

IN THE FLOW OF HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A THEORETICAL PROFILE OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA*

Orazio Maria Gnerre

Abstract

This paper intends to evaluate some elements that make up the worldview of contemporary China. To do this, these factors are dealt with (among others): the positioning that China assumes and wants to assume on the planet, and the ensemble of geopolitical theories that derive from it; and the conception of politics with respect to centralization / decentralization issues. In addition to this, the role of the economic (and geoeconomic) vision of contemporary China is also highlighted, in particular in relation to the thoughts of Xi Jinping expressed in 2017 at the Davos Forum. It becomes important to understand, in this sense, the idea of globalization and multipolarity that China extends, as a guiding principle, to its foreign policy. This is because it is based on cultural roots of distant ancestry. Through these interrelated interpretative levels, it is possible to understand the function that China plays within the contemporary world and its contribution of ideas and visions.

Keywords: People's Republic of China, International relations, Geopolitics, centralization, decentralization.

Introduction

Much has been said and written about cultural roots and their outcomes of Chinese politics. The problem that we want to assert with this text is that the Chinese conception has profound developments and premises of a geo-spatial type. Trying to understand contemporary China simply through some interpretations of the state-party-army relationship of the Maoist era, or with some formulations of President Xi Jinping extrapolated from the context of origin can certainly be useful, but it does not define a perspective that, for him, nature is much larger. Chinese thought is the theoretical perspective of a great power that lives immersed in the global world and that, since the regeneration of the state, was perfectly aware of the weight it could play in world balance. But for China, international politics is not a mere game of powers, but a holistic vision that moves from the local to the global. This perspective, in reality, can be traced in many ways as a general pattern of national "world views", but in China it has been formulated in a very coherent way and presents some essential elements that we are going to expose here.

China and the world

Talking about the People's Republic of China is very important today. Even if they

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are not used to thinking in these terms, China is in fact one of the two powers that have emerged unscathed and in good health from the Cold War. Although it did not fight it as a pre-eminent “warrior”, it experienced strong moments of tension with both sides: the United States and the Soviet Union.

Simplistically associated in the Western imagination with the history of Eastern Communism, it has actually established itself as an autonomous power and decisive political force in the dynamics of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, thanks to a particular and highly personal theoretical profile, as well as an independent reading of world political and social events.

To understand therefore the theoretical profile of contemporary China, it will be necessary to take into account two fundamental elements: its recent history and its geopolitical positioning, both of which it derives from its effective geographical position in terms of access to resources and administration of the territory, as well as its place within the dense network of international relations. In a single word, China's relationship with the “world”, here understood as a cognitive link between space and history, where these two factors, in a corresponding relationship, influence each other.

First of all, it will be necessary to clarify how China properly entered modernity and was confronted with a true technical development only starting from the communist revolution. Previously, it has experienced that phenomenon also known as the “great divergence”, for which the West has overtaken the East since the beginning of the second millennium, leaving an impressive gap between these two worlds, in the areas of technical-scientific development and productive forces [6:17].

Paradoxically, in ancient times China, predominantly administered through the imperial institution, distinguished itself precisely for its important scientific discoveries and great technological inventions, as well as for an administrative system that, despite its obsolescence, lasted right up to the revolution. The separation that therefore took place between East and West was both the result of a certain impetus that took place in the European Middle Ages [8:1-30], for which there was even talk of a “medieval industrial revolution” [2], and of contextual factors among the most disparate.

As Diamonds reminds us, however, China suffered this actual fracture much later than the rest of the world, if it is true that “at the beginning of the 1400s, China held the technological supremacy. He invented, among other things, gunpowder, compass, cast iron, paper and printing. Almost a century before Europeans embarked on ocean navigation, China regularly sends shipments of up to 28,000 men to the east coast of Africa, embarked on fleets of hundreds of ships, much larger than Columbus's caravels” [1].

A very common reading that justifies the overcoming by the West first and the widening of the gap then is that of a political nature, a thesis supported by Diamonds himself, for which the determining factor for the divergence between Europe and China would have been an isolationism that prevented this country

from accessing the resources provided by colonial businesses [1]. This constitutes, as we shall see, a very important precedent with respect to the Chinese “world view”. In summary, few correct choices, in a period of technological development that is capital for the future of all humanity, have determined which sectors of the globe would be able to access those factors necessary for the exponential growth of development. However, that China had been a “victim” of a certain completely contextual asymmetry was also a common opinion in Europe, which over time had passed from the reverential relations it had with the so-called Indies and as witnessed by Marco Polo's *Million* or by the travels of evangelizers like Matteo Ricci, to an ever-greater political interference in the country. This sentiment was all contained in Napoleon's famous assertion that China should be left in its stupor, because the world would tremble when he woke up.

As written by Carl Schmitt, the construction of the international political framework of the modern world took place through the affirmation of Eurocentrism following the Peace of Westphalia and the subsequent colonial partition of the world [14]. This phenomenon has cut off from the organization of the new world the nations that did not belong to Christianity, that is, to the European assembly¹. The Asian nations, including China and Japan, from the nineteenth century onward (a period marked by the great social and technical repercussion of industrialization and the rise of the United States of America which put Eurocentrism in crisis) had to live under constant threat from the West. With industrialization, a new type of social relationship was affirming, the capitalist one, and a new form of colonization, that is, imperialism. The scholar Han Suyin summarizes the real condition of China in this particular situation as follows:

“[In] the period 1840-1949 [...] there were unequal treaties, extra-territorial rights, war indemnities, concessions, occupation by foreign troops, massacres, looting of Chinese cities . [...] The Chinese economy was shattered by the double shock of Western aggression and internal disintegration caused by the corruption and inefficiency of the Manchus. The destruction of the economic base of feudalism, the peasant economy, created a labor market and a market for industrial products, opening up to capitalism the possibility of developing also in China. But Chinese capitalism could not develop, because there was already another, and much stronger one. Mao Tse-Tung wrote: “First of all, the creation of a capitalist society in China will not be allowed by international capitalism, that is, by imperialism. The whole history of modern China is the history of the imperialist aggression against China, of the imperialist opposition to the independence of China and the development of its own capitalism”.

Western monopoly capitalism exported capital to the areas it dominated to benefit from their raw materials and cheap labor, precisely because it feared the rise

¹ “Christianity” was the name given to all European peoples, but not necessarily to all Christian peoples, as shown by the exemplary case of the Kingdom of Ethiopia, which despite being Christian, nevertheless suffered colonialism.

of rival Asian industrial powers and had an overwhelming superiority in controlling outlets. Any Chinese attempt at autonomous capitalist development and industrialization was bound to run up against deliberate obstacles. [...] Massive industrialization by a strong and independent bourgeoisie was impossible. And it was not allowed to protect indigenous production on the domestic market. Western capitalism imposed control over customs, tariffs on imports, international trade, communications; the customs and railway revenues were used for the payment of war indemnities and the repayment of loans” [17:33-35].

This highlights another point of capital importance: how the communist revolution in China was in effect a national liberation struggle that inaugurated the long period of transformation that was decolonization.

When Mao made the decision to continue fighting Chiang Kai-shek after the Second World War, he defined a decisive breaking point between what would be the Chinese line of conduct and the positions and fixed points of the Soviet Union. If Stalin famously inaugurated the doctrine of “socialism in one country”, according to which the pole of aggregation and command of the world communist strategy was to be solely the Soviet Union, in alliance with “progressive” regimes of different nature around the rest of the globe, Mao's idea was quite different. He received the order from the Soviet Union to govern with the Kuomintang, but he did not accept it, laying the first stone for the construction of the Chinese road to socialism.

After the war of liberation from the Japanese occupation, Mao's priority became to expel all foreign imperialist influences and lay the foundations for a general modernization of the country. To do this, it was not possible, according to Mao, to persist in the alliance with the Kuomintang, much less to submit to the orders of the Third International which promoted it.

Mao's idea that each country had its own path to socialism [10], and which in fact was implemented in Deng Xiaoping's formulations on “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, promoted an international action of non-interference, favoring cooperation over political and military confrontation. It has often been reiterated, during the tug-of-war between the United States and China over the development of nuclear power, while the United States attempted a containment policy towards the Asian country, that this weapon would only serve self-defense purposes. At the same time, the Chinese government reiterated that any imperialist operation by the West would be opposed to the benefit of the nations under attack, in compliance with the country's guiding principles.

The break with Khrushchev, and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet technical personnel from China in 1960, with “[the] breaking of 343 contracts for experts and appendices to these contracts, [and the] abolition of 257 arrangements for scientific cooperation and technique” [17:91] gave way to a phase of freeing up knowledge and technical skills from abroad, strengthening China in the medium term.

All this helped to understand the importance of establishing a new system of

anti-hegemonic international relations, which will be implemented in the Non-Aligned Movement. In fact, the Bandung conference of 1955 was already moving in this direction. The focus on the Third World, in line with Mao's conceptualizations of the center and periphery, was part of the overall view of China.

The autonomy of China in the theoretical field also asserted itself in socio-economic matters, with the phase of reforms inaugurated by Deng. "Socialism with Chinese characteristics", so-called market socialism, veered in the direction of independent development in economic and social terms. Already the Chinese predilection for the structuring of a strong agricultural economy on which to build development set some not insignificant divergences from the Soviet Union, as well as clearly from the Western field, but the conception of an entirely innovative economic system in the imagination of the relations between the market, the productive forces and the power of the working class were fundamental in this distancing.

Of course, arguing that the reason why China survived the war unscathed was solely an economic one is an understatement: it is well known the importance that the United States gave to it in diplomacy as a political pivot to shift the confrontation with the Soviet colossus, but it was certainly spared from the crisis of socialism that occurred in the USSR also thanks to its innovative economic system, which kept in mind the growth characteristics intrinsic to the market.

However, after the symbolic end of an era, that of the bipolar conflict, China has moved towards a new phase of history with tools suitable for the new context. It turned out to be, more and more and better, a new world actor who has emerged from the tug-of-war between the blocks. Not only has it equipped itself with an apparatus of means necessary to "play" at its best on the international chessboard, but it has itself created the conditions of the era we are living in. Furthermore, it also has an autonomous and in some ways innovative conception of international relations, here understood in their side meaning of coexistence between nations and cooperation.

Not only was it a point of reference in the decolonization phase: we can say without a doubt that today, certainly together with India, it is at the forefront of the "reconvergence" movement, therefore a propulsive center of an unparalleled reterritorialization. The "great convergence" is characterized by an ever-greater growth in the standard of living of populations once disadvantaged in terms of economics and technical advancement. It is impossible to deny an important role to China in this great historical movement, considering at least the role of driving force of the Asian regional economy and the launch and support of important integration processes, especially from the energy point of view. To date, China is the second largest economy in the world by GDP per capita, a far cry from its conditions only sixty years ago. As Han Suyin points out, it has the largest population in the world on its side, which has made up for the initial lack of means in terms of labor force [17]. But this vast population, in addition to being a great

competitive advantage, also corresponds to the commitment that the Party has taken on for its livelihood, and its liberation from conditions of actual misery, towards progressive and constant improvement of living conditions.

The rise of China on the world stage brings with it very important transformations. This convergence process also makes us question the transformation of the international political system and could bring us a step closer to greater equality and cohesion between human groups [9].

Economy and society: the Chinese vision

As we have said, one of the strengths that characterizes China in its present dimension is its independent vision of the socio-economic sphere. This modern state was born from a communist revolution. This historical element, still present in the collective memory as in the institutional one, carries with it a theoretical legacy and real repercussions in the present.

It is urgent once again to reiterate that the Chinese model has developed on very different paths from the Soviet one, which also nourishes its own legacy in the Russian Federation. Unlike Russia, however, this political tradition has not suffered a general collapse, and indeed has remained motionless in the national ideal Olympus. Rather, the coincidence that Mao postulated between socialist society and modern national history made it possible for socialism to evolve organically with society without dogmatic rigidities or irreparable fractures.

The general principles that were already affirmed by the revolution and by Mao, and which today are still fundamental for contemporary China, are those of national independence, which today is combined with the principle of respect for the national sovereignty of states, and the realization of a harmonious and socialist society. This last principle is more and more explicit by the Party, which to date extends the principle of harmony between the parties to the international scenario.

Beyond the *Great Leap Forward* and productive effort that China undertook to achieve after the revolution, it is important to underline how it created a system centered on developing a solid agricultural base for the country. Born in an agricultural region, Mao already promoted agricultural studies in the period of the *red bases*, thinking about the possible socialist organization of agricultural work. It is no coincidence that the role of agricultural laborers was very important in the revolution. Obtaining food self-sufficiency, as mentioned, served as the basis for the industrial development of the country. Although China is now an importer of grains, the lesson received from the socialist organization of agricultural production was that of the importance of greater decentralization of production.

A fundamental agrarian reform for the country was launched in 1952, through which the feudal system that blocked the country's growth in economic terms was abolished. The ten-year plan for the development of agriculture launched in 1956 had the aim of modifying, through agricultural labor, the whole of society, mobilizing it towards changing uses and practices. But it was in 1958, with the foundation of the communes, that the principle of decentralization was fully

explicit and put into practice. This principle, which gave a certain autonomy to the productive centers, thus created the foundations of a model that was also reflected in the political organization or military doctrine for nuclear war, which at the time was one of the main threats facing humanity. To date, the importance of equal and decentralized development is affirmed by the coordination of the same with regard to the regions [12:33], despite the endemic problems that manifest themselves in the accumulation mechanisms typical of moments of economic growth.

This pre-eminent role that in China was attributed to work, and in particular to the primary sector of agricultural production, is automatically reflected on society and therefore on morality. President Xi Jinping, for example, in line with Mao's traditional ideas on the subject, proposed in 2014 that national artists return to the countryside to better understand socialist values. There is no doubt that, for socialist thought as it has manifested itself at every latitude and in every form, work is one of the primary factors of human life. From work, both material and intellectual, comes production and improvement, that is, a qualitative increase in the standard of life, not in a merely material sense. This principle, often disregarded or abandoned in Western post-ideological societies, is still alive in China, and this too is a factor worthy of consideration when approaching the Chinese question.

The primacy of the productive element over the speculative one has two significant implications when we talk about the People's Republic of China: the first is that of the primacy of the real economy, the second is the importance of redistribution.

“China's financial rules are unlikely to match Wall Street's. The most likely scenario [if the Yuan becomes the dominant currency] would be the following: a world characterized by a much smaller size of the financial services sector (as a percentage of GDP) than today, similar to when the United States emerged as a hegemonic power towards the end of the Second World War. In the 1950s, financial services accounted for about 1% of US GDP, while in 2007 they accounted for more than 8%. [...] If China dictates the rules of global finance, it is possible to hypothesize a world less dependent on financial engineering and fast profits, which have so much inhibited development and real innovation. It would expand the use of equity rather than debt to finance business, and venture capital funds would not be the preserve of a privileged few. [...] Surely China is not the only country to provide capital to its entrepreneurs. The United States and Israel, for example, also finance manufacturing companies, but their funds are often directed towards those projects that have potential military applications (or in any case to extremely limited sectors), while China has supported solar energy projects, biotechnology and other sectors in ways completely disconnected from its military apparatus.

A Chinese-funded global world would likely see an explosion of public works. Not only did China constitute one of the first empires in the history of mankind, precisely through the construction of dams, bridges, canals and other structures for civilian use [11], but also in recent decades it has shown that it is capable of

transforming the own country and its material relations with the rest of the world. The increase in infrastructures in the world², as it is happening, would create, if properly designed, more job opportunities and would increase the number and quality of economic activities, thus guaranteeing widespread economic development following an increase in access to credit and to the markets” [12:205-206].

Moreover, this “widespread economic development” is theorized by the government precisely as a corrective to the polarization between center and periphery due to the accumulation of capital. There is no doubt that the problem of redistribution processes is one of the fundamental issues in the 21st century, especially considering the possibility of creating economically depressed areas even in advanced countries, as in the case of the Appalachian Mountains region in the United States of America.

In this regard, it should be remembered that President Xi defined that “the commitment to eradicate poverty reflects China's people-centered philosophy” [21]. However, there is no doubt that the United States, currently the world's largest economy, recorded a poverty rate of 11.9% [18] in 2017, whereas China had reached 0.5% [19] a year earlier. This underlines how the Asian country “for decades [...] has experienced a sustained reduction in poverty rates” [19]. This type of commitment, which saw the first concretizations with the founding of the new China, would not even be conceivable without the central role that the state has assumed and assumes in the process of national development, and it certainly would not have been possible if the country had been subjected solely to the pressures of market forces, internal and external.

To date, China, in a new phase of international politics, and especially after the world détente between great powers³ that took place with the end of the Cold War, has overcome a certain economic closure based on the guiding principle (however valid in many respects) of self-sufficiency. China has opened up to David Ricardo's teaching on the mutual benefit that nations can obtain from trade, and is a global promoter of this conception. Indeed, we can assert that it believes that trade is the main road on which diplomacy is grafted, and that a win-win relationship between nations centered on trade is the only way to overcome what Xi has called the Thucydides trap, the risk that the great powers run of weakening and destroying each other in unnecessary wars instead of collaborating in mutual development.

However, this vision is accompanied by a desire to review international relations in a non-hegemonic sense, and this brings with it some important consequences on the economic level: first of all the importance of building an international infrastructural network for the creation of a new geography of energy; secondly, the creation of important diplomatic relations with the nations exporting

² A phenomenon in which China plays a prominent role.

³ However, it has not put an end to the competition, nor has it put an end to the outbreak of wars, which have actually increased in number despite decreased in intensity.

raw materials and energy; finally, the attempt to promote a progressive de-dollarization, both to the advantage of the Yuan [12:205-206] and of other currencies such as the Euro.

All of this interacts with the global reality in various ways. On the one hand, China promotes a very clear idea of international relations, while on the other it modifies world political conditions with its very existence and thanks to its considerable specific weight.

Multipolarity

The term "multipolarity" has often taken on different shades of meaning. Although it is clear to everyone that the Cold War represented a "bipolar" phase of world politics, and that something similar to a "unipolarism" of American origin has succeeded it, the current condition in which the world finds itself is uncertain. Under these new conditions, Antonio Gramsci's words remain valid according to which "the old dies and the new cannot be born" [5]. It is therefore not clear whether we are still living in a unipolar phase, albeit undermined by the rise of new prominent regional players, if we are in an effective multipolarity where the United States, China, the European Union and the Russian Federation are the main players, or if you are in a median condition between these first two.

To better understand the phase we are experiencing and also anticipate the changes of the future it is necessary to clarify the terminology. The concept of "multipolarity" is itself unclear. In the West, the interpretation prevails that it is a moment of interregnum in which, with the United States of America having lost the scepter of hegemony, other emerging poles would take its place without being able to override one another. It is also not clear whether this period is what we are experiencing or is yet to come.

To come to our interpretation⁴, we must begin by asserting that, in fact, there is incontrovertibly a crisis of US hegemony. The reasons are disparate, but the results are there for all to see. Although the context of history is by its nature surprising in its final outcomes, it is evident that the emergence of the aforementioned regional poles and of increasingly advanced actors in technological and economic terms is a considerable challenge for the previous international order. This is, moreover, strictly connected with the phenomenon we have already spoken of, the "great convergence", for which some peoples left on the sidelines of history are quickly making up for the time lost in the race for development. This is due to many reasons, one of which is certainly the centrifugal power of technology, which is opposed to the centripetal power of capitalist accumulation.

This phase, in which a power loses its grip on certain territorial areas, and in which new actors emerge in a still asymmetrical and partly chaotic context, can in our opinion be defined as "polycentrism", without disturbing the category of

⁴ I dealt with the difference between polycentrism and multipolarism in [3].

multipolarity. The concept of polycentrism emphasizes precisely on the multiplication of the centers of power that influence the web of international politics with their actions. Multipolarism, on the other hand, which could also be interpreted synonymously, is more correctly to be interpreted as a new form of multilateralism.

In fact, multipolarity is strongly supported by some countries in the international context, and the People's Republic of China is one of them. The general vision of China with respect to international politics is however very distant from an anarchic world fragmentation of the decision-making sphere, but is rather based on an alternative idea to the current one of globalization.

In the face of growing US protectionism that has manifested itself with the Trump administration, Xi Jinping's 2017 speech at the Davos Forum has already drawn a first difference between the globalization of poverty and "economic globalization", as he has called the advantages of international trade:

"Many of the problems troubling the world are not caused by economic globalization. For instance, the refugee waves from the Middle East and North Africa in recent years have become a global concern. Several million people have been displaced, and some small children lost their lives while crossing the rough sea. This is indeed heartbreaking. It is war, conflict and regional turbulence that have created this problem, and its solution lies in making peace, promoting reconciliation and restoring stability. The international financial crisis is another example. It is not an inevitable outcome of economic globalization; rather, it is the consequence of excessive chase of profit by financial capital and grave failure of financial regulation. Just blaming economic globalization for the world's problems is inconsistent with reality, and it will not help solve the problems.

From the historical perspective, economic globalization resulted from growing social productivity, and is a natural outcome of scientific and technological progress, not something created by any individuals or any countries. Economic globalization has powered global growth and facilitated movement of goods and capital, advances in science, technology and civilization, and interactions among peoples" [20].

It becomes clear in this discourse, how for the authorities of China there is a substantial difference between the forms of reproduction of misery generated by the dominant model of globalization, and a legitimate globalization of trade based on more precise and symmetrical rules.

And again, it is important to note that the People's Republic of China, like the Russian Federation which shares many geopolitical interests with it, is very respectful of the UN, in which it is also a member of the Security Council. That an international institution brings together the representatives of all countries and assists the concertation of global solutions to world problems is one of China's major interests. Rather, the regulatory role of international politics assumed by the United Nations, especially regarding the latest events in the Middle East, has often come into conflict with US exceptionalism. Not least among the issues, there is the

one for which the US has recently cut the funds to the World Health Organization following the explosion of the coronavirus epidemic of 2020, accusing the same institution of conniving the alleged Chinese responsibilities.

All this fits completely with the project also promoted by China of the BRICS [4], that is the deployment of the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa and precisely China which has promoted in more than one case projects aimed at the greater redistribution of world power. That this project, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, not only serves to cope with commercial and political competitors, but to promote greater stability and integration between countries is evident from the fact that the BRICS have promoted the integration of several projects, customs unions, industrial cooperation and active participation in global governance.

In the last period, following a style already seen in contemporary history, the United States has preferred to "close" itself commercially and attack a certain type of internationalist approach that has also often distinguished them in world politics. The term "globalism", which is endowed with a certain polysemic, has re-emerged directly in the political language of President Trump, not so much to designate the distortions of financial globalization or the imposition of the law of one country on others, but to negatively define the political concertation between states and the processes of international democracy of the United Nations. This process of the opening and closing of the United States, already investigated by Carl Schmitt as a means that the United States used to defeat Eurocentrism and establish itself as a hegemonic power [14], is also at the heart of Carlo Maria Santoro's reflection [13].

However, it is in this that we understand the difference between polycentrism as a fact and multipolarity as a project. If the United States, by withdrawing from the international scene, is pushing the advancement of polycentrism, a phase of relative political chaos (to which Xi also referred in his 2017 speech at the Davos Forum), so are China and the other countries that support a multipolar option believe that the integrative moment is fundamental to ensure a better future than the present. If the terms "polycentrism" and "multipolarism" seem analogous, even terminologically overlapping, in reality they refer to two very different concepts. The "centers" of polycentrism clearly represent those points of accumulation of political and capitalist power which are settling down, in economic terms, after the breaking of a monopoly similar to that produced by the phenomenon of Schumpeterian creative destruction. The "poles" of multipolarism, on the other hand, were already conceived as centers of irradiation of a framework of spatial order and integration by the forerunners of the multipolar idea, to be traced in Karl Haushofer with his geography of *pan-ideas* [7], and in Carl Schmitt with his conception of the great geopolitical spaces [16].

This integrative role, within a global reterritorialization that proceeds on the economic vector in general and energy in particular, has been completely assumed by China, whose activism in the development of infrastructural networks has precisely this purpose. Multipolarity for China is the project of a non-chaotic

globalization, in which the positive forces released and multiplied by the international market can be controlled and guided. The role of classical concepts such as State and People, which are experiencing difficult periods in the limitless extension of market dominance, is however very important and still central to China. A globalization that threatens these terms of reference is clearly seen as a dangerous globalization, a globalization of risk. Multipolarity therefore represents for China the necessary path to safeguard some non-negotiable principles with the mandatory nature of economic and technical development: the only safeguard against generalized poverty. This is accompanied by an idea typical of the Chinese people in their existence, and reiterated by Xi at the 2017 Davos Forum, according to which in moments of crisis it is only the union of efforts, in this case a global union, that makes it possible to solve problems [20].

Conclusions

As we have seen, there are many aspects that structure Chinese thought today. All of these have very deep roots both in the tradition of thought of this civilization and in the policy launched with the Mao revolution. What we can clearly observe is how the world view, the conception of international relations, the role of China among other nations, the issue of centralization / decentralization and economic perspectives are all interrelated in Chinese thought, constituting a specific order of reasoning. It is therefore essential to take these principles into account, and to read the policy of the Asian country in light of them, on pain of not understanding the consequences of certain actions and declarations of its decision makers.

The role of the People's Republic of China is increasingly important on the international scene, and therefore it becomes important to understand how this actor relates to this scenario. One of the lessons of China's approach to international relations is that globality is always composed of multiplicity. We should continue to keep this basic concept in mind, in order not to fall into the traps of a thought that escapes the fundamental realism of the "concept of the political" [15].

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Orazio Maria Gnerre

Expert of international relations and geopolitics, Italy
orazioagnerre@gmail.com

ORCID ID 0000-0002-5923-6216

**ՊԱՏՄՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԵՎ ՄԻՋԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ՀԱՐԱԲԵՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ
ՀՈՍՔՈՒՄ. ԺԱՄԱՆԱԿԱԿԻՑ ՉԻՆԱՍՏԱՆԻ ՏԵՍԱԿԱՆ ՆԿԱՐԱԳԻՐԸ**

Օրացիո Մարիա Գներե

Բանալի բառեր՝ Չինաստանի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետություն, միջազգային հարաբերություններ, աշխարհաքաղաքականություն, կենտրոնացում, ապա-կենտրոնացում:

Արդի չինական քաղաքական մտքի զարգացման վրա բավականին մեծ ազդեցություն են գործել բազմաթիվ՝ քաղաքական, հասարակագիտական, տնտեսագիտական և այլ գործոններ: Այդ գործոնները շատ խորը արմատներ ունեն ինչպես չինական քաղաքակրթական իմաստասիրական ավանդույթի, այնպես էլ Մաո Ցզե Դունի (1893-1976 թթ.) 1966-1975 թթ. իրագործած «Մշակութային հեղափոխությամբ» սկսված քաղաքականության մեջ: Ամենայն հստակությամբ

կարելի է դիտարկել, որ պետք չի չինական աշխարհայացքը, միջազգային հարաբերությունների չինական աշխարհայացքային հայեցակարգը, Չինաստանի դերը այլ երկրների հետ հարաբերություններում, կենտրոնացման/ապակենտրոնացման խնդիրը և տնտեսական հեռանկարները փոխկապակցված են չինական աշխարհայացքում՝ կազմելով հիմնարար հատուկ կարգ: Հետևաբար, կարևոր է հաշվի առնել այդ սկզբունքները և ասիական երկրի հետ քաղաքականությունը դիտարկել այդ լույսի ներքո:

Ակնհայտ է, որ Չինաստանի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետության դերը միջազգային ասպարեզում՝ լինի տնտեսական թե քաղաքական՝ գնալով ավելի է կարևորվում: Հետևաբար անհրաժեշտ է հասկանալ, թե ինչպես է Չինաստանն առնչվում այս կամ այն գործընթացներին:

Սույն հոդվածում փորձ է արվում գնահատել ժամանակակից չինական պետության աշխարհայացքի որոշ բաղկացուցիչները: Այս առումով դիտարկվում են նաև հետևյալ հանգամանքները՝ Չինաստանի զբաղեցրած դիրքը աշխարհում և դրանից բխող աշխարհաքաղաքական տեսությունները, ինչպես նաև կենտրոնացման և ապակենտրոնացման հարցերը: Առանձնացվում է նաև ժամանակակից Չինաստանի տնտեսական դերի տեսականը ըստ նրա ղեկավարների պատկերացումների: Այս խնդիրների ուսումնասիրումը կարևոր է նաև ապագայի աշխարհակարգի մասին որոշ տեսական դրույթներ առաջ քաշելու առումով: