

THE 1953 COUP IN IRAN AND THE ROLE OF GREAT BRITAIN IN IT*

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Abstract

The article discusses the causes of the 1953 military coup in Iran and the role of Great Britain in it. In 1951 Prime Minister Mossadegh roused Britain's ire when he nationalized the oil industry. Mossadegh argued that Iran should begin profiting from its vast oil reserves which had been exclusively controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The company later became known as British Petroleum (BP). After considering military action, Britain opted for a coup. President Harry Truman rejected the idea, but when Dwight Eisenhower took over the White House, he ordered the CIA to embark on one of its first covert operations against a foreign government. In 1953, Iranian armed forces, with the help of the CIA and British intelligence, orchestrated a coup that toppled the democratically elected government of Iran.

Keywords: Mohammad Mossadegh, Fazlollah Zahedi, nationalization of oil, coup, AIOC, BP, Iran, Great Britain, MI6, CIA.

Introduction

The nationalization of the oil industry in Iran did not yield the result the Iranian people expected and the Prime Minister of Iran M. Mosaddegh promised them. In fact, it was due to these promises that Mosaddegh gained great fame and reputation. Referring to the great reputation of Mossadegh, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran, notices: "Enthusiastic about the promises of Mosadegh, different classes of people gradually gathered around him, among them university students, merchants or workers" [2:182]. Mossadegh promised that the time of abundance was approaching and all the expenses of the state would be covered by the oil revenues, which is the legal right of Iran and according to which, 300,000 pounds per day should be levied from the oil company, as a result of which the income of every Iranian should increase [2:182].

However, as it turned out, as a result of the nationalization of oil "the income of every Iranian" mentioned by Dr. Mossadegh, did not increase; moreover, it decreased. As a result of the oil crisis the greater damage was caused to the state budget. The reduction in imports reduced state customs duties, and there were also difficulties in tax collection. New tax increase on tobacco and tobacco products caused a wave of dissatisfaction among the society [4].

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The nationalization of oil in Iran was also a major blow to the economy of Great Britain. The loss of oil revenues coming from Iran sharply reduced London's financial opportunities, by which the latter paid for the import of vital goods the level of which remained disproportionately high compared to exports. Great Britain was unable to export enough goods to buy the currency they needed in order to pay for imports, as well as to return the huge loans which they had taken to finance military operations during the war [23:16]. At the same time, the reason for the financial shortfall of Great Britain was that it did not want to reduce costs in order to maintain its great empire [23:16]. Even though it faced a huge loss of revenue as a result of the nationalization of oil, the country's main concern still remained the growing crisis of the currency, which haunted the British economy throughout the post-war period. After the end of the World War, Great Britain made a very slow transition from a military industry to a peaceful economy. At the end of the war, 55% of the gross domestic product of the UK came from the military output [10:33].

British government preparations for the coup

The British government was concerned about the nationalization of Iranian oil also because the latter could have a domino effect in the region and other oil-producing countries in the region could follow their example.

Seeing that it was impossible to find edges of reconciliation with the government of Mossadegh, the British government soon began to actively take steps to oust Mossadegh from power. The minister of Foreign Affairs Herbert Morrison addressed this issue to British Iranologists, one of whom was Ann Katharine Lambton, a lecturer at the London School of Oriental Studies and at the School of African Studies and the press attache of the British Embassy in Tehran during World War II who was also considered one of the leading orientalist in Britain. She offered not to compromise with Mossadegh anymore, but to use "effective means of propaganda" to mobilize the public opinion in Iran against him [18:114]. Lambton also offered to refuse the US offers to compromise, since in her opinion "Americans have no experience or idea of understanding or perceiving Iran" [12:300]. Soon, the activities of the operative intelligence network of the British embassy expanded. On the advice of Lambton, another skilled Iranologist Robert Zehner, a professor at Oxford University, returned to Tehran to join the staff of embassy in intensifying anti-Mosaddegh propaganda; it was also planned to organize and expand the internal opposition through local agents, such as the Rashidian brothers (Assadollah, Seifollah and Ghodratoollah). Professor Zehner was actively in contact with a number of anti-Mossadegh elements, including Ernest Perron who was the personal secretary of the Shah in Switzerland. Zehner's activities were supplemented by the other staff members of the embassy and particularly by the staff of MI 6, including Charles Montague (Monty) Woodhouse and Norman Darbyshire who played a decisive role in the campaign against Mossadegh. They started to cooperate with local agents, among which, in addition to the Rashidians, civil

servants were included, such as Soleiman Behbudi known as the “head of the Shah’s palace” [29:23].

The British firmly supported General Fazlollah Zahedi because of his connections with many key officers in the army. Zahedi, actually, was arrested by the British in 1943 for his pro-German stance, but the British considered this as an advantage, since due to that Zahedi could not easily be considered pro-British [19:168]. Soon, the British intelligence established contacts with disgruntled officers of the army, key officers of the gendarmerie, the air force officers, royal security and even with the Iranian secret police [28:188]. The role of the world television and radio company “BBC” in the British fight against Mossadegh should be singled out as well. As early as June 1951, when the government of Mosaddegh was preparing to take oil industry under his control and when Great Britain was re-deploying military forces in the Persian Gulf, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain provided funding for an additional half-hour broadcast and, at the request of the British Embassy in Tehran, another 15 minutes were added [27:515-535]. In his book, Norman Kemp also discusses the key role that the “BBC” has played in providing information to Iranians. “The authorities of Iran suspended the activities of the company’s daily newspaper and every evening the factory workers gather around the radio to listen to the foreign programs of the “BBC” to get up-to-date information”” [17:208].

In October 1952, the government of Iran closed the British Embassy in Tehran, claiming that certain intrigues were taking place there, thus removing the camouflage of Britain from its secret activities. In November, the representatives of MI 6 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs met with the staff of CIA and offered a joint action plan to overthrow the Iranian government [26:77]. In late June, the United States finally approved the coup, and Britain, meanwhile, submitted to the CIA the “complete plan” of pre-scheduled action [24:1].

US position on British proposals

Yet at the same time, a question arises as to why the USA agreed to join the coup planned by Great Britain. The US government initially welcomed the initial stage of the formation of the nationalization movement of the oil industry. This is explained by the fact that US President H. Truman was convinced that the sponsorship of the nationalist movement would contribute to the struggle against communism in third countries and it was nationalism that could be a barrier to the penetration of communism. According to Truman and those around him, Mosadegh was the very incarnation of Iranian nationalism. Such controversies between the British and American policies towards the Iranian government were a concern for London. In 1952, the Minister of the Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden expressed an opinion that US Secretary of State D. Acheson and the State Department, seeking to end the threat of communism in Iran, wanted to help Mossadegh for already a long time to the detriment of the interests and rights of the MES and the United Kingdom [11:39]. Anthony Eden mentions in his memoirs: “I did not

accept the argument that the only alternative to Mossadegh was the communist authority. I thought that if Mossadegh was overthrown, he could be replaced by a more sensible administration, with which it would be possible to sign a satisfactory contract. I knew that Iran had flexibility, which, at first glance, did not seem obvious. Iranians have always been able to start over" [9:201].

In the beginning of 1953, the rapprochement of the American and British policies took place in Iran (one of the reasons for that rapprochement was that they sensed the danger of the Soviet Union becoming more active in Iran). According to William Taylor Fine, American politicians had a misconception that Mossadegh was gradually leaning towards the Soviet Union, expanding his political base at the expense of joining the Tudeh party [11:39]. However, this conclusion was definitely wrong and the role of the Tudeh, in the given period, was extremely overestimated. In his work, Professor Yervand Abrahamyan quotes the message of the British Ambassador, where it is mentioned: "Tudeh party should not be taken as a serious threat" [32:221]. Dean Acheson, who held the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Truman administration, later also stated that the threat of the Tudeh party had never been taken seriously [7:680-681].

After D. Eisenhower came to power, the US attitude towards Iran changed dramatically. According to the Iranian author Abbas Manouchehri, the change in the course of US policy had two reasons: political and economic. From an economic point of view, the actions taken by Mossadegh in Iran endangered the interests of American oil companies; in addition, the "Cold" War and the war going on in Korea forced the USA to retain its traditional allies, particularly Great Britain, in Europe [37:165].

In his book "The Art of Intelligence", Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA of the period, alludes to the role of the CIA in Iran. "The supporters of the Shah received assistance from outside", he wrote, not mentioning that it directly came from the CIA. This action aimed to protect the interests of the US capital in the international oil companies. It is interesting to note that the operation also affected the personal commercial interests of the director of CIA, since the latter's law firm "Sullivan and Cromwell" handled the affairs of the Anglo-Iranian oil company [3:4].

According to Christopher Woodhouse, who was in charge of preparing a coup in Iran and who was an MI 6 officer, with the help of British money, it was already possible to secure the cooperation with the high-ranking army and police officers, deputies, senators, mullahs, merchants, newspaper editors, as well as with the mob leaders [30:118]. Interestingly, two years after the coup, the same Woodhouse, the then-leader of MI 6, became the director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, one of the leading "independent" research institutes of Great Britain [30:138]. Shapoor Reporter, another Iranian agent of the British, was awarded the title of knight and later became an intermediary in the sale of British weapons to Iran, in particular, between the manufacturers of the "Chieftain" tanks, "Rapier" missile and Iran [31:140-142].

One of the reasons why the CIA attributed the organization and implementation of the coup to itself was that this relatively newly formed structure (1947) was criticized from the very beginning within the USA and was in obvious competition with other intelligence services, which is why the latter needed to fully attribute the implementation of such an action to itself, thus demonstrating its effectiveness and enhancing the reputation of the newly created structure [5:14].

Domestic political tensions within Iran

However, the question arises as to whether Mossadegh was ousted from power as a result of the planned coup, or Mossadegh was doomed to failure from the very beginning because of the unstable internal political situation in Iran. To address this and other similar questions, one should understand the situation that had developed in the domestic political life of Iran and observe the ranges of the oppositionists, growing day by day, who opposed Mossadegh because of his policies. In the early days of the nationalization of oil, after a year the popularity of Mossadegh started to fade away, and the wave of dissatisfaction was everywhere, from the palace to common citizens. In that short period of time, Mossadegh managed to gain many opponents in various spheres of governance.

After taking over the duties of Prime Minister, the organization “Fedayeen of Islam” demanded Mossadegh and his ministers to adopt the Sharia laws. Refusing to comply with these demands, in June 1951, Mossadegh ordered to arrest Navvab Safavi, the leader of their group. The relations between Ayatollah Abolghasem Kashani, who was a proponent of the nationalization of the oil industry, and the organization “Fedayeen of Islam” began to strain as well, due to latter’s support for Mossadegh, but in the middle of 1952, the group re-established its connection with Kashani, who had begun to oppose Mossadegh. “Fedayeen of Islam” actively cooperates with the internal opponents of Mossadegh, particularly with Mozzafar Baghai who left the National Front and later became the most zealot opponent of Mossadegh, encouraging Fedayeen to use violence against him [36]. During the last six months of Mossadegh being a Prime Minister, “Fedayeen’s” hostile attitude towards the Mossadegh government brought the hope to the Secret services of the US and Great Britain that the group would also help to overthrow Mossadegh [8:143].

Since the very beginning of assuming the post of Prime Minister Dr. Mossadegh managed to spoil his relations not only in the external sphere of Iran but also in the internal one. It is interesting to mention the position of Jamal Emami, one of the deputies in Mejlis and also a member of the oil commission, was obviously ironic about the activities of Mossadegh. “The governance of the country has been reduced to the lowest point. There are only rallies here and there. Student rallies, pupil rallies, seventy-years-olds rallies and even rallies of six-year-olds. I am pretty disgusted with these vile street rallies. It would be better if our Prime Minister finally decides whether he is a politician or leader of the uneducated mass. I could never ever imagine that a seventy-year-old man would be transformed into a

demagogue. A person who blockades the Mejlis with the help of the crowd is really dangerous for the society” [33]. Interestingly, it was Jamal Emami who nominated Mossadegh for the post of Prime Minister in the Mejlis [33].

Mossadegh gained a large number of enemies among the army officers as well. The reason for this was that he reduced the military budget by 15%, transferred 15,000 people from the army to the gendarmerie and set up a commission to study the issues connected with corruption, procurement, and also with career promotion. Mossadegh also removed a total of 136 officers from the army, including 15 generals, as well as began to call for an end to US military missions [28:187]. The army officers were outraged because of the budget cuts and other actions that undermined their positions [28:187]. The disappointment with Mossadegh’s policy was already openly expressed on the National Front and a vivid example of this was that in August 1952, the bill on the extension of martial law in the Chamber of Deputies (Parliament) faced the resistance of the deputies of the National Front. The bill was proposed by Ahmad Vosough, the Deputy Minister of National Defense, and his response to the clear, obvious complaints was the following: “I should mention that this bill was introduced by Dr. Mossadegh, the Minister of National Defense”. When the deputy minister added that the whole aim of it was the establishment of security and order, Yousef Mosher, one of the deputies of the National Front, said that it was an obvious lie [25]. The day before, the Senate refused to pass a bill on the third reading, which intended to provide Mossadegh with a six-month emergency mandate [25].

Consequently, without any hesitation, Mossadegh aimed to undermine the position of Shah. In October 1952, the Mejlis decided to dissolve the Senate, half of the members of which were appointed by the Shah, according to the Constitution [6:385]. Mossadegh accused those in the palace of meddling in politics and of encroaching on the Constitution and blamed the Shah’s mother, his sister Ashraf and younger brother. He stated that as a result of the active intervention of the inner circle of the Shah the government postponed the elections in 1952, leaving 57 of the 136 deputy’s seats vacant [6: 388].

At the end of February 1953, the Shah threatened to leave the country. According to Elwell Sutton, this act, which in the West would be considered as the acceptance of defeat by the Shah, was accepted as a dramatic prelude to the beginning of the Shah’s protection and aid movement in Iran. Any similar step such as taking refuge in a sacred place is not considered a manifestation of cowardice in Iran, but a deep act of political-spiritual significance and has a strong psychological impact on Iranians. Mossadegh immediately sensed the danger coming from that and this time he was able to thwart the intention of the Shah [6: 387].

In July 1953, Kashani lost his presidency in parliament, and in mid-July, 56 members of the National Front resigned, declaring that the opposition had created conditions in Parliament under which it was impossible to carry out normal parliamentary activity. Whether it was a maneuver or not is not entirely clear, but whatever it was, it enabled Mossadegh to announce on the radio that he intended to hold

a referendum on the dissolution of the Mejlis because of its inaction. According to Yervand Abrahamyan, Mossadegh forced his deputies to resign from the National Front [32: 217]. The referendum was held from August 3 to 10, with 99% of its participants voting in favor of dissolving the Mejlis [6: 389].

According to the Shah, the idea of dissolving the Mejlis was that generally the majority of the elected deputies were against Mossadegh, that is why the latter held a referendum [34: 56].

General Hossein Fardoust, who once held the position of Deputy Director of SAVAK, as well as the position of the head of the “Imperial Inspection”, referring to the events of August 1953 in his memoirs, notes:

“The plan for the coup on Mordad 25 was as the following: three military formations, each of which with the strength of one reinforced regiment combat effectiveness, were previously deployed in three military units. The two officers in charge of the security of Nasiri, immediately after Mossadegh rejected the order of Shah (Mossadegh immediately ordered to arrest Nasiri), were to inform the commanders of the three military formations via radio (which was carried out). One of the military formations was to surround the house of Mossadegh and arrest him, the other to seize the radio station, and the third one to be ready to carry out the further orders of the coup leaders. The commander-in-chief of the coup was Zahedi and the commanders of the three military formations were to receive orders from him by telephone. Immediately after receiving the news of the arrest of Nasiri, Zahedi ordered to execute the plan of coup, but surprisingly, none of the military formations moved from their locations. The Minister of Defense, General Riahi, was being informed of the incident and the military units loyal to Mossadegh disarmed and arrested the three military units of the coup, without a clash” [35: 176-177].

Becoming informed of the failure of the coup, the Shah, along with the queen, left first for Baghdad and then for Rome. According to the Shah, the decision to leave the country was conditioned by the fact that being well acquainted with the political plans of Mossadegh, as well as with his greed for power, he decided to leave the country to avoid possible bloodshed and leave the Iranians free to choose their future path [34: 58].

Implementation of the coup

According to the same H. Fardoust, the failure of coup attempt on Mordad 25 was conditioned, first of all, by the large number of people aware of the coup, consisting of Nasiri, Zahedi, three commanders of the military formations, two officers of the headquarters security guard of Zahedi, other certain high-ranking officers of the coup military formations, and secondly, due to the fact that Zahedi, the ring-leader of the coup, was not present in person, and the Shah was absent from Tehran, whose presence would have a huge impact on the action [35: 178].

The day after the coup attempt, it was announced that the government forces had managed to stop the coup and all of the organizers had been arrested. On August 17 mobs threw down from their pedestals the statues of Kings of the Pahlavi

line. General Zahedi was the object of an intense search. A total of sixteen civilians and fifteen officers were arrested, including two major generals and six colonels [21]. Foreign Minister Hossein Fatemi indicated that the Government was considering the formation of a Regency Council to carry out the royal functions, but at a press conference, he said there was no thought of establishing a republic in Iran and that, regarding a Regency Council, "the Government is studying developments" [21]. At the same time General Zahedi, who kept in touch with foreign correspondents from hiding places, issued a declaration addressed to officers of the armed forces telling them the time was approaching for them to make sacrifices, "even of your lives, to maintain the independence and the monarchy of Iran and preserve the principles of the holy religion of Islam" [21].

After the failure of Mordad 25, Mossadegh ordered 27 gallows set up in Sepah Square of Tehran in order for his opponents, some of whom were his former supporters, to be hanged [34: 59]. However, on the 28th Mordad (August 19), a crowd of Zurkhanehs, a crowd of other sections of the ordinary population, took to the streets, probably with the support of Ayatollah Behbehani and probably Kashani. According to some eyewitnesses, soon the group of five hundred was augmented by police and troops until it totaled almost three thousand. It was then divided into groups of several hundred each [22]. 32 Sherman tanks moved towards the center of Tehran and besieged important strategic objects and after a three-hour clash with three tanks in front of Mosaddegh's house, Zahedi was declared a legitimate candidate for prime minister [32: 223]. According to the "New York Times", more than 300 persons were killed during the fight [20].

After the failure of the coup on Mordad 25, the CIA and MI 6 attributed the victory of the coup on Mordad 28 to themselves, and a large number of researchers are of the same opinion, mainly citing the book by Kermit Roosevelt. However, a detailed study of modern archives clearly contradicts the facts contained in that book. First of all, the report of Roosevelt on the overthrow of the government of Mossadegh is quite interesting in which Eisenhower mentions in his diary that it was more like a ten-cent cheap novel [13].

A document is striking in the archives of the US State Department, in which, after the failure of the coup, the CIA headquarters reported to their station in Tehran on August 18: "The State Department has announced that since the operation was tested and failed, we should not take any further action against Mossadegh, which may complicate the relationship with him in the future and in the absence of strong arguments from you and Henderson, the operation against Mossadegh must be stopped" [14].

In the evening of August 18, a break appeared to take place between the Tudeh and Mossadegh regime. Apparently Tudeh partisans began demonstrating on streets without having obtained usual appropriations from Mossadegh and engaged in acts of violence. Mossadegh ordered streets cleared and demonstrations ceased. For the first time in several months serious fighting took place between security forces and Tudeh. In the morning of August 19, the supporters of the Shah

arranged a pro-Shah demonstration. This demonstration began in a small way in a bazaar area but the initial small flame found an amazingly large amount of combustible material and soon there was a roaring blaze which during the course of the day swept through the entire city. Security forces sent to put down the demonstration refused to resort to violence against crowds, some joining demonstrators and others remaining passive. As crowds increased in volume in various parts of the city, they destroyed the offices of those newspapers which during recent days had been most scurrilous in their attacks on the Shah. From the city center a huge crowd commandeered vehicles of all kinds and rushed northward, engulfing Tehran Radio station. Members of the Embassy had a good opportunity to observe the character of these crowds at this time. They seemed to come from all classes of people including workers, clerks, shopkeepers, students, and others [15: 694].

Thus, it becomes clear that the activities of external forces during the coup were limited to Mordad 25 (August 16). The question is how it turned out that two days after the failure of the pre-planned coup such a large crowd of people from all walks of life, from soldiers to ordinary citizens, took to the streets and ousted Mossaddegh from power.

It can be stated that after the failure of the first attempt of coup, everyone knew what kind of revenge awaited them, be it a soldier or a cleric, as well as seeing the gallows already being prepared in the square the next day, they were forced to act in a more organized way, and go to the very end, in this case having nothing to lose, which ultimately led to success.

The role of the clergy in the success of the coup should also be taken into account. The state religion of Iran, the Shia branch of Islam, always had profound roots in the Iranian population and the vast majority of Iranians were firmly connected with religion. That is why the clergy has also always been highly regarded by the Iranian population and the latter managed to unite and guide broad circles of the people with their ideology. Some documents shed light on the involvement of high-ranking Iranian clergies in the coup. In the secret message dating to April, in the archive documents of the US State Department, it is noted that Ayatollah Kashani, Boroujerdi and Behbehani agreed to support the Shah against Mossaddegh, if necessary [16].

After the overthrow of the Mossaddegh's administration, Mossaddegh was arrested and the Shah returned to Iran with great pomp on August 22 [34: 59], [1: 140].

Conclusion

Thus, juxtaposing the general facts, one can assume that the reason for the fall of the Mossaddegh government was not so much the factor of oil, but the policy he adopted from the very beginning, both in the external and internal spheres. The real reason for the fall of his government was that he tried his best to exclude the Shah and the army from the politics, but the army, playing a major role virtually everywhere, as well as in Iran, remained a strong supporter of the monarchy and opposed

giving way to a government elected by the people. Among the mistakes of Mossadegh were the reduction of the army, withholding of salaries, dissolution of the parliament, etc. One of his mistakes was also the confrontation with the clergy. All this led to his downfall. Without questioning the preparations for the coup, one should state that the initiative and the main work of its preparation were carried out mainly by the British MI6, and not by the CIA. However, the coup planned by the two countries, which took place on the 25th of Mordad, failed, and the events of the 28th of Mordad (August 19), which led to the overthrow of Mossadegh, were undoubtedly due to the efforts of the Iranian people, Iranian army and clergy, as many people in the abovementioned circles were dissatisfied with the government of Mossadegh. After all, if the events of the month of Mordad would not have taken place, it could be stated that the government of Mossadegh was doomed to failure from the beginning, since after gaining real power, it seemed to be cut off from reality and the demagogue methods among the common people and the ear-pleasing promises made during the speeches would not solve the numerous economic problems that arose, which is why almost everyone was disappointed with him, even the representatives of his National Front. The Anglo-American coup would never succeed had Mossadegh not squandered the vote of confidence given to him by such a large circle of the society. The dissolution of the Senate, the acquisition of enemies among the army officers, the reduction of the military budget, the dissolution of the Mejlis, and obviously, many of the other factors mentioned above led to the overthrow of M. Mossadegh.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- AIOC** - Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
MI6 - Military Intelligence, Section 6
CIA - Central Intelligence Agency
BP - British Petroleum

**ԻՐԱՆՈՒՄ 1953 Թ. ՀԵՂԱՇՐՋՈՒՄԸ ԵՎ ՄԵԾ ԲՐԻՏԱՆԻԱՅԻ
ԴԵՐԱԿԱՏԱՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ ՆՐԱՆՈՒՄ**

Հայկ Սողոմոնյան

Քանալի բառեր՝ Մոհամմադ Մոսադեդ, Ֆազլոլլահ Ջահեդի, նավթի ազգայնացում, հեղաշրջում, ԱԻՆԸ, ԲՓ, Իրան, Մեծ Բրիտանիա, ՄԻ 6, ԿՀԿ:

Հոդվածում քննության են առնված 1953 թվականին Իրանում տեղի ունեցած ռազմական հեղաշրջման պատճառները, ինչպես նաև Մեծ Բրիտանիայի ունեցած դերն ու մասնակցությունն այդ իրադարձությանը: Իրանի վարչապետ Մոհամմադ Մոսադեդը 1951 թվականին ստորագրեց Իրանի նավթային արդյունաբերության ազգայնացման մասին օրենքը: Իրանում նավթային պաշարների շահագործման մենաշնորհը մինչ այդ պատկանում էր Անգլո-իրանական նավթային ընկերությանը (հետագայում վերանվանվեց Բրիթիշ Փեթրոլյում): Ազգայնացումից անմիջապես հետո վարչապետ Մոսադեդը վտարեց բրիտանացի մասնագետներին և խորհրդականներին, իսկ 1952 թվականին ընդհանրապես խզեց դիվանագիտական հարաբերությունները Լոնդոնի հետ: Նավթի ազգայնացումը առավել սրեց Արևմուտքի հետ Իրանի հարաբերությունները, ինչպես նաև Իրանի ներքաղաքական վիճակը: 1953 թվականի ամռանը իրանական բանակի սպայակազմի կողմից իրականացված ռազմական հեղաշրջման արդյունքում, որում անմասն չէին նաև ԱՄՆ և Մեծ Բրիտանիայի գաղտնի ծառայությունները, մեծ հոչակ վայելող վարչապետ Մոսադեդի կառավարությունը տապալվեց, իսկ վերջինս ձերբակալվեց: