբողջական երկաթե սաղավարների սի շարքի ՄԱՍԻՆ

Ադամ Լ. Կուրիկ, Օլեգ Ա. Ռադյուշ, Լեոնիդ Ա. Վյազով

Բանալի բառեր՝ սաղավարտ, սպառազինություն, Խոսրով I Անուշիրվան, Սասանյան պետություն, գտածո, Կովկաս:

Հոդվածում նկարագրվում է սաղավարտների մի տեսակ, որը հավանաբար տարածվել է Ասիայում և Արևելյան Եվրոպայում VI դարի կեսերից մինչև դարի երկրորդ կեսը ընկած ժամանակահատվածում: Այդ սաղավարտները բնութագրվում են առանձնահատուկ կառուցվածքով. նրանք պատրաստված են երկաթե մեկ ամբողջական թասանման կտորից, որի ստորին մասում կա լրացուցիչ կապ, որը ամրակցված է սաղավարտի ներսի կամ դրսի եզրին: Բացի

այդ, սաղավարտի ստորին մասում ամրացվել է օձիքանման օղազրահ: Կցված օղազրահը ապահովում է լրացուցիչ պաշտպանություն սաղավարտի ամբողջ շրջագծով մեկ, ներառյալ՝ ճակատամասի:

Սաղավարտների այս հատկանիշը բավականին երկար ժամանակ հանրաճանաչ չէր եվրոպական սպառազինության մեջ և Կենտրոնական և Արևելյան Եվրոպայում տարածվեց միայն XVI դարում: Հողվածում քննարկման առարկա է դարձել նաև սաղավարտների այդ տեսակի իրանական ծագման մասին վարկածը, ինչպես նաև առաջ են քաշվում տեսություններ Արևելյան Եվրոպայում և Ասիայում այդ սաղավարտների տարածման հնարավոր պատճառների մասին:

ARMENIAN KALĀNTARS OF THE TOWNS OF TRANSCAUCASIA IN THE 17TH-18TH CENTURIES*

Kristine Kostikyan

Abstract

Kalāntars were the high officials of Şafavid, Afshārid and Qājār administration of towns, who managed the affairs referring to handicraft production and trade there. During the predominance of the Iranian states of the period the towns of Transcaucasia had kalāntars, and more often Armenian kalāntars were at the head of the towns, where Armenians formed the majority of the urban population. Armenian kalāntars were usually the representatives of local elite families of eminent melik's and merchants.

The research on the topic has helped reveal the names of a few Armenian kalāntars in Agulis, Zagam, Lori, Erevan, Barda and Tiflis, also trace some peculiarities in the functions of this official in the region. The kalāntars of the mentioned towns usually managed the affairs of not only the town, but also those of the surrounding villages, since handicrafts and trade were among the main occupations of the inhabitants of many Armenian villages. The next peculiarity of office in the regions is the frequent cases of transmission of the post from father to son.

Keywords: Armenian kalāntar, melik', khoja, town, Erevan, Şafavids, Nādir shāh, handicrafts, trade, source.

Kalāntar is a Persian word with the meaning of 'an elder, a mayor, a police-master'. The meaning of 'a mayor' appeared in Şafavid period, as it started to be used as a term for a mayor, the official at the head of town administration. It was used also in a later period, during the rule of Afshārid and Qājār dynasties in Iran.

This official played a key role in the regulation of the affairs in a town. According to "Dastūr al-mulūk", the kalāntar appointed the elders (kadkhudās) of the town blocks and masters (ustāds) of the handicraft guilds [11: 240]. Among the main duties of a kalāntar were the assessment of tolls on merchants, artisans, guilds of handicraft production and other members of town community, as well as collection of taxes. He was also engaged in the settlement of the problems of the community and the protection of its rights, and had several officials at his disposal to help him investigate and clear up the disputes and different matters of the artisans and other inhabitants [11: 240]. The kalāntar was also responsible for the implementation of the orders (arqām va aḥkām) received by the guilds. According to de Thevenot, the kalāntar usually earned much money, since those who had problems gave valuable gifts in order to have his protection [33: 113]. A Şafavid decree, con-

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firming the rights of a kalāntar of Işfahān, states that local judges (qāzis) also were subject to him [28: 270].

Zak'arya of Agulis states about Melik' Šahnazar of Agulis who applied to the shāh with 'mansar'¹ to get the decree for the post of the local kalāntar and received it [36: 85]. The statement shows the way how this official was usually appointed; a kalāntar had to have the consent of the town's elite, the heads of the town blocks and handicraft production, expressed in a document signed and sealed by them and obtain a royal decree based on it.

Whenever the town consisted of significant groups of Christian and Muslim population, like Işfahān, each group had its own kalāntar. The kalāntars of the towns with a predominantly Armenian population were mainly Armenians. Unlike the other high officials in Muslim states, the kalāntar was typically not obliged to adopt Islam. Nevertheless, there were few cases of conversion to Islam as well. Such a case happened in New Julfa with kalāntar Avet, who adopted Islam and changed his name to Muḥammad Ḥusayn in 1691 [21: 30]. Another case happened with Melik Šahnazar of Agulis, who despite having adopted Islam, 'lived a life of a Christian Armenian and was buried as an Armenian' [36: 89].

The historical sources have kept the names of some Armenian kalāntars in the towns of Iran. Eḡya Karnetsi mentions the name of Arut'in as kalāntar of Rasht in his letter dated 1723 [15: 242]. During the rule of Karīm Khān Zand certain Sark'is, an Armenian was appointed as kalāntar in the port-town of Ēnzeli [29: 49].

We have very detailed information about the Armenian kalāntars of New Julfa. The Armenian kalāntars of New Julfa secured a kind of autonomy of the Armenian community in Işfahān. From the beginning of the establishment of the colony, Khoja² Safar and then his brother Khoja Nazar, the representatives of the wealthy merchant family of Khačik from Juḡa (Old Julfa), filled the post. This was the continuation of a family tradition, since the epitaph of Khoja Khačik in Juḡa on the bank of Araxes River contains his title as "k'aḡak'apet" (mayor, town head) [5: 92], which means that latter was the kalāntar of the town. Khoja Nazar, his son, was also highly influential and was able to protect the rights of the Armenian subjects and Armenian Church in some affairs referring to them and even stop the construction of a Catholic Church in Işfahān with the stones of St. Ējmiacin authorized by Shāh 'Abbās [16: 151]. Šušanik Khačikyan has researched and defined a rather full list of the kalāntars of New Julfa [21: 29-30].

Some of the big settlements (gyuḡak'aḡak') and towns of Eastern Armenia had Armenian kalāntars.

The Persian documents of Matenadaran have maintained evidence about the existence of kalāntar in Kapan (of Syunik'), who interfered in the affairs of Tat'ev

¹ Mansar, mahsar (versions used in Armenian sources) - Maḡzars were the documents expressing common consent of the people of a settlement or a region on an issue referred to them [26: 163].

² Khoja (Pers. khvāja) was the title of the wealthy merchants who bought estates and occupied influential posts in government.

monastery [22: 281]. They were the representatives of the family of Burt'ellu, the branch of the princely family of Orbélians of Syunik' [29: 124] who converted to Islam in the 15th century [20: 187]. Syunik' was a region densely populated by Armenians with the number reaching 500,000 [7: 302-303, 315].

We have very limited information about the Armenian kalāntars in the following towns: Juġa (Old Julfa), Agulis, Barda, Lori and Zagam in the 17th-18th centuries.

As mentioned above, we have only the name of Khačik as k'aġak'apet (the Armenian equivalent of kalāntar) of Juġa on the bank of Araxes, mentioned in his epitaph dated 1604. After consideration of the evidence of contemporary sources, Armen Ayvazyan has concluded that before the deportation of its inhabitants the town should have had an entirely Armenian population with the number varying from 15,000 to 25,000 [7:180].

The kalāntars of Erevan (Īravān), Agulis, Juġa, Zagam and Lori also bore the title of 'khoja' and 'melik'. Although mostly being landlords, meliks received a significant portion of their income from trade, a fact reflected also in the royal decrees confirming their rights. In some decrees confirming the rights of the Armenian melik's there was a strict order forbidding any deals performed by his subjects without their awareness [22: 355].

The most featuring is the case with the melik's of Agulis, who were at the head of the town community with a population of about 25-30,000 Armenians [7: 95], and were often confirmed as local kalāntars. There is evidence about Melik' Shāhnazar and after him, Melik Ovanes of Agulis to be confirmed at the post of kalāntar in the late 17th century [36: 80, 85, 139] and the early 18th century [6: 66].

So the functions of a melik of town and kalāntar should be very similar, since, as witnessed by Zak'ariya of Agulis, there was a common will to obtain a royal decree confirming the status of local melik' to a kalāntar [36:139]. The author of the 'History of Davit' Beg' names Mosin Melik', the k'aġak'apet (Armenian equivalent for kalāntar) of the town (12: 141). Ashot Hovhannisian in his research on 'Zak'arya of Agulis and his time' is right to trace a certain combination of the rights of a town's melik' to that of a kalāntar (or k'aġak'apet) [17: 73]. For a later period, there are the decrees of Karīm Khān, Aqā Muḥammad Shāh Qājār and crown-prince 'Abbās Mīrzā issued in 1774, 1797 and 1825 respectively confirming the rights of Melik' Arut'yun and his son Šmavon Bīg of Upper Agulis at the post of kalāntar of the Armenians of Āzādjirān region in Nakhijevan [34: 94, 95, 108, 136, 213].

The equalization of the posts of a melik' of a town and its kalāntar can also be traced to a case referring to Tiflis, where Aġa, the son of Aškhal Bīg is mentioned as melik' and kalāntar during Nādir Shāh's rule by Catholicos Abraham Kretatsi [8: 16, 87]. We should keep in mind that Tiflis was among the towns where Armenians formed the majority of its population in the 17th-18th centuries [7: 388]. Tournefort gives the following description of the population of Tiflis at the beginning of

the 18th century: there were about 14,500 Armenians (including Catholics), 3,000 Muslims and 2,000 Georgians [35: 237].

The name of Qarakhosrov Beg as the kalāntar of Lori has survived in the Armenian documents referring to Sanahin Monastery of the early 1660s [31: 96, 154, 162]. The existence of an Armenian kalāntar there evidenced in the documents containing deals coincides with the observation of A. Ayvazyan on its demography, who considers the population of Lori region to be about 60,000 [7: 38, 46].

In his historiography, Fazli Bīg Işfahāni mentions a certain Melik' Safar appointed as kalāntar of Qarābāq (in Barda) in 1616; he was still at the post in 1618 [10: 22, 731, 782]. Barda and the region around it had a significant number of Armenian inhabitants. At the beginning of the 18th century it was included into the melik'dom of Gyulistan, and its melik' was also called 'melik' of Barda, K'olani, Ganja and Basar' or 'Melik of Barda' [4: 78, 29]. The town Barda' was a trade-economic center of the region and there were Armenian tradesmen there [15: 110].

An Armenian epitaph inscription has likewise kept the name of Tamraz as kalāntar of Zagam (Dzegam) [14: 250]. As witnessed by the English travellers of the 16th century, Zagam was the chief town of the silk-producing region around it, included into the Georgian kingdom, and from there a considerable amount of high-quality nuts was annually transported to Persia on 4,000 loaded camels [3: 255]. The population of Zagam with the people living in surrounding villages should have been about 50,000 in the 17th century and the early 18th century [7: 46].

At present, we have more detailed information about the kalāntars of Erevan only.

Erevan (Ērevan, Iravān) started its rise as a town under the rule of Şafavid shāhs since the 16th century and had a population of about 50,000 [7: 189]. Situated on the main transit trade routes connecting Tabrīz and Işfahān with Aleppo, Trabzon, Tiflis, Izmir and Constantinople, it became the political and economic centre of the boundary region, named vilāyat-i Īravān or Chukhūr Sa'ad. In the sources of the 17th-18th centuries it is mentioned as "the capital" or "the great" town of the country of Ayrarat, Persian Armenia, Armenia [1: 301], and it was inhabited with predominantly Armenian population. Muslims of Iravān, consisting mainly of the local garrison and administration, never formed more than one fourth (a quarter 1/4) of the total population of the town [18, 19]. We have the evidence of Zak'ariya of K'anak'er about two Muslim (or Persian) kalāntars of Īravān, but both had responsibilities referring to the dues and affairs of the Armenian people, its Church and settlements. The first is Ma'sum Ağa who held the post of kalāntar during the bīglarbīgī of Tahmāsb Qūlī Khān [9: 87]. After the short conquest of Īravān in 1635 by Ottoman troops, he left Şafavid state for Ottoman territory [9: 114]. According to the same source, after the reoccupation of Īravān by Şafavid troops of Shāh Şafī in 1636, another Persian named Ğara Ğubad managed to obtain the post of kalāntar through bribery. Zak'ariya of K'anak'er tells about some of his unfair

writs regarding Holy Etchiazdin and then about his fall at the beginning of the rule of Shāh ‘Abbās II (1642-1666) [9: 152-153].

Sources have maintained information about several representatives of Melik‘ Šahnazaryan family of Geğark‘uni, running this post at the beginning of 17th century and in the 18th century: Melik‘ Šahnazar, Melik‘ Yavri, Melik‘jan and Melik‘ Manučar.

The evidence about Melik‘ Šahnazar and his son Yavri being appointed at the post after his death, in 1013 (1604/5), has been recorded by the Persian historiographer Fazlī Işfahānī [10: 356]. Melik Yavri, like his father, supported Shāh ‘Abbās I in his war against Ottoman forces and therefore was rewarded with high position not only as a melik‘, but also as kalāntar of Erevan. According to Işfahānī, he also played an important role in freeing the Armenian prisoners in 1605 and in holding negotiations around the submission of Mağasberd to Şafavid Persia [10: 360, 444].

However, Melik‘ Yavri did not hold this post for long, as there is a statement about his death already in a royal decree of 1610, by which his brother K‘yamal was appointed at the post of melik‘ [27].

Later, at the beginning of Nādir Shāh’s rule, another scion of this noble family held the post of the kalāntar of Erevan. He was Melik‘jan Melik‘ Šahnazaryan who accompanied Catholicos Abraham Kretatsi during his visit to Muğan steppe and was present at Nādir’s coronation [8: 29, 59]. Soon (the exact time is not clear) kalāntar Melikjan Melik-Šahnazarian fell as a result of some intrigues by Nādir shāh’s order, and then his son Manuchar was appointed at the same post [26: 341a]. After Nādir shāh’s death Manuchar was also killed by the order of the Khān of Yerevan in June 1747 [26: 341b].

As witnessed by sources, the appointment of the melik’s of Geğark‘uni region to the post was a kind of reward for cooperation and faithful service to the shāhs of Iran in their fights against Ottoman forces in Transcaucasia

The Persian documents of the Matenadaran contain evidence also about Khoja Sahak kalāntar, the son of Grigor, and the grandson of Khoja Set‘ of Iravan, holding the post in the mid-seventeenth century. We have few Persian documents on purchase where the name of this kalāntar of Erevan is mentioned: in one, composed in 1651, he is mentioned as a contemporary kalāntar, who bought a piece of an orchard from his sister Zaman [25]. Then in 1661, already after his removal from the position of kalāntar, he sold his estates consisting of the whole of the village Yayji in Daračičak, 4.5 dangs of the Amiri Village in Darak‘end to Catholicos Hakob Juğayetsi of Holy Etchmiadzin and in 1664 granted his estate (consisting of a piece of an orchard) in Darak‘end to the local monastery of Qizilvank, that is St. Anania monastery [24: 11-13].

The information about the Armenian kalāntars of Transcaucasia allows us to define some peculiarities in their functions. Catholicos Abraham Kretatsi gives a very distinct definition for the position of kalāntar Melik‘jan, as he notes that the Armenian melik’s of Erevan province, which are melik’s Hakobjan and Mkrtum, also those of the 9 maħals of Karpi, Ğirkhbulağ, Şoragal, Ikdir, Gaṛni,

C`aġknadzor, Geġark`uni, Aparan, and Širakavan are obedient to the kalāntar and fear him [8: 103]. This fact referring to the subordination of the melik`s to kalāntar is evident also from the Armenian equivalent title given to Melik` Yavri in his epitaph: as “paronats paron” [13: 341], in which “paron” is a title given to the Armenian noblemen, the melik`s and khojas, and consequently it means “the head of melik`s or khojas”. Thus, the Armenian kalāntars of Erevan had administrative supremacy not only over the town community, but also the eminent merchants and meliks of the regions and villages of Erevan province and their subjects involved in handicraft production and trade.

This was the peculiar feature of the Armenian kalāntars of Eastern Armenia and was stipulated with characteristic features of the Armenian settlements and villages, where villagers were partially cultivators and at the same time had specialization in some particular handicraft production and trade. Astapat, for example, was the place from where the plant roots for the red colour known as “Ronas” (Toron in Armenian), used for colouring the canvas, was exported [2: 509]. The village Šahkert, also named Qazānchī, was well-known for its pottery made of copper from the mines of Kapan. The silkworm breeding was one of the main items of production in many Armenian villages and towns in Transcaucasia in the 17th-18th centuries.

Juġa, Šahkert, Šořot`, Tšġna, Dašt, Dastak, Agulis, Meġri, Kaler, and others, located in the small region between the mountain chain of Syunik` and the left bank of the Araxes River, were the settlements from where the Armenian khojas developed their trade activities, connecting various commercial centres of the world with one another. The merchants of Juġa and Agulis were among the most active merchants involved in international trade in the 16th-18th centuries. The specialization in certain handicrafts was sometimes reflected in the Turkish names given to Armenian settlements, such as Qazānchī (Šahkert), Chulmakchī (Nork`), Chanākhchī (Avetaranots), Qūshchī, etc. [23: 140-144].

Similar is the case with the kalāntars of Upper Agulis, whose post in the decrees of the 18th-19th centuries is mentioned as kalāntars of Āzādjirān (or the region of Goġtn). Āzādjirān or Goġtn was a region including over 27 small and big Armenian settlements, specialized in handicraft production and trade.

Conclusions: The research on the topic allows us to conclude that many of the big settlements and towns having dense Armenian populations had Armenian kalāntars under Persian rule, who were running the affairs connected with trade and handicraft production under that rule.

The Armenian kalāntars of Eastern Armenia were the chosen civil leaders of the Armenian population of not only the towns but also the region around it, as they had administrative supremacy over the Armenian melik`s and their subjects involved in handicraft production and trade of the province. Among Armenians this post often turned into a hereditary office and passed from father to son. Thus, four representatives of the family of Melik` Shahnazaryans of Geġarkuni region held the post in the period of the 17th-18th centuries.

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ԱՅՄՐԿՈՎԿԱՍԻ ՔԱՂԱՔՆԵՐԻ ՀԱՅ ՔԱԼԱՆԹԱՐՆԵՐԸ ԺԷ-ԺԸ ԴԱՐԵՐՈՒՄ

Քրիստինե Կոստիկյան

Քանալի բառեր՝ հայ քալանթար, մելիք, խոջա, քաղաք, Երևան, Սեֆյաններ, Նադիր շահ, արհեստներ, առևտուր, աղբյուր:

ԺԷ-ԺԸ դարերում Իրանի Սեֆյան, Աֆշարական ու Ղաջարական պետությունների տիրապետության տակ գտնվող Այսրկովկասի հայկական գյուղաքաղաքներից ու քաղաքներից շատերի (Երևան, Ագուլիս, Ջազամ, Լոռի, Ջուղա) ղեկավարի՝ քալանթարի պաշտոնը զբաղեցրել են հայ նշանավոր մելիքներ կամ վաճառականներ, որոնց մի մասի անունները պահպանվել են պատմական սկզբնաղբյուրներում: Հետազոտության արդյունքում պարզ դարձավ, որ Երևանի քալանթարի պաշտոնը զբաղեցրել են Գեղարքունիքի Մելիք-Շահնազարյանների տան չորս ներկայացուցիչներ, որոնք իրենց դիրքում հաստատվել են Իրանի տիրակալներ շահ Աբբաս Ա-ին և Նադիր շահին Օսմանյան պետության դեմ պատերազմներում մատուցած ծառայությունների դիմաց:

Հոդվածում ներկայացվում են նաև քալանթարի պաշտոնի գործառույթները, որոնք Այսրկովկասի հայկական շրջաններում ունեին որոշ առանձնահատկություններ: Այդ առանձնահատկություններն են քաղաքի մելիքի դիրքի համարժեքությունն այդ պաշտոնին, նաև արհեստագործական արտադրության ու առևտրի հետ սերտ կապի մեջ գտնվող հարևան գյուղերի բնակչության ու նրանց վերնախավի որոշակի կախվածությունը քաղաքի քալանթարից և նրա ենթակայության տակ գտնվելը:

PLANS OF EREKLE II, KING OF KARTLI-KAKHETI AS REGARDS THE CAMPAIGN OF RUSSIAN TROOPS IN DAGESTAN IN 1775*

Davit Merkviladze

Abstract

In the spring of 1775, in order to punish the Kaitag Utsmi Amir-Hamza, a military expedition of Russian troops under the command of General Medem was sent to Dagestan, after which, at the invitation of Fatali Khan of Derbent, these troops entered the city of Derbent. King Erekle II of Kartli-Kakheti soon responded to this campaign and tried to interest the Russian authorities in a long stay of Russian troops in the city of Derbent, and also suggested that they continue the campaign of troops in the South Caucasus.

In a letter to General Medem dated May 6, 1775, Erekle II suggested that he move to the South Caucasus with his army. Promising General Medem all-encompassing support on behalf of all the Christians of Transcaucasia, King Erekle emphasized the ease and further unhindered march of Russian troops. On May 29, King Erekle sent a letter to the head of foreign policy of the Russian Empire, Nikita Panin, in which, reproaching the imperial court for neglecting the interests of the Georgian Kingdom and all Transcaucasian Christians in the last Russian-Turkish war (1768-1774), he asked to order General Medem to continue the campaign in the South Caucasus. According to the King, in this case, given the situation, all the inhabitants of the Transcaucasian khanates, both Christians and Muslims, would declare obedience to Russia. In the words of King Erekle, such an action by the Russian army would be a great consolation for all Christians living between Derbent and his kingdom.

As a result of the analysis of the content of the above-mentioned letters, it can be concluded that the "minimum plan" of Erekle II regarding the campaign of Medem to the North-Eastern Caspian was to maximize the stay of Medem's troops in Derbent, and the "maximum plan" was the advancement of these troops to Shirvan and their approach to the borders of the Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom.

Naturally, in this case the King of Kartli-Kakheti was guided by the interests of his kingdom. Probably, on the one hand, Erekle II wanted to use Medem's troops, if they entered Shirvan, to spread and strengthen his power over some of the khanates of the South Caucasus. And if Petersburg had not agreed to advance the army in Transcaucasia and would have left them in Derbent, this circumstance would have made it easier for King Erekle to fight against the predatory raids of the Dagestanis, and might have made it possible to try to annex the East Kakhetian region - Char-Belakani, appropriated by the Dagestanis, to his kingdom.

The aforementioned initiative of Erekle II was unsuccessful: Medem was ordered to refrain from answering the King's letter. Soon Medem was recalled from Derbent, and then part of the Russian troops stationed there left this strategic point. Such decisions of the Russian Imperial Court largely determined the subsequent foreign policy steps of the Georgian King, in particular his political rapprochement with the Ottoman Empire.

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Keywords: Erekle II, General Medem, Russia, Derbent, Kartli-Karheti, Fatali-Khan, Dagestan, South Caucasus, Nikita Panin.

In July 1774, the united army of Dagestani chiefs under the command of Amir-Hamza, the Utsmi of the Kaitag, severely defeated Fatali-Khan of Quba and Derbent in Gavdushan Valley. The winners started dividing Fatali's territories [6:151-153; 3:18-19]. Amir-Hamza besieged Derbent. Fatali Khan turned to Russia for help and expressed his readiness to accept the subordination to Empress Catherine II. The Russian government was already going to punish Amir-Hamza for capturing acad. Samuel Gottlieb Gmelin, head of the Russian Naturalistic Expedition in the Caspian lands, which was followed by the death of the latter in captivity. At the same time, Fatali Khan was considered to be an ally of Russia in this region.

In the beginning of March 1775, in accordance with the order received from the Imperial Court, General-poruchik of Russian army *Johann Friedrich* Medem moved from Kizlyar to Derbent with about 2,800 soldiers [3:20]. Soon he was joined by the Shamkhal of Tark and the chief of Buinak with their troops. Amir-Hamza was forced to lift the siege from Derbent and attack Medem. On March 28, not far from today's village of Mamedkala 20 km from Derbent, the fire from canons forced the Kaitag horsemen to retreat due to heavy losses¹.

Freed from the enemy's siege, Fatali Khan welcomed General Medem and offered to send an army to Derbent [3:20-21; 8:208]. Fatali-Khan sent to Catherine II the key to Derbent together with a letter. In the letter, Fatali asserted his loyalty to the Russian Empress, expressed gratitude for sending the army and asked for help to liberate Shirvan. In return, he promised that all his descendants would be grateful and glorify the queen [6:156-158]. The Shamkhal of Tarki also wanted to enjoy the protection of Russia [3:20].

Fatali-Khan tried to take advantage of the Russian army's presence there and take revenge on his enemies. From May 10, General Medem, Fatali-Khan and Shamkhal Murtuzali attacked Amir-Hamza and his allies in the mountain gorges. They raided and looted the auls of the Dagestanis. However, eventually they were defeated in one of the gorges and retreated [3:21; 10:65].²

General Medem's military actions allowed Fatali-Khan to easily reclaim most of his possessions; he then worried about the urgent solution of the Shemakhi issue. Amir-Hamza was forced to "repent" his behavior and send hostages to Medem [3:22].

Medem's campaign and the capture of Derbent by the Russian troops drew the attention of King Erekle II of Kartl-Kakheti. On May 6, Erekle sent a letter to Medem, where he offered the general to come with his army to New Shemakhi. After that, in King's words, "the entire Daghistan would be subject to him." In ad-

¹ General Medem himself indicated the date of the battle in his letter to the queen Catherine II, see [4:59]. On the role of artillery in this battle, see [2:162; 7:212].

² For details of General Medem's campaign in South Dagestan, see also [10:36-47].

dition, on behalf of his country and “all the local Christians,” Erekle promised to help Medem as much as possible. The King indicated another route to the General-poruchik: from Salyan the road along the Mtkvari (Kura) river was completely flat on both sides of the river and it was easy to reach Tbilisi and Kakheti. The King also noted that in this direction it was possible to approach Kakheti by boats up to a hundred versts or closer. Erekle undoubtedly wanted Medem and his army to come to the borders of the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti as close as possible and even cross the borders of the kingdom if there was a corresponding will from St. Petersburg.

Erekle II emphasized that “loyalty to Christianity” forced him to give such “advice” (he refrained from naming “many other reasons”). In King’s words, the “Christians on this side” (Christians of the South Caucasus) were vigilantly watching the approach of the general and his army. It is especially noteworthy that this did not concern the “Sultan’s serfs” (Ottoman Christians), who wished for the entry of the Russian army, but since at that time there was a “reconciliation” between Russia and the Ottomans, this matter had to be postponed for the future. Erekle indicated that his advice referred to the “countries that no longer have a protector.” Finally, the King asked Medem to write a reply letter.³

It is significant that King Erekle sent the letter addressed to Medem along with the oral commission with a certain Efrem, who turned out to have been sent by Medem “for this case”. It is unknown with what thought and purpose Medem could have sent the messenger to Erekle. He must have also brought the general’s letter to the King. Through the messenger the King sent another letter to the general, a petition to Catherine and a letter to count Nikita Panin, head of Russian foreign policy. Medem should have certainly forwarded the King’s letters to Catherine and Panin to the imperial court in St. Petersburg. Unfortunately, we did not find either Erekle’s second letter to the general, or the appeal to the Queen of Russia. Meanwhile, Erekle’s letter to Count Nikita Panin was published and we can familiarize ourselves with it [12:178-180].⁴

In the letter to N. Panin dated May 29 Erekle II expressed diplomatic gratitude that in the “reconciliation with the Ottomans”, that is, according to the Kaynarca truce, he was ensured against the threat of revenge from the Ottoman side for participating in the war on the Russian side. There, the King openly reprimanded the Russian authorities for dragging him and his kingdom into the war against the Ottomans at their instigation (according to the will of the Emperor and the letters written by Panin), which the King could not do with his own forces, and the Ottomans did not give him a reason to do it. Although the King and his subjects en-

³ The original version of the mentioned letter was published by A. Tsagareli, although the title mistakenly states that this is Erekle’s letter to General-poruchik P. Potemkin. Also, unintentionally, by mistake, 1875 is indicated as the year of writing the letter [12:177-178]. For the Russian translation of the letter to be submitted to the addressee, see [3:266-267]. The above-mentioned errors have already been corrected by the editor here.

⁴ For the Russian translation of the letter to be submitted to the addressee, see [13:267-269].

gaged in the war with great enthusiasm, they did not spare themselves, and Erekle incurred great costs, did not receive any benefits, but rather accrued new problems.

In this context, mentioning N. Panin's letters to Erekle II urging him to join the war, Erekle clearly indicated his personal responsibility before the King. Supposedly, in addition, Erekle wanted to remind N. Panin of his responsibility, as he needed to share his proposed plan for the Russian army stationed in Derbent in order to somewhat improve the situation. It is also noteworthy that Erekle directly told Panin that during the Russo-Ottoman war, Russia once already disappointed the Christians there and at that time his government had an opportunity to win the hearts of Christians.

Then Erekle II formulated his own proposal. The King wrote that at that time the Russian army was in the Derbent area, it had defeated the "Lezgins" and destroyed some of their villages. Because of this, the Lezgins were so scared that they could no longer continue fighting and "all Christians or Muslims between Derbent and us" would become full subjects of the Russian Empress. According to Erekle II, the presence of Russian troops in Derbent was a great consolation for Christians and if the army did not move forward, or did not stay there, it would be very sadening and disturbing for the Christians of this region (South Caucasus).

Therefore, in contrast to the letter to Medem, Erekle did not offer N. Panin the routes for moving the army, nor did he write anything about their arrival in the kingdom or directly to its borders. In this regard, his proposal was more modest and was expressed only in the offer to leave the army in Derbent or to "move forward" to some extent.

Analyzing the content of the above letters, one could conclude that the "minimum plan" of Erekle's plan regarding Medem's campaign to the North-Eastern Caspian region was to extend the stay of Medem's army in Derbent as much as possible. The "maximum plan" was to move the army to Shirvan and approach the borders of Kartli-Kakheti kingdom, and in the best case, enter the kingdom directly.

Another question is what Erekle's goal was. It is clear that the Ottoman territory was not the subject of the King's interest: The Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca had been recently concluded between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, and neither side was going to violate it at that stage. Erekle II understood this well, and so he pointed out that he did not consider the Sultan's subjects among the Christians who were ready to serve the Russian Empire and to General Medem he only pointed only "unprotected" countries, where the activity of his army had to be extended. Such countries implied the Muslim khanates located between the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti and the Caspian Sea formally considered as subordinate parties of Iran, i.e. territories under the protection of Iran. In Russia too, they were also regarded as "countries of Persia", i.e. territories under the patronage of Iran. However, after the death of Nadir-Shah, due to civil wars and unrest in Iran, these khanates actually became independent political entities and the power of any large state (Russia, the Ottoman Empire, Iran) did not extend to them, i.e. they remained "without protection". From the 1760s, the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti became one of the strongest

political forces in Eastern Transcaucasia, and its interest for the neighboring khanates gradually increased. In the first place, this concerned the Ganja, Yerivan and Nakhichevan khanates; however, in the case of a favorable situation, naturally Erekle's political vision would quickly spread to other khanates as well.

That is why, during the movement of Medem's army on the territory of South Caucasian Khanates, Erekle II pointed out to the Russian Court that Iran was not in a position to harm them in the provinces of Iran on the southern coast of the Caspian Sea: "The majority of Persian Muslims in Gilan, who are discontent with each other, will gladly welcome you and obey your orders." The region of Gilan was not mentioned accidentally - it was the area directly bordering with an independent khanate, to which the power of Kerim-Khan extended.

Erekle's strategy was to present his kingdom to the Russian Imperial Court as its main stronghold in the South Caucasus. Accordingly, with its strengthening and expansion, Russia's influence in the region would also increase. Thus, Erekle wanted to use Medem's army to subjugate individual khanates of the South Caucasus to his power.

On the other hand, if it was not possible to persuade the Russian government to make general Medem "move forward", that is, to enter the above-mentioned Khanates, then why did Erekle try to keep the Russian army in Derbent for as long as possible? The answer lies in that Medem's military expedition was directed against the Dagestani leaders. The continuation of this expedition would lead to the weakening of Dagestani forces. That is why, in his letter to Medem, Erekle II mentioned with satisfaction the victories won over them by the General-poruchik. Even if active hostilities were stopped, the presence of Russian troops in Derbent, even of a small part, would definitely remain in the center of attention of the Dagestanis. And in such a situation, the probability of aggressive actions on their part against eastern Georgia would be significantly weakened, if not completely stopped.

This situation would make it easier for Erekle II to fight against Dagestani raids. It is true that after the treaty of Kaynarca, the extent of Dagestani raids was much reduced, but Erekle probably pursued even more far-reaching goals. He was long worried about the issue of Eastern Kakheti, aka Char-Belakani, conquered by the Dagestanis. Most likely, he wanted to take advantage of the presence of Russian troops in Derbent to hinder the actions of the Dagestanis towards Kakheti, and to solve the Char-Belakani problem once and for all. If possible, the King probably hoped for coordinated military operations with Medem on the two opposite sides of Dagestan.

Medem demanded to increase the army to 10 thousand men. Fatali-Khan also expressed his desire to restore the previous control over his possessions and himself to enter the protection of Russia. General Medem informed the Imperial Court about this in his report of May 24 [1:787-788]. General-poruchik also indicated that his military measures were sufficient to punish Utsmia [1:782].

The above-mentioned report was discussed at the Imperial Council of State on June 22, and it was decided that Medem had to refrain from military action with

Fatali-Khan; Fatali's representatives had to be received in St. Petersburg and duly assured of patronage [1:788]. On July 2, they discussed the rescript for Medem, where he was ordered not to interfere in the "disputes of the highlanders", i.e. in the confrontation between the Caucasian rulers [1:782].

The proposals of Erekle II were to be discussed in July. There is no direct reference to this in the published reports of the State Council. However, this is evidenced by the fact that on July 28, in the letter sent on behalf of Catherine II, Medem was told, that King Erekle's request made it absolutely clear that the King continued to seek help from Russia to satisfy his "own lust for power", just as it was "when our troops were there" (implying the period during the Russo-Ottoman war) and therefore he no longer deserved any attention. Therefore, Medem was instructed to reject Erekle's offer with silence. And if the King contacted him again, he had to inform him that it was impossible to do so and if the King wished, he himself could make "new conquests and [territorial] acquisitions" [3:25-26].

It is quite natural that the King of Kartli-Kakheti was concerned about strengthening his Kingdom and expanding his power, and for this he tried to use various factors. To this end, he was not to be denigrated, especially by the Russian Empress, whose court resorted to any method to further increase the vast empire and subjugate the neighboring peoples.

As for Fatali-Khan, he was denied the request to come under the protection of Russia; however, at the same time, he was encouraged not to turn his back on Russia and to depend on the expectation of allowance from the Empress. On September 10, the State Council approved the reply to be sent to Khan, explaining to him that "due to the treaties concluded with neighboring states" it was not possible to help him. And advised him to seek help from Persia, on which he was politically dependent, to return the lands confiscated by the neighboring rulers. On the advice of knyaz Volkonsky, it was decided in the answer "to somewhat mitigate the issue of advice asking for help from Persia", in order to avoid Fatali-khan being completely offended by the refusal from St. Petersburg [1:788-789]. Panin sent the reply letter together with the returned Derbent key to Fatali Khan on October 7 [3:26].

It was well known in St. Petersburg that after the death of Nadir Shah, Iran had no power over the khanates of the South Caucasus. Kerim-Khan had neither the opportunity nor the desire to help Fatali-Khan in strengthening his power, who did not think of declaring obedience to Kerim-Khan and sought to dominate other neighboring khanates. It should also be considered that at that time Iran was engaged in the war with the Ottomans, which completely excluded its interference in the affairs of North-Eastern Caspian Khanates inaccessible for it.

Thus, how to explain on the one hand the cold-hearted attitude of the Russian government to Erekle II (they were not even going to give a decent answer to the King), and, on the other hand, the message of the diplomatic rejection to Fatali-Khan's request? It was unacceptable for the Russian authorities to strengthen the political units of the Caucasus "more than it should be." After all, they were considered as potential bites for the empire. Their strengthened rulers would no longer

turn to the Imperial Court for “help” and “protection”; this would prevent Russia from expanding its political influence on them in the future. The most ambitious rulers in Transcaucasia at that time were Erekle II and Fatali-Khan (this was the reason for the open hostility-rivalry between these two monarchs).

In this case, the matter was further complicated by the concern of the Ottomans due to the appearance of the Russian army in Derbent simultaneously with the start of hostilities against the Ottomans by Kerim Khan. In St. Petersburg the possibility of a sharp reaction from large southern neighbors caused by sending a military detachment to Dagestan was sensed in advance. On April 26, Catherine II urged Medem to refrain from military measures with “a tinge of war” against Amir-Hamza “on the borders of Persia” and to force him to return the belongings of Gmelin’s expedition in some easier way [6:155].

Nonetheless, the conduct of military measures and the entry of the army in Derbent were already inevitable. The Ottomans did not know anything about the number of Medem’s army or about its goals. Therefore, they were afraid that the army would invade South Caucasus from Derbent towards the Ottoman borders. Istanbul persistently demanded the answer from St. Petersburg, for which purpose the Russian army was in Dagestan [9:156-157]. Russia had recently concluded the favorable Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca with the Ottomans and was not going to make it questionable. Agreeing to Erekle’s proposal would increase the suspicions of the Sultan’s court and pose a great threat to the peace established between Russia and the Ottomans. This was not in Russia’s interests at that stage. Moreover, in response to the Ottoman request, Medem was forbidden to “intervene in the affairs of the highlanders” [9:157; 1:788].

We should also take into account that during the war of 1768-1774, the interests of the Russian Court and the King of Kartli-Kakheti showed significant incompatibility, which considerably cooled the relations between them for some time. With his proposals Erekle II tried to somehow turn these relations towards a new partnership, but in vain. At Catherine’s court it was decided to withdraw the Russian army from Derbent. This was ordered to Medem in the rescript sent on July 28. In September, Catherine II called Medem’s occupation of Derbent a “careless and troublesome act” and commissioned Count Potemkin to correct it [5:401]. Of course, King Erekle knew nothing about these moods of the imperial court.

The withdrawal of Russian troops from Derbent was delayed. In the spring of 1776, after the reconciliation of Fatali-Khan and Amir-Hamza through the mediation of Russian representatives, Russian soldiers left Derbent. After that, it became clear to Erekle II that Russia was not ready to renew relations with him and demonstratively turned its back on him. Therefore, the King preferred to look to the restoration of the relations with the Ottomans, which had been seriously damaged due to the alliance with Russia during the 1768-1774 war. That same summer, Gurgina Enakolopashvili, the ambassador of the King of Kartli-Kakheti, visited Istanbul with new proposals from the King. The confidant of Erekle II was received with great honors at the Sultan’s Court and sent back with abundant gifts.

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**ՔԱՐԹԼԻ-ԿԱԽԵԹԻ ԱՐՔԱ ՀԵՐԱԿԼ II-Ի ԾՐԱԳՐԵՐԸ ԴԵՊԻ ԴԱՂՍՏԱՆ 1775
Թ. ՌՈՒՍԱԿԱՆ ՋՈՐՔԵՐԻ ԱՐՇԱՎԱՆՔԻ ՀԵՏ ԿԱՊՎԱԾ**

Դավիթ Մերկվիլաձե

Քանալի բառեր՝ Հերակլ Բ, գեներալ Մեդեմ, Ռուսական կայսրություն, Դերբենդ, Քարթլի-Կախեթ, Ֆաթալի-խան, Դաղստան, Հարավային Կովկաս, Նիկիտա Պանին

1775 թվականի գարնանը Ղայթաղի ուցմի Ամիր-Համզային պատժելու նպատակով Դաղստան ուղարկվեց ռուսական ռազմական արշավախումբ գեներալ Մեդեմի հրամանատարությամբ, որից հետո Դերբենտի Ֆաթալի խանի հրավերով զորքերը մտան քաղաք Դերբենդ: Այս արշավանքին արձագանքեց Քարթլի-Կախեթի թագավոր Հերակլ II-ը: Վերջինս փորձեց շահագրգռել ռուսական իշխանություններին, որպեսզի Դերբենդում ռուսական զորքերը մնան երկարաժամկետ, ինչպես նաև առաջարկեց նրանց շարունակել զորքերի արշավը դեպի Հարավային Կովկաս:

1775 թվականի մայիսի 6-ին գեներալ Մեդեմին ուղղված նամակում Հերակլ II-ի նամակի վերլուծության արդյունքում, հեղինակը եզրակացնում է, որ Հերակլ II-ը ունեցել է երկու ծրագիր. ա) նրա «նվազագույն ծրագիրն» կապված է եղել Մեդեմի հյուսիս-արևելյան արշավանքի հետ՝ նպատակ ունենալով հնարավորինս երկարացնել Դերբենդում Մեդեմի զորքերի գտնվելու ժամանակը, բ) իսկ «առավելագույն ծրագիրը» եղել է նպաստել և հասնել նրան, որ ապահովվի ռուսական զորքերի առաջխաղացումը դեպի Շիրվան և Քարթլի-Կախեթի սահմաններ:

Սակայն Հերակլ II-ի վերոհիշյալ նախաձեռնությունները ձախողվեցին: Շուտով Մեդեմը հետ կանչվեց Դերբենդտից, իսկ այնտեղ տեղակայված ռուսական զորքերի մի մասը հեռացավ : Ռուսական կայսերական արքունիքի նման որոշումները մեծապես որոշեցին վրաց ցարի հետագա արտաքին քաղաքական քայլերը, հատկապես՝ Օսմանյան կայսրության հետ նրա քաղաքական մերձեցման տեսանկյունից:

COVERAGE OF THE SITUATION OF WESTERN ARMENIANS IN EGYPTIAN-ARMENIAN PRESS (1899-1904)*

Myasnik Esayan

Abstract

The developing relations of production caused a great revival in the economic life of Egypt starting with the second half of the 19th century. Armenians who migrated to Egypt took an active part in the development of the country's economic and cultural life. The revitalization of the economic and cultural life of Egypt has caused significant positive changes in the social and cultural life of Egyptian Armenians, where the Armenian periodical press has been doing a lasting job. The Egyptian-Armenian press has always been concerned about the situation in Western Armenia and Cilicia. In addition, Egyptian-Armenian periodicals have set themselves the task of keeping alive the hope of reviving the Motherland, uniting the Armenian immigrants settled in different countries all across the world around that idea.

Keywords: Egyptian-Armenian press, Western Armenia, Kurdish atrocities, Sasun, Ottoman authorities.

Introduction

The article is devoted to the coverage of the situation of Western Armenians in the Egyptian-Armenian press of 1899-1904. The choice and importance of the mentioned period lies in the situation in Western Armenia being one of the most discussed topics in the Egyptian-Armenian press in 1899-1904. Prior to that (1865-1898), 4 social-political Armenian newspapers were published in Egypt, two of which were published for several months with several issues. In addition, those newspapers had very little coverage of the situation of Western Armenians. The limitation to the year 1904 is explained by the fact that in the period until 1908, when a new page was opened in the history of the Egyptian-Armenian press after the Young Turk's revolution, several socio-political periodicals were published, which were quickly closed after the publication of a few issues only.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Egyptian Armenian community was considered one of the largest cultural centers of Armenia, where Western Armenian intellectuals, writers, public speakers Arpiar Arpiaryan, Ervand Otyan, Mihran Asqanaz, Eghishe Torosyan and others were carrying out their activities [40:338]. Armenian periodical press occupies a worthy place in the social and political life of Egyptian Armenians. The first Egyptian-Armenian periodical, *Armaveni* newspaper, was founded in Egypt in 1865. 165 Armenian newspapers and magazines (*Armaveni*, *Neghos*, *Arshalouys*, *Husaber*, among others) were founded in Egypt in

* The article was submitted on April 12, 2023. The article was reviewed on May 18, 2023.

1865-2010 [39:20]. Currently, four Armenian newspapers and magazines are published in Egypt: *Husaber*, *Arev*, *Areg* and *Teghekatu*.

One of the most important issues raised by the Egyptian-Armenian socio-political periodicals of the beginning of the 20th century was the liberation of the homeland from Turkish rule. Almost all Egyptian-Armenian periodicals of the early 20th century (*Phyunik*, *Arshalouys*, *Joghovurd*, *Azat Bem*, *Partez*, *Nor Or*) referred to the coverage of the national liberation struggle at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century and tried to communicate the difficult situation in Western Armenia to Egyptian Armenians with their publications. Unlike the Egyptian-Armenian periodicals *Phyunik*, *Arshalouys*, *Azat Bem*, and *Nor Or*, which severely criticized the Armenian persecution policy of the Ottoman authorities, *Joghovurd* and *Partez* were satisfied with reporting only some information about the situation of Western Armenians.

Coverage of Turkish-Kurdish persecution

At the beginning of the 20th century, the rights and dignity of the Armenian people continued to be violated in the Ottoman Empire. All of this was reflected in the Egyptian-Armenian press of the time. In the articles on Western Armenians, much attention was given to the coverage of Kurdish atrocities, and Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Kurdish collisions. The plight of Western Armenians and the Turkish-Kurdish persecution were mostly covered by the *Phyunik* periodical edited by Smbat Byurat, a supporter of the ideas of the liberation movement, public speaker, and public figure [41: 320], who criticized the anti-Armenian policy of the Ottoman authorities with editorial articles and tried to keep alive the hope of restoring the independence of the Motherland. Referring to news from the newspapers of Constantinople, *Phyunik* periodical reported that Armenians killed 5 Turks in one of the villages of Bitlis in May of 1899, because of which 7 Armenians were arrested [3: 15]. In the *Matnich* article, the periodical reported that in 1899, as a result of the betrayal of Gegham Vardanyan from Arabkir, arrests began in the areas from Erzurum to Arabkir. Many teachers and merchants were imprisoned in Yerznka, Baghesh, Tevrik and Sebastia. After these events, the traitor of the Armenian nation, paid by the Ottoman authorities and accompanied by 10-15 soldiers, roamed the villages of Kharberd and spread terror among the Armenian people [9: 5-6].

The Egyptian-Armenian *Phyunik* periodical noted that although according to article 61 of the Berlin Treaty in 1878, the Ottoman government undertook to carry out reforms in Western Armenia, the situation of Western Armenians had not improved for 20 years; on the contrary, it had worsened [3:5]. The periodical reported in the article "News from Taron" that Bitlis authorities sent 1,500 soldiers to arrest 8 Armenian hayduks hiding in Tsnork village of Mush region on September 8, 1899. The Turkish army destroyed and looted the village of 500 Armenian houses. Armenian hayduks were killed during the uneven clashes that took place. The newspaper noted: "After this incident, the Armenians of the Mush are in fear and

terror [6: 13]”. On the way to the village of Tsnork, the Turkish army conducted a search under the pretext that Aghbyur Serob was allegedly hiding in the village of Berdak, which was also accompanied by robbery and looting. During this same period, two Kurds killed Armenian fellow villagers during a dinner in Yerishter and Asvarich villages. In response to the complaints of the families of the murdered Armenian villagers, the local authorities of Mush imprisoned the sons of the murdered as rioters. S. Father Lazar and three congregants were killed by Kurds of Khut village in the Aghberka monastery; the property of the church was looted. In addition, the periodical added that Armenian-Kurdish clashes took place in Babshen and other villages of Mush [6: 13-14]. After looting and destroying the villages of Spaghank, Helenk, Khastur, Shushnamerk, and Sirnad, the Turkish army, with the support of the Kurds, carried out searches and destructions in Berdak village under the pretext of looking for Armenian hayduks, during which 3 Armenian villagers were killed and 7 were injured. "In order for Europe to intervene, we will have to wait for all the Armenians to be destroyed" [8:5] added the columnist indignantly. The periodical pointed to the armed struggle as a way out of the existing situation for Western Armenians. For such an output the libertarian editor also used the thoughts and ideas of progressive Armenian writers commemorating the armed struggle. This position of the periodical was probably due to the fact that in 1896 editor Smbat Byurat barely survived the Armenian massacres and took refuge in Egypt with his family.

Egyptian-Armenian periodical *Arshalouys* edited by Eghishe Torosyan [42: 709] also reported about the Armenian-Kurdish clashes in early November, of 1899, when bloody Armenian-Kurdish clashes took place also in the city of Erzurum. These clashes were witnessed by German traveler T. Belk who informed that the Armenians were attackers, armed with Russian weapons; 50 casualties were registered on both sides. Peace has been established only with the help of the Turkish regular army. The German telegram ended with words of praise for the governor of Erzurum, whose efforts put an end to the clashes. The Berlin correspondent of the London's *Daily Chronicle* newspaper, conveying this information to the newspaper's editorial office on November 16, added that from German traveler Belk's telegram he concluded that the governor of Erzurum had asked him to spread information about the attacks of those Western Armenians in the European press. In connection with this telegram, both the correspondent of the London newspaper and the editorial office of *Arshalouys* agreed that "there will be a great bloodshed and that Turkish officials will try to keep it a secret" [1:2-3]. The main goal of *Arshalouys* was the liberation of Armenia, like other Egyptian-Armenian periodicals of the early 20th century. However, unlike the famous Egyptian-Armenian *Phyunik* periodical of the early 20th century, which saw the liberation of Armenia only in the event of an armed struggle, on the pages of *Arshalouys*, armed self-defense, if not completely denied, was at best considered the last resort. The periodical considered that, first of all, peaceful means should be used to find a solution to the current situation. *Arshalouys* criticized the working style of the Armeni-

an national parties, blamed the Armenian rulers and party leaders for the unhappiness of the Armenian people, who, instead of building industrial and educational institutions in the country, wasted huge sums on various senseless actions. However, in the publications of 1910-1914, the periodical finally changed its attitude towards the constitutional authorities and became convinced that the latter were the descendants of the Hamidian regime and had a sense of Turkish supremacy over foreigners, which could lead to newly organized massacres.

The Egyptian-Armenian *Nor Or* periodical, like *Phyunik*, pointed to the armed struggle as a way out of the existing situation for Western Armenians, as it was edited by *Phyunik*'s editor Smbat Byurat [43:150]. The periodical also noted that at the beginning of the 20th century, the Kurds in Western Armenia continued to plunder, with green light from the Ottoman authorities. The newspaper noted: "Many Armenians converted to religion in the hope of finding protection from the authorities, but the Kurds continue to rob Armenians who have converted to Islam" [17:3]. The periodical complained that the majority of Egyptian Armenians showed indifference towards the massacres taking place in Western Armenia, Western Armenian immigrants and orphans. In order to make an impression on Egyptian-Armenians, the Egyptian-Armenian newspaper presented the translation of the famous lover of Armenia Mr. Anatole France's article dedicated to Armenian orphans published in newspaper Figaro on June 13, 1900, which reflected the general picture of the deprivations that took place in Western Armenia at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. The article covered the Armenian massacres in 1894-1896, during which more than 300,000 Armenians were killed. In many places, such as Sasun and Zeytun, Armenians showed serious resistance, but in many villages there was a massacre of unarmed Armenians. The Egyptian-Armenian periodical urged the Egyptian-Armenians to become active and provide assistance to Armenian refugees and orphans. "If we allow the fathers to be slaughtered, at least we must help the children" [18:2].

In 1899-1902, Armenians of Sasun and Mush also fell victims to Turkish-Kurdish atrocities. Referring to the news published in the British Times newspaper, the Egyptian-Armenian *Phyunik* periodical reported that the Kurds robbed the Sasun monastery, killed the monastery's abbot, two monks and also set fire to 5 Armenian villages, killing 150 Armenians and kidnapping 20 Armenian women. "A telegram from Vienna will increase the number of crushed Armenians to 800" [4:18]. The field of Mush was covered with blood in the spring of 1900 [14:4-5]. 106 Armenians were killed in one month¹. On July 8, 1900, one thousand Kurdish gangs set fire to the area between the villages of Talvorik and Geiliguzan, not sparing children, the elderly and women. In particular, they tortured and killed priest T. Petros and the pregnant wife of the head of the village of Spagank. After setting the

¹ In particular, 10 Armenians were killed in the village of Arak, 4 in Havaturik, 7 in Karner, 10 in Bifshidz, 17 in Hunna, 2 in Berdak, 6 in Ashuarinj, 4 in Akhjoi, 2 in Tsronk, 30 in Korvon and 20 in Mokunk village.

tomb on fire, the Kurdish thugs organized massacres in the villages of Yeghard and Dzorer. *Phyunik* sarcastically turned to progressive humanity, asking if these are private cases, and answered: "No, the arch, this is the repetition of events 1892-1893, which will soon be followed by 1894-1896 massacres" [15:4-6]. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Egyptian-Armenian periodical already predicted the impending disaster and considered the Turkish-Kurdish atrocities to be the forerunner of the Great Genocide.

In yet another article *Phyunik* reported that the Turkish police, together with the Hamidian Kurdish detachments, carried out many destructions and murders in the villages of Baghesh, looted S. Aghbrik monastery located between Mush and Sasun, killing the abbot and two churchmen [5:17]. In the spring of 1901, the Ottoman authorities arrested the bishop of Zeytun, priests, and a large number of teachers and transferred them to Marash. After being imprisoned for several weeks, most of them were released for a bribe of 600 gold [7:8]. Taking news from other newspapers, *Phyunik* reported that the anarchy prevailing in Van and surrounding villages created a disastrous situation in 1901, in connection with which the National Patriarchate of Constantinople submitted complaints regarding the disputes that took place. In June 1901, a group of 500 people led by Mahmud agha Boybek attacked the village of Alpis, where 72 Armenian families lived. The Armenians managed to escape to the nearby Kefertis village, with 4 casualties as a result of the clashes [16:5-7]. A few days later the aforementioned gang set fire to Kefertis village, killing 5 more Armenians. In the summer of 1901, due to the murder of Sheriff agha's brother, the villages of Havatorek, Marnink, Arak, Berdak and Mokunk were greatly destroyed, with most of the villagers killed [10:7].

The ring around Zeytun and Sasun was getting tighter as the Ottoman authorities built barracks and fortresses on the hills and ravines surrounding the cities. On July 3, 1901, the Hamidie detachments, together with the regular troops, resumed the destruction and massacres in the Mush field, as a result of which many villages, particularly the important center of the Armenian population, the village of Shekhokhan, were completely destroyed. *Phyunik* regretfully noted that after all of this, Europe still remained silent [11:3].

At the end of 1901 and the beginning of 1902, the situation of Western Armenians in Cilicia and the provinces of Western Armenia continued to be disastrous. In July-August 1901, Kurds killed more than 100 Armenian villagers. The Kurds looted Gotanli village, burned the fields and imprisoned 40 Armenian villagers, citing the murder of Sheriff agha, the Kurdish chief of the village [12:15]. Referring to the article about Armenia published in the British *Tan* daily, *Phyunik* reported that on September 1, 1901, the governor of Bitlis sent 8 troops to Mush. The author of the article noted that the situation in Mush and Sasun was the same as on the eve of the massacres in 1894-1896 and expressed fear that new massacres might take place. In addition, the author of the article added that the Ottoman authorities not only failed to implement the Armenian reforms stipulated by Article 61 of Berlin, but also organized new murders and massacres [12:9-11].

At the beginning of November 1901, Andranik, together with a group of hayduks and armed villagers, entered S. Arakelots Monastery not far from Mush and turned it into a self-defense fortress. In relation to this incident, *Phyunik* informed that the Ottoman authorities were spreading false news that the Armenian gang led by Andranik was holding 60 hostages in the monastery and Turkish troops were sent to free the hostages at the request of the Bishop of Mush. At the same time, the author added that according to the news from Constantinople, the Ottoman authorities asked the Armenian Patriarchate to intervene and convince them to lay down their arms and leave the territory of the Ottoman Empire under the condition of guaranteeing Andranik's and his troops' lives [13:4-5]. Let us add that Andranik did not accept any conditions offered by the Ottoman authorities, and on November 27, the hayduks, wrapped in white sheets, left the monastery unnoticed. The Battle of S. Arakelots Monastery left a great impression on the Armenians of Taron and Sasun and significantly raised the fighting spirit of Western Armenians.

Along with presenting the dire situation of Western Armenians, the Egyptian-Armenian periodical called on all Armenians not to despair. The periodical added that in the 1880s anti-Jewish persecution forced young Russian Jewish intellectuals to abandon their studies, leave for Palestine and engage in agriculture, and so the Zionist movement began. Jews from around the world began to return to Palestine, bought land and eventually put down deep roots in their homeland. The newspaper considered that the Armenian people had to follow the example of the Jews and start returning to the Motherland, and to this end an ideology similar to Zionism was needed [9:4-5].

Reference to Sasun's uprising in 1904

The peak of the national liberation struggle of the beginning of the 20th century was the uprising of Sasun in 1904, the last mass outburst of the Armenian armed struggle in Western Armenia, the coverage of which was also made by the Egyptian-Armenian press. Describing the course of the uprising, the Egyptian-Armenian *Joghovurd* periodical edited by Avetis Palyan [44:30] noted that a new massacre like the massacres in 1894-1896 was taking place in Sasun, which also threatened the unarmed and defenseless Armenians of Erzurum and Van [19:177-181]. *Joghovurd* referred very briefly to Sasun's uprising in 1904 and the situation of Western Armenians in general, because the periodical emphasized the coverage of the Eastern Armenian struggle against the confiscation of the property of the Armenian church in 1903-1904 after the adoption law on the June 12 in 1903. The periodical called on Armenians to live without foreign intervention and help, to improve life by their own efforts.

In its turn, *Partez* periodical edited by Mihran Asqanaz reported that on December 26, 1903, news reached them from Sasun that the situation was very serious. About 1,000 Armenian hayduks gathered there under the leadership of Andranik, and Kurdish guerrilla groups camped in the border areas of the province to prevent new Armenian hayduk groups from entering Sasun. "The Armenians of

Sasun are waiting for the repetition of events in 1894” [27:13]. *Partez* was a periodical of a pedagogical nature and its educational orientation was Christian morality [44:32]. The periodical saw the guarantee of the existence and stability of the Armenian nation in the improvement of the character of the individual and instilled in the readers noble human qualities: kindness, honesty and others. Being a periodical of a pedagogical nature, *Partez* was satisfied with reporting about the atrocities of Turkish-Kurdish barbarians in Western Armenia, Sasun's uprising in 1904 and did not mention the exit of Armenians from the existing situation.

The Ottoman government started the campaign against Sasun at the beginning of spring of 1904. Uneven fighting continued until mid-May. The enemy, having taken over Sasun, retaliated against the civilians who remained there, looting and desolating the villages. Reporting various information about the course of the uprising, *Partez* noted that the events of 1894 were repeated. In addition, it was reported that 20 Ottoman soldiers were killed, 23 were wounded, and 12 villages of Talvorik region were destroyed during the clashes at the beginning of April [28:14]. In another article about the Sasun uprising, the newspaper reported that on May 15 they received a telegram from Mush, in which it was said that the inhabitants of Sasun resisted valiantly against 14 Turkish regiments and a 700-strong Kurdish militia led by Sheikh Ahmad on the heights of Talvorik, but the forces were very unequal. 45 Armenian villages of Sasun were destroyed; 12,000 Armenians were captured, and another 8,000 Armenians were killed by the Turks. To avoid torture and massacre, 12 Armenian women in Talvorik threw themselves into the river with their children [32:13-14]. The Egyptian-Armenian *Azat Bem* periodical edited by Ervand Otyan [44:26] reported that in April-May 5000 Armenians were killed in Sasun, and 50 villages were destroyed [22:3-4]. According to private sources in Constantinople, the periodical notices that, contrary to the claims of the Ottoman authorities, a large number of unarmed and innocent people were killed in Sasun [22:4]. *Azat Bem* condemned the anti-Armenian policy of the Ottoman Empire, with words of accusation against the diplomatic games of Western European countries. The periodical raised the idea of solidarity and cooperation of Armenian national political parties and saw the nation's salvation in working together.

During the spring in 1904, the Armenian villages of the Mush plain were captured by Turkish regular troops, and, to avoid torture and massacre, the Armenians of the province went up to the mountains of Sasun. After the Sasun massacre, the Ottoman government began to forcefully deport the Armenian population of Sasun: more than 6,000 Armenian women, children and the elderly. In addition, the construction of 8 new barracks and the process of formalizing the lands belonging to Armenians in the names of Kurds began in Sasun. *Partez* reported that despite the presence of foreign consuls, the Armenian massacres continued in the Mush field, during which the villages of Araks, Alita, Komar, Tatrako and Trink were almost completely destroyed, many women and children committed suicide, and most of the corpses of Armenians were not buried [35:13-14].

The situation of those settled in the Mush field was getting worse. The Ottoman government forbade them to go to the city of Mush. On July 3, 1904, the women of the destroyed villages of Mkragom and Temert sent a petition for help to the governor of Mush. Four Armenian women carrying the petition were raped by the soldiers. The Ottoman authorities placed around 1,300 Armenian refugees in the Basdr settlement, forbidding the locals to provide them with food for 15 days, as a result of which most of the Armenian exiles died, and some were tortured by Ottoman soldiers and Kurds [36:13]. The periodical *Partez* testified that the ambassadors of England and France presented a complaint to the Ottoman government regarding the Armenian massacres, adding that under the guise of suppressing the Sasun rebellion, the Ottoman troops together with the Kurdish guerrillas killed many innocent Armenian villagers [31:13]. In June-August, the appeals of the consuls of the European countries forced the Ottoman authorities to allow some of the emigrants to return to their homes. British vice-consul in Van, Turrell, who visited Sasun twice during the summer, reported in a July 31 newsletter that the data published by Armenian sources about the casualties were exaggerated, because before the Ottoman troops entered Sasun, most of the population had already left the villages of Sasun. British vice-consul Turrell put the number of Armenian casualties at around 900, while Heathcote, British vice-consul at Mush, reported around 4,000 casualties. Turrell claimed that Armenian hayduks burned the villages in order to stir up European public opinion. After studying the circumstances of the massacre near Mush, Turrell came to the conclusion that the massacre was the revenge of the Turks for the killing of 17 Turkish soldiers in Kuraghu village on July 29 [29:2].

Reprinting the information published in British newspaper *Tan*, *Azat Bem* informed that on July 2, 1904, the Ottoman government decided to grant amnesty to the captured citizens of Sasun, to rebuild 547 burnt houses, and to allow emigrants to return to their places of residence. Contrary to the announcement of amnesty, the Kurds continued to incite disputes in the Mush field. In particular, at the end of July, 19 Armenians were hanged near the city of Mush [23:3].

Not receiving help, Sasun fell at the end of August, and the massacre of the civilian population began. About 40 villages were destroyed; more than 7000 Armenians died. The rebellion that started in Sasun turned into a general uprising in Western Armenia. The struggle did not stop with the fall of Sasun. In May-August 1904, Armenian hayduks waged guerilla battles against Turkish-Kurdish regular and irregular military units. On August 2, 1904, the Kurds set fire to the Armenian village of Goms, and on August 11, 2 Armenians and 24 Kurds were killed during the bloody Armenian-Kurdish clashes. On August 12, a massacre of the population of the Armenian villages of Khavu and Akhchan was organized. *Partez* emphasized that this information is only a small part of Kurdish atrocities [37:11].

In May-July 1904, the situation worsened in Baghesh vilayet, Mush Valley and other provinces of Western Armenia, which were also covered by the Egyptian-Armenian press. Reporting from *Armenia* newspaper, *Azat Bem* weekly reported that on July 9, Kurds burned down the Armenian market in Baghesh, looted

the goods of Armenian merchants, and the local authorities forbade journalists to cover the fire [25:3-4]. On July 26, Kurdish chieftain Salo attacked the villages of Ichkilise and Kumlupuchak with his gang, robbing and killing many Armenians. Other Kurdish terrorist groups destroyed the villages of Chupun and Karapazar, and set fire to the Armenian shops in the city of Mush [24:4].

After the massacre of Sasun, a difficult situation was also created in Erzurum. *Partez* reported that arrests of Armenians had become frequent, with local authorities inciting Muslims against Armenians. The situation was the same in Khnus, Baghesh, where many Armenian shops remained closed [33:13]. On July 9, 1904, a fire broke out in the Christian neighborhoods of Marzuan, a city of 2,000 inhabitants in the Svaz province. While the Christian population of the town tried to move their families and movable property to safety in terror, the two wells of the governorate did nothing to put out the fire. During that fire about 600 houses and 200 shops belonging to the Christian population of the city, including Armenians, were burned [34:13]. Referring to the article published in the British newspaper *Standard*, *Partez* reported that the British consul in Erzurum was arrested as a revolutionary while visiting the Armenian provinces, but after a short time the local authorities apologized and released the consul. The newspaper noted that the Ottoman government intentionally created such obstacles for foreign consuls so that the latter would refuse to visit the distant provinces of the empire and would not learn about the conflicts that were actually happening there [26:13]. After climbing the mountains, under the pretext of looking for the Armenian hayduks, the regular Ottoman troops and the Kurdish guerrilla groups attacked the Armenian settlements with fire and sword. In particular, in August-September 1904, the small town of Shahira located on the shores of lake Van suffered a similar fate. *Partez* testified that in the same period, they were expecting a new massacre in Van every minute. “The local authorities distributed weapons to the 150-member terrorist group in the city, and if clashes occur in Van, the Ottoman government will bear all the responsibility [38:10-11]”.

Eastern Armenians did not remain aloof in providing assistance to Western Armenians, which did not escape the attention of the Egyptian-Armenian press. Taking news from European newspapers, the Egyptian-Armenian periodical *Arshalouys* reported that on November 9, 1899 an Armenian group of 120 people from the territory of the Russian Empire entered the Alashkert field and fought with Turkish troops and Kurdish detachments near the village of Astur. Causing great human losses to the Turks and Kurds and suffering 15 casualties, and 2 prisoners, the Armenian group managed to return to the territory of the Russian Empire. After this incident, the governors of Bitlis, Mush and Van ordered the Hamidi regiments to be more ruthless towards the Armenian population [2:2-3]. Referring to the European newspapers, the *Phyunik* periodical reported that the group consisting of Eastern Armenians, which was going to support the liberation movement of Van, got into a battle with the Turkish troops on the way and retreated, leaving 10 victims on the battlefield [5:17]. Referring to newspaper *Armenia*, *Joghovurd* mag-

azine reported that in early July 1904, a group of 60 Eastern Armenians led by Tuman Tumanyan from Artsakh was discovered and surrounded by Russian border guards on their way to Western Armenia. The Armenian group did not show resistance and surrendered, counting on the mercy of the Russian border guards. “The prudence of some of our passionate patriots did not help; they started massacring the Armenians who disarmed themselves [20:270-271]”. As a result of the clash, 38 Armenians were killed; other members of the group were arrested.

The uprising of Sasun in 1904 and the subsequent guerrilla struggle was the last outburst of the Armenian armed struggle in Western Armenia. Despite its efforts, it remained isolated and did not develop into a nationwide uprising.

One of the most important issues of the Egyptian-Armenian press at the beginning of the 20th century was the liberation of the homeland from the Turkish yoke. In its publications, it criticized the Ottoman dictatorship, exposed the Hamid tyranny, and condemned the anti-Armenian policy of the Ottoman Empire. The Egyptian-Armenian press has always been concerned about the situation in Western Armenia and Cilicia and has regularly tried to present the difficult situation of Western Armenians to the reader through its publications. The Egyptian-Armenian press devoted much space to the coverage of national issues among the Egyptian-Armenians, with particular attention to the uprising of Sasun in 1904. Unlike the Egyptian-Armenian periodicals *Phyunik*, *Arshalouys*, *Azat Bem*, *Nor or*, which severely criticized the Armenian persecution policy of the Ottoman authorities, *Partez* and *Joghovurd* periodicals were satisfied with reporting some information only about the situation of Western Armenians. Among the national issues, the Egyptian-Armenian press also covered the Kurdish atrocities in Western Armenia, and the situation of Western Armenian immigrants and orphans. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Egyptian-Armenian periodicals already predicted the impending disaster and considered the Turkish-Kurdish atrocities to be the forerunner of the Great Genocide.

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**ԱՐԵՎՄՏԱՀԱՅՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԴՐՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԼՈՒՍԱԲԱՆՈՒՄԸ ԵԳԻՊՏԱՀԱՅ
ՄԱՍՈՒԼՈՒՄ (1899-1904 ԹԹ.)**

Մյասնիկ Եսոյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ եգիպտահայ մամուլ, Արևմտյան Հայաստան, քրդական վայրագություններ, Սասուն, օսմանյան իշխանություններ:

20-րդ դարասկզբի եգիպտահայ մամուլի կարևորագույն խնդիրներից է եղել թուրքական լծից հայրենիքի ազատագրումը: Այն իր հրապարակումներում քննադատել է օսմանյան բռնապետությունը, մերկացրել համիդյան բռնակալությունը, դատապարտել Օսմանյան կայսրության հայահալած քաղաքականությունը: Եգիպտահայ մամուլին մշտապես մտահոգել է Արևմտյան Հայաստանում և Կիլիկիայում տիրող իրադրությունն, ու այն պարբերաբար իր հրապարակումներով փորձել է ընթերցողին ներկայացնել արևմտահայության ծանր իրավիճակը: Եգիպտահայ մամուլը մեծ տեղ է հատկացրել ազգային խնդիրների արձարժմանն ու լուսաբանմանը եգիպտահայության շրջանում՝ մեծապես անդրադառնալով 1904 թ. Սասունի ապստամբության լուսաբանմանը: Ի տարբերություն եգիպտահայ «Փիւնիկ», «Արշալոյս», «Ազատ Բեմ», «Նոր օր» պարբերականների, որոնք խիստ քննադատության են ենթարկել օսմանյան իշխանությունների հայահալած քաղաքականությունը՝ «Ժողովուրդը» և «Պարտեզը» բավարարվել են միայն որոշ տեղեկություններ հաղորդելով արևմտահայության դրության վերաբերյալ: Ազգային խնդիրների շարքում եգիպտահայ մամուլն անդրադարձել է նաև Արևմտյան Հայաստանում քրդական վայրագությունների, արևմտահայ գաղթականների ու որբերի դրության լուսաբանմանը: Եգիպտահայ պարբերականները 20-րդ դարի սկզբին արդեն կանխատեսում էին սպասվելիք աղետը և թուրք-քրդական վայրագությունները Մեծ Եղեռնի նախակարապետն էին համարում:

ON TEACHING OF PERSIAN LANGUAGE IN ARMENIAN SCHOOLS OF IRAN IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY AND THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY*

Tereza Amryan

Abstract

In the article, the activities of Armenian schools in Iran in the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, and the teaching of the Persian in those schools are addressed. The purpose of the study is to examine the teaching of Persian in Armenian schools. For conducting the research historical and comparative-historical methods have been used. In the second half of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century the Armenian schools of Iran were influenced by the Armenian schools of the Caucasus. They often brought educational literature from Tbilisi to Iran and sometimes invited teachers from there. Along with foreign languages, Persian was also taught at Armenian schools in Iran. During the years of the constitutional movement, the classes of Persian language became more widespread in Armenian schools. During the reign of Reza Shah, the management of all schools in the country came under the control of the state, and the teaching of Persian became mandatory in all schools. Thus, in the second half of the 19th century the teaching of Persian facilitated the integration of students into economic and social life, but after educational reforms and standardization of school curriculum, the teaching of Persian gradually became mandatory and standardized in all Armenian schools of Iran.

Keywords: Iran, community, Armenian Schools, Persian, teaching, aim, the Caucasus, diaspora, pedagogy, teacher, curriculum, timetable, schedule.

Within the framework of the article as a historical review the activity of Armenian schools in Iran in the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, and the teaching of theq Persian language in those schools are addressed. For the purposes of the study, attention was paid to schedules, timetables, teaching plans (curriculum) of some schools, the material used during teaching, and also the teaching staff. During the research, we relied on the example of the Armenian schools of New Julfa, Tabriz, Tehran, and diocesan central school of Atrpatakan¹, and used historical and comparative-historical methods. It should be noted that we have little information about some Armenian schools in Iran, and we know the place and date of establishment of some schools. Sometimes there is no complete information about the material or textbooks used in some schools, but

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¹ Historical region in northwestern Iran which is called Azerbaijan. Armenians call it Atrpatakan.

the combination of the material provided by different sources allows us not only briefly introducing the activity of Armenian schools in Iran during certain historical periods, but also to revealing the goals, perceptions and concepts of teaching of the Persian language in those schools.

Armenian colonies appeared in Iran in the 3rd-4th centuries. A big emigration of Armenians was organized in the 4th century as a result of the invasion of Sasanian King Shapur II in Armenia. According to the Armenian historians, between 3rd and the 5th centuries they made about one hundred thousand Armenians immigrate to Iran. New Armenian settlements were established in the Northern part of Iran in the 11th century as a result of Seljuks' invasions. And finally, new Armenian settlements were created in Iran as a result of the deportation of Armenian people organized by Safavid Abbas I (Abbas the Great) at the beginning of the 17th century [14: 193-194; 5: 13-15; 20: 41-61; 22: 22-25; 22: 248-253]. Abbas I settled the Armenians in Isfahan; however he allowed them to choose any place they would like to live in [9: 26]. Historically, Armenians lived in Tabriz, Salmast, Urmia, Gharadagh, Maragha, Maku, Ardabil, New Julfa, Kyarvand, Peria (Fereydan), Charmahal, Masjed Soleyman, Aghajari, Abadan, Khoramshahr, Ahvaz, and Shiraz etc. [24: 30-41; 13: 132-141]. Until the mid-40s of the 20th century, the Armenian community in Iran was conditionally divided into two parts: Northern part (with Tabriz as the center) and Southern part (with New Julfa as the center) [15: 150-151].

The education in Iran until the 70s of the 19th century had a scholastic nature [34: 5]. In 1854 the Ministry of Education was established in order to regulate educational process in the country. Intellectuals began to discuss the issue of the "Europeanization" of the educational system. The issue of creating new books for secular schools also became subject to discussion. Public activist and writer Mirza Melkum Khan (1833-1908) insisted on the implementation of the European educational system in Iran [33: 10-12; 33: 47-49]. Next to the mosques there were schools called *madrassa* in Iran. In those schools the Muslim priests taught the learners to read and write. European-type educational institutions were established in Iran due to efforts of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar in the 70s of the 19th century. In honor of Qajar prince Muzaffar ad-Din, the theological schools in Tabriz were called *Muzafferiye*. Soon many schools were opened in Tehran, the most famous one being "Dār ul-Funun" where the students were taught physics, algebra, geography, history, arithmetic, French, etc [35: 155-160; 34: 8-10; 34: 30-31; 25: 211-213]. The higher schools where Persians received religious education were called *talabiyeh* [25: 215-220].

In 1828 Eastern Armenia was annexed to Russia under the Treaty of Turkmenchay, and about 45 thousand Armenians from the Northern provinces of Iran moved to Yerevan and Nakhichevan [14: 196]. During the reign of Naser al-Din Shah, some decrees were published, which forbade forced religious conversions of Armenian people and put an end to the restrictions on Armenians [24: 9]. The existence of Armenian schools in Iran was allowed by proclamations

of shah, and at the beginning of the 20th century it was allowed by the constitution. Until 1936 Armenian schools in Iran had autonomy; they organized teaching in their native language and with their preferred curriculum. The curriculum of those schools was mostly the same as in Armenian schools in the Caucasus [16: 58].

In the 12th-13th centuries, there were schools called “khalfa” in the Armenian community of Iran: those schools were located in churches and monasteries. The students used to sit on the ground, and the priest taught them to read and write. The purpose of “khalfa” schools was to teach literacy, and those schools had religious nature. In the Armenian community of Iran secular schools were formed in the first half of the 19th century [24: 179; 25: 120].

In the first half of the 19th century, on the example of Armenian educational and cultural centers in the Caucasus the first schools in the Armenian community in Iran were established. The first schools were opened in New Julfa, Tabriz, and Tehran [25: 120].

In the middle of the 19th century, Armenian Catholicos Nerses Ashtaraketsi put the basis of regular primary schools in Armenian community of Iran. The first centres of Armenian education were established in Tabriz and New Julfa [25: 106-107]. Those schools were under the attention of the Persian state; it is no coincidence that the Qajar Mozaffar ad-Din Shah with a special *farman*² granted Armenians the privilege to open Armenian schools [see the full text of the decree 25: 109].

Armenian schools had the function of protecting and preserving Armenian language and cultural heritage; however the study of different languages, including Persian, at schools, facilitated the further integration of students into the social and economic life of Iran, and also offered opportunities for them to be engaged in science. In Middle Ages, when many people had no opportunity to study at school, Armenian merchants considered it important to give education to their children [6: 61-66; 1: 5-6].

It is interesting to mention that in 1750, an Armenian resident of Madras city in India Petros Voskanyan bequeathed money to open a school in New Julfa: that school intended to teach Armenian, Persian and Latin [1: 7]. The project to establish the school was not fulfilled, but it is interesting to pay attention to the choice of the languages they intended to teach at that school.

Armenian priest Yedgaryan mentioned in his book dedicated to Charmahal province of Iran that although the Armenians of Charmahal tried to preserve their mother tongue, they also studied Persian, Turkish, and Luri [9: 30].

² FARMĀN (OPers. framānā, Mid. Pers. framān; Arabized pl. farāmīn), decree, command, order, judgement. In historical as well as contemporary administrative and political usage the term often denotes a royal or governmental decree, that is a public and legislative document promulgated in the name of the ruler or another person (e.g., prince, princess, governor) holding partial elements of sovereignty [44].

It is mentioned in the book of Yedgaryan (published in 1963): “Over 50 years ago, in the Armenian villages of Charmahal only 6-7 people could read Farsi: those people were considered to be outstanding individuals and favored among the population in the province.” [9: 60]. Yedgaryan noted: “...reading and writing Persian was a necessity: for instance, the children of modern village headmen always deal with Persian village heads, governors and other Iranian officials, thus they [Armenian village headmen] have to teach their sons Farsi. However, this had its effect on the society; the villagers become jealous, and many people do the same thing [learn Persian]. Thus, the number of people who learn Farsi in the province is increasing every day.” [9: 60-62].

Since the beginning of the 17th century, New Julfa has become the main cultural center of the Armenian community in Iran. The first Armenian schools were opened here in (or near) the churches and monasteries. Those schools were exclusively religious until the first half of the 19th century [25: 106, 25: 110]. The Armenians of Julfa were not only good craftsmen, but also successful traders. It is noteworthy that the merchants considered it important to provide education to their children [6: 61-66; 1: 5-6]. In 1630, the first school was established in Amenaprkich Monastery. In 1710, Muradian Surb Hakob (St. Hakob) and Surb Stepanos (St. Stepanos) schools were opened [10: 6-7]. In the 17th-18th centuries the most famous school of Julfa was that of monastery Surb Amenaprkich (St. Amenaprkich): that school was often called University [26: 335; 19: 116-117; 16: 5; 35: 387-500]. In the 19th century schools of monasteries Surb Astvatsatsin (St. Astvatsatsin), Surb Minas (St. Minas), and Surb Stepanos were famous [16: 7].

In 1830s a school named Amenprkchyan Seminary was opened due to the support of Grigor Samyan, an Armenian philanthropist from Madras [16: 8; 13: 210; 35: 133]. The school provided its students with proper education which fully met the requirements of that time. This was probably due to the fact that the school curriculum was based on that of Lazaryan Seminary in Moscow [34: 55]. In 1837, this school was closed, but it was reopened in 1840. In this school, Armenian grammar, arithmetic and calligraphy, history, English and Persian were taught. The school continued its activity until 1853. Then, thanks to the financial support of the Armenian philanthropist Margar Sukiasyan, Samyan school functioned for 30 more years, until it merged with the National Central School of Julfa [1: 17; 35: 588-590]. In 1840, a school was opened in the courtyard of Astvatsatsin Church in Maidantagh district of New Julfa due to the financial aid of Harutyun Abgaryan, an Armenian merchant living in Calcutta (India). In 1843 a two-story building was built for the school that was later named *Haykian hayrenasirakan usumnan* (lit: Haykian Patriotic Seminary) [16: 7; 13: 210]. This school functioned for 40 years. At school, the Armenian young people of Julfa studied religion, elementary arithmetic, Armenian and Persian [1: 10; 23: 271; 35: 590-591].

In 1834, Karapet Sarafyan, an Armenian merchant living in Tehran, wanted to bequeath 1.000 tumans to Surb Amenprkich Monastery of New Julfa in order to open a school for twelve adopted children and teach them Armenian, Russian,

Persian and French. However, because of his bankruptcy, the plan to build the school was not realized [1: 17; 35: 592-593].

In 1841, a Frenchman, named Bori, taught Armenian, Persian and French at the school he founded in New Julfa [1: 8]. Due to the dispute between followers of Catholic and Armenian Apostolic churches, Bori closed the school, left the country, went to Istanbul and opened another school there [35: 591-593].

In 1853, in New Julfa the school of Surb Minas Church was opened with the financial means of Mariam Harutyunyan and Taguhi Manukyan, two Armenian sisters who lived in Java [1: 15-16]. In 1858, a girls' school was opened next to the Katarinyan nunnery in New Julfa. It was the first girls' school in Iran [13: 210; 16: 20; 1: 24; 25: 110].

In the 19th century, in New Julfa, the Persian language was taught along with other subjects [16: 57-58]. In the 1880s, 3 schools in the courtyards of the three churches in New Julfa were merged, and the National Central School of Julfa was established [10: 7; 16: 9-16; 1: 19; 13: 210-211].

After the schools were united and made more regular, textbooks were brought from Tbilisi, then books were published in New Julfa and Tabriz: they used to teach French, Russian, and Persian [16: 61]. In the curriculum and schedule of the Armenian schools of New Julfa introduced by Minasyan among different subjects, one can see the Persian language as well [16: 63-66]. New teachers and educators arrived to Armenian schools of Iran from the Tbilisi. They modified the old ways of teaching, renovated educational methods and adapted them to foreign educational methods. The subjects included in the curriculum were: religion, the Armenian language and literature, Grabar³, Persian, history of Persia and geography, foreign language, Armenian history, general history, geography, arithmetic, algebra, geometry, cosmology, accounting, physics, chemistry, natural sciences, healthcare, pedagogy and psychology, use of visual aids, painting, song-recording, and handicrafts [see the distribution of subjects in different grades in [16: 65-66].

Armenian educational institutions in Iran enjoyed not only the patronage and care, but also the control of the government. In the sources where the names of Armenian teachers are mentioned one can also see the names of Persian male and female teachers who worked in Armenian mixed-gender schools of New Julfa [16: 113-127]. It is noteworthy that at the beginning of the 20th century, young people from Charmahal and surrounding villages as well used to come to New Julfa to continue their education [20: 551-553].

It is worth mentioning that between 1901-1905, due to Varvare Kananyan, a girls' school and a kindergarten named Gevorg Kananyan were established in New Julfa (in memory of Varvare Kananyan's husband, Gevorg Kananyan who had been an Armenian merchant in Moscow). Kananyan School was founded at a time

³ Classical Armenian.

when Armenian schools were being closed in the Russian Empire as a result of Golitsyn's⁴ anti-Armenian policy [13: 211; 1: 36-38; 1: 40-46; 16: 25; 25: 111].

The Armenian population of Tabriz mainly lived in two districts: Ghala (or Berdatagh) and Lilava (or Leylabad) [25: 23]. Armenians of Iran consider the beginning of the history of modern school education to date 1835. It is the year when Aramyan school in Tabriz was established. At first, it was situated in several rooms in an old building of the prelicity in Tabriz. In 1850s the separate building of the school was built [13: 211]. Until 1875, the school was called Nersisyan (in honor of Nerses Shnorhali), and later it was called Aramyan (in honour of the Armenian philanthropist Aramyan) [24: 199-200; 25: 107; 25: 114].

In August 1879, a girls' school was established in Ghala. In 1883, the Tumanyan brothers (members of Tumanyan trading house) bought a new building for the Ghala school. It was not suitable for classes, and so it was demolished. In 1887 a new one was built and was called Annayan. After several years Aramyan school moved there and became a mixed-gender school. Then the national school of Ghala was called Aramyan-Annayan. Soon, thanks to Tumanyan brothers, the two-story building of Haykazyan School was built in Lilava district [24: 200; 11: 138; 13: 211]. In 1882, Haykazyan male school was established, and in 1895 Tamaryan School was opened in Tabriz [24: 200-201; 13: 211-212]. The curriculum of Aramyan school was in Armenian and included the teaching of foreign languages (Persian, Russian and French). Initially, it was a male school, but in 1887, after moving to the new building of the Annayan school by Tumanyan family, the school was merged with the girls' school and became a mixed-gender school named Aramyan-Annayan National School. Aramyan school played a key role in the education of Armenians in Iran. It had around 1.300 graduates until 1936, when Shah Reza Pahlavi banned the teaching of the Armenian language in the country and ordered to close national schools [11: 138]. It is known that in 1896 Aramyan and Haykazian-Tamaryan schools were united, but in 1897 they were separated [24: 201].

During the constitutional movement the central diocesan secondary school was founded in Tabriz in 1909, and Haykazyan-Tamaryan schools became elementary schools [23: 210-213]. The diocesan central school of Atrpatakan, founded in 1909, later became a role-model not only for Armenian schools in Iran, but also for Iranian schools. In the 1920s, the cultural influence of the Caucasus and Russia was great on Armenian schools of Iran. In those years, teachers came to Iran from the Tbilisi, and brought educational literature. The teaching was based on the curriculum of Nersisyan School of Tbilisi, which was adapted to local needs and conditions [12: 179]. Among the 36 weekly hours provided by the curriculum, 15 were for language learning. It was distributed as follows: 5 hours for the

⁴ Grigory Golitsyn was a Russian general and statesman. In 1896 he was appointed commander of the Caucasian military district. Grigory Golitsyn was one of the initiators of the adoption of the law on the closure of Armenian schools.

Armenian language, 4 hours for Russian, and 3 hours for Persian, 3 hours for French [18: 87-90]. They tried to use the curriculum of the Armenian schools in the Caucasus in the Armenian school of Tabriz, and also to invite teachers from Tbilisi [18: 80; 25: 109]. In one of sources regarding the teaching of languages in the Armenian diocesan school of Atrpatakan, it is mentioned that the Persian teacher came and taught for an hour per day. The girls did not learn Persian; they learned needlework instead [18: 21].

In the 1911-1912 school year, the total number of students in the Armenian diocesan school of Atrpatakan reached 74. The students of the school were mostly former graduates of Aramyán and Haykazyan-Tamaryán schools of Tabriz who had completed a six-year course of education. During the first four years of the school's activity the number of subjects taught was doubled. In the 1915-1916 school year, the school was closed and did not function; in the 1916-1917 school year, the school was reopened [18: 63-66]. It is interesting that the role of the diocesan school of Tabriz is great in the disappearing of the old Armenian dialect of Tabriz. Thousands of boys and girls stopped speaking their dialect, because they learned the literary language at school, and also took the literary language home. Except for languages, all subjects were taught in Armenian [18: 26, 18: 66].

In the 1916-1917 school year, in the schedule for the 4th and 5th grades, a person named Mirza Jafar is mentioned as the teacher of the Persian language. In the 4th and 5th grades, they studied Persian 3 times a week. It was mentioned that in the 1917-1918 school year, Mirza Jafar taught Persian in all grades [18: 77, 1818: 81]. On September 21, 1917, the educators of the school discussed the issue of textbooks or notebook-textbooks. However, in the source it is not mentioned what kinds of textbooks would be used for teaching Persian [18: 82]. There were mentioned different books for teaching different subjects in the 1918-1919 school year, but nothing was noted about textbooks for teaching the Persian language [18: 89-90].

The first Armenian residents in Tehran were 7 families who were brought as hostage by Agha Muhammad Khan from Karabakh. They lived in the district called Darwaza-Ghazvin, located in the western part of Tehran. In 1790-1795, Armenians built Surb Gevorg (St. Gevorg) Church. Later Fath-Ali Shah Qajar brought 10 other Armenian families who were glassmakers from New Julfa. They settled in the Darwaza-Shah-Abdul-Azím district in the south of the city and in 1908 they built Surb Tadevos and Bardughimeos (St. Thaddeus and Bartholomew) Church [3: 394]. In 1870 Usumnasirats Miutyun was established in Tehran which in the same year established Haykazyan school in the Darvaze Ghazvin district of Tehran [3: 396]. The school used the curriculum of Caucasian schools, but from time to time it was subject to change. In Haykazyan school the educational process was organized according to the educational methods of the time, and the classrooms were equipped with new tables and chairs for the students [38]. In the 1930-1931 curriculum of Haykazyan mixed-gender school in Tehran the number of English and Persian lessons increased [29].

As mentioned, the first public school called Haykazyan was opened in Tehran in 1870. However, before that, since the 1850s, the children of Armenian community of Tehran had been attending the “khalfa” schools located in the churches. In the beginning, the Haykazyan school was also located in the church. In 1884 Usumnasirats Miutyun constructed a new building for the school [24: 192-193].

In 1903, in the northern part of Tehran, in Hasanabad district, a building was made and three classes were opened as a branch of Haykazyan school in Darvaze Ghazvin. Until 1906-1907 Haykazian schools in two districts of Tehran were male, but there were also separate classes for girls. Soon, thanks to the efforts of the teachers and the trustees, the female students stopped wearing *chadras*, the classes were combined, and the school was declared to be mixed-gender [24: 193]. In 1910, the new Haykazyan school was built in the Hassanabad district of Tehran [13: 212].

Until 1890, mainly Armenian teachers from Iran and Turkey taught in Haykazyan school, but later Armenian educators from the Tbilisi were also invited. Starting with January 1892, Hovhannes Khan Masehyan, a well-known diplomat, the first ambassador of Iran to Japan, who also taught Persian and French, was supervising the school. Hovhannes Khan Masehyan taught Persian until the relevant textbooks were compiled [21: 10-12], and after that, a Persian teacher was invited to teach the Persian language. Here they used to teach Armenian, Armenian grammar, Persian, French, geography of Armenia, general geography, Armenian history, general history, algebra, music; since 1892 they also taught gymnastics [30: 227-228]. In 1891-1892, the first Armenian school for girls was founded in Tehran. In 1891, the National School was opened in Darvaze Ghazvin district, and in 1903 another school was opened in Darvaze Dovlat district [13: 212-213]. In 1932-1933, Armenian philanthropist from India Davit Davtyan visited the Davtyan mixed-gender school in Terhan, where the students were taught Persian. Before the closure of the national schools in 1936, the teaching process was organized in Armenian, and after the schools were again opened, the teaching was conducted in Persian [12: 184].

In the provinces of Iran Armenian schools were established in the last quarter of the 19th century [24: 202]. In 1881, in Salmast the basis of regular school was laid [25: 120]. In the villages of Gharadagh and its surroundings the first schools were opened in the 1890s. Maragha school was founded in 1880s, but back in 1876 some large rooms of a number of houses in the city were used as classrooms [24: 202-203]. In 1889-1900, due to the efforts of the Armenian women’s charitable society of Tabriz, some schools were opened in Urmia, Maku, Gharadagh, Baranduz, among other places [13: 211-213]. In the 1920s, there was an Armenian school in Vanak village near Tehran, where Persian was also taught [12: 184]. In 1923, Persian was also taught in the Armenian school of Ghazvin [12: 185-186]. In 1931, in Armenian National School called Surb Lusavorcyan (St. Lusavorcyan) and established in Hamadan some subjects taught in Persian increased from 30 and

reached to 70 [27]. In the 1850s, an Armenian school was founded in Khoysan⁵. The school was next to the church and had 2 rooms, but in 1896 it was renovated; an attic and a large room was built. Then an Armenian teacher was invited from New Julfa to teach Persian and English [17: 241].

It was mentioned in the sources that in the 19th century secular schools were established in Tabriz and New Julfa, under the influence of the Armenian cultural centers of the Caucasus. Before and after 1905 under the influence of the first Russian revolution school education found its way to the remote regions of Iran. In 1904, an Armenian school was established in Hamadan, and in 1905-1909, Armenian schools were established in Ghazvin, Mashhad, Sultanabad (Arak), Resht, and Enzeli. There were few Armenian schools in Peria province, and there were few Armenian schools in Burvari, Gyapla, Kamara and Kazaz provinces, which were around Arak [13: 212]. Persian was also taught in the Armenian school of Gerdabad village, in Khoysan school (founded in 1850), in Surb Minas school (opened in 1896), in the school of Boloran (founded in 1892), in the Armenian school of Rasht, in the school of Arzrukh village, and in National School of Karun (established in 1931) in Ahvaz [12: 195-196; 7: 98; 17: 241]. In the 1932-1933 school year, in Armenian school of Sultanabad among 230 hours, 57 were distributed to teaching Persian, which later increased and reached to 81 hours [26; 28]. In 1923, Armenian students in Vardanyan school in Ghazvin had Persian classes [39]. The curriculum of Ghazvin school did not correspond to the program of the public schools, and graduates could not hold positions [12: 186]. Very often Persians also studied in Armenian schools. For example, in 1924, there were 3 Armenian and 9 Persian students in the school of village called Nerkin Chanakhchi (in Gharaghan province) [12: 187; 191]. In 1923, there were 7 teachers in Rasht National School called Mkrtich Avetis Hordananyan [40]. In 1936, 5 Armenian and 3 Iranian teachers worked in the old Armenian National School (established in 1924) Arian of Kermanshah. There were 8 Armenian and 2 Persian teachers in the Armenian school founded in 1908 in Sultanabad. There were 230 weekly hours for classes in the school of Sultanabad: 157 hours of classes were in Armenian, 57 hours in Persian, and 16 hours in English [12: 190-193].

In the 19th and 20th centuries, European and American missionary schools had a great influence in Iran [12: 179; 12: 182-183; 34: 12-15]. The French carried out even wider missionary activities. They opened schools for Armenians and Assyrians in Tehran, Tabriz, New Julfa, Isfahan and Salmast. The French Catholic Mission Saint Lazare and Sisters of Charity together opened 76 schools. The Protestants also had missionary schools in Julfa. In the 1920s, in Iran's educational system schools were separated from the church, and the influence of missionaries on the country weakened [1: 30-32; 1: 54-55; 25: 111-112; 25: 117]. Though Armenian students attended missionary schools, we have not studied the issue of the teaching of Persian in missionary schools.

⁵ Khoysan is an Armenian village in Iran, situated 140 kilometres northwest of Isfahan.

It is interesting that when the Iranian government did not aim to level the schools or to implement one common program in all schools, different classes of the society did not always warmly accept the study of Persian by Armenians. Armenian priest Yedgaryan mentioned in his work: “It is necessary to bear in mind that Armenian people who know Persian are persecuted by the ignorant Persian people in their province, with the argumentation “why a nation with a different religion could speak their language and use their script.” With such perceptions, the son of the village head of Ahmadabad, young man Hovsep, was killed by the Persians from the neighboring village about 50 years ago and was thrown into the well next to the mentioned village. After 5-6 days, they could barely find him, take him out and bury him. However, these and similar prohibitions and persecutions do not stop the process; the educated Armenian people of the province are thriving towards enlightenment and development with increasing momentum.” [9: 60-62].

It is interesting that over time girls also started learning Persian in Armenian schools and it was not only for boys. It is mentioned that at the beginning of the 20th century, there was also a vocational school in Masjid-Suleiman, where girls not only learned to weave carpets, but also studied the Persian language [12: 200].

During 1905-1911, the constitutional movement in Iran, there was a debate for creating relevant Iranian education system. Articles 18 and 19 of the Constitution accepted accepted by Majles⁶ stated the need to establish a secular educational system under the supervision of the Ministry of Education. In 1911, a law on education was passed, according to which elementary education was declared mandatory [36: 343].

At that time theoretical subjects prevailed in Armenian schools, which is why often parents preferred non-Armenian schools for their children. Thus, Armenian schools tried to make education and knowledge more practical. In the 1930-1931 school year, in Haykazyan mixed-gender school, they paid more attention to teaching natural subjects and allocated more hours to those subjects, and the number of the classes of Persian and English increased [12: 182].

Besides that, in one of sources there is information about the classes of the 1926-1927 school year in Armenian school of Atrpatakan. There was the list of classes the students studied. The following subjects were mentioned: Geography of Armenia, History of Armenian Literature, Armenian Language, and *ashkharabar*⁷. Persian was not in that list [18: 173-175]. In the educational bulletin of teaching program of the 1919-1920 school year of the Armenian diocesan central school of Atrpatakan it is mentioned that the parents requested to add English classes in addition to French. It was also mentioned about looking for a new teacher of Persian. Famous Armenian linguist Hrachya Acharyan was the teacher of French in that school [18: 105-106].

⁶ Islamic Consultative Assembly.

⁷ Language of Armenian literature in the 19th century.

Among the biographies of Armenian teachers of the Armenian diocesan central school of Atrpatakan, the biography of the teacher of the Persian language Jafar Akhgari was also mentioned. In 1920-1921 Jafar Akhgari was invited as the teacher of the Persian language and taught in that school until 1935-1936. After Armenian schools were closed, he worked for some time in the Armenian Prelacy of Atrpatakan as the person in charge of paperwork in Persian [18: 121-122].

Before the implementation of the state program in all schools, Armenian girls generally did not learn Persian; instead they practiced needlework and crafts during the class hours when boys studied Persian [18: 125]. After Qajar dynasty, in 1925, Reza Pahlavi was declared Shah in Persia. An educational reform was carried out during his reign. According to the reform, the administration of all schools had to be transferred from the religious class to the state. In the 1927-1928 school year, with the implementation of the program developed by the Ministry of Education, the class hours for a more profound teaching of the Persian language were increased. For example, Armenian schools were instructed to substitute Russian classes with Persian ones in Armenian schools of Gharadagh [18: 173-176].

In 1927, because of the demand of the Ministry of Education, the lessons of the Persian language were to be increased. In the 1927-1928 and subsequent school years, they had to include the history of Persia and Persian geography in the curriculum [18: 172]. In 1934, the Iranian government demanded the implementation of state educational program in all schools with a special calendar [12: 200]. In 1934, a decree was received according to which the state program had to also be used in diocesan school and all subjects had to be taught in Persian. All grades of the schools had to have 160 hours (for languages) per week: 67 hours were for Persian, 57 hours for Armenian, and 36 hours for French. Persian was to be taught using textbooks determined by the Ministry of Education [18: 189-191]. A committee was created under the Ministry of Education, and a special program for Armenian schools in Iran was developed. Iranian state educational program (first to sixth grades) defined 36 class lessons per week, with every class lesson lasting for 40-45 minutes for Armenian elementary schools. According to the timetable, 121 class hours were allocated to subjects taught in Persian, and 95 class hours were allocated to subjects taught in Armenian [12: 201; 43]. In this pretext, Armenian priest Yedgarian mentioned that after those reforms "...the Armenians were able to speak the language of the country better with their Persian neighbors." It was also mentioned that after that program people of Charmahal province, both male and female, became literate [9: 32].

In 1935, national schools adopted the common educational program of the state. Armenian schools were closed all over Iran. the state education program penetrated into Armenian schools: they used to study religion or Armenian language once or twice a week, in mixed groups (classes) with Persian children [16: 39, 16: 47, 16: 66].

Starting from the 1935-1936 school year, only those national schools could continue their existence in Iran which would operate according to the educational

program arranged by the Ministry of Education and would have inspectors who had graduated from secondary school and knew Persian very well: the mother tongue would be taught out of the frames of the educational program, 10 hours per week. Armenian schools, unfortunately, had serious staff problems because of those regulations and requirements. There was a shortage of Armenian teachers with even a sixth grade certificate, and Armenian schools were closed [16: 48]. Armenian students had to attend other schools where “everyone was Armenian, but they did not learn the Armenian language” [2: 41].

In 1936, Reza Shah ordered Minister of Education Mulla Tadayon to develop an educational program and instructed Armenian schools to be guided by that program. That meant that teaching in Armenian schools would be held in Persian [8: 293]. In 1936, Armenian schools lost the right to autonomy. All Armenian schools were closed, the buildings and property of those schools were confiscated [24: 190]. In 1936 Armenian diocesan central school of Atrpatakan was also closed [18: 193]. In 1936, Armenian schools in Tabriz were also closed. The buildings of Armenian schools were used for Persian schools. In 1956 after the the national schools⁸ in Iran were reopened, those buildings were not returned to the Armenian schools [24: 201].

In response to the personal request by Archbishop Melik Tangian, on December 20, 1941, Reza Shah gave permission to teach the Armenian language in the Armenian schools of Iran [4: 29].

With the implementation of the new educational program, the Armenian language and religion were taught for 1 or 2 hours per week, and with great difficulty, because it was done in one class mixed with non-Armenian children. This continued until the re-nationalization of schools in 1955. After the re-nationalization of schools, along with state educational program, subjects in Armenian were also taught in Armenian schools (8-10 hours in lower grades and 4-6 hours in higher grades). Apart from the 2 hours of religion class per week, these classes were out of the curriculum, but traditionally fit into the timetable [16: 55; 7: 70-75].

After the Islamic revolution on November 11, 1981, the 20-point circular was published by the Ministry of Education of Iran: according to that, in schools it was banned to teach subjects in Armenian, but later, in the 1994-1995 school year, it was allowed to teach Armenian for 2 hours in the 4th grade of secondary school and four hours in 1st, 2nd and 3rd grades each [7: 60-62].

Thus, in the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, the Armenian schools of Iran were influenced by the Armenian schools of the Caucasus, the curriculum was formed in accordance with the requirements of the time, and the teaching of the Persian language facilitated the integration of men into economic and social life. Men were engaged in crafts and trade, active not

⁸ National schools of national minorities.

only in the community but also outside the community. Until the beginning of 20th century, studying the Persian language was not mandatory for girls in Armenian mixed-gender schools, because women lived an intra-community life and were not active outside the community. At the beginning of the 20th century the Armenian schools of Iran were under influence of the Armenian schools of the Caucasus and the methods used there. During that period, they began to bring educational literature from the Caucasus, and would sometimes invite teachers from Tbilisi. The Persian language continued to contribute to the future social and cultural integration of the Armenian students into social and economic life: very often Persian teachers were involved in teaching Persian at Armenian schools. In 1905-1911, during the the constitutional movement there was debate regarding the formation of the Iranian relevant educational system, and Persian language classes became more widespread in Armenian schools. During the reign of Reza Shah, an educational reform was carried out in the country. The management of all schools in the country came under the control of the state, and the teaching of Persian gradually became mandatory in all Armenian schools of Iran. Soon, Reza Shah authorized that Armenian language could be taught in Armenian schools of Iran. After the Islamic revolution, subjects taught in Armenian were banned, but later it was allowed to teach Armenian in secondary schools.

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19-ՐԴ ԴԱՐԻ ԵՐԿՐՈՐԴ ԿԵՍԻՆ ԵՎ 20-ՐԴ ԴԱՐԻ ԱՌԱՋԻՆ ԿԵՍԻՆ ԻՐԱՆԻ ՀԱՅԿԱԿԱՆ ԴՊՐՈՑՆԵՐՈՒՄ ՊԱՐՍԻՑ ԼԵԶՎԻ ԴԱՍԱՎԱՆԴՄԱՆ ՇՈՒՐՋ

Թերեզա Ամրյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ Իրան, համայնք, հայկական դպրոցներ, պարսկերեն, ուսուցում, նպատակ, Կովկաս, սփյուռք, մանկավարժություն, ուսուցիչ, ուսումնական պլան, ժամանակացույց, դասացուցակ:

Հոդվածում անդրադարձ է կատարվել 19-րդ դարի երկրորդ կեսին և 20-րդ դարի առաջին կեսին Իրանի հայկական դպրոցների գործունեությանը և այդ դպրոցներում պարսկերենի ուսուցմանը: Հետազոտության նպատակն է քննու-

թյան առարկա դարձնել այդ ժամանակահատվածում պարսկերենի ուսուցումը հայկական դպրոցներում: Հետազոտության իրականացման համար կիրառվել են պատմական և պատմահամեմատական մեթոդներ: 19-րդ դարի երկրորդ կեսին և 20-րդ դարի սկզբին Իրանի հայկական դպրոցները կրում էին Կովկասի հայկական դպրոցների ազդեցությունը: Հաճախ Թբիլիսիից ուսումնական գրականություն էր բերվում Իրան, երբեմն էլ ուսուցիչներ էին հրավիրում: Իրանի հայկական դպրոցներում այլ օտար լեզուների հետ մեկտեղ նաև պարսկերեն էին դասավանդում: Սահմանադրական շարժման տարիներին հայկական դպրոցներում պարսից լեզվի դասաժամերն ավելացան: Ռեզա շահի օրոք երկրի բոլոր դպրոցների տնօրինումը անցավ պետության վերահսկողության ներքո, և բոլոր դպրոցներում պարսկերենի դասավանդումը դարձավ պարտադիր: Այսպիսով, 19-րդ դարի երկրորդ կեսին պարսկերենի ուսուցումը նպաստում էր ուսանողների ինտեգրմանը տնտեսական և հասարակական կյանքին, սակայն կրթական բարեփոխումներից և դպրոցական ծրագրի ստանդարտացումից հետո Իրանի բոլոր հայկական դպրոցներում պարսկերենի ուսուցումը աստիճանաբար դարձավ պարտադիր և ստանդարտացված:

THE GERMAN-TURKISH RELATIONS DURING THE MACEDONIAN REFORMS (1903-1908)*

Gao Jianzhi

Abstract

In February 1903, with the introduction of Austro-Russian “The Vienna Scheme”, the Macedonian issue became a European-wide problem. The diplomatic games of the Great Powers over the Macedonian reforms became one of the key factors affecting the adjustment of relations among the Great Powers. In order to expand its influence in Turkey and develop German-Turkish relations, Germany mostly stayed out of the Concert of Europe on Macedonian reforms and hindered the reform process. However, when faced with a choice between Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, Germany sided with its ally Austria-Hungary. The Ottoman Empire took advantage of the differences among the Great Powers on the Macedonian reforms to slow down the reform process as much as possible and maintain the integrity of its European territory. However, in the face of the coercive power of the Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire’s claims of sovereignty and struggles often faced failures. In order to avoid the complete collapse of the Empire, the Ottoman Empire tried to develop German-Turkish friendship during the Macedonian reforms, and this diplomatic choice became the main basis for the implementation of national policy in the future and promoted the reorganization of the European power structure.

Keywords: Macedonian Reforms, the Ottoman Empire, Diplomatic Games, German-Turkish Relations.

Introduction

At the beginning of the 20th century, an uprising against the Ottoman Empire broke out in Macedonia which successfully attracted the attention of the Great Powers. From 1903 onward, the Great Powers engaged in a fierce diplomatic game over Macedonian reforms. The Ottoman Empire, as the country concerned, tried to take advantage of the contradictions among the Great Powers to win Germany’s support in the process of Macedonian reforms and implement the policy of resistance to the reforms. Why did Germany, which originally claimed to have no direct interests in the Balkans, become involved in Macedonian affairs? What foreign policies did Germany and the Ottoman Empire adopt respectively in the process of Macedonian reforms? What impacts did the adjustment of the German-Turkish relations have on the subsequent international situation? All of this deserved an in-depth study. This article used the diplomatic archives of Britain, France and Germany as the basis to study, and took the Macedonian reforms as a case study to explore the process of the evolution of the German-Turkish relations,

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in order to enrich the scholarly understanding of the diplomatic games and reorganization of power among the Great Powers before the First World War.

The internationalization of Macedonian Issue and the involvement of German powers

The origins of the Macedonian issue could be traced back to the Treaty of San Stefano signed by Russia and the Ottoman Empire in March 1878. The core of the treaty was the creation of Greater Bulgaria, which brought Macedonia into the international spotlight for the first time. However, Britain and Austria-Hungary argued that the treaty would destroy the balance of power of the Balkans; they proposed amendments to the treaty and convened international conferences. As a result of Anglo-Austrian intervention, the Treaty of Berlin, signed in July 1878, negated the main results of the Treaty of San Stefano; Greater Bulgaria was divided into three parts, and Macedonia was returned to the rule of the Ottoman Empire. Under the provisions of Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, the Ottoman Empire committed itself to implementing reforms in all its European provinces [20: 460-461; 4: 213-214]. However, the Turkish government lacked willingness to implement the reform programs, which delayed the reforms in Macedonia. In the quarter century following the Treaty of Berlin, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia, the major Balkan states, began to infiltrate to Macedonia, which was called “no man’s land” or “residuum” of the Balkans [11: 362], through cultural, religious and linguistic points of view, they tried to incorporate all or part of Macedonia into their own territory, so as to realize their dreams of regional hegemony. The fierce competition among the Balkan states for Macedonia, coupled with the influence of European nationalism, contributed to the awakening of Macedonian nationalism. The Macedonian revolutionary groups established in the course of nationalism propaganda took advantage of the Balkan countries’ quest for regional hegemony and frequently launched armed uprisings, eventually forcing a fundamental change in the attitude of the European powers, which had long been on the sidelines. In 1903, the Austro-Russian “Vienna Scheme” was introduced, and the Macedonian issue was officially upgraded into a European issue.

In the process of Macedonian Europeanization, Germany continuously exercised its influence. In 1881, the League of the Three Emperors reaffirmed the existing Macedonian status by stipulating that Bulgaria was not to extend its influence into the Macedonian region. During the Bulgarian crisis of 1885-1887, Bismarck proposed to the Turkish government that their main forces were to be deployed in Macedonia in order to avoid serious consequences [16: 88]. In addition, Bismarck was also deeply concerned about Greek conspiracies in Macedonia [16: 94].

In the mid-1890s, Macedonian revolutionary groups took advantage of the Turkish government’s suppression of the Armenian national movement and the Eastern Questions caused by the Greek-Turkish War to launch several uprisings, which further complicated the already volatile Balkan situation. In May 1895, the German *chargé d’affaires ad hoc* in Constantinople mentioned that the Macedoni-

ans were eager for regional autonomy and demanded reforms from the Turkish government in accordance with Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin; at this point, a bloody and deadly rebellion by Macedonians could not be ruled out [13: 121-122]. In July, Prime Minister Hohenlohe mentioned that the Macedonian issue was entering a dangerous phase, and that the Armenian movement for autonomy had stimulated the Macedonians' desire to break away from Turkish rule and to strive for a union with Bulgaria [13: 124]. In November, the German ambassador to Austria-Hungary stated that revolutionary movements were being awakened in Macedonia and that the situation would be critical if the Turkish government did not gain a firm foothold in the Balkans [12: 163]. In view of the serious situation in Macedonia, the German ambassador in Constantinople proposed that the Great Powers could intervene jointly in Macedonian affairs, on the one hand, to suppress the ambitions of the Balkan states, and, on the other hand, to urge the Sultan to agree to implement reforms in Macedonia as soon as possible, so as to preserve the status quo in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire [12: 128].

In order to avoid further deterioration of the situation in the Balkans, Germany issued a stern warning to the Bulgarian government and its support of Macedonian revolutionary groups, in an attempt to quell the potential renewed unrest in Macedonia. Germany noted it doubted that the Great Powers would support the existing Bulgarian government if European countries decided that the actions in Macedonia were motivated solely by Bulgarian instigation [13:123]. However, German attempts to quell the Near East crisis were thwarted again by the Greco-Turkish War of 1897. According to Hohenlohe, the Greek government had already planned to attack the Turkish frontier in Macedonia in the future, and the Serbian and Bulgarian armed forces would attack the Turks immediately. Therefore, only strong combined pressure from St. Petersburg and Vienna could deter the restless souls of Sofia and Belgrade. Germany supported Austro-Russian cooperation, and would be more than happy to help if Russia needed German cooperation in Vienna [13: 141]. The Secretary of State Marschall also stated that as long as Russia and Austria-Hungary were coordinated, both countries would not tolerate the peace and order in Macedonia being broken by any Balkan countries [13: 144]. In 1897, the Austro-Russian agreement was signed under the strong impetus of Germany. Despite attempts by Russia and Austria-Hungary to maintain the status quo in the Balkans and to avoid the spread of unrest in Macedonia, the situation in Macedonia did not improve [14: 516-520]. In December 1898, the German ambassador in Constantinople mentioned that in the local diplomatic circles, the Macedonian issue had become the main topic of political dialogue, that it was only a matter of time before a catastrophe in Macedonia, and the intervention of the Great Powers had become indispensable, but that the Macedonian region was full of fierce conflicts between different Christian peoples, which prevented the final settlement of the problem, and the Turkish government enjoyed such strife, so it was necessary for the Great Powers to act in concert to urge the Turkish government to carry out reforms. In January 1899, after communication between German, British and Italian ambassa-

dors in Constantinople, they agreed that the Great Powers were to take joint action to urge the Sultan to improve the situation of Christians in Macedonia and to avoid the outburst of ethnic hatred. Macedonians would tend to remain stable if they realized that the Concert of Europe of the Great Powers was working to solve their problems [14: 527].

At the beginning of 20th century, Austria-Hungary and Russia decided to take the lead in Macedonia to avoid a war among the Balkan states over Macedonia and other Great Powers accessing the Balkan Peninsula, which they regarded as their own sphere of influence. On February 21, 1903, the Austro-Russian “Vienna Scheme” was formally submitted to the Turkish government, which requested the latter to carry out the necessary reforms; thus the Macedonian issue formally became a European-wide issue. Later, on the basis of the “Vienna Scheme”, Austria-Hungary and Russia further proposed the “Mürzsteg Programme” which involved more extensive contents.

Reasons for Germany’s involvement in Macedonian reforms

Germany originally did not have much interest in the Balkans, so Bismarck argued against sacrificing the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier for the sake of interests in the Balkans for several times. However, since the Berlin conference, German-Turkish relations had slowly developed in a friendly direction. The Treaty of Berlin brought Macedonia back under the Ottoman Turkish rule, made Eastern Rumelia autonomous, and limited Russian expansion in the Black Sea and the Balkans. Although the Ottoman Empire was no longer a de facto Great Power [1: 263], at least the treaty prevented Russian expansion into the Balkans, and preserved the temporary stability of the Ottoman Empire and the prestige of the Sultan. Germany’s actions objectively won the goodwill of the Ottoman Empire. The Turks believed that the Germans would provide protection from the Great Powers and would allow the Empire to continue its domestic reforms and eventually become strong enough to survive without their protection [19:132-133].

The reasons for Germany’s involvement in Macedonian reforms and the development of German-Turkish relations were manifold. Firstly, from the economic aspect, Germany’s economic penetration into the Ottoman Empire was constantly strengthening. In 1888, the Deutsche Bank made the first major loan to the Ottoman Empire. For Germany, the purpose of the loan was to facilitate Deutsche Bank’s entry into the financial sphere of the Ottoman Empire, and the loan would allow the Deutsche Bank to rise quickly to a position comparable to, or even higher than, that of the Imperial Ottoman Bank [19:144]. According to statistics, from 1888 to 1913, German investment in the Ottoman Empire rose from £166,000 to £20,653,000. The investments involved the construction of railways, ports and public works; as well as this, there were investments in banking, industry and mining. Of these, Germany had the greatest influence in railway and port construction and banking investment [22: 64-66]. Secondly, Germany’s political influence in the Ottoman Empire was increasing as German-Turkish economic ties grew closer. In

1898, under the background that the Ottoman Empire adopted the high-pressure policy against the Armenians, the major European Powers, especially Britain and France, unanimously supported many anti-Ottoman revolutionary groups; the Kaiser became the first head of European Powers to visit the Ottoman Empire and conveyed the message of support for the Sultan's regime. The chancellor, Bernhard von Bülow, recalled that during his visit to the Ottoman Empire, the Kaiser had assured His Majesty the Sultan and the 300 million Muslims who regarded him as their caliph that he would always be their friend, no matter where they lived on earth [2: 254]. Even after his return to Germany, the Kaiser did not forget to express his friendship for the Ottoman Empire, which he regarded as an example for other countries because of the absolute obedience of its subjects to the Sultan. Behind the improved relations between the two countries was Germany's intention to expand its influence in the Ottoman Empire. In this regard, scholars commented that one of the motivations for the Kaiser's visit to the Ottoman Empire was to obtain concessions for the Baghdad railway to the Persian Gulf, and this initial goal was quickly achieved after the visit [19: 185]. Thirdly, Germany and the Ottoman Empire had a good basis for cooperation in the military field, and the relationship between the two countries was further enhanced. On the one hand, Germany sent several military delegations to the Ottoman Empire to help the latter modernize its military system. Among them, Colmar Frieheer von der Goltz and Otto Limon von Sanders were the most representative. Goltz expressed satisfaction with his work in that after the reform of German officers, the Turkish army was ready to help the Germans in war and to ensure the survival of his country in the war, if not its revival [19: 91-192]. On the other hand, a new class of officers was formed in the course of the Ottoman Empire's reform in accordance with the German military model. They had close ties to German instructors; many Turkish officers believed in German military doctrine and intended to rely on the German military model and strength to reconstruct their weak military system. Their admiration for Germany enabled the latter to gain great influence in the political and military fields of the Empire, and Germany gradually assumed the role of the protectorate of the Ottoman Empire [19: 197-199].

Therefore, after the Berlin Conference, along with the continuous development and strengthening of German-Turkish relations, Germany realized that the Ottoman Empire was its necessary ally; without this partner, Germany could neither compete with Britain and Russia in the East and Asia, nor obtain the expected benefits [21: 127]. With Macedonian reforms on the agenda, German-Turkish relations changed.

German-Turkish foreign policy during the Macedonian reforms

Macedonian reforms were mainly concerned with three aspects: the gendarmerie, finances and justice. Throughout the period of Macedonian reforms, the established strategy of the Ottoman Empire was to take advantage of the contradictions among the Great Powers to win the support of Germany, to prevent the reforms

from advancing as much as possible, and to preserve the interests of the Empire and the prestige of the Sultan. Germany's strategy was to maintain the solidity of the Dual Alliance, support Austro-Russian leadership in the reforms, create obstacles for the reforms, minimize the loss of the Ottoman Empire, and promote the development of German-Turkish relations.

On the issue of the reorganization of the gendarmerie, the major powers proposed to grant foreign officers' full responsibility for the reorganization of the gendarmerie, increase the number of officers of the Great Powers and speed up the process of the reorganization. Faced with the proposal of the Great Powers, the Ottoman government responded with countermeasures.

On the same day that the Ottoman government announced its acceptance of the "Mürzsteg Programme", Britain proposed to send a certain number of officers to reorganize the gendarmerie, and the Great Powers could specify the duties of the officers, formulate rules of procedure and set up committees [6:144]. The British proposal was immediately supported by France and Italy. Austria-Hungary and Russia, on the other hand, advocated that they had to take the lead in matters of reforms. In addition, there was considerable disagreement among the Great Powers over the appointment of a foreign general to take charge of the reorganization of the gendarmerie. In order to draw Italy in and undermine the Triple Alliance, Britain proposed that an Italian hold the post [6:156]. Austria-Hungary, on the other hand, opposed the appointment of an Italian general in charge of the gendarmerie reorganization, fearing that Macedonian reforms would tilt in favor of Italy and facilitate its expansion in the western Balkans, which would harm Austria-Hungary's interests in the region. Faced with the disagreement among the Great Powers, the Ottoman Empire opposed the proposals of the Great Powers one by one.

First of all, the Ottoman government refused the proposals of the Military Commission, established by the representatives of the Great Powers, on the powers and responsibilities of the officers of the reorganization of the gendarmerie. It insisted that the authority of the representatives appointed by Austria-Hungary and Russia was limited to consultation and did not have the power to intervene directly in the administration, while the representatives sent by the Ottoman government had full authority over Macedonian reforms, and their instructions were all from the Ottoman government. In a note sent to Austria-Hungary and Russia, the Ottoman government wrote that the plans of the Military Commission did not take into account the views of the imperial government and violated its sovereignty and prestige. In addition, the privileges granted to foreign officers were contrary to the previous agreement between the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary and Russia, which stipulated that foreign officers were only responsible for reorganizing the gendarmerie and did not have the right of command and execution [7:71-72]. By denying executive powers of foreign officers, the Ottoman Empire aimed to put the initiative of reforms ultimately firmly in its own hands. Secondly, the increase in the number of foreign officers beyond what was stipulated in the agreement by the

Great Powers was not accepted. The Turkish government expressed the hope that the Austro-Russian ambassadors would reach a consensus with the imperial government on the issue in a spirit of reconciliation and would not send additional foreign officers [7:102-103]. The reorganization of the gendarmerie had already achieved remarkable results, and it was believed that it would achieve even more in the short term. Adding the number of foreign officers would only increase the financial burden on the three Macedonian provinces. Therefore, increasing the number seemed superfluous [8: 38-40].

In order to force the Ottoman Empire to accept the offer of additional officers, the Great Powers (except Germany) sent officers to Macedonia with the intention of creating a *fait accompli*. However, the Turkish government did not give in and once again rejected the overtures [8:73]. Enraged by the repeated refusal of the Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers decided to take joint action to force the Turkish government into submission. The Austro-Russian ambassadors in Constantinople sent a strongly worded note to the Turkish government: in view of the disorder and chaos in the Macedonian provinces, it was imperative to hire additional officers. If the Turkish government refused to accept the proposal, the Great Powers would embark on joint action, and France and Italy had already expressed their support for such action [8:79]. Britain expressed its support for coordinated efforts by the Great Powers to put pressure on the Turkish government [8: 79]. The French ambassador also drafted a document asking the Turkish government to acknowledge the additional officers [8:80]. Eventually, the ambassadors of the five powers (except Germany which promised to support the actions of the representatives of the five powers) formally signed the joint note and presented it to the Turkish Government [8: 80, 8:95-96]. In the face of the combined pressure of the Great Powers, the Turkish government finally made a compromise decision, but on the following conditions: first, the number of foreign officers was not to be further increased under any pretext or reason; second, the period of appointment of new officers was not to exceed the period established by previous officers; third, the new officers were not to have effective command of the gendarmerie, and their duties were to be limited to the reorganization of the gendarmerie; fourth, the Great Powers would do their utmost to limit the revolutionary agitation that led to the existing evils [8: 98]. Subsequently, the imperial edict of the Ottoman Empire officially recognized that the Great Powers had assigned additional officers to reorganize the gendarmerie [8:116].

During the period of gendarmerie reform, Germany basically followed the policy of non-interference, tried to undermine the Concert of Europe as much as possible and gained the confidence for the Ottoman Turkish Empire to resist. In response to the British request to put pressure on the Ottoman Turkish Empire, Germany stated that it had no intention in the Near East other than to keep the peace, that it was satisfied with its position in the second or third line, that it supported all measures to improve the situation in the Balkans, and that it would give Austria-Hungary and Russia the right to take the initiative if they could coordinate their

actions with Britain [6:151-152]. In order to avoid causing a political dispute with the Ottoman Turkish Empire, Germany relinquished the military command it enjoyed in the formed Macedonian gendarmerie corps [15:100]. Furthermore, regarding the Military Commission's view that officers were to enjoy absolute command, Germany considered that the command of foreign officers serving in the Turkish army was something entirely new and that the Turks, for political and religious reasons, would protest against it in the strongest possible terms. For the sake of German-Turkish relations, the German representatives on the Military Commission would exercise restraint and would not accept the position of the commander [15:100-101]. Finally, Germany refused to participate in the Great Powers' proposal to partition Macedonia as a gesture of goodwill to the Ottoman Turkish Empire. However, it also made it clear that it would not interfere with the actions of its allies, Austria-Hungary and Italy, and tried to resolve the Austro-Italian differences on the issue of partitioned occupation in order to preserve the stability of the alliance.

In terms of the dispute between the Great Powers and the Turkish government over the number of commissioned officers and their responsibilities, it could be concluded that firstly, the Turkish government's determination to implement the reform program was questionable. Although the appointment of officers to reorganize the gendarmerie had the element of interfering in the Ottoman Empire's internal affairs and endangering the prestige of the Sultan, the intention of the Great powers was to calm the restlessness of the Christian population in the region and to eliminate the elements of revolutionary unrest, which would contribute to the stability of the Turkish European territories. Secondly, the Concert of Europe was difficult. Germany's policy of non-interference and rejection of the reform program made the reform process extremely difficult, and the effect of the Concert of Europe was insufficient due to Germany's policy toward the Ottoman Empire.

On the issue of financial reform, Austria-Hungary and Russia initially submitted a draft of reform to the Ottoman Empire that was mainly the responsibility of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. Later, due to the Turkish government's opposition, Austria-Hungary and Russia drew up a new reform proposal, which consisted mainly in the establishment of a Fiscal Council by one financial representative of each of the Great Powers, with full responsibility for the reform.

The Turkish government refused to accept the Austro-Russian reform proposal and considered it as an infringement of its sovereignty by giving the Imperial Ottoman Bank government powers [15:214]. In order to make it harder for the Austro-Russian reform proposal, the Turkish government asked the Great Powers to raise tariffs from 8% to 11%, and argued that since the reorganization of the Macedonian gendarmerie, it had been overburdened with financial deficits in order to maintain a large military force in Macedonia to suppress the fighting between ethnic armed groups. The increase in taxation would be only used to cover Macedonia's budget deficit, not in other ways, and it was hoped that the Great Powers would amend the commercial treaty with the Ottoman Empire to meet its demands

[9:23-26]. In addition, the Turkish government took advantage of the conflicts among the Great Powers with the intention of undermining the Concert of Europe. Firstly, the Ottoman Empire asked Germany to mediate, urged the Great Powers to abandon the creation of the Fiscal Council in Macedonia, which threatened its sovereignty, and explained its rejection of the powers' proposal; it considered the creation of the Fiscal Council beyond the scope of the Great Powers' previous reform program, and believed that once the Turkish government accepted the proposal, more reforms would follow. The idea of establishing the Fiscal Council was merely a product of British design, which took advantage of the current lack of political power in Russia and the plight of Austria-Hungary, busy with its internal affairs, with the intention of gradually taking the reins of reforms into its own hands. Britain had been trying to persuade the Turkish government to extend the reforms to the province of Adrianople, which was bound to cause a series of chain reactions. In view of this, the Turkish government hoped that Germany would use its influence to persuade the other Great Powers to drop the idea of creating the Fiscal Council [15: 270-271]. In addition, the Turkish government presented to Italy that the establishment of the Fiscal Council meant changing in the Balkan situation, which Italy had been trying to maintain the status quo of, and therefore hoped that Italy would not participate in the action of the joint note [15: 256]. Germany's hesitancy over the coordinated action of the Great Powers had emboldened the Turkish government to reject the proposal. The Turkish government stated that the new proposal of the Great Powers was a direct interference in its internal affairs and seriously undermined the independent sovereignty of the Empire, which the Great Powers had repeatedly declared and promised to respect in the past. The Turkish government had already fulfilled the requirements of the "Mürzsteg Programme", and the reforms were effective, while the new proposal of the Great Powers, which went far beyond the scope of the original plan, was unacceptable to the Turkish government [10: 50-51].

In order to force the Turkish government to accept the reform plan, the Great Powers decided to resort to naval demonstrations. In order to solve the dilemma, the Turkish government once again sought the help of Germany. Although Germany wanted to support the Turkish government's claim, it persuaded the latter to accept the reform plan in order to maintain the stability of the Dual Alliance in view of the firm position of Austria-Hungary in the reform at this time. Germany expressed the hope that the Turkish concessions would provide a modicum of accommodation in diplomatic relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers [15: 293-294]. Under the coercive power of the Great Powers and in the absence of any hope for foreign aid, the Turkish government finally had to accept the financial reform plan of the Great Powers.

Germany became proactive on financial reform instead of the policy of staying out of the gendarmerie reform. It emphasized that if international financial control over Macedonia were to be exercised, the possibility of such control extending to the entire Turkish Empire was to be considered and Germany was to have a seat in

the Fiscal Council [15:216]. The reasons for Germany's change of attitude were mainly the following.

Firstly, Germany believed that the Imperial Ottoman Bank was a French-run institution that competed with German enterprises in the Ottoman Empire. In essence, France was Germany's real enemy, and if the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which was the pioneer of the economy of France, enhanced its political character, it would be contrary to Germany's interests and thus would seriously weaken its position in the Ottoman Empire. In view of its huge economic interests in the Ottoman Empire, Germany could not accept the financial control of Macedonia by French or even foreign banks [15: 209-210].

Secondly, Germany believed that the basic idea of the fiscal reform plan was to separate Macedonia from other Turkish provinces, which not only meant that Macedonian revenues would not have to be handed over to the Turkish Treasury, but also that this mode of international control might be extended to other provinces of the Empire, which was harmful to Turkish national interests and would inevitably be resisted by the latter [15:209-210].

Thirdly, the contradictions among the Great Powers provided the conditions for Germany to destroy the Concert of Europe. In the first place, Britain opposed the Austro-Russian fiscal reform plan and argued that it could result in Macedonian local authorities without enough funds for regional development and payment of civil servants [5:76]. In addition, the men assigned by Austria-Hungary and Russia to the fiscal reform were not financial experts, and Britain worried about the effectiveness of the implementation of the reform plan [9: 16]. In the second place, Italy was dissatisfied with the lack of prior consultation with Austria-Hungary and Russia believed that the two countries' actions did not take Italy's interests into account [15: 206], and hoped that the signatories of the Treaty of Berlin would supervise Macedonian fiscal reform together [15:247], with the intention of transforming Macedonian reforms from Austro-Russian domination to shared management of the Great Powers. Italy had proposed to Britain that the situation in Macedonia was at stake and that it was important for the Great Powers to agree on concerted action [17: 79]. In the third place, France sought to use its opposition to the Austro-Russian reform plan as an opportunity to mediate the Anglo-Russian relations. On the one hand, on the grounds of maintaining friendly Franco-Turkish economic relations, France expressed that it did not want the Imperial Ottoman Bank to take the responsibility of Macedonian fiscal reform, aimed at denying the Austro-Russian reform plan [15: 224]. On the other hand, France reminded Russia that the continuation of the current predicament in Macedonia would only facilitate the expansion of Austro-Hungarian influence [17: 79]; Germany and Austria-Hungary might take advantage of Russia's internal and external difficulties to seek hegemony in the Balkans. Austria-Hungary, as an instrument of German policy, pursued policies in both the Balkans and the Near East that were strictly Germanic. Therefore, France had good reasons to frustrate German-Austrian policy in a certain way [17: 79-80]. Finally, Russia, which had been tied up by the Russo-

Japanese War, was interested in shifting its diplomatic focus to the Near East in order to rid the plight of the Far East. Russia had declared that it would “never abandon the Christians of Macedonia” [15: 234], and was tired of having Austria-Hungary play a dominant role in the Balkans while it was subordinate [15: 248]. Germany seized the divergent interests among the Great Powers and constantly strengthened the differences between them in order to increase the difficulty of reforms.

Fourthly, Germany did its best not to participate in the joint action of the Great Powers and to provide support to the Turkish resistance. Germany had suggested that the joint action by the Great Powers could easily cause the Turkish government to make negative decisions, because the Turks were accustomed to strong and threatening notes from the Great Powers. In the opinion of the Ottoman Empire, the action of one or two countries had to be valued, because a strong attitude of one country showed its firm determination to act; consensus could be easily reached between two countries, and the collective action of the Great Powers often ended in failure because of their divergent interests [15: 266]. Germany was also pessimistic about the formation of the Fiscal Council, which it considered to be hasty and full of uncertainties; for example, the Great Powers had not yet defined the rules of the organization, the mechanism of its operation, the terms of reference of the council, the selection of the chairman, the powers of the inspectors, the relationship with the Imperial Ottoman Bank, among other issues. If the Fiscal Council could not formulate detailed regulations in advance, it would not function properly and the Great Powers might then talk to themselves and reduce the effectiveness of financial reforms in Macedonia [15:268]. In addition, when the Great Powers resorted to naval demonstrations to force the Turkish government to accept the reform plan, Germany did not put it into practice despite verbal expressions of cooperation with the other Powers’ actions. Germany explained to the other powers that it could not participate in the joint naval demonstration because it had no warships in the Mediterranean and was in the winter maintenance period for its warships [15: 304].

On the issue of judicial reform, differences between Austria-Hungary and Russia had intensified and the reform process had become deadlocked. After the Russo-Japanese War, Russia, whose ambitions for expansion in the Far East had been suppressed, wanted to escape from domestic pressure by expanding its influence in the Balkans; thus it became proactive in the issue of judicial reform. Austria-Hungary, in order to accelerate the pace of annexation of the two provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, wanted to make concessions to the Ottoman Empire on the Macedonian judicial reform and win the latter’s favor, so it became passive on the judicial reform. Faced with the intensification of conflicts between the two military blocs, the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire was to fall back on the German-Austrian blocs and resolutely reject the demands of the Great Powers for reforms. The German foreign policy was to widen the differences between Austria-Hungary and Russia, undermine the reform process, and promote the de-escalation of Austro-Turkish relations and the development of German-Turkish relations.

In November 1906, when Russia proposed to Austria-Hungary an extension of the “Mürzsteg Programme” to introduce judicial reform in Macedonia, Austria-Hungary stated that Russia was preparing for the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and that it would not participate in the implementation of the policy. Germany supported the position of Austria-Hungary which believed that if Austria-Hungary supported the Russian proposal, it would only be detrimental to its interests and would stimulate the revolutionary enthusiasm of the Macedonian people. The Russian proposal was sinister; it was merely a way of looking at Eastern affairs from the British point of view in order to achieve reconciliation with Britain on other issues [15: 405]. To prevent Russia from taking the initiative in the judicial reform, Germany and Austria-Hungary wanted the Ottoman Empire to assume the role. Austria-Hungary stated that it would support the Ottoman Empire if the latter could take the initiative to propose improvements in the Macedonian judiciary [15: 407]. The Great Powers had to pursue conservative policies in the Balkans to ensure the integrity of Turkish territorial sovereignty [15: 411]. Germany also proposed that judicial reform had to wait, as much as possible, until the Ottoman Empire completed other reform measures before implementing them separately and that the Ottoman Empire had to decide on the measures to be taken at its own discretion [15: 407].

With the support of Germany and Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire decided to take the lead in proposing a judicial reform plan in line with its own interests in order to avoid further infringement of its sovereignty by the Great Powers, and at the same time it sent specialized personnel to Macedonia to take charge of the judicial reform [15: 409]. In March 1907, the Ottoman Empire formulated a judicial reform plan based on its self-interest. Austria-Hungary welcomed the Turkish initiative and proposed that Austria-Hungary and Russia had to give the Turkish government sufficient time to implement reform and give the Fiscal Council an important role in judicial reform. Russia, on the other hand, advocated the immediate process of judicial reform and the establishment of a new special commission to take charge of the reform. Russia actively sought British support for its claim to be widely accepted. Britain fully agreed with the Russian program and aimed to develop relations between the two countries in the direction of an agreement. The rapid development of Anglo-Russian relations led Germany to lament that there was no trace of Russian distrust of Britain. The mutual political trust that had accumulated during the Macedonian reforms process helped Britain and Russia finally conclude an agreement to adjust their colonial differences.

The establishment of the Triple Entente worsened Germany’s diplomatic environment; in order to avoid isolation, Germany paid more and more attention to the stability of the Dual Alliance and the development of friendly German-Turkish relations, so Germany was particularly active in promoting the easing of Austro-Turkish relations. Firstly, Germany persuaded Austria-Hungary not to follow in the footsteps of Britain and Russia and implement a hardline policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Germany told Austria-Hungary that it opposed the Anglo-Russian

proposal and feared that military action by Britain and Russia to force the Turkish government to accept the demands of the Great Powers would trigger a war against the Ottoman Empire and threaten the peace of Europe. So, Germany hoped that Austria-Hungary would stick to its original position and settle the row over the judicial reform [15: 448-449]. Secondly, Germany was outside the Concert of Europe and undermined the reform process. Although Germany noted it would support the actions of the Great Powers, it reserved the right to act in the event of further developments. In any case, Germany would not participate in the violence against the Ottoman Empire over the issue of the judicial reform [15: 456-457]. Moreover, Germany tried to divert the attention of the Great Powers from the judicial reform by using the issue of negotiating the renewal of the terms of the members responsible for the reorganization of the gendarmerie and the financial reform. Germany successfully persuaded Austria-Hungary and Russia to back its position that the judicial reform proposals had to be shelved for the time being and the extension of negotiations had to be put on the agenda [15: 464-465]. Finally, Germany privately advised the Turkish government to accept the note from the Great Powers as soon as possible to strengthen its position on the issue of the judicial reform, and suggested that it linked the extension of negotiations with a 3% tariff increase to add to the difficulties of the judicial reform [15: 465-466].

With the support of Germany, the Turkish government combined the extension of negotiations with the judicial reform as a response to the joint note. As a sign of its sincerity in developing German-Turkish relations, the Turkish government stated it had been doing everything in its power to maintain friendly relations with the Triple Alliance. For example, it was prepared to issue a royal decree which approved the Austro-Hungarian Novi Pazar Railway Project and made concessions in Tripoli in favor of Italy [15: 495]. The Turkish government's goodwill received a positive response from Germany. At a meeting of ambassadors organized by the German ambassador in Constantinople, the German ambassador made it clear that he insisted on resolving the issue of the negotiations first, since the judicial reform could be discussed only if the continuation of the functions of the Fiscal Council was ensured, and that Germany refused to participate in the collective intervention of the Great Powers. The French ambassador was impressed by the German ambassador's efforts to persuade the other ambassadors to accept his position throughout the meeting, and he mentioned that the German ambassador took up the note that the ambassadors had prepared and were ready to sign to refute it article by article. The disagreement among the Great Powers made them realize that this was a retreat and, in the present circumstances, even with the help of naval demonstrations, it was sure that the resistance from the Sultan could not be overcome [18: 474]. Eventually, the conference of ambassadors unanimously recognized that the Great Powers were unable to force the Turkish government to accept the judicial reform plan through diplomatic means [18: 470-471]. With the announcement of the Novi Pazar Railway Project by Austria-Hungary, a new crisis emerged in the Balkans that distracted the attention of the Great Powers, and the

struggle for the judicial reform in Macedonia, which lasted for more than two years, finally came to an end.

The failure of the judicial reform was closely related to the foreign policies of Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire. Firstly, Germany was reluctant to participate in the collective actions of the Great Powers, at the same time tried to undermine the joint note to the Turkish government as much as possible, and hoped to maintain a friendly relationship with the Ottoman Empire so as to establish Germany's economic, political, military and even strategic superiority in the latter. Secondly, Austria-Hungary had aggressive intentions toward the Balkans, but its focus was on the two provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As the conflicts between Austria and Serbia intensified, the rise of the nationalist movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina prompted it to accelerate the pace of annexation of the two provinces. Therefore, on the issue of the judicial reform in Macedonia, Austria-Hungary not only wanted to keep pace with Germany and maintain the stability of the Dual Alliance, but also hoped to obtain Turkish concessions on Bosnia and Herzegovina through the reform. Thirdly, the Turkish government's fierce opposition to the judicial reform was also an important reason why it could not be implemented. On the one hand, the Turkish government was well aware of the contradictions among the Great Powers, especially the support of Germany, which strengthened its determination and confidence to resist the reform proposal. Naum Pasha, the Turkish deputy foreign minister, said: "No one had the courage to suggest that the Sultan accepted the judicial reform program" [15: 475]. On the other hand, the Sultan hoped to win the support of the Muslim masses by resisting the judicial reform program of the Great Powers, to increase his prestige and to save his faltering regime from collapse. It was the cooperation of Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire that made the Macedonian judicial reform end in failure, and the cooperation among the three countries also provided the conditions for further deepening of their relations in the future.

Conclusion

After the internationalization of the Macedonian issue, the diplomatic games of the Great Powers around the Macedonian reforms played a key role in promoting the restructuring of the relations among the European Powers. Germany had great political, economic and military influence in the Ottoman Empire, and the latter had always sought to establish friendly relations with Germany; this two-way appeal promoted the rapid development of the relations between the two countries. During the Macedonian reforms, based on the development of German-Turkish friendship, Germany repeatedly undermined the Concert of Europe and put obstacles in the way of reforms in order to safeguard the Turkish interests. In addition, in order to maintain the stability of the Dual alliance, Germany supported Austria-Hungary to lead the Macedonian reforms, and, at the same time, in order to avoid being dragged into the confrontation with the Ottoman Empire by its alliance, Germany took the proactive diplomacy aimed at guiding the diplomacy of Austria-

Hungary in the direction of Austro-Turkish détente. However, when Austro-Turkish differences arose and a choice had to be made between them, Germany chose to side with Austria-Hungary more often. This was further demonstrated by the Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909, during which Germany chose to firmly support Austria-Hungary and satisfy its annexation intentions at the expense of the Turkish interests and the opportunity for German-Russian friendly negotiations. Bülow once noted that there was no need for Germany to throw Austria-Hungary directly into the hostile camp; Germany and Austria-Hungary would always be together on the Bosnian issue based on the alliance treaty, and Germany would never abandon Austria-Hungary [3: 332].

During the Macedonian reforms, the Ottoman Empire intended to take advantage of the differences among the Great Powers as much as possible, to undermine the Concert of Europe, and to put numerous obstacles in the way of Macedonian reforms in order to maintain the stability and integrity of the Empire. In addition, the Ottoman Empire bound its strategic interests with Germany and used Germany's influence on its allies Austria-Hungary and Italy and its deterrence power over the Triple Entente to seek diplomatic balance among the Great Powers and to survive in the gap. Although the Ottoman Empire did its best to maintain its imperial prestige and territorial integrity, its diplomatic initiative was not in its own hands in the face of *realpolitik*, and more often than not it could only hope for a smaller price in exchange for the greater losses it might face. Finally, in view of the friendly cooperation between Germany and the Ottoman Empire during the Macedonian reforms, the two countries also moved towards deepening the strategic cooperation, despite the emergence of the Young Turk Revolution which failed to interrupt the process of cooperation between the two countries. As the Austro-Russian rivalry intensified in the Balkans, many Balkan Slavic states supported by Russia tried to divide the Turkish European territories; the Ottoman Empire, which had a long-standing feud with Russia, fully realized that it needed powerful foreign aid to save its crumbling empire, and, eventually, the long-cultivated German-Turkish friendship blossomed into an alliance.

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**ԳԵՐՄԱՆԱ-ԹՈՒՐՔԱԿԱՆ ՀԱՐԱԲԵՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԸ ՄԱԿԵԴՈՆԱԿԱՆ
ԲԱՐԵՓՈԽՈՒՄՆԵՐԻ ԺԱՄԱՆԱԿ (1903-1908 ԹԹ.)**

Գաօ Ջիանժի

Բանալի բառեր՝ Մակեդոնական բարեփոխումներ, Օսմանյան կայսրություն, դիվանագիտական խաղեր, գերմանա-թուրքական հարաբերություններ:

1903 թվականի փետրվարին ավստրո-ռուսական «Վիեննայի համակարգի» ներդրմամբ մակեդոնական հարցը վերածվեց համաեվրոպական խնդրի: Մեծ տերությունների դիվանագիտական ջանքերը Մակեդոնիայի բարեփոխումների շուրջ դարձան այն կարևոր գործոններից մեկը, որն ազդեց մեծ տերությունների միջև հարաբերությունների կարգավորման վրա:

Փորձելով ընդլայնել իր ազդեցությունը Թուրքիայում և զարգացնել գերմանա-թուրքական հարաբերությունները Մակեդոնիայի բարեփոխումների հետ կապված՝ Գերմանիան մնաց եվրոպական համակարգի լուսանցքում և խոչընդոտեց բարեփոխումների գործընթացին: Այնուամենայնիվ, Գերմանիան, կանգնելով Ավստրո-Հունգարիայի և Օսմանյան կայսրության միջև ընտրության առջև, անցավ իր դաշնակից Ավստրո-Հունգարիայի կողմը: Օսմանյան կայսրու-թյունը, օգտվելով մակեդոնական բարեփոխումների հարցում մեծ տերություն-ների միջև առկա տարաձայնություններից, փորձեց հնարավորինս դանդաղեց-նել բարեփոխումների գործընթացը և պահպանել իր եվրոպական տարածքի ամբողջականությունը: Կայսրության լիակատար փլուզումից խուսափելու հա-մար Օսմանյան կայսրությունը փորձեց մակեդոնական բարեփոխումների ընթացքում զարգացնել գերմանա-թուրքական բարեկամությունը, և ապագայում դիվանագիտական այս ընտրությունը դարձավ պետական քաղաքականության իրականացման հիմքը:

THE ETHNIC STRUCTURE OF SOVIET AZERBAIJAN (BASED ON THE MATERIALS OF AGRICULTURAL CENSUS OF 1921)*

Anush Harutyunyan

Abstract

The article is devoted to the investigation of the ethnic structure of Soviet Azerbaijan based on the materials of the agricultural census, which conducted in summer of 1921. The data of the census published in the pages of “Izvestiya” of Az. CSD from 1921 to 1924 and in publications dedicated to each uezd (administrative unit). The articles published in these magazine and books deal with different issues of Azerbaijan’s society: branches of agriculture, cargo transportation, trade, education and schools, but we are interested in that information, which introduce the ethnicity of the republic. The importance of these materials is essentially high. It shows how many ethnic and subethnic groups had been living in the current territory of Azerbaijan, what language they spoke, what kind of ethno consolidation processes had been fixed, thus, how they expressed their ethnic identification and what kind of theoretical and practical problems arose during the identification process.

Keywords: Soviet Azerbaijan, agricultural census, ethnic structure, family list, administrative units, ethnic minorities, ethnic differentiation.

The importance and shortcomings of census

After the October Revolution in Russia, the soviet central government, like any other, attached great importance to obtaining statistical information about the population. However, at first it was impossible to initiate the census because of civil war and international intervention. Thus, the first All-Union census, which carried out with certain methodology and organization, conducted only in 1926.

Meanwhile, until the first All-Union census, in the beginning of 1920s the soviet government tried to initiate some actions in order to get the factual image of population, in particular in 1920 carried out a census by the decree “About the conduction of agricultural and professional census with registration of industrial enterprises” [18:11]. But the covering area of this event was limited to the territory over which the soviet power extended. So, the information about Transcaucasia could not found. Likewise, the urban census of 1923 could not provide the comprehensive statistical bases. The aim of these statistical researches was to record the demographic changes that happened during the past several years and to study the current economic situation.

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The Sovietization of the territory of the former Russian empire gave an opportunity to initiate similar events in Transcaucasian states too. In Transcaucasia, the first Sovietized republic was Azerbaijan in April 1920. In Sovietized former territories of Baku, Elizavetpol provinces (guberniya) and Zaqatala district (okrug) a local agricultural census carried out in summer of 1921, which can be considered as a logical continuation of the Russian census mentioned above. The census results were published in the pages of “Izvestiya” of Az. CSD from 1921 to 1924 and in individual publications dedicated to each uezd (administrative unit). Statistical charts about the sex-age composition of the population, employment, and literacy level is important, but the reports on the ethnic composition of the population and their analysis are invaluable.

This agricultural census is a primary source, which recorded the demographic balance created after the events of previous years¹. Moreover, the results of the census clearly testify to the policy pursued by Azerbaijan’s government in 1918-1920 towards other ethnic groups in the territory of Azerbaijan² [21:3].

However, it is necessary to approach the results of the census with some reservations taking in account either the difficulties of conducting the census (the lack of proper roads, quality personnel, the exclusion of some settlements or the inaccuracy of boundaries, insufficient development of statistics in general), or some features of census’ principles. Considering all these shortcomings, the event can be even qualified as a common registration, as both methodically and organizationally it was far from the modern perception of the census. Even more, the word “perepis” («перепись») translates both as a census, and as registration. However, whether census or registration, it does not diminish the significance of information referring to the certain historical period.

The authorized representative of RSFSR Kvitkin raised the problem of realizing the agricultural and demographic-professional census in Azerbaijan in July of

¹ During the First World War, Transcaucasia was a close rear for the Russian Caucasian army, which until 1917 captured a significant part of the eastern provinces (vilayets) of the Ottoman Empire. However, due to the disintegration of the Caucasian front, the Turkish army attacked Transcaucasia. Although the territory of Azerbaijan was not subjected to such destruction as Armenia, nevertheless, a military struggle took place between the Baku commune and the Turkish army, which ended in 1918. On September 15 with the capture of Baku by the Turkish army. However, the demographic changes were not so much due to the direct military operations of 1918, but to the policy conducted by the Turkish-Azerbaijani military and political leadership.

² This specifically refers to Armenians, partially to Russians. Since its foundation, the government of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan carried out an anti-Armenian policy, which expressed in the organized massacre of Armenians in Baku, Shushi, Nukhi and other places. Within 3 days after capture of Baku approximately 30 thousand Armenians were killed, over 18 thousand Armenians were killed or forced to leave Nukhi [25:52]. What refers to Russians there was no certain anti-Russian attitude toward them. Russians continued working in administrative posts. There was a large number of population in Mughan, where the Soviet Republic of Mughan existed from February to May of 1919. As a result, of the struggle against Mughan, most of the local Russian population left for the North Caucasus.

1920, two months after the Sovietization of the country. He suggested conducting an agricultural and demographic-professional census in Azerbaijan and Russian at the same time. Nevertheless, the statistical committee of Azerbaijan had just formed [1:I], which agreed to conduct the demographic-professional census only in Baku and industrial region, but for some reasons census conduction in the all territory of Azerbaijan the committee considered inadvisable now [1:I]. On July 16, 1920, the presidency of the People's Committee of Azerbaijan made a decision on creating a temporary statistical commission within the People's Committee [19:136].

In November of the same year, the CSD of RSFSR raised the question of conducting the census again. Meanwhile, it is impossible to take both agricultural and demographic-professional censuses due to local conditions. The revolutionary committee of Azerbaijan was aware of that quite well. Only in August of 1920, the CSD of Azerbaijan created instead of a statistics console. On August 9, 1920, the People's Committee of Azerbaijan passed a decree on conducting a census. The decree assumed a census of demographic, professional and industrial enterprises in all cities and city-like settlements of Azerbaijan [19:195]. The census requires proper preparation. Because of long discussions throughout 1920, a decision made to conduct a demographic census in May of 1921 in towns and city-like settlements and start the agricultural census from 15th of July of the same year [1:II]. It's impossible to conduct two censuses at the same time because of the lack of appropriate personnel.

The methodological and technical programs, which used in Russia, were adapted for local conditions and became the theoretical bases for these censuses. However, the main program of agricultural census in Russia could not be acceptable completely for Az. CSD both technical (the lack of paper for printing the census forms) and methodological reasons. In the pre-revolutionary period, the local authorities (zemstvo) periodically registered the local population, which gave an opportunity for analysis about the population movement. But in the territory of Azerbaijan even the results of the 1917 agricultural census being incomplete (a part of it was lost from the former Ministry of Trade and Industry) didn't allow one to get an idea about farming, animal husbandry and other deals of population, about education, ethnic structure and so on.

The matter is that there is an extremely lack of educated people especially in uezds, and all available intelligentsia were members of various committees. Consequently, there was no hope that it would be possible to staff easily the census [1:III]. On 24 August 1920, the People's Committee of Azerbaijan made a decision about the registration of statistics. According to the decision for processing statistical works was engaged those people, who carried out scientific and pedagogical activities, who have completed courses in Russian or foreign educational centers, who have passed central or regional courses of CSD in RSFSR, those with printed statistical works, who worked in statistical institutions, and those who had participated in the works of censuses of 1903, 1913, 1918, 1919 [19:234-235].

The situation aggravated by the fact that the majority of the population in Azerbaijan did not know Russian, so it was necessary to recruit personnel either from the Turkic intelligentsia or from other nationalities who would also know the Turkic language. For example, in the Aresh (Aghdash) uezd no one agreed to participate in the census from the center and there are no educated people among the locals. If the People's Commissariat of Justice did not provide people from the ranks of prisoners, it is possible that the census would not take [1:III].

Az. CSD hoped to recruit people for the census from Turkish teachers, but it became clear that the majority of teachers had worked at different organizations of communist party organizations, and the other part was busy conducting teacher training courses. In addition, the CSD did not have any other choice but to recruit census workers from those cadets [1:III]. It is noteworthy that those cadets are unprepared to conduct the census. In reality, it was an illiterate mass. It was necessary to undertake a preparation with them before starting the census process. That is why in different places the census started at different times. Moreover, qualified or at least literate Turkish personnel were lacking not only in places during the actual accounting, but also in CSD, where from the 12 responsible persons only one was Türk [1:IV].

The problems of ethnic differentiation

In the territory of Soviet Azerbaijan many nationalities, ethnic and subethnic groups had lived. In the first period of Soviet power, this ethnic diversity served as an example of internationalism, which would attract the people of the East and helped to export the revolution. Except the Az. Türks the major ethnic groups were Tats, Talishes, East Caucasian mountaineers, Russians, Armenians, Jews, Georgians and others.

Tats inhabited at the Apsheron peninsula, the southern parts of Quba uezd, small quantities also found in the northern part of Shamakhi. The total amount of tats was 101 382. The Talishes were inhabited in the bordering with Persia Lenqoran uezd. Total amount was 66 206. The number of Persians were quite small, only 1031, where was not found a place of compact settlement [17:3]. The tribes of East Caucasian mountaineers (Cyurin, Kriz, Jeck, Khinalukh, Avar, Tsakhur est.) mainly lived in the northern uezds, which are near to the Caucasus mountaineers (Nukhi, Zaqatala, Quba). Their language called Lezgin generally [17:3].

However, there were some uncertainties in both theoretical and practical processes of ethnic differentiation. As it said above, the theoretical bases used in Russia adopted. In the instructions of the census conducted in Russia in 1920, it written, "Nationality is understood as a group of people, united by a common national self-consciousness, so that nationality should not be confused with citizenship (subordination) [24:42]. The ethnic puzzle in Azerbaijan didn't allow an opportunity to use this principle in practice.

Demographic elements in 1921 were included in the program of the agricultural census in the most modest way, because of which all the relevant material can

only partially illuminate the complex and mixed picture of demography, in particular the ethnic question. Therefore, the information about the national image is very generalizing [24:39].

In the instruction of the census, it was said how to act when the respondent finds it difficult to indicate the nationality. In this case, the nationality of respondent's parents mentioned; otherwise, the theorists formed the list of ethnonyms, which would help the correspondents to get oriented about the nationality of the respondent. There are 33 ethos's, which could found in the territory of Azerbaijan: 1. Avars, 2. Aisors, 3 Andiys, 4. Armenian, 5. Archins, 6. Belarus, 7. Russian, 8. Georgians-Christian, 9. Georgian-Muslim, 10. Greek, 11. Mountainous Jews, 12. European Jews, 13. Kurds, 14. Kurd-ezdis, 15. Curin, 16. Lak, 17. Mughal, 18. German, 19. Osetian, 20. Persian, 21. Polish, 22. Rutul, 23. Talish, 24. Tat, 25. Az. Türks, 26. Kazanian Türks, 27. Ottoman Turks, 28. Udis, 29. Ukrainian, 30. Tsakhur, 31. Gypsies, 32. Czech, 33. Shahsevan [24:40].

During the census, family forms used instead of personal forms, which used during the All-Union census. Therefore, the registration done by families or by households, which is completely understandable in the context of an agricultural census. The usage of family forms accurses some uncertainty in terms of ethnic determination. The matter is that the answer of ethnic identification at the proper line in the form was filled by the identification of only the head of the family or householder. As a result, the inter-family ethnic picture has leveled.

This applies especially to regions where intermarriage is quite common. Thus, if the Mughal woman (the Turks of Zaqatala were called Mughals because of their Mongolian origin) was married to a Cyurin (Lezgi), then she was counted as a Cyurin, or the ingilo-muslim woman married a Mughal was counted as a Mughal. Along with that, hired workers counted according to the nationality of their employer. Intermarriage was quite common, especially among peoples of the same religion, and although hired work was not widespread, the phenomenon still recorded [24: 39]. The uncertainty surrounding the registration of nationality caused a whole series of irregularities during the census. Rural illiterate population couldn't understand a question about nationality as it was supposed to be. The issue of ethnicity was often associated with religion, language or the place of former locality or origins.

One of the chief census officers Mikheile Avdiev in his articles in the pages of "Izvestya" Az. CSD reported on the difficulties of ethnic classification in Nukhi and Zaqatala uezds³, where he had been the head of census workers. Speaking about the ethnic picture of the population, he writes. "In Nukhi uezd we have a motley mixture of nations. The only existed cultural phenomenon in this uncivi-

³ The Zaqatala uezd was disputed territory between Azerbaijan and Georgia. In 1920 during the Sovietization of Azerbaijan Georgia tried to seize the territory, but without any luck. Meanwhile, the population of Zaqatala (as well as Nukhi) were Muslims, but originated from the East Caucasian mountaineers tribes, or were Georgians, who changed the religion.

lized background is Islam, which both united the local multiracial population and created an almost unified "Muslim nation" out of it. But as we know, for the complete crystallization of the national group, a deeper consciousness and a more complex process are necessary" [25: 56]. Sometimes people indicated words Muslim, Molokan, Subotnik as their nationality. There is no united language either. "There were cases when it was impossible to determine exactly what language a given nationality spoke. On the other hand, instead of nationality, a place of residence where the respondent or the respondent's ancestor lived often mentioned. For example, in Nukhi the newcomers named themselves Mchikh-Lezgi, Laz-Lezgi, and came from Mchikh and Laz. They identified their identity with the settlement" [24: 42].

The other phenomenon fixed by the census too, and then some small groups changed their mother tongue, but not former self-identification. For example, Avdiev mentioned; "The inhabitants of the village Tal have forgotten their native Avar language and now speak the Azerbaijani dialect, but they never consider themselves Türks. The same can said about some of the Tsakhurs, who partially speak the Azerbaijani dialect, but have preserved their way of life and manners. And it can be said that this is the case in all of Azerbaijan, with the only difference that in one place the differentiation and concentration is more or less clear, while in the other there is not even a hint of the existence of a certain self-awareness" [24: 42]. The reverse process had also reported. "There are few Armenians left in Nukhi. All of them are fluent in the Azerbaijani dialect, but almost never abandon their mother tongue. Only in one irreplaceable case, to maintain the connection with the Armenian Apostolic Church. The fate of the Armenians of Orban village is an excellent expression of this. In 1918 during the invasion of Turks in Transcaucasia, when the Armenian-Türk struggle had reached its heyday, Orban's Armenians, about 15 families, accepted Islam and thereby insured themselves from death. During the census, we met an Armenian family, in whose house we stayed for a whole day. 4 years since the conversion to Islam had unbelievably increased the already great Muslim influence on Orban's Armenians. Young people speak exclusively in the Azerbaijani dialect. If the local Armenians stay Muslim in the future, the next generation will finally forget their native language and turn into Azeri Türks".

The third side also existed; some assimilation processes had triggered. In Zaqatala Avars are assimilated, in Nukhi the same fate befell those from the Cyurin and Samur regions. M. Avdiev highlighted; "It is difficult to say how many Dagestanis are among the Türks in Nukhi, but it is undoubted that the number is great. It is even possible that a detailed anthropological study of the Nukhi population will show that it is not the Turkic people who predominate, but representatives of the East Caucasian mountaineers group, who have now lost their dialect, manners and customs" [25: 56]. But this did not apply to the entire population of the uezd. According to physical features, the population of Nukhi can be divided into two groups: Caucasian and Mongolian. "All the nationalities, except Türks, who belong to Mongolian race, are included in the first group. However, if we recall the histor-

ical overview, the conventionality of the term "Azerbaijani Türk " will become completely clear for us. Indeed, who does not belong to this group? Here are pure Iranians, and Armenians, and Udis, and Curins, and true Mongols, and even Jews"⁴ [25: 56-57]. V. Khudadov commented this as a creation of a universal nation consisting of different ethnic groups, but with one general türkic language [27: 171].

M. Avdiev thoughts. "The group of Az.Türks seemed to have a dominant position. Conventionally, it can be considered that this whole group is united or is on the path of unification around a common national self-consciousness. It is true that in the current conditions it is also possible to separate the East Caucasian mountaineers tomorrow they may move towards Dagestan. Now, if we do not count the Azerbaijani dialect, this whole large group was united only by the religion - Islam, and the peoples who are part of it call themselves part of the "Muslim nation"⁵. Anthropologically, as already said, here, of course, there is very little in common" [24:9] So he concluded that: "All this prompts us to think that the national-ethnic problem should be put in the form of a number of indicators: religion, language, place of birth and nationality as a cultural commonality, but the matter is that there is no such cultural unity in Azerbaijan. The Tats and Talishs of Baku, Lenqoran, Quba have their own language and religious characteristics, which is an indicator of national-cultural commonality, and are related to the Persians and not to the Az. Türks" [24: 42].

The ethnic composition of uezds

According to the received census data of 1921, the rural population of the country decreased by -16.8 % compared to the agricultural census of 1917, when it was 1 786 740. There was a large decrease at uezds of Gyoqchay (-24. 7%), Jewat (Salyan) (-23, 0%), Lenqoran (-21, 9%), Shamakhi (-32, 1%), Aghdash (-22, 7%), Nukhi (-20, 9%) [17: 2].

In the uezds of ASSR, except the Nakhijevan region, where the census did not take, 3772 rural settlements accounted for. The total amount of the country's rural

⁴ There is another nuance too. In the publication of CSD in 1924, the following mentioned; the ethnic structure was given in two tables. In the first one the national self-determination was expressed and in the other one national-ethnic composition. There are almost the same picture in two tables, but the matter of Tats in Baku and Quba uezds was different. In the first table in Baku uezd 85.59 % of population was Az. Türks and only 10.21 % was Tats, but in the second table 12.3 % of population was Az. Türks and 83.50 % was Tats. The same picture was in Quba uezd: In the first table, the 50.73% of population was Az. Türks and 13.25 % was Tat, and in the second one 38.75 % was Az. Türks and 25.20% was Tats [12: IV]. What does it mean? More probable version is that the Tat people didn't understand the question about nationality properly and confused it with religion or citizenship.

⁵ Moreover, defining identity by religion was not at all new for the Muslims of the region. Ever since the middle of the 19th century, when the search for ethnicity began among the newly formed Muslim intelligentsia, many, such as Mirza Fatali Akhundov, considered themselves representatives of the Muslim nation. In the following decades, ethnonym searches began, which did not have a final result. The Turkic-speaking Muslim population of the region was called Tatar, Caucasian Tatar, Türk. During the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan, the name Tatar was rejected, Turk was used, which, as we saw, continued to be used during the census.

population was 1 516 923 [17: 1]. Türks was 61, 3 %, Armenians was 13.4 %, Iranian groups was 11, 9 %, East Caucasian mountaineers was- 6.8 %, Russians was 2.8 %, Kurds was 2.2 %, Georgians was 0.7 %, Germans was 0.4 %, other 0.4 % [17: 4].

Organizationally, the census conducted as follows: the territory of Azerbaijan was divided into 12 regions. 1. Baku uezd, 2. Lenqoran uezd, 3. Quba uezd, 4. Shamakhi uezd, 5. Gyokcha uezd, 6. Salyan uezd, 7. Aghdash (Aresh) uezd, 8. Gyanja uezd, 9. Jevanshir uezd, 10. Ghazakh uezd, 11. Nukhi and Zaqatala uezd, 12. Shushi, Karyagino, Kubatlu uezd [1: III].

The administrative division changed in 1923. Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region created. Then from the eastern parts of Jewanshir and Shushi uezds Aghdam uezd formed. The western part of Jewanshir and the northern part of Kubatlu became parts of Kurdistan. From one hand, Kariagino renamed Jebail and the northern parts, where totally lived Armenians became part of NKAR, from the other hand the southeastern part of Shushi uezd and the southern parts of Kubatlu joined to Jebail Uezd. Gyanja uezd was divided into two parts: in the western part, Shamkhor uezd was formed, in the eastern part Gyanja uezd. As a result, the uezds of Jewanshir, Shushi, Kubatlu were abolished and new administrative units were formed: 1. NKAR, 2. Kurdistan, 3. Aghdam, 4. Shamkhor [12: I]. In Azerbaijan the uezds did not divide into volosts (smaller administrative units), but were divided into rural communities, which consists of rural settlements.

- Baku uezd- the total population was 58. 166, from which 52. 208 were Tats, 5. 863 were Az. Türks, 68 were Russians, and 27 were others. [13: 2; 26: 106].
- Lenqoran uezd- the total population was 152. 910, from which 78.380 were Az. Türks, 66.206 were Talishes, 8.224 were Russians, 100 were others [3: 3; 23: 127].
- Quba uezd- the total population was 154.559, from which Az. Türks were 59.703, 48.731 were Cyurins, 42.312 were Tats, 3.813 were others [2: 2; 23: 141].
- Shamakhi uezd- the total population was 81. 668, from which 57. 820 were Az. Türks, 13. 585 were Russians, 6.262 were Armenians, 3.988 were Tats [1: 52- 62; 25: 218].
- Gyokchay uezd- the total population was 96.953, from which 85.817 were Az. Türks, 2.874 were Tats, 2. 404 were Russians, 1.575 were Armenians, 360 were others [14: 2; 23: 149].
- Jewat (Salian) uezd - the total population was 81. 909, from which 75. 655 were Az. Türks, 2. 537 were Russians, 3.530 were Ukrainians, 187 were others [9: 2; 23: 132].
- Aresh uezd- the total population was 52.807, from which 49. 317 were Az. Türks, 1.408 were Mountaineers, 906 were Russians, 413 were Kurds, 359 were Armenians, 92 were Persians, 248 were Gypsies, 22 were Germans, 5 were Georgians, 37 were others [11: 32-42; 25: 210].

- Gyanja and Shamkhor uezds- the total population was 167.743, from which 109.402 were Az. Türks, 46.411 were Armenians, 4.247 were Germans, 7.549 were Russians, others were 134 [8: 2].
- Jewanshir uezd- the total population was 84. 674, from which 40. 032 were Az. Türks, 29.815 Armenians, 14.680 Kurds, 147 others [5:12; 25: 224].
- Ghazakh uezd- the total population was 67. 457, from which 66. 243 were Az. Türks, 1.092 were Germans, 117 were others [4: 2].
- Nukhi and Zaqatala uezds- the total population of Nukhi was 71.613, from which 58.415 were Az. Türks, 7.167 were Mountaineers, 1.011 were Türks migrated from Armenia, 35 were Ottoman Turks, 2.044 were Udis, 1.782 were Armenians, 976 were Mountainous Jews, 56 were Slavons, 127 were others [10: 2; 24: 74]. The total population of Zaqatala was 68.280, from which 31.753 Mountaineers, 26. 737 Az. Türks, 9.718 Georgians (6.079 Muslim-Georgians, 3.639 Christian-Georgeans), 72 others [15: 2; 24: 50].
- Shushi, Karyagino, Kubatlu uezd- the total population of Kubatlu was 39.496, from which 23.517 were Az. Türks, 1.975 were Armenians, 13.994 were Kurds [7: 2; 25: 101]. The total population of Shushi was 127. 858, from which 54.492 were Az. Türks, 72.789 were Armenians, 439 were Persians, 140 were others [6: 2]. The total population of Karyagino was 72.352 [16: 2].

In NKAR the total population was 129.243, from which 122.426 were Armenians, 6.550 were Az. Türks⁶. In Kurdistan the total population was 35.219, from which 28.422 were Kurds, the others were Az. Türks, Armenians⁷. In Aghdam the whole population was Az. Türks, in Shamkhor 75 % were Az. Türks, 16.60% were Armenians, 7.10 % were Russians. In Jebrazil uezd the total population was 70.281, from which 50.163 were Az. Türks, 18.779 were Armenians, 311 were Persians, 437 were Russians, 571 were Kurds. What refers to the urban population, 69 % were Az. Türks. Among the latter, the literacy rate is below average, 13.5 percent. In other words, the rest of the urban population, 31%, is three or more times more literate than the Türk population.

⁶ The census conducted in Nagorno-Karabakh in August 1921 immediately after the decision of the Caucasian Bureau on July 5, according to which the autonomous region created after two years on 7 July 1923. There is some uncertainty around the number of population because of bordering issues [Error! Reference source not found.: 52-53], but after some corrections and recalculations the number mentioned above was accepted.

⁷ On 7 July, the Caucasian Bureau made the other decision too: to create Autonomous Kurdistan the center and borders of which were to be determined only after the adjustment of the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh [20: 96] but after several days, the decision about autonomy changed into the decision about Kurdistan uezd. The question is did the majority of the uezd Kurds. But the province was not called a Kurdish uezd, which would clearly indicate that the majority of Kurds live in the uezd, it had a geopolitical quality, and at the same time it did not have a special status in relation to other administrative units of Azerbaijan [Error! Reference source not found.: 803].

In conclusion

We can say that, despite the limitations both in theoretical and practical processes, this census has a great importance in a way of contracting ethnic processes in Eastern Transcaucasia. First, it fixed the demographic changes caused following the turbulent events of 1918-1920. According to census data the ethnic structure of rural population in Azerbaijan was quite complex. Despite the fact that more than a half of total population was Az. Türks, the issue of ethnic minorities, such as Caucasian natives and Iranian-speaking ethnic groups was present. The process of ethno consolidation among Az. Türks and the creation of common self-identity was not completed yet, which expressed with the usage of "Muslim" as a common ethnonym. Thus, an opportunity was given to compare the results with the data of following censuses to understand the logical process of soviet national policy from internationalism (with the registration of small ethnic groups) to creating the titular nation in the face of the ethnonym Azerbaijanis, which, as we notice, wasn't expressed in any way during 1920's and early 1930's and emerged as a result of Stalin's policy in the mid-1930's to create "an ancient nation" in Azerbaijan similar to Armenia and Georgia. The tendency was absent in 1920's and the census of 1921 proved that.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Az. CSD- Azerbaijan’s Central Statistic Department.
RSFSR- Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.
Az. Türks- Azerbaijani Türks.

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ԽՈՐՀՐԴԱՅԻՆ ԱԴՐԲԵՋԱՆԻ ԲՆԱԿՉՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԷԹՆԻԿ ԿԱԶՄԸ (ԸՍՏ 1921 Թ. ԳՅՈՒՂԱՏՆՏԵՍԱԿԱՆ ՄԱՐԴԱՀԱՄԱՐԻ)

Անուշ Հարությունյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ Խորհրդային Ադրբեջան, գյուղատնտեսական մարդահամար, էթնիկ կազմ, ընտանեկան թերթիկ, վարչական միավոր, ազգային փոքրամասնություն, էթնիկ տարբերակում:

Հոդվածում փորձ է արվել ներկայացնել Խորհրդային Ադրբեջանի բնակչության էթնիկ կազմը՝ հենվելով 1921 թ. գյուղատնտեսական մարդահամարի տվյալների վրա: Թեև մարդահամարի անցկացումը թե՛ տեսական, թե՛

գործնական առումներով հեռու էր ժամանակակից իմաստով մարդահամարի անհրաժեշտ պահանջները բավարարելուց և էթնիկ որոշարկման մեխանիզմները դրանում ամենաթույլ կերպով էին արտահայտված, այնուհանդերձ այն հնարավորություն է տալիս, թեկուզ և ընդհանրացումների մակարդակում, պատկերացում կազմել 1918-1920 թթ. արյունալի իրադարձություններից հետո ստեղծված էթնիկ ժողովրդագրական պատկերի մասին: Այս տվյալները կարևոր են նաև հաջորդած մարդահամարների տվյալների հետ համեմատական անցկացնելու հնարավորության առումով, ինչը կլրացնի այն էթնիկ գործընթացների ամբողջությունը, որոնք տեղի ունեցան Ադրբեջանում խորհրդային իշխանության առաջին տասնամյակներին՝ համահունչ խորհրդային ազգային քաղաքականությանը:

Մարդահամարն անցկացվեց Խորհրդային Ռուսաստանում 1920 թ. տեղի ունեցած գյուղատնտեսական մարդահամարի նմանությամբ և տեսական հիմքով: Ըստ մարդահամարի՝ գյուղական բնակչության (1 516 923՝ առանց Նախիջևանի) 61,3 %-ը Ադրբեջանի թյուրքերն էին, մնացած հատվածը՝ հայեր (13.4 %), իրանական խմբեր՝ թաթեր, թալիշներ (11, 9 %), արևելակովկասյան լեռնականներ (6.8 %), ռուսներ (2.8 %), քրդեր (2.2 %), և այլն: Ադրբեջանի թյուրքերը մեծամասնություն էին կազմում միայն Շամախու, Արեշի, Ձևատի, Գյոքչայի, Ղազախի ուեզդներում: Սակայն նրանց շրջանում ինքնության որոշարկման սկզբունքներն այժմ էլ, ինչպես և նախկին տասնամյակներում, շարունակում էին մնալ անհստակ՝ հաճախ պայմանավորվելով կրոնով, թյուրքալեզվությամբ, ծննդավայրով և այլ հանգամանքներով: Ուստի Ադրբեջանի բնակչության տեսակարար հատվածը կազմող այս խումբը դեռևս գտնվում էր ինքնության որոնման միջանկյալ փուլում: Այս են վկայում նաև վիճակագիրներն իրենց վերլուծություններում:

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY TOWARDS AFGHANISTAN*

Xin Yin

Abstract

The Carter administration came to power at a crucial period when the relations between the East and the West were shifting from relaxation to re-confrontation. Its policy towards Afghanistan was not only restricted by the situation of U.S.-Soviet Union relations but also exerted a direct influence on the maintenance and transformation of this situation, notably the opening of the “New Cold War” between the East and the West. With the evolution of the Carter administration’s policy towards Afghanistan as the main clue, this paper aims to study the formation background, causes of change and development logic of different US policies towards Afghanistan in this period so as to reveal the internal relationship between the change of the U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and the evolution of the Cold War situation, as well as the essence of the U.S. policy.

Keywords: Carter Administration, Soviet Union, Afghanistan, “New World Order Strategy”, “Carter Doctrine”, “New Cold War”, Evolution.

Introduction

The Carter administration was in the midst of a significant change in East-West relations, transitioning from Cold War détente to renewed confrontation. At the beginning of his presidency, Carter introduced the “New World Order Strategy”, designed to foster improved relations between the US and the Soviet Union. However, with the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan, Carter's “New World Order Strategy” was deemed a failure, resulting in the introduction of the “Carter Doctrine.” Throughout Carter's presidency, why did the US policy towards Afghanistan transform from the “New World Order Strategy” to the “Carter Doctrine”? What were the rationales behind the policy shift and what were the outcomes? These questions are all worth studying. This paper seeks to focus on the policy shift of the Carter administration toward Afghanistan to delve into the reasons for the transformation from the “New World Order Strategy” to the “Carter Doctrine”, so as to uncover the inherent link between this policy shift and the changing Cold War situation, as well as the essence of the US policy.

A review of current research on US policy towards Afghanistan reveals that studies on US-Afghan relations primarily focus on US national interests and the context of the US-Soviet Cold War. Following the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan quickly captured the attention of Western scholars, resulting in the publication of

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numerous notable works on subjects such as US policy towards¹, Soviet policy towards Afghanistan², and the impact of US policy towards South Asia on Afghanistan³, etc. However, these works generally lack in-depth analysis of the policies and underlying rationales implemented by the Carter administration in response to the outbreak of war. Although there was a brief surge of interest in the 1970s, research on Afghanistan policy both domestically and internationally has since shifted towards US policy towards Afghanistan post-September 11th attacks. Nonetheless, there remains significant potential for research on US policy towards Afghanistan during the 1970s, particularly given the ongoing declassification of US national archives.

“Balanced” policy toward Afghanistan before the Carter administration

In the wake of the Cold War, Afghanistan's unique geographical position drew the renewed interest of the US and the Soviet Union, yet the US policy towards the country remained largely subordinate to its broader South Asian policy prior to the Carter administration. The US pursued “balanced power” between India and Pakistan in South Asia during this period to curb the expansion of the Soviet Union’s communism. Regarding its policy on Afghanistan, the US strove to offset the Soviet Union’s influence in the region by upholding an equilibrium with Soviet power in the area, fighting for an equilibrium among Afghanistan and its neighboring countries, and supporting an equilibrium of political power within Afghanistan, all designed to counterbalance Soviet infiltration in the region. The US

¹ Several publications on the topic of US policy towards Afghanistan include: Mohammad Khaild Ma Aroof, *Afghanistan in World Politics: A Study in Afghan-US Relations*, Delhi (India), Gian Publishing House, 1987, 164p. Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *Afghanistan The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower*, London, Casemate, 2001, 244 p. Tom Lansford, *A Bitter Harvest: US Foreign Policy and Afghanistan*, London, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003, 216p. Jacqueline Fitzgibbon, *US Politics, Propaganda and the Afghan Mujahedeen: Domestic Politics and the Afghan War*, London, I.B. Tauris, 2019, 240p. Douglas A. Borer, *Superpowers Defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan Compared*, London, Frank Cass Publishers, 1999, 288p. Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Brookings Institution, 1994, 1206p..

² Several publications on the topic of Soviet policy towards Afghanistan include: Gregory Feifer, *The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan*, New York, Harper Perennial, 2010, 326p. Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, Durham, Duke University Press, 1985, 336p. Anthony Arnold, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion in Perspective*, Stanford, Hoover Press Publication, 1981, 126p. Anthony Arnold, *The Fateful Pebble, Afghanistan’s Role in the Fall of the Soviet Empire*, Novato, Calif, Presidio Press, 1993, 225p. Toms T. Hammod, *Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the Consequences*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1984, 262p. Russian G. Staff, *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost*, trans. W. Lester Grau and Michael A. Gress, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2002, 392p..

³ Publications on the topic of US policy towards South Asia and its impact on Afghanistan include: A. Z. Hilali, *U.S.-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan*, London, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2005, 322p. Robert J. McMahon, *The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1994, 448p. Hafeez Malik, *Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 1987, 444p.

mainly offered economic assistance to Afghanistan, coupled with a limited provision of military support, in a bid to ensure that Afghanistan maintained a non-aligned stance and a neutral position in the rivalry with the Soviet Union.

While Afghanistan held no strategic significance to the US during the Truman administration, the US provided the country with some economic aid to counter the Soviet Union. However, the Truman administration declined to extend military aid to Afghanistan, resulting in lukewarm relations between the two nations during this time. With Eisenhower assuming presidency, the focus of the Cold War shifted, with South Asia playing a more strategic role. Consequently, Afghanistan was incorporated into the South Asia strategy and began to gain more attention from the US. Nevertheless, as Afghanistan was reluctant to join the US military alliance against the Soviet Union and the US leaned towards Pakistan regarding the Pashtunistan issue, although Mohammad Daoud Khan⁴ was invited to visit the US, on the whole Afghanistan remained peripheral to the US interests in the Middle East and Southwest Asia during the time. The US strategy towards Afghanistan during this period was centered on preserving the country's neutrality and buffer state status and preventing it from falling into the arms of the Soviet Union. After Kennedy came to power, on the one hand, the US was vying with the Soviet Union for influence in South Asia, hoping to coordinate the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan at their best and maintain robust US-Pakistan relations. On the other hand, the US put forth the Peace Corps program in response to the "non-aligned movement" burgeoning across the Third World. Afghanistan, one of the founding members of the "non-aligned" movement, became a recipient of the US Peace Corps program. The US sustained its influence in Afghanistan by providing technology and technical training, which were aimed to bolster local economic development and prosperity. Following Kennedy's assassination, Johnson assumed office and continued the Peace Corps program. However, the escalating Vietnam War dragged the US into the war, making it unable to dedicate significant attention to Afghanistan. Moreover, the US government deemed it sufficient to maintain a "neutral" stance towards Afghanistan during that period and consequently did not provide additional economic or military aid to the country. Following Nixon's ascension to the presidency, the US initiated a strategic contraction and a foreign policy of *détente* with the Soviet Union due to its defeat in the Vietnam War and the outbreak of the domestic crisis. During this period, despite dispatching leaders to visit Afghanistan, the US sent back assistance to the country. The US mainly offered limited economic and technical assistance to Afghanistan to maintain the country's independence and non-aligned policy and keep it from being overly influenced by the Soviet Union. Such a policy continued through the early years of the Carter administration.

⁴ Mohammad Daoud Khan was an Afghan statesman who served as prime minister of Afghanistan from 1953 to 1963 and, as leader of the 1973 Afghan coup d'état which overthrew the monarchy, served as the first president of Afghanistan from 1973 to 1978.

As for the underlying reason, on the one hand, the US preferred to focus on the South Asian subcontinent and was reluctant to become overly involved in Afghanistan because “Afghanistan is of limited strategic value, given its geographic distance, complex terrain, and challenges in diplomatic communication, as well as lack of critical facilities essential for modern military operations... Instead, Pakistan is an ideal location for establishing strategic bases and intelligence-gathering” [11: 135]. On the other hand, Afghanistan had pursued a policy of neutrality since the reign of Shah Mahmud Khan⁵, while the US concentrated on building an anti-Soviet military alliance in the Middle East. After Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan became military allies of the US, Afghanistan maintained a neutral and non-aligned foreign policy. Factoring in the issue of Pashtunistan, the US was wary of offering arms to Afghanistan fearing that Afghanistan would use the weapons to fight against Pakistan instead of the Soviet Union [3: 80]. As a result, the US refused to give military assistance to Afghanistan. On October 19, 1954, a National Intelligence Estimate entitled *Afghan Prospects* pointed out: “The strategic significance of Afghanistan is as a buffer state, separating the USSR on the north from non-Communist Pakistan and India to the south, but itself dominated by neither the Communist nor the non-Communist power bloc” [4: 708]. “The US acquiesced in the special status of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, but did not want Afghanistan to fall completely under Soviet control” [16: 279]. It was evident that for a long time, the US viewed Afghanistan as a buffer state to contain the Soviet Union. As long as Afghanistan remained neutral and did not smash the bottom line of aligning with the Soviet Union, the US was reluctant to make any substantial commitments to Afghanistan. Thus, from the Truman administration to the Nixon administration Afghanistan was met with a nonchalant attitude from the US for a prolonged period and received limited assistance.

Carter administration's “New World Order Strategy” and its impact on policy towards Afghanistan

In 1977, Jimmy Carter won the election and became the 39th President of the US. At the beginning of his term, the US economy was stuck in a dire state of stagnation, grappling with severe fiscal deficits and economic stagnation, compounded by soaring unemployment and inflation rate. Worse still, following the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, the OPEC, which was established by Middle East countries, substantially hiked the price of oil to nearly 10 times the pre-1970s levels, dealing a huge blow to the US, which was heavily dependent on oil imports. The persistent rise in oil prices rippled across other products exacerbating inflation and ultimately leading to a full-blown stagflation crisis. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union not only doubled its economy during this period, further narrowing the economic gap with the US, but also rapidly built up its military power. “And the Soviet Union at this

⁵ Shah Mahmud Khan: was the Prime Minister of Afghanistan from May 1946 to 7 September 1953, under King Mohammed Zahir Shah's monarchy.

point was nearing equality in strategic weapons. The decisive American superiority, which had characterized the entire postwar period, had ended by 1967... By 1969 it was clear that the number of Soviet missiles capable of reaching the US would soon equal that of all American missiles available for retaliation against the Soviet Union, and, if Soviet building programs continued through the Seventies, would come to exceed them” [9: 165-166]. Carter was compelled to pursue a new foreign policy to counteract the Soviet Union due to the decline of the US in political, economic, and military power after he assumed office. On May 22, 1977, for the first time Carter offered a systematic presentation of his foreign policy at the University of Notre Dame and announced the introduction of the “New World Order Strategy”, which mainly included the implementation of “human rights diplomacy”, strengthening alliances with Japan and Europe, increasing attention to the Third World and pursuing a *détente* with the Soviet Union.

As the focus of Carter’s “New World Order Strategy”, “human rights diplomacy” primarily targeted the Soviet Union, with the ultimate goal of “attempting to undermine the unity and power of the Soviet bloc by supporting dissidents in the Soviet Union and the satellite states in Eastern Europe” [14: 154]. Nevertheless, motivated by interests, the US was hugely divergent in implementing Carter’s “human rights diplomacy” and did not abide by uniform standards. As for Afghanistan, the US considered the country to be of little interest to it, and thus there were no so-called “human rights” issues despite the Soviet Union’s provision of military and economic support, and there was no need to devote too much attention to the region.

In developing relations with the Third World countries, the Carter administration obtained three major achievements: 1. The issue concerning the Panama Canal: Carter and General Torrijos inked the Torrijos–Carter Treaties in Washington, D.C. in September 1977. 2. The Carter administration prompted the signing of the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel in September 1978, taking the two countries towards normalization of relations. 3. China and the US issued the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations on December 16, 1978, which recognized the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate government of China and helped normalize the relations between the two countries. It could be seen that Afghanistan was not a top priority for the Carter administration. When it came to the region, as long as Afghanistan could adhere to the “non-aligned” policy, it was that “the US need not directly structure its activities in Afghanistan on the basis of competition with the Soviet Union” [8: 9].

The Carter administration’s efforts to advance relations with Western Europe and Japan resulted in increased cooperation among NATO countries to enhance European defense and prevent Soviet Union’s expansion. Additionally, Afghanistan was offered economic assistance from Western-controlled international economic organizations, as well as Western European countries and Japan. Consequently, from the US perspective, “the Soviet Union, as the principal military supplier to Afghanistan, is less likely to destabilize the region”, and “the US should

avoid being drawn into a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, but rather react somewhat to Soviet actions, which would have a limited, marginal effect, and at the same time gradually build up our capacity to play a more active role, if that should be necessary at a later time" [6: 4]. As a result, the US adopted a hands-off approach towards Afghanistan during the period, scaling down its aid and involvement, which created an opportunity for the subsequent invasion by the Soviet Union.

It can thus be deduced that the New World Order Strategy aimed to eliminate the pessimism brought about by the decline of U.S. hegemony by emphasizing human rights, enhancing the influence of U.S. ideology around the world, improving the country's appeal across the Third World, and boosting its strategic position in the US-Soviet Union relations through limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, so as to facilitate a détente with the Soviet Union and bring about domestic political and economic restoration and development. On Afghanistan, the United States believed that it was sufficient to keep it in its "non-aligned" foreign policy and did not need to intervene too much.

Carter administration's response to the Soviet Union's attack on Afghanistan and the introduction of the Carter Doctrine

Afghanistan has been a long-standing area of interest for the Soviet Union. In modern history, Czars attempted to utilize the country as a gateway to the Indian Ocean and sought to secure an ice-free port in the Persian Gulf by establishing a land route through Afghanistan to the Indian Ocean. To this end, the Soviet Union had been infiltrating Afghanistan in the post-Second World War era. The conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan reignited in the early 1960s due to the Pashtunistan issue, resulting in a border blockade that severely damaged the Afghan economy. Afghanistan was forced to seek assistance from the Soviet Union, which presented a chance for the Soviet Union to intervene and expand its infiltration into the Afghan economy. Throughout the 1970s, Afghanistan experienced a series of regime changes, with "the April Revolution"⁶ of 1978 offering a premium opportunity to the Soviet Union to meddle in Afghan politics. Despite the absence of direct evidence of the Soviet Union's involvement in the April Revolution, the Soviet Union had been pushing for the long-term goal of establishing a communist regime in Afghanistan. Such efforts eventually led Afghanistan to lean towards the Soviet Union. As the situation in Afghanistan became more volatile and the tensions be-

⁶ "The April Revolution" also known as the "Saur Revolution" or "Sowr Revolution" or "the April Coup", was staged on 27–28 April 1978 by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and overthrew Afghan president Mohammed Daoud Khan, who had himself taken power in the 1973 Afghan coup d'état and established an autocratic one-party system in the country. Daoud and most of his family were executed at the Arg in the capital city of Kabul by PDPA-affiliated military officers, after which his supporters were also purged and killed. The successful PDPA uprising resulted in the creation of a socialist Afghan government that was closely aligned with the Soviet Union, with Nur Muhammad Taraki serving as the PDPA's General Secretary of the Revolutionary Council.

tween the Soviet Union and Afghanistan intensified, the Soviet Union launched a surprise invasion of Afghanistan on December 25, 1979 to prevent the country from slipping out of its grasp. On the 27th, Hafizullah Amin⁷ was killed and the presidential palace was taken. On the 28th, Babrak Karmal⁸ was appointed the General Secretary of the PDPA replacing Amrullah following a cabinet reshuffle. This marked yet another invasion of a sovereign country after the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Despite closely monitoring the Soviet Union's preparations for an invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter administration appeared somewhat chaotic and passive after the invasion. And there was "no one used the word 'invasion' or tired to charge any violation of international law when the USSR, upon the request of its treaty partner, first sent large contingents of troops in December of 1979" [10: 141]. Till January 8, the New York Times consistently used the word "intervention" which changed to "invasion" [10: 142]. Moreover, a considerable number of officials in the Carter administration had previously believed that diplomacy had to take precedence over military action in shaping foreign policy, the administration engaged in repeated discussions and consultations regarding the specific policy as to the Soviet Union's invasion. After Raja Anwar became the new General Secretary of the APDP on December 28, Washington reckoned: "There is little prospect that the government as now constituted can win significant popular support" [5: 297]. Carter called for a meeting of the National Security Council on the same day, during which the President emphasized that the ultimate aim was to get the Soviets to withdraw. And the Secretaries of State and Defense and Dr. Brzezinski said it was to make it as costly as possible for the Soviets [5: 302]. On December 29, the US Bureau of Intelligence and Research analyzed the effect of the Soviet Union's intervention in the Afghan civil war, the surrounding regions and the Soviet Union's position, and pointed out: "In the current Afghan situation, the USSR has a bear by the tail... Given this unattractive prospect, Moscow has now begun to escalate its intervention in Afghan affairs in the hope that this will improve its chances to reduce the just mentioned negative aspects of the situation. It is trying to insure that it will gain reliable control over its client regime (which it did not have under Amin) and that Afghanistan will neither sink into anarchy (thus increasing the risk of external intervention) nor become a hostile neighbor to the USSR" [5: 328-329]. It was clear that in the early days of the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, the Carter administration, albeit recognizing the gravity of the situation and deliberating on various policies, failed to establish a comprehensive action plan. Of

⁷ Hafizullah Amin: was an Afghan communist revolutionary, politician and teacher. He organized the Saur Revolution of 1978 and co-founded the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), ruling Afghanistan as General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party from September 1979 until his assassination in December 1979.

⁸ Babrak Karmal: was an Afghan communist revolutionary and politician who was the leader of Afghanistan, serving in the post of General Secretary of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan for seven years.

course, when formulating policy towards Afghanistan, the Carter administration took into account its relationship with countries in the vicinity, such as Pakistan, Iran, and China. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter Administration sought the support of the Iran, Pakistan, and China. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter Administration sought the support of the Iran, Pakistan, and China. But, to the dismay of Washington, the response to its overtures was in the case of Iran downright hostile and in that of Pakistan and China, cautious and restrained [6: 561]. After all, in terms of the specific situation in Afghanistan, the US policy was not effectively executed and thus failed to deter the Soviet Union's actions in Afghanistan.

In a letter to President Carter on January 2, 1980, the former Afghan ambassador stated: "If the US does not act decisively and immediately, there is almost nothing to prevent the Russians from advancing into Iran, Pakistan, India and ultimately the Persian Gulf" [5: 347], if Afghanistan become another part of the Soviet block. It is this very fear of loss of identity that forced hundreds of thousands of Afghans to seek refuge in neighboring Pakistan, there to regroup and organize a counter force against the communist regime in their homeland. "But now their hopes of success against tdirect Russian army have diminished, unless they receive substantial assistance and support from the US" [5: 348]. He urged the Carter administration to take swift actions to pressure the Soviet Union into withdrawing its troops and restoring Afghanistan's territorial independence, neutrality, and integrity. The Carter Administration formulated a series of policies with the ultimate aim of forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. Carter emphasized in the State of the Union address to a joint session of Congress on January 23, 1980: "I'm determined that the US will remain the strongest of all nations, but our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or to the rights of any human being. We seek to be and to remain secure - a nation at peace in a stable world. But to be secure we must face the world as it is." "But now the Soviet Union has taken a radical and an aggressive new step. It's using its great military power against a relatively defenseless nation. The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War." "The vast majority of nations on Earth have condemned this latest Soviet attempt to extend its colonial domination of others and have demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Moslem world is especially and justifiably outraged by this aggression against an Islamic people. No action of a world power has ever been so quickly and so overwhelmingly condemned. But verbal condemnation is not enough. The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for their aggression." "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the US of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force" [12]. Later this came to be known as the "Carter Doctrine", the new US policy towards the Persian Gulf.

Reasons for the Carter administration's policy shift toward Afghanistan

Since the Carter administration took office, there was a notable policy shift towards Afghanistan. Its foreign policy underwent a transformation from the "New World Order Strategy" centered on "human rights diplomacy" to the "Carter Doctrine", altering the hands-off approach at the beginning to a continuous hardening stance and transitioning from a defensive to an offensive approach. When the US maintained a moderate *détente* with the Soviet Union, the US policy towards Afghanistan was primarily defensive. However, with the Soviet Union's incursion into Afghanistan and the escalating bipolar tension, the US was extremely offensive in its policy towards Afghanistan. The main reasons for the change are as follows:

Change of Afghanistan's neutrality: As a key participant of the "non-aligned" movement, which was led by the Third World countries and emerged in the 1960s, Afghanistan staunchly adhered to a policy of neutrality in its foreign affairs. Afghanistan's foreign policy remained neutral from Mohammed Daoud Khan's first reign to King Zahir Shah's assumption of office, throughout Daoud's second term of the Republic of Afghanistan and prior to the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan during the April Revolution in 1978. For this reason, Afghanistan utilized its rejection of the US anti-Soviet Union military alliance in the Middle East as leverage to maintain a balance between the two superpowers during the Cold War. Thus, after Carter came to power, the US was more convinced and appreciative even than the Soviet Union of Afghanistan's non-aligned policy until the April Revolution. As a result, initially the Carter administration's stance on Afghanistan was to uphold a non-aligned foreign policy. As the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan intensified in December 1979, the Afghan government was gradually reduced to a puppet regime, putting an end to its neutral and non-aligned policy and eroding Afghanistan's status as such a nation in the eyes of the Carter administration. The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan also impacted the strategic interests of the US, promoting the Carter administration to adopt a more confrontational approach towards the Soviet Union, evidenced by implementing the Carter Doctrine as the guiding foreign policy and the provision of covert assistance to Afghan insurgents to force the withdrawal of the Soviet Union's troops.

The cabinet's influence on the Carter Administration's policy toward Afghanistan: Before serving as a president, Carter was not in any major decision-making position in the federal government. After being elected, Carter's lack of political experience and indecisiveness contributed to the absence of a consistent code of conduct in the management of his cabinet, as well as internal divisions arising from indecisiveness in foreign policy formulation. Former US President Richard Nixon once described Carter as "a 'reformed eagle' that pledged to take a strong stand in one minute but made concession after concession to the Soviets the next" [15: 47].

When he took office, Carter expected Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew Brzezinski to help provide him with as many perspectives and options as possible in foreign policy decisions. Carter once noted: "Brzezinski's and Secretary of State Vance's respective strengths ensured that they were both competent in their positions, but they also stimulated a natural competition between the two organizations they represented... This competition was extremely beneficial to me because to formulate foreign policy it was necessary to analyze as many points of view as possible" [1: 260]. However, Vance and Brzezinski held strikingly different ideas. The moderates, or "doves", led by Vance, valued the *détente* between the East and West and advocated restraint and negotiations with the Soviet Union, while the hardliners, or "hawks", under the leadership of Brzezinski, perceived the increased influence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as a threat to the US security and opposed the Soviet Union's expansion regardless of the form. Carter sometimes took the opinion of one person and adopted the suggestions of both at other times, giving rise to a fluctuating stance and lack of consistency in foreign policy at the outset of the Carter administration.

The growing divergence between Brzezinski and Vance's views on the US global strategy and relations with the Soviet Union led to an intensifying conflict over time, causing the Carter administration to be criticized for being "fragmented, unplanned, and unmanaged" [2: 277] from all sides. After the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979, the divide between Brzezinski and Vance began to gradually ease. When Vance resigned in April 1980 over disagreements on the use of force in the "Iran hostage crisis"⁹, the administration no longer had conflicting factions between "hawks" and "doves". It fully adopted Brzezinski's views on Afghanistan and showcased a tougher stance against the Soviet Union. At the same time, Carter saw an opportunity to shift the public and media perception of his administration as weak, and to create a new image of the US on the global stage.

Impact of external factors: Before the Iran hostage crisis, the US had been pursuing a "Twin Pillar Policy" in Iran by cultivating Iran and Saudi Arabia as proxies in the Persian Gulf region. Although a pillar of the US "Twin Pillar Policy", Iran was wary of US involvement in the Persian Gulf region and only cooperated with the US in curbing the Soviet Union's expansion into the region. February 1979 saw a revolution in Iran in which Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini overthrew the ruling monarchy of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and established the Islamic Republic of Iran. In relation to foreign policy, the US-Iranian alliance came to a close

⁹ The "Iran hostage crisis" was a diplomatic standoff between the United States and Iran. Fifty-two American diplomats and citizens were held hostage after a group of militarized Iranian college students belonging to the Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line, who supported the Iranian Revolution, took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and took them as hostages. The hostages were held for 444 days, from November 4, 1979 to their release on January 20, 1981.

in March when Iran declared its exit from the Central Treaty Organization drafted by the US. In the aftermath of the “Iran hostage” incident on November 4, Khomeini called on Muslims worldwide to join the fight against the infidels. The influence prompted a handful of Islamic countries to launch anti-American movements, causing significant repercussions in some pro-US countries like Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco. Consequently, the US government had to reassess the adjustment of its Persian Gulf policy.

The Iran hostage crisis and the resulting deterioration of US-Iranian relations provided the Soviet Union with an opening to expand its reach southward. The Soviet Union had been striving to dominate Iran and move southward to secure access to a warm water port in the Indian Ocean. In February 1979, Khomeini conferred with the Soviet Union’s ambassador and acknowledged the Soviet Union’s entitlement to intervene in cases where anti-Soviet factions instigated violence against Iran under the terms of the 1921 Russo-Persian Treaty of Friendship. The Soviet Union was the first to acknowledge the new regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran following its establishment. In the wake of the Iran hostage incident, the Soviet Union not only vigorously urged the Iranian government to confront the US through radio along the border and cultivated relations with the Iranian government, but also proactively launched offensives in other areas of the Persian Gulf. The Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Iraq in 1972, establishing a strategic partnership that involved the provision of loads of advanced weapons, low-interest loans and technical assistance. The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 was a crucial part of the Soviet Union’s global strategy. By this time, the Soviet Union had constructed a substantial presence encircling the Persian Gulf, which posed a serious threat to the interests of the US and other Western countries in the region. As a result, these countries pledged to take a hardening stance against the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan and demanded its withdrawal.

Conclusion

The introduction of the Carter Doctrine on January 23, 1980 signaled a revision of the US détente with the Soviet Union since the 1970s and a renewed emphasis on military power and containment. This change in policy towards Afghanistan marked the termination of the US-Soviet détente and the beginning of the New Cold War. In retrospect, it was evident that the policy towards Afghanistan under the Carter administration, while carrying certain distinct features of the time, remained an organic part of the US global Cold War strategy and policy. Carter’s “New World Order” strategy and the “Carter Doctrine” were subordinate to the US containment strategy. Whatever the change in the policy towards Afghanistan, its goal remained secondary to the US strategic interests during the Cold War, i.e. containing the expansion of the Soviet Union.

The rollout of the Carter Doctrine marked a significant shift in the US policy towards Afghanistan, representing a revision of the Nixon-Kissinger model of bal-

ancing power via diplomacy and instead emphasizing the economic and military importance of the Middle East-Southwest Asia regions for the US. The US was more capable of managing conflicts, furnishing the country with a more coherent and potent deterrent capacity. Despite these efforts, the US was unable to fully reverse its decline until the introduction of the Reagan Doctrine after President Reagan took office, followed by a shift in US policy towards Afghanistan.

Whether the Soviet Union or the US were on the offensive or defensive in Afghanistan, their policies were centered on their respective Cold War interests, reducing Afghanistan to both a beneficiary and a victim of the competition between the two superpowers. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, the US deployed a covert operation to train and arm Muslim guerrillas who then overthrew the Najibullah regime, which was backed by the Soviet Union and founded in 1986. However, the Muslim guerrillas failed to bring stability to Afghanistan. On the contrary, a more violent civil war broke out between various factions, igniting the underlying ethnic and religious tensions that had simmered in the country. Coupled with the emergence of the Islamic revival movement in the 1980s, the political foundation was laid for the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan. As the Cold War came to a close, the US celebrated victory in the Gulf War and began to draw up the "Greater Middle East" strategy. Viewing Afghanistan as a key component of the strategy, the US covertly supported the Taliban to gain a foothold in Central Asia, limit Russia's traditional sphere of influence, and counterbalance Iran's regional power. The US favoritism towards Israel led to dissatisfaction among the Taliban, which pointed the finger of blame at the US. Al Qaeda took advantage of the support to the Taliban regime to carry out terrorist attacks, and the 20-year war in Afghanistan failed to eliminate the Taliban, which instead regained control of Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the US troops, catching the US by surprise. History will tell to which extent the statement that Afghanistan is "the Graveyard of Empires" will be fulfilled in the US.

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ABBREVIATIONS

OPEC - Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PDPA - People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan

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ՔԱՐԹԵՐԻ ՎԱՐՉԱԿԱԶՄԻ ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ ԱՖԴԱՆՍՏԱՆԻ ՆԿԱՏՄԱՄԲ

Սին Յին

Բանալի բառեր՝ Քարթերի վարչակազմ, Խորհրդային Միություն, Աֆղանստան, նոր աշխարհակարգի ռազմավարություն, Քարթերի դոկտրինա, «նոր սառը պատերազմ», զարգացում:

Քարթերի վարչակազմը իշխանության եկավ վճռորոշ ժամանակաշրջանում, երբ Արևելքի և Արևմուտքի հարաբերությունները հանգիստ վիճակից անցում էին կատարում նոր առճակատման: Աֆղանստանի նկատմամբ նրա քաղաքականությունը ոչ միայն սահմանափակված էր ԱՄՆ-Խորհրդային Միություն հարաբերությունների ընթացքով, այլև անմիջական ազդեցություն է ունեցել դրա փոխակերպման վրա՝ մասնավորապես Արևելքի և Արևմուտքի միջև «նոր սառը պատերազմի» սկզբնավորման վրա: Հոդվածում քննարկման առարկա է դարձել տվյալ ժամանակահատվածում Աֆղանստանի նկատմամբ ԱՄՆ քաղաքականության տարբեր դրսևորումները: Այդ քաղաքականության ձևավորման նախադրյալները, փոփոխությունների պատճառները և զարգացման տրամաբանությունը:

ԳԻՏԱԿԱՆ ԿՅԱՆՔ
SCIENTIFIC LIFE

**INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
“PROBLEMS OF THE HISTORY OF THE CAUCASUS” DEDICATED TO
THE 75TH ANNIVERSARY OF PAVEL CHOBANYAN (1948-2017)**

Monika Mirzoyan

Keywords: International Conference, Pavel Chobanyan, Caucasian Studies, Armenian Studies, Institute of Oriental Studies of NAS RA.

The International Conference “Problems of the History of the Caucasus” was held at the National Academy of Sciences of RA in Yerevan on March 15-16.

Pavlik (Pavel) Chobanyan was born in Khanlar town of Azerbaijan SSR (native village - historical Pip-Zaglik) on March 15, 1948. In 1973, he graduated from the Department of History at Yerevan State University. From 1974-1976, he pursued Caucasian and Georgian studies at the postgraduate course of the Institute of Oriental Studies of Armenian Soviet Republic Academy of Sciences and in the Institute of Manuscripts of the Georgian Academy of Sciences under the supervision of of Georgian scholar P. Metreveli.

P. Chobanyan began his scholarly career at the Institute of Oriental Studies. From 1977-1985, he was a junior researcher at the Department of Caucasian and Byzantine Studies of the institute; in 1995-1996, he was the head of the "Christian East" department. From 1985-1995, P. Chobanyan worked as a senior researcher at the Institute of History of NAS RA. For more than ten years, from 2002 to 2013, he served as deputy director of research at the Institute of Oriental Studies. For many years, from 1999-2003, he was a member of some scientific and editorial boards. He served as the Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the “Historical-philological journal” of NAS RA. In 2007, Chobanyan worked as a senior fellow analyst at the National Research Institute for Strategic Studies of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia (National Research University of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Armenia).

P. Chobanyan is the author of more than 150 scientific publications. He is also the editor of two dozen scientific articles. His works are related to the study of Armenian history, Armenian-Georgian, Armenian-Russian relations, and Georgian correspondence. He authored the fundamental monographs “Georgian travelers and their information about Armenians” [3] and “Armenian-Russian-Georgian Relations in the Second Half of VII Century” [2]. The scholar Kh. A. also published a translation of the “Grammar of the Old Georgian Language” by Shanidze together with Hayrapet Margaryan. In 1990, P. Chobanyan published a collection of documents entitled “Armenian-Russian relations in the second half of the 18th century (1760-1800)”, and in 1999 Makar Barkhudaryan's “The Country of Aghvank and

their neighbors” and “Artsakh” were republished with the author’s preface and annotations [1: 222-235].

P. Chobanyan also carried out teaching activities at various universities. He conducted general and professional courses at David Anghat University, Pedagogical University after Kh. Abovyan, Yerevan State University, and Yerevan Mkhitarayan Congregation’s school.

The scholar also participated in many international conferences, made presentations World Congresses of Oriental Studies at the 35th (Budapest) and 37th (Moscow), and participated in an international conference organized on the initiative of the Mekhitarist Congregation of Vienna to mark the 200th anniversary of the Mekhitarist Congregation of Vienna [4: 1-4].

Pavel Chobanyan was awarded the Garegin Nzhdeh Medal by the RA Ministry of Defense in 2010. He received other medals, including "150 years since the birth of K. Mechiev" (2010) and "20 years since the declaration of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic" (2011).

The first day of the conference began in the round hall of the Presidium of NAS RA, and the second day continued in the conference hall of the Institute of Oriental Studies of NAS RA.

The conference was jointly organized by the Institute of Oriental Studies and Institute of History of the National Academy of Sciences of NAS RA and the Department of History of the Yerevan State University.

Academician-Secretary of the Division of Armenian studies and Social Sciences of NAS RA Yuri Suvaryan gave an opening speech of the conference. Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of NAS RA Robert Ghazaryan and director of the Institute of History of NAS RA Ashot Melkonyan made welcoming remarks. Edik Minasyan, Dean of the YSU Faculty of History, welcomed the conference participants as well. The conference was also attended by members of Pavel Chobanyan’s family who made welcoming remarks.

In his speech, Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of NAS RA Robert Ghazaryan stated that he considers it a problem that most of our society does not have a clear idea of the state called "Azerbaijan" and who “Azerbaijanis” are, when and how they created the state, such as it is today. According to R. Ghazaryan, it is necessary to educate and inform the public at the state, university, why not also at the school level. Naturally, it is not about instilling hatred, as is done in Azerbaijan, but simply about showing the true course of history. “Azerbaijan's first target is the Armenians because anti-Armenianism is one of the cornerstones of their state. Not much has changed since 1918, but on the other hand, their “theft” extends to other countries in the region. They are also appropriating the historical and cultural heritage of the Iranian, Georgian, and Caucasian peoples and local populations” [5].

Thirty-one participants spoke at the conference, including thirteen from abroad (Georgia, Russia, the United States, Iran, and China). Eight participants from Georgia (Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, Institute of History and Ethnography, Georgian National Center of Manuscripts, Institute of Oriental Stud-

ies) presented the results of their research on various issues of Armenian-Georgian relations and Caucasian history during the conference. Remarkable reports were made on various topics of Armenian and Georgian history of the early Middle Ages to the Modern Age, and the ethnopolitical and socio-economic history of the Eastern Caucasus.

Mariam Chkhartishvili, one of the Georgian participants, presented the paper "Identification of Nobleman Atrnerseh of the "Book of Letters" and "Revisiting Political History of Georgia in 6th-7th Centuries", David Merkviladze's paper was "The Plans of Erekle II, the King of Kartli-Kakheti as regards the campaign of Russian troops in Daghestan in 1775", and Manuchar Guntsadze presented "Socio-economic Issue in the Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921)". Jilbert Meshkanbarians with a paper called "The Safavid Iran's Taxation Process According to 16th-18th centuries Armenian Historians and Other Sources of the Period" represented Iran. Among the Armenian participants, Azat Bozoyan, Doctor of Historical Sciences, presented a remarkable paper entitled "Research on the problems of the history of the Caucasus in Pavlik Chobanyan's works" and Benyamin Mailyan presented a paper called "The Adjarian question in Georgian-Turkish-Azerbaijani relations (1918-1921)". There were other interesting papers on the early Middle Ages, modern history of Armenia and Georgia, and the ethnopolitical and socio-economic history of the Eastern Caucasus [6].

One of the sessions was held online, with the participation of Prof. Sepuh Aslanian (Chair of the Department of Armenian Studies of Los Angeles, USA), S. Lusineh Gushchyan (Russian Museum in St. Petersburg), Gilbert Meshkanbarians from Iran, and Mariam Bezhitashvili (Georgia).

The conference papers were printed in advance and distributed to the conference participants.

The conference has been organized within the framework of the thematic program "21T-6A163 Science Committee of Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sport of Armenia".

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**«ԿՈՎԿԱՍԻ ՊԱՏՄՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՀԻՄՆԱՀԱՐՑԵՐ» ՄԻՋԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ
ԳԻՏԱԺՈՂՈՎ՝ ՆՎԻՐՎԱԾ Պ. ՉՈՔԱՆՅԱՆԻ ԾՆՆԴՅԱՆ 75 ԱՄՅԱԿԻՆ**

Մոնիկա Միրզոյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ միջազգային գիտաժողով, Պավել Չոբանյան, կովկասագիտություն, հայագիտություն, ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտ:

2023 թ. մարտի 15-16-ին Երևանում՝ ՀՀ ԳԱԱ-ում կայացավ «Կովկասի պատմության հիմնահարցեր» միջազգային գիտաժողովը, որը նվիրված էր հայագետ-կովկասագետ Պ. Չոբանյանի ծննդյան 75 ամյակին:

Պավլիկ (Պավել) Չոբանյանը ծնվել է 1948 թ. մարտի 15-ին Ադրբեջանական ԽՍՀ Խանլար քաղաքում (հայրենի գյուղը՝ պատմական Փիփ-Չազլիկ): 1973 թ. ավարտել է Երևանի պետական համալսարանի պատմության ֆակուլտետը: 1974-1976 թթ. կովկասագիտություն-վրացագիտություն մասնագիտացմամբ ուսանել է ՀԽՍՀ ԳԱ Արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի ասպիրանտուրայում՝ ուսումնառությունը իրականացնելով Վրացական ԽՍՀ ԳԱ Ձեռագրերի ինստիտուտում՝ ակադեմիկոս Ե. Պ. Մետրևելու ղեկավարությամբ:

Պ. Չոբանյանը գիտական գործունեությունը սկսել է Արևելագիտության ինստիտուտում: 1977-1985 թթ. եղել է այդ Ինստիտուտի Կովկասագիտության և բյուզանդագիտության բաժնի կրտսեր գիտաշխատող, 1995-1996 թթ.՝ «Քրիստոնյա Արևելք» բաժնի վարիչ: Տասը տարուց ավելի՝ 2002 թ. մինչև 2013 թ.,

գրադեցրել է Արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի գիտական գծով փոխտնօրենի պաշտոնը: 1985-1995 թթ. Պ. Չոբանյանը աշխատել է ՀՀ ԳԱԱ պատմության ինստիտուտում որպես ավագ գիտաշխատող: Երկար տարիներ եղել է մի շարք գիտական և խմբագրական խորհուրդների անդամ, 1999-2003 թթ. գրադեցրել է ՀՀ ԳԱԱ Պատմա-բանասիրական հանդեսի խմբագրի տեղակալի պաշտոնը: 2007 թ. որպես ավագ գիտնական-վերլուծաբան՝ Պ. Չոբանյանը աշխատել է ՀՀ ՊՆ Ազգային ռազմավարական հետազոտությունների ինստիտուտում (ՀՀ ՊՆ Պաշտպանական ազգային հետազոտական համալսարան):

Գիտնականը հեղինակել է 150-ից ավելի գիտական հրապարակումներ: Նա նաև երկու տասնյակ գիտական աշխատությունների խմբագիր է: Պ. Չոբանյանի աշխատությունները վերաբերում են հայոց պատմության, հայ-վրացական, հայ-ռուսական հարաբերությունների, վրացական ուղեգրությունների ուսումնասիրությանը: Նրա գրչին են պատկանում «Վրացական ուղեգրությունները և նրանց տեղեկությունները հայերի մասին» և «Հայ-ռուս-վրացական հարաբերությունները ԺԸ դարի երկրորդ կեսին» հիմնարար մենագրությունները: Գիտնականը Հ. Մարգարյանի հետ համատեղ հրատարակել է նաև Ա. Շանիձեի հեղինակած «Հին վրացերեն լեզվի քերականություն» աշխատության թարգմանությունը: 1990 թ. լույս է տեսել Պ. Չոբանյանի մասնակցությամբ կազմված «Հայ-ռուսական հարաբերությունները XVIII դարի երկրորդ կեսին (1760-1800 թթ.)» փաստաթղթերի ժողովածուն, իսկ 1999 թ. գիտնականի աշխատասիրությամբ և առաջաբանով վերահրատարակվել են Մակար Բարխուդարյանցի «Աղվանից երկիր և դրացիք» ու «Արցախ» տեղագրական աշխատությունները:

Պ. Չոբանյանը ծավալել է նաև մանկավարժական գործունեություն տարբեր համալսարաններում: Ընդհանուր ու մասնագիտական դասընթացներ է վարել Դավիթ Անհաղթ համալսարանում, Խ. Աբովյանի անվան մանկավարժական համալսարանում, Երևանի պետական համալսարանում, Մխիթարյան միաբանության Երևանի վարժարանում:

Գիտնականը մասնակցել է նաև միջազգային բազմաթիվ գիտաժողովների, զեկուցումներով հանդես է եկել Արևելագետների 35-րդ (Բուդապեշտ) և 37-րդ (Մոսկվա) համաշխարհային կոնգրեսներում, մասնակցել Վիեննայի Մխիթարյան միաբանության նախաձեռնությամբ կազմակերպած միջազգային գիտաժողովին՝ նվիրված Վիեննայի Մխիթարյան միաբանության 200-ամյակին:

Պ. Չոբանյանը պարգևատրվել է ՀՀ ՊՆ «Գարեգին Նժդեհ» մեդալով (2010 թ), ՌԴ «150 лет со дня рождения К. Мечиева» (2010 թ), «20 лет провозглашения Нагорно-Карабахской Республики» (2011 թ) հուշամեդալներով:

Գիտաժողովի առաջին օրվա աշխատանքները մեկնարկեցին ՀՀ ԳԱԱ Նախագահության շենքի կլոր նիստերի դահլիճում, իսկ երկրորդ օրվա աշխատանքները շարունակվեցին ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի նիստերի դահլիճում:

Գիտաժողովը կազմակերպվել էր ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության և պատմության ինստիտուտների, Երևանի պետական համալսարանի պատմության ֆակուլտետների համատեղ ջանքերով:

Գիտաժողովի բացմանը ողջույնի խոսքերով հանդես եկան ՀՀ ԳԱԱ Հայագիտության և հասարակական գիտությունների բաժանմունքի ակադեմիկոս-քարտուղար Յուրի Սուվարյանը, ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի տնօրեն Ռոբերտ Ղազարյանը, ՀՀ ԳԱԱ պատմության ինստիտուտի տնօրեն Աշոտ Մելքոնյանը, ԵՊՀ Պատմության ֆակուլտետի դեկան Էդիկ Մինասյանը: Գիտաժողովին ներկա էին և ողջույնի խոսքով հանդես եկան նաև Պավել Չոբանյանի ընտանիքի անդամները:

Իր խոսքում ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի տնօրեն Ռոբերտ Ղազարյանը նշեց, որ խնդիր է համարում այն, որ մեր հասարակության զգալի մասը հստակ պատկերացում չունի «Ադրբեջան» կոչվող պետության և «ադրբեջանցու» մասին, թե ովքեր են, երբ և ինչպես են պետություն ստեղծել, ինչպիսին է այդ պետությունն այսօր: Ռ. Ղազարյանի կարծիքով՝ հարկավոր է պետական, բուհական, ինչու չէ, նաև դպրոցական մակարդակով կրթել, տեղեկացնել հանրությանը: Խոսքը, բնականաբար, ատելության սերմանման մասին չէ, ինչն արվում է Ադրբեջանում, այլ ուղղակի պատմության ճշմարտացի ընթացքը ներկայացնելու: «Ադրբեջանի թիրախում առաջին հերթին հայերն են, որովհետև իրենց պետության հիմնաքարերից մեկը հենց հակահայկականությունն է. 1918 թվականից սկսած և մինչ օրս շատ բան չի փոխվել, բայց մյուս կողմից նրանց «գողությունը» տարածվում է տարածաշրջանի մյուս երկրների վրա: Նրանք յուրացնում են նաև իրանական, վրացական, կովկասյան ժողովուրդների, տեղաբնիկների պատմամշակութային ժառանգությունը»:

Գիտաժողովին զեկուցումներով հանդես եկան 31 մասնակից, որոնցից 13-ը՝ արտերկրից (Վրաստան, Ռուսաստան, ԱՄՆ, Իրան, Չինաստան): Գիտաժողովի առկա նիստերի ընթացքում հայ-վրացական հարաբերությունների, Կովկասի պատմության տարաբնույթ հարցերի շուրջ իրենց հետազոտությունների արդյունքները ներկայացրեցին Վրաստանից ժամանած ութ մասնակիցները (Իվանե Զավախիշվիլիի անվան Թբիլիսիի պետական համալսարան, Պատմության և ազգագրության ինստիտուտ, Ձեռագրերի ազգային կենտրոն, Արևելագիտության ինստիտուտ): Լսեցին ուշագրավ զեկուցումներ Հայաստանի և Վրաստանի պատմության վաղ միջնադարի, նորագույն շրջանի, Արևելյան Այսրկովկասի էթնոքաղաքական և սոցիալ-տնտեսական պատմության զանազան խնդիրների թեմաների վերաբերյալ:

Վրաստանի մասնակիցներից Մարիամ Չխարթիշվիլին հանդես եկավ «Իշխան Ատրնեբսեհի նույնականացումը «Նամակների գրքում» և VI-VII դարերի Վրաստանի քաղաքական պատմության վերանայումը» զեկույցով, Դավիդ Մերկվիլաձեն՝ «Քարթլի-Կախեթի թագավոր Հերակլ Բ-ի ծրագրերը ռուսական գործերի դեպի Դաղստան կատարած 1775 թ. արշավանքի կապակցությամբ»,

Մանուշար Գունցաճեն՝ «Սոցիալ-տնտեսական խնդիրը Վրաստանի Դեմոկրատական Հանրապետությունում (1918-1921)» թեմաներով: Իրանից մասնակցում էր պ.գ.թ. Ժիլբերթ Մեշքանբարյանսը, ով ներկայացրեց «Սեֆյան Իրանի հարկահանման գործընթացը համաձայն XVI-XVIII դարերի հայ պատմագիրների աշխատությունների և ժամանակաշրջանի այլ սկզբնաղբյուրների» թեման: Հայաստանյան մասնակիցներից պ.գ.դ. Ազատ Բոզոյանը ներկայացրեց «Այսրկովկասի պատմության խնդիրների հետազոտությունը Պավլիկ Չոբանյանի աշխատություններում» ուշագրավ զեկույցը, իսկ պ.գ.թ. Բենիամին Մախլյանը իր զեկույցում անդրադարձավ «Աջարական հարցը վրաց-թուրք-ադրբեջանական հարաբերություններում (1918-1921 թթ) թեմային: Եղան այլ հետաքրքրական զեկույցումներ Հայաստանի և Վրաստանի պատմության վաղ միջնադարի, նորագույն շրջանի, Արևելյան Այսրկովկասի էթնոքաղաքական և սոցիալ-տնտեսական պատմության զանազան խնդիրների թեմաներով:

Նիստերից մեկը տեղի ունեցավ համացանցային զուս հարթակի միջոցով, որին մասնակցեցին ԱՄՆ Լոս Անջելեսի Հայագիտության ամբիոնի վարիչ պրոֆեսոր Սեպուհ Ասլանյանը, Ռուսաստանի Դաշնությունից Ս. Պետերբուրգի Ռուսական թանգարանի աշխատակից Լուսինե Ղուչյանը, Իրանից Ժիլբերտ Մեշքանբարյանսը և Վրաստանից Մարիամ Բեժիտաշվիլին:

ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի գիտխորհրդի երաշխավորությամբ նախապես տպագրվել և գիտաժողովի մասնակիցներին էր տրամադրվել գիտաժողովի զեկույցումների նյութերի ժողովածուն:

Գիտաժողովը կազմակերպվել էր ՀՀ ԿԳՄՍՆ Գիտության կոմիտեի «21T-6A163» թեմատիկ ծրագրի շրջանակներում:

**ՀԱՅԵՐԵՆ ԵՎ ՌՈՒՍԵՐԵՆ ԱՅՔՈՒԲԵՆՆԵՐԻ ԼԱՏԻՆԱՏԱՌ
ԳՐԱԴԱՐՁՈՒՄՆԵՐ**
**THE LATIN TRANSLITERATION OF THE ARMENIAN AND RUSSIAN
ALPHABETS**

Հայերեն	Armenian Translit- eration	Русский	Russian Translit- eration
Ա ա	A	А а	A
Բ բ	B	Б б	B
Գ գ	G	В в	V
Դ դ	D	Г г	G
Ե ե	E	Д д	D
Զ զ	Z	Е е	E
Է է	Ē	Ё ё	Yo
Ը ը	ə	Ж ж	Ž
Թ թ	t'	З з	Z
Ճ ճ	Ž	И и	I
Ի ի	I	Й й	Y
Լ լ	L	К к	K
Խ խ	Kh	Л л	L
Օ օ	e'	М м	M
Կ կ	K	Н н	N
Հ հ	H	О о	O
Ձ ձ	Dz	П п	P
Ղ ղ	Ĝ	Р р	R
Ճ ճ	č'	С с	S
Մ մ	M	Т т	T
ԅ է	Y	У у	U
Ն ն	N	Ф ф	F
Շ շ	Š	Х х	Kh
Ո ո	Vo	Ц ц	Ts
Չ չ	Č	Ч ч	Č
Պ պ	P	Ш ш	Š
Ջ յ	J	Щ щ	Šč
Ռ ռ	r'	Ъ	“
Ս ս	S	Ы	Y
Վ վ	V	Ь	‘
Տ տ	T	Э э	Ē
Ր ր	R	Ю ю	Yu
Յ չ	Ts	Я я	Ya
Ու ու	U		
Փ փ	p'		
Ք ք	k'		
և	Ev		
Օ օ	O		
Ֆ ֆ	F		

ԲԱՆԲԵՐ ԱՐԵՎԵԼԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԻՆՍՏԻՏՈՒՏԻ
(պարբերականը մինչև 2021 թ. կոչվում էր «ՄԵՐՁԱՎՈՐ ԵՎ ՄԻՋԻՆ
ԱՐԵՎԵԼՔԻ ԵՐԿՐՆԵՐ ԵՎ ԺՈՂՈՎՈՒՐԴՆԵՐ») ՄԱՏԵՆԱՇԱՐ

BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES
(Until 2021 the periodical was named “The Countries and Peoples of the Near and
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