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**ՀԱՏՈՐ II, ՀԱՄԱՐ 1**

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**ԲԱՆԲԵՐ ԱՐԵՎԵԼԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԻՆՍՏԻՏՈՒՏԻ (ԲԱԻ)**

**Տպագրվում է ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի գիտական խորհրդի որոշմամբ**

**Գլխավոր խմբագիր՝ Ռոբերտ Ղազարյան**  
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## **ԲՈՎԱՆԴԱԿՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ**

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**ՀՈԴԿԱԾՆԵՐ**

**ARTICLES**



## C. F. LEHMANN-HAUPT'S STUDIES ON ASSYRIAN INSCRIPTIONS OF THE ARMENIAN HIGHLAND\*

*Vahe Sargsyan*

### Abstract

*Prominent German orientalist C. F. Lehmann-Haupt explored the Tigris Tunnel during his travels in the Armenian Highland and Northern Mesopotamia from 1898 to 1899.<sup>1</sup> According to him, the kings of Assyria considered this place as the source of the Tigris (or at least one of its sources) and tried to reach it during their campaigns. This was probably conditioned by the circumstance that the waters of the Tigris River, which “flooded the walls” of the Assyrian capitals of Assur, Calah and Nineveh, flowed through the rocks there. According to the inscriptions of the Tigris Tunnel, the sacrifices made by the Assyrian kings in honor of their gods were considered to be dedicated to the god of the river and the spring [9: A.O.102.6 ii 34-40; A.O.102.8: 20-23; A.O.102.14: 67-72; 14: 434].*

**Keywords:** Nairi, Urartu, Assyria, Tigris Tunnel, inscriptions, C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, W. Belck, Tiglathpileser I, Shalmaneser III, campaign.

A. Taylor discovered the inscriptions of the Tigris Tunnel in 1862 [29: 41-42], later it was noticed by engineers K. Sester and E. Naumann. However, unlike C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, they were not experts in the field of Oriental Studies or Assyriology. Since the abovementioned researchers were unable to read the inscriptions on the spot and the copies were distorted, the inscriptions of Shalmaneser III (858-824 BC) were attributed to Tukulti-Ninurta II (890-884 BC) and Ashurnasirpal II (883-859 BC) [see in detail 28: 27-30; 20: 309; 14: 434, 439]. The fact that the Assyrian king Ashurnasirpal II states in his chronicle that in the second year of his reign at the source of the *Subnat* River he left his image (i.e., the statue) next to the statues of his father Tukulti-Ninurta II as well as Tiglathpileser I, served as an argument [8: A.O. 101.1, I 104-105; 14: 434]. It should be noted that this tributary belonging to the Tigris Basin is called S/Zebene-su by travelers. Due to the fact that there was also an inscription of Tiglathpileser I along with his depiction in a relief in the Tigris Tunnel, and the names of the rivers Subnat and Zebene-su (Zibene) are similar to each other, they were erroneously identified. Due to these factors, the inscrip-

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\* The article was submitted on April 21, 2022. The article was reviewed on May 20, 2022.

<sup>1</sup> The left auxiliary tributary of the Arghana is the Zibene (Dibene). A natural tunnel passes through not far from the source, which thanks to C. F. Lehmann-Haupt's research has come to be known as the Tigris Tunnel in scholarly literature. To study it, C. F. Lehmann-Haupt came to Lche (Lice) on 23.05.1899 and then until 02.06.1899 explored the place, spending nine nights in the vicinity of the Tigris Tunnel (see 14: 438). His companion, member of the expedition W. Belck, due to some circumstances, also explored it after C. F. Lehmann-Haupt (see 4: 248).

tions of Tukulti-Ninurta II and Ashurhasirpal II, along with the royal images, were also localized here [28: 20-21; 14: 441-442].

At the end of the 19th century, C. F. Lehmann-Haupt proved in his study that only the inscriptions of Tiglathpileser I and Shalmaneser III exist in the Tigris Tunnel. The scholar identified the Subnat tributary mentioned in the inscriptions in Northern Mesopotamia, placing it near the settlement of Babil [13: 19-22; 14: 442; 18: 51; 3: 238]. This localization proposed by C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, however, remained ignored, and the viewpoint of identifying the Subnat with Zibene continued to be the dominant interpretation in Biainian studies (Uartology).<sup>2</sup>

The earliest inscription in the Tigris Tunnel belongs to Tiglathpileser I (1114-1076 BC) with the image of the king turned to the right.<sup>3</sup> The inscription states that the king who conquered the great sea of Amurru (Mediterranean) and the sea of Nairi (Lake Van) marched to Nairi for *the third* time.<sup>4</sup> It is noteworthy that the expedition of C. F. Lehmann-Haupt managed to find another inscription left by Tiglathpileser I in Khotanlu, near Manazkert. The inscription was left here by the Assyrian king to commemorate his victory after the conquest of the Nairi countries [13: 17-18; 15: 115-117; 8: A. 0.8 7.15].<sup>5</sup> C. F. Lehmann-Haupt's colleague W. Belck, prior to the discovery of this inscription, had identified the place of the battle between the two sides here. According to W. Belck and the follower of the viewpoint of the latter - C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, the route of the Assyrian king passed through the Tigris Tunnel<sup>6</sup>, the mountains stretching between the Tigris and Aratsani (modern Murad), and then Tiglathpileser I fought a victorious battle against the joint Nairi forces near Manazkert, pursuing them as far as Lake Van. From the mention of reaching the Upper Sea (Black Sea) in the inscriptions of Tiglathpileser I [8: A.0.87.1, iv 43 - v 21] C. F. Lehmann-Haupt concludes that the Assyrian army reached Dayaeni during this military campaign. According to them, Dayaeni stretched to the shores of the Black Sea. Based on the identification of the countries of Tunubu and Tunibuni, it is presumed that Tiglathpileser I, leaving his inscription and image in the Tigris Tunnel, carried out religious activities, seeking

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<sup>2</sup> For identification, see [11: 170-171; 8: 61]. Some scholars have identified Subnat with the Eastern Khabur [1: 95].

<sup>3</sup> The inscriptions are located along the stream of the river, at the right end of the tunnel [see 14: 433-434].

<sup>4</sup> K. Radner dates the inscription to the years of 1104-1097 BC, based on the mention of Nairi's third campaign in other inscriptions [see in detail 27: 177, 199].

<sup>5</sup> I. M. Diakonoff considers that the battle against the Nairi "kings" did not take place near Manazkert at all, as the invasion passed through the basin of the Western Euphrates and this inscription proves that Tiglathpileser I passed near Manazkert during this or another campaign [7: 126 note 128].

<sup>6</sup> The second among the Nairi lands mentioned in the description of the campaign is Tunubun, which according to N. Adontz is the Tunibuni (see below) mentioned by Shalmaneser III - the Blue Pass - one of the passes of the Taurus, not far from the Tigris Tunnel [1: 83]. The latter is the central one of the three mountain passes in Shubria leading to Uartu, which, passing through the Byurakn Mountains (modern Bingöl), reaches the valley of the Aratsani [26: 232].

the favor gods and moving north in the direction of Manazkert.<sup>7</sup> Judging by the inscription, it was left at the beginning of the military campaign, mentioning only the geography of the king's previous campaigns. From these two inscriptions left by Tiglathpileser I, it is probable that during his reign Nairi extended from the Taurus to the Aratsani, encompassing at least some parts of the Lake Van basin [24: 88].

### The inscriptions of Tiglathpileser I

In the Tigris Tunnel, the inscription of Tiglathpileser I is followed by an inscription of Shalmaneser III with a depiction of the king.<sup>8</sup> After the introductory part of the inscription, it is mentioned again that the king is the conqueror of the regions from Lake Van to the Mediterranean Sea: the land of the Hittites, Melidu, Dayanu, Sukhmu, the royal city of Arame of Urartu - Arzashku, lands of Gilzanu and Khubushkia from the source of the Tigris to the source of the Euphrates.<sup>9</sup>

In the depths of the tunnel, not far from this inscription, there is another inscription left by Shalmaneser III (*This inscription is attributed to Ashurnasirpal II and Shalmaneser III*) [14: 436]. According to this inscription, the king entered through the mountain passes of Enzu<sup>10</sup>, conquered the lands of Sukhmu, Dayaeni and Urartu, passed through the land of Gilzanu, received tribute and, marching against Nairi for the third time, wrote his name at the source of the Tigris.

About 40 meters above the Tigris Tunnel, at the entrance to the upper cave, which was mentioned by C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, Shalmaneser III left two inscriptions, again with the image of the king, who "looks" into the depths of the cave.<sup>11</sup> These two inscriptions of the king are almost identical to the inscriptions of the Tigris Tunnel.

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<sup>7</sup> V. Mayer believes that during this campaign of the third year, the Assyrian army reached as far as the southern regions of Lake Van, and then the campaign continued in the direction of Melid [17: 237; see also and cf. 7: 127, n. 128].

<sup>8</sup> Like the image of the inscription of Tiglathpileser I, it "looks" at the direction of the river stream. Before C. F. Lehmann-Haupt's research, the given inscription was attributed to Tukulti-Ninurta II [13: 31-44; 14: 436, 440-441].

<sup>9</sup> The lines at the bottom of the inscription are bent upwards at the end. Some of the inscriptions of Shalmaneser III found in Assur have such a feature. This circumstance proves that the Assyrian king took this mason with him to the military campaign [14: 441]. As already mentioned, according to the chronicles of Shalmaneser III, after the Tigris Tunnel, the Assyrian army moved forward through the Tunibuni mountain pass, appearing in the area that was under the rule of Arame of Urartu [9: A.0.102.6 iii 34-45, 102.10 iii 26-33a].

<sup>10</sup> Also known as Enzate, Enzite and Alzu, as well as Amadani [27: 184; 11: 256].

<sup>11</sup> According to C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, this image of the king was directed towards the water flowing from the bottom of the cave. It is noteworthy that C. F. Lehmann-Haupt's Kurdish companion showed the footprint of Alexander the Great (Zulkarna) on the way to the upper cave. The ideas about Gilgamesh's immortality in Central Asia in the Hellenistic period were associated with the name of Alexander the Great [19: 22-23]. The examination of the inscription revealed that there are two different inscriptions here and it was left not by Ashurnasirpal II but by Shalmaneser III [14: 440].

Based on the data provided by the inscriptions, C. F. Lehmann-Haupt thinks that Shalmaneser III managed to halt the mountaineers of the Armenian Highland and the Aramaeans, who worked with them, and to prevent the danger hanging over the Assyrian “citadel”. The campaigns against Arame of Urartu preceded the invasions of Damascus, Hamat and their allies. He was inclined to believe that the kings of Biaina always had ties and alliance with enemies of Assyria in the west, especially the Aramaean rulers in northern Syria.<sup>12</sup>

According to C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, Shalmaneser III, before reaching Urartu, had to pass through the regions of the Nairi people at the source of the Tigris. Based on the evidence of entering through the homonymous mountain pass, the researcher localizes the Tigris Tunnel in Enzite.<sup>13</sup> C. F. Lehmann-Haupt also thinks that this important gorge was not defenseless during the campaigns of Tiglathpileser I and Shalmaneser III.<sup>14</sup> The rock-cut fortress<sup>15</sup>, first built by the “Nairi people” and consequently conquered and modified by the Biaina people<sup>16</sup>, used to be above the Tigris Tunnel.

C. F. Lehmann-Haupt had previously tried to explain the existence of four inscriptions of Shalmaneser III in the Tigris Tunnel by the fact that the king had left them during the years of various campaigns. The inscriptions of Shalmaneser III indicate that he reached the region of the sources of the Tigris during the campaign of the 7th year of his reign in 852 BC and the 15th year in 844 BC, and left his images and inscriptions there [9: A.0.102.6, ii 34-40, A.0.102.8, 20'-23'a, 47'b-51, A.0.102.10, ii 26-30, A.0 102.14, 67-72, A.0 102.3; 14: 453].

C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, however, in order to date the inscriptions of Shalmaneser III, assumed that they were located in the tunnel and in the upper cave in

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<sup>12</sup> The hypothesis proposed by M. Salvini, according to which Arame of Urartu could have been an Aramaean, who managed to unite some tribes of the Armenian Highland, creating a defensive chain of fortresses, virtually presents an argument based on C. F. Lehmann-Haupt's viewpoint [25: 26-27].

<sup>13</sup> The researcher considers the road from Lche (Lice) to the Tigris Tunnel to be the entrance leading towards the mountain pass mentioned in the inscription [14: 444]. K. Radner supposes that the Arghana mountain pass is evidenced in the inscription. The Assyrian troops probably moved through the Tigris Tunnel through the Euphrates region and crossed the mountain pass to the north, then south through the Tigris River, returning to their homeland [27: 184, 200].

<sup>14</sup> According to the chronicles of Shalmaneser III, after the Tigris Tunnel, the Assyrian army advanced through the Tunibuni mountain pass, appearing in lands that were under the rule of Arame of Urartu [9: A.0.102.6 iii 34-45, 102.10 iii 26-33a]. The fortress mentioned by C. F. Lehmann-Haupt accordingly controlled this mountain pass.

<sup>15</sup> The permanent Urartian presence here can be assumed only from the years of the reign of Sarduri II.

<sup>16</sup> The author considers among the characteristic features of the Bainian (Urartian) fortresses the presence of rock stairs and the door to the left of the stairs leading to the two small rock-cut rooms. A hole from the left room in the direction of the inscriptions leads to the river. From the other room, the path led the researcher to a rock-cut fortress [14: 444-446]. The research carried out by A. Schachner in the area of the Tigris Tunnel confirms the conjecture of C. F. Lehmann-Haupt: there used to be a fortress here both in the Iron Age and in late antiquity as well as in the Middle Ages, and the scholar attributes the rock stairs to the Post-Urartian period [27: 61-72].



chronological order. According to that, C. F. Lehmann-Haupt considered the inscriptions at the end, which mention Shalmaneser III's campaigns to Nairi for *the third time*, to have been engraved later [14: 455]. When Shalmaneser III marched for the third time, one inscription of his success was not enough, and he left two inscriptions along with those that already existed. The third campaign to Nairi, as mentioned, has its parallels with the inscription of Tiglathpileser I<sup>17</sup>, but the third campaign is related not to the source of the Tigris, but to Nairi. The two "early" inscriptions at the beginning of the upper cave of the tunnel, however, state that the king marched against the Chaldeans for the first time in the 9th year of the reign of Shalmaneser III. Therefore, according to C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, it is groundless to date these inscriptions to the 7th year of the king's reign [14: 453]. As it is mentioned, in the 15th year of his reign, Shalmaneser III marched to Nairi for the 4th time, but the Tigris inscriptions mention the third campaign. C. F. Lehmann-Haupt concluded that Shalmaneser III in the 7th year marched not towards Nairi, but only to the west, outside the Nairi regions, meanwhile having received tribute from Nairi. According to that, C. F. Lehmann-Haupt concludes that the inscriptions at the beginning of the tunnel and cave represent the king's successes in the west and north, which are crowned with the image of the king, and the events already in the Tigris basin and the incursion into Enzitone and the environs of the tunnel are the continuation. This approach in terms of dating the inscriptions did not gain much traction and was actually criticized and refuted at the beginning of the last century.<sup>18</sup> It is noteworthy that this dating was widely used in Soviet Urartology [18: 190-193; 21: 56].

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<sup>17</sup> Shalmaneser III wanted to show his equality by doing so, as he was the only Assyrian king after Tiglathpileser I to initiate a campaign again towards the basins of the Upper Tigris, Aratsani and Lake Van [27: 198-199].

<sup>18</sup> On the occasion of the 7th year of the invasion of Shalmaneser III, however, it is mentioned that the king also had visited the region of the source of the Tigris, which C. F. Lehmann-Haupt mistakenly identified as the tributary of the Arghana. He came to this conclusion by comparing the data reported in the inscriptions of the 7th and 15th years, "the place from where the water flows", "at the source of the Tigris, on the tributary, on the mountain cliff from where its water flows" [9: A.0.102.6, ii 34-40, iii 34-45]. According to C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, only the 15th year of the Tigris Tunnel is mentioned. He also mentions that the events of the 7th year of the Balavat Gates are depicted near a fountain far from the cliffs and depict an inscribed obelisk with the image of the King [14: 455-456]. Other scholars who have touched upon the issue, however suggest that in connection with the events of the 7th year the Tigris Tunnel and the upper cave with a rectangular entrance and a fortress, perhaps even a temple, are pictured. K. Radner considers that the Assyrian king left an obelisk near the Tigris Tunnel, which has not been preserved, and A. Schachner thinks that, since the words "image" and "obelisk" in Assyrian are identical, the image was also edged [6: 55, 58; 27: 199, 220]. E. Unger considers the tunnel "the place from where the water flows", and the upper cave - "at the source of the Tigris... on the mountain cliff". He compares the construction of a statue mentioned in the description of the invasion of 852 and leaving an inscription on it with the images of the Balavat Gate in the inscription of the upper cave and with the image of the king in the Tigris Tunnel. Comparing the inscriptions, E. Unger also concluded that the duplicate inscriptions were engraved by two different stone-cutters. During the 7th year of the campaign of Shalmaneser III, the image of the king was

### The evidence on the Tigris Tunnel in the Epic of Gilgamesh

C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, following his companion W. Belck also suggests that before the tunnel was formed, there used to be a lake upstream [5: 459; 16: 802]. It is the reflection of this geological situation that underlies Pliny's account [20: 330]. It is noteworthy that according to Pliny, the Tigris originates from a spring in the plain called Elegos<sup>19</sup>, and then flows into a lake called Aretisa, without mixing with the latter.<sup>20</sup> Crossing the Taurus, it enters a cave and, at the bottom of the mountain, exits to the opposite side at Zoranda, then, passing through Lake Tospitis (Van), flows again downstream. According to C. F. Lehmann-Haupt, this report testifies to the two underground sections of the upstream of the Tigris. The idea of belonging to a single water system of the two underground streams of the Tigris, as later C. F. Lehmann-Haupt assumed, was reflected in the Babylonian version of the epic of Gilgamesh [16: 803-804]. C. F. Lehmann-Haupt thinks that the Mashu Mountains mentioned in the epic are the ancient name of the Taurus [16: 799-800; 31: 42-43]. Gilgamesh passes through the gates of these mountains in darkness<sup>21</sup> and finds himself in the garden of gods. C. F. Lehmann-Haupt suggests that the Mashu Mountains and the dark route are not in a fairy-tale land, but in Armenia, linked to the Tigris Tunnel. The Tigris Tunnel used to be a place of worship. The evidence of this is the obelisk of Naram-Sin found not far from here, near Diyarbakir.<sup>22</sup> It was perceived as the entrance to the underworld, or the underworld itself [2: 263-264]. The Tigris Tunnel was also a natural boundary, thanks to which Shubria

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created in the tunnel, and since the adjacent part of the latter was not convenient, the inscription was a little further away, as shown by the fact that it was made in the upper cave. During the next campaign, the king left the main inscription in the upper cave and added his image in the tunnel, as it was already a duplicate, the inscription was written on an uneven surface without much effort [30: 53-73].

<sup>19</sup> To the south-west of Lake Tsovk, a fortress called Elegia is mentioned [12: 53].

<sup>20</sup> C. F. Lehmann-Haupt notes that Pliny's report is confirmed by E. Huntington's research [10: 593-594]. According to E. Huntington, local Armenians stated that there used to be no lake near Lake Tsovk 500-600 years ago, the river flowed here along the plain, and then the stream became subterranean. The water of Lake Tsovk gradually began to flow to the Tigris until 1879 and the subterranean stream is located in the eastern part of the lake. Since, according to E. Huntington, Lake Tsovk had a subterranean stream or tunnel, the two tunnels of the Tigris were confused by the Assyrians. This information probably dates back much earlier than Pliny, among the Greek travellers and logographers of the 6th-5th cc. BC, who knew much more about the northern parts of Western Asia than the contemporaries of Alexander the Great. The ideas about the Tigris during the reign of Shalmaneser III can be deduced from the information provided by Hecataeus of Miletus. The Eastern and Western Tigris are absorbed into a single water system from which Lake Van is irrigated [22: 460; 14: 459-461].

<sup>21</sup> It is noteworthy that the path of Gilgamesh did not pass over but passed through the mountains and here, unfortunately, the Sumerian ideas had their impact (see *ibid.*).

<sup>22</sup> The researcher came to this conclusion due to the fact that in the tunnel there are many crosses engraved above the inscription of Shalmaneser III, which, according to him, proves that it used to be a place of worship during the Christian period as well. Surprisingly, however, this testimony of C. F. Lehmann-Haupt is far from the truth [14: 462; 16: 799-800; 19: 32-43, 155-156].

maintained its existence during the Assyrian-Urartian conflict [27: 218; 22: 263-264].

Thereby, still at the end of the 19th century, C. F. Lehmann-Haupt stated that there are only the inscriptions of the Assyrian kings Tiglathpileser I and Shalmaneser III together with images of kings in the Tigris Tunnel. He correctly identified the Subnat tributary mentioned in the Assyrian inscriptions as the Zibene, in Northern Mesopotamia. His expedition also managed to find the inscription of Tiglathpileser I near Manazkert, thanks to which he traced the route of the Assyrian army's military campaign. It is noteworthy that C. F. Lehmann-Haupt is the first scholar who assumed that the source of the Tigris used to be a sanctuary for the Assyrian kings and are even attested in the epic of Gilgamesh.

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ՎԵՐԱԲԵՐՅԱԼ**

*Վահե Սարգսյան*

**Բանալի բառեր՝** Նաիրի, Ուրարտու, Ասորեստան, Տիգրիսի թունել, արձանագրություն, Կ. Ֆ. Լեման-Հաուպտը, Վ. Բելք, Թիզլաթալասար I, Սալմանասար III, արշավանք:

Գերմանացի ականավոր արևելագետ, ուրարտագետ Կ.Ֆ. Լեման-Հաուպտը 1898–1899 թթ. Հայկական լեռնաշխարհում և Հյուսիսային Միջագետքում կատարած իր ճանապարհորդության ժամանակ հետազոտեց նաև Տիգրիսի թունելը: Ըստ հետազոտողի՝ Ասորեստանի արքաներն այդ վայրը համարել են որպես Տիգրիսի ակունքը, կամ ակունքներից մեկը և իրենց արշավանքների ժամանակ ձգտել են հասնել այնտեղ: Դա հավանաբար պայմանավորված էր նաև այն հանգամանքով, որ Ասորեստանի մայրաքաղաքներ Աշուրի, Կալախի և Նինվեի «պատերը ողողող» Տիգրիս գետի ջրերը այստեղ հոսում էին ժայռերի միջից: Զոհաբերությունները, որոնք ասորեստանյան արքաներն, ըստ արձանագրությունների, կատարում էին իրենց աստվածների պատվին, համարվել են նաև նվիրված գետի և աղբյուրի աստծուն:

Տիգրիսի թունելի արձանագրությունները դեռևս 1862 թ. հայտնաբերել էր Ա. Թեյլորը: Այստեղ այնուհետ հետազոտություններ են կատարել ինժեներ Կ. Սեստերը, Է. Նյումանը: Նրանք, սակայն, ի տարբերություն Կ. Ֆ. Լեման-Հաուպտի, մասնագիտացած չէին արևելագիտության և ասորագիտության ասպարեզում: Վերոնշյալ հետազոտողների՝ արձանագրությունները տեղում ընթերցել չկարողանալու, ինչպես նաև՝ արտապատճենների աղճատված լինելու հանգամանքով պայմանավորված, Սալմանասար III-ի (Ք.ա. 858-824 թթ.) արձանագրությունները վերագրվում էին Թուրույթի-Նինուրտա II-ին (Ք.ա. 890-884 թթ.) և Աշուրնաճիրպալ II-ին (Ք.ա. 883-859 թթ.): Կ.Ֆ. Լեման-Հաուպտն իր հետազոտություններով փաստեց, որ Տիգրիսի թունելում գտնվում են միայն ասորեստանյան արքաներ Թիզլաթալասար I-ի (Ք.ա. 1114-1076 թթ.) և Սալմանասար III-ի արձանագրությունները՝ արքաների պատկերներով: Ասորեստանյան արձանագրություններում հիշատակվող Սուբնատ վտակը, որը նույնացվում էր Զիբենի հետ, հետազոտողն իրավացիորեն տեղորոշեց Հյուսիսային Միջագետքում: Նրա արշավախմբին հաջողվեց նաև գտնել Թիզլաթալասար I-ի արձանագրությունը Մանազկերտի մոտ, որի շնորհիվ նաև փաստարկվեց ասորեստանյան բանակի արշավանքի երթուղին: Ուշագրավ է, որ Կ. Ֆ. Լեման-Հաուպտն առաջին հետազոտողն է, ով նաև ենթադրեց, որ Տիգրիսի ակունքները եղել են սրբազան վայր Ասորեստանի արքաների համար և վկայված են անգամ «Գիլգամեշ» էպոսում:

## THE PHENOMENON *ŠILTĀQĀT* AND ITS REFLECTIONS IN THE ARMENIAN HISTORICAL MILIEU\*

Gor Margaryan

### Abstract

Since the end of the XIV century, in official documents and written sources on the history of the Ilkhanate, the term *šiltāqāt* is often found, the meaning of which is still not fully understood. The interpretation of the term was often given without regard to the substantive characteristics of the word: *šiltāqāt* is interpreted partially, sometimes conflicting, and approximately meaningful comments are given. *Šiltāqāt* has been interpreted as an illegal tax, a tax levied under various pretexts, a pretext or extraordinary tax, generally as a collective name for lawless taxes, etc. Moreover, what was the meaning and application of *šiltāqāt*? If it was a tax, in what amount, where, how, and under what circumstances was it levied?

Surely, since the Ilkhanid period *šiltāqāt* was levied on the subject peoples, and hence the term should have been reflected in the reports of the economic life of those same peoples. In particular, the article deals with the mention of *šiltāqāt* in the Armenian sources, the use and semantic meanings of the term or phenomenon. Interestingly, during the post-Ilkhanid period until the early 16th century, the term does not occur in Armenian sources at all. However, later on, beginning from the 16th century in Armenian historical sources, and interestingly, also in various Armenian dialects, the term (sometimes in a distorted form) is often found, as well as a description of the phenomenon. The purpose of this article is to collect all the information and references to *šiltāqāt* in the Armenian sources, and on the basis of this as additional historical material, try to make clarifications of *šiltāqāt*, its application, meaning, etc. by means of source analysis.

**Keywords:** *Šiltāqāt*; *šiltağ*, etymology; Ilkhanid; tax system, illegal taxing; Armenian sources; *Nakhčiwānī*.

### *Šiltāqāt*: meaning and etymology

The word *šiltāqāt* is formed from the Turkic-Mongolian *šiltāq* and the Arabic plural suffix *-āt*. Contrary to the common misconception that it is a Mongolian word, it must be said that *šiltāq* (and hence '*šiltāqāt*') comes from the Uighur **tilta:ğ**, which means cause or preposition. It later was loaned into Mongolian, becoming *šiltağ* [6: 494]. One of the earliest definitions of the term was given by F. Meninsky in the last quarter of the 17th century, interpreting the term *šiltāq* as a far-fetched dispute, gossip, harassment [21: 2852: 1701: 1912].

The root of *šiltağ* was likely **til/dil-** "tongue", which entirely explains the meanings gossip, dispute, and slander of *šiltağ*. "*šiltağ*" was common among Tur-

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tic and Mongolian peoples [19: 147-151]. The dictionaries of L. Budagow [35: 671], J. Vuller [15: 457], and A. Vámbéry [35: 365] published almost simultaneously in 1860-1870s show a remarkable interpretation of the word. In the dictionaries listed, the *šiltağ* is primarily interpreted in the sense of detection, lies and falsehoods, quarrels, enmities, bad reputations, and only in one case, a pretext, an opportunity. The definitions falsehood and gossip are interesting to see in Armenian examples with translations close to those meanings. V. Radloff also represents the meanings "lying, slander, and gossip" of the word, but he also mentions the meaning "burglary and oppression" which is especially visible in the derivative translation of *šiltāqçī* - a robber, plunderer [41: 1078-1079].

The origin of *šiltağ* was probably the stem *til/ dil* (language), which fully explains the meaning of *šiltağ* (in the sense of slander, gossip and calumny) among the Turkic and Mongol peoples. In the dictionaries of L. Budagow, J. Vuller and A. Vambery, published almost at the same time, the interpretation of this word is remarkably interesting. In the mentioned dictionaries *šiltağ* is mostly interpreted in the sense of exposure, lies and falsity, quarrel, enmity, bad reputation, and only in one case - pretext. The primary meanings in the sense of lie and gossip are interesting to see in the Armenian examples with close translations. Radloff's explanation of the word is somewhat different. He also presents the meanings "lie, slander and gossip" of the word, but he also mentions the meaning robbery and oppression, which is especially evident in the derivative translation of the word *šiltāqçī* - brigand, robber. According to another explanation, the word comes from Turkic-Mongolian *siltan'an* - to make an excuse [13: 155].

One of the first experiments in the interpretation of *šiltāqāt* in the special literature was V. Minorsky's analysis of the *soyurghal* of Qasim b. Jahangir Aq-Qoyunlu. According to the author, *šiltāqāt* is derived from the Mongolian words *šiltaghan* and *siltaq* and had the meaning "pretext". Minorsky, referring to N. Poppe's Mongolian dictionary, explains the word with the synonym for the Persian word *bahāne* as a pretext or reason. [40: 333]. later gained the meanings oppression and persecution and clearly states that it was a tax obligation [22: 930; 947]. It should be noted that Minorsky's explanation was later borrowed and used by many other scholars. E. Ashtor interprets *šiltāqāt* as extraordinary taxes in the fiscal system of Iraq during the post-Iranian period [9: 250]. P. Luft considers *šiltāqāt* as an unapproved and illegal tax according to the Shariah, but an established and existing tax imposed by the authorities [28: 92-95]. It is difficult to agree with the opinion of the famous Soviet Orientalist I. Petrushevsky that *šiltāqāt* had the meaning of collective taxes and was similar to *ikhrajāt* [37: 277-278]. The author contradicts his observation that *šiltāqāt* was a tax obligation when he stresses that Ahmed Gövde's reform [0: 19&9; 39: 28-37] was necessary in order to "not disturb anyone with [the taxes] *šiltāqāt* and *ikhrajāt*" [37: 273], and if they are the same thing, why both names are mentioned in the firman?

The illegal taxing mechanism and phenomenon of *šiltāqāt* should be sought in the Mongolian "environment", that is during the Mongol Empire. The possible an-

swer to the question can be found in the work of Rashid ad-din, who describes an interesting system of illegal taxation. According to history, the administrative territories of the Ilkhanate were given to hākims with cabāla to tax. Tax collectors and messengers were sent from the royal court to levy the collected taxes, whose living and other expenses had to be taken care of by hākims through a tax. The hākims were spending 4/6 of the taxed money on them, and they owned the remaining money by distributing the bitikchis<sup>1</sup>, nāibs<sup>2</sup>, and viziers. As a result, tax collection was needed again and hākims justified the collection of new taxes in front of rayats by pointing to the fact that messengers were sent for the mission of taxation. Again, taxes were imposed on those who were sent, for example, victualling - *ulūfe*, as important tasks-*muhimmāt*, as extraordinary expenses, and requirements-*ikhrajāt*, etc. Naturally, the tax collected again did not reach the royal court either. The viziers entering into a deal with hākims allocated berats to collect taxes, with which the messengers were directed to the hākims and returned empty-handed. According to Rashid ad-Din, the court or treasury was receiving a maximum of 2 dinars instead of 10. As a result, to the surprise of rayats<sup>3</sup> and Rashid ad-Din, some of the taxes were spent extravagantly on messengers, then those expenses have increased and thereby validated the need for double taxation and not sending the money collected from taxes to court [42: 247-256]. That is, there was a phenomenon of double or extra taxing.

According to Rashid ad-Din, Ghazan Khan used his reforms to put an end to this practice. However, it is safe to say that the reforms of Ghazan Khan did not have a long life. This is evidenced by the following. In the record of Armenian manuscripts, one of the authors similarly describes the above phenomenon, writing that during the reign of Muhammad *Öljaitü* Khodabande Khan (1304-1316) “they came in spring and taxed, then the khan died in autumn (1316) and Aghlaghu, Sintamur? and HasanTamur? with 1300 people came and taxed again” (*լըլյիւ հարկ ւնիւ*) [47: 341]. It can be assumed that the above-described incidents of the late XIII - early XIV century describe *šiltāqāt*, the method of its levying and characterize it as additional taxation (often for far-fetched reasons). In our opinion, *šiltāqāt* as the term for illegal taxation, appeared because the collection of other taxes was done under false, artificial pretexts, which is evidenced by the inscription of Abu

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<sup>1</sup> Bitikchi-a scribe, secretary (also bichechi), or an officer in the Mongol administrative apparatus [27: 45].

<sup>2</sup> The Arabic word “*Naib*” signifying simply a deputy, mainly meant provincial governor, e.g. naib of a castle, naib of a province [24: 79; 145-148], and under the Mongols it meant a deputy ruler or viceroy and so on [12: 270]. There are also various forms and meanings such as *naib ul-imam* (or a deputy of the Hidden Imam) [11: 81], *naib ul-sultanat* (regent) [16: 302], *malik naib* (deputy of regent) [4: 96]. In Sunni Islamic law, it refers to the authorized representative of a *qadi* (judge) [10: 228].

<sup>3</sup> The term rayat, which denoted the subject population, came from an Arabic word which originally meant a flock of sheep. In Iran it meant peasant, peasantry [25: 235]. **Rayat** was a somewhat derogatory Arabic term used throughout the Middle East and by the Ottoman administration for the **peasantry** [18: 257].



Said in Ani: "Let nothing else be collected from any person under the pretext [of taxes] *kalan*, *nemeri*, and *tarkh*" [52: 318].

One of the first testimonies of *šiltāq* and *šiltāqāt* is found in medieval written sources in the work of the Jalayirid royal official Muhammad Hindushah Nakhjivani: "The mentioned inspectors (the police) should not seek cling and delay the needs of those in need because of any spurious pretext or dispute." (That is, for no reason they should do anything illegal [should not extort?]) [38: 300]. Next, Nakhjivani also mentions an Arabicized plural version of *šiltāqāt*, with *-āt*. particle-*šiltāqāt*, which was apparently one of the first testimonies found in written sources. Here, the author uses the term to refer to illegal taxation. The text reveals that in the 14th century, *šiltāqāt* was already a big problem, damaging the economic and social life of the Ilkhanate. Nakhjivani writes, "and if it's because of what claim *kadkhudās*<sup>4</sup>, then *hākims*, *mutasarrifs*<sup>5</sup>, *nökärs*<sup>6</sup> and their appointers, what they have taken from the people with the *šiltāqāt* and *šanāqis* have to return to the people, hand them over, and never consider the apology to be generosity" [26: 434].

### The *šiltāqāt* in the Armenian historical milieu.

It is interesting that *šiltāq* or *šiltāqāt* is never mentioned in the Armenian sources of the 13<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> centuries, neither as a tax or duty, nor in other forms. However, it is obvious that the term was used and began to appear in sources from the 16<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> century. L. Khachikyan suggests that during the preceding period, without the use of the word *šiltāqāt*, but in the same sense, Armenian manuscripts contain references to the fine and oppressio [49: 79]. In Armenian sources, since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the word has been found in the form *š(ə)lt'ağ(kh)* (շ(ը)լթաղ(խ)), *šilt'ağ* (շիլթաղ), *šlt'akh* (շլթախ), *š(ə)rt'ākh* (շ(ը)րթախ). One of the first testimonies is found among the Armenian written sources, in Simeon Lehatsi's work, where **the term** is used in the sense of illegality, oppression, and calumny [52: 86; 272], in the form *šəlt'akh* and conjunction with the synonym *iftirā'* (slander)<sup>7</sup>.

In one of the pastoral letters of the Catholicos Alexandr Jułayec'i (1706-1714), in the 14th certificate, applied the form *šəlt'ağ*, which contains the meaning of deception [47: 456-461].

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<sup>4</sup>Kadkhudā- The village headman, known as "Kadkhoda" (God of the Village) [8: 498], who acted as the representative of the village in its relations with the administration [17: 13]. It also means the **head** of a city or a **district** [33: 529].

<sup>5</sup> The *hākim* (governor) and *mutasarrif* are often mentioned in sources as civil officials who were concerned with fiscal affairs [31: 204].

<sup>6</sup>Nökär, noukär, nawkar - bodyguard of a ruler, comrade, **servant**, dependent, soldier [20: 174; 7: 161].

<sup>7</sup>*İftirā'* - calumny, inventing a lie, falsehood, imposition, *İftirā' kardan-* to defame, invent lies [32: 80].

At the same time, *šilt'akh* is used in the sense of slanderous oppression from 1717 to 1724, representative of the British East India Company in Tabriz, in Armenian Catholic merchant Ellias Mushelian's (Elia Karnets'is) letter addressed to his French colleague Porécar (Policarpe, Polycarde?) [51: 61-74; 45: 103-114]. In a letter written in 1715, he asks Porécar to obtain a guarantee in Isfahan so that there are no obstacles to bringing his tambaku (tobacco) load because he has been warned that "they are *doing šilt'ağ* there", that is, slanderously and on various pretexts, trying to take away the goods, or at least to extort a fine or a bribe [46: 68]. The term is also found in Armenian fables and folk tales (again signifying pretext, calumny) [1: 763]. For example, in one of the fables of Elia Karnets'is, were "the wolf makes a *šilt'ağ* to the lamb" («գէլը զառիւն շլթաւ աւելընի»), that is, he accuses the lamb of dirtying the water of the spring from which the wolf was drinking, so that he can make the lamb guilty and eat it on a false pretext [5: 187]. In the same sense, one application was found to the form "*šilt'akh*" in Simeon Yerevantsi's **works**, where the term should also be understood in the sense of extorting money by calumny, especially that here has been "*šilt'akh*"-ed with "revenge" and "for hunger" [43: 349-350]. Interestingly, the meaningful application of the *šilt'akh* dialectic word "*šar*" (*շար* - spurious accusation) is also reflected in F. Meninsky's modern dictionary. Catholicos Abraham Kretatsi (1734-1737) uses the *šiltāq* in his history in the sense of tax terror: "And the Khans of Gendje (Gandzak) and other zabits always do "*šamata-šiltāğ*" and do not allow the people to stay calm, but they always oppress and rob" [43: 74]. It is likely that in the 17th and 18th centuries, this term also penetrated Armenian dialects, with the meaning of being/doing something illegal, also obscene, and shameless. For example, "that's good that there's no *šiltāğ* (expression) between us" (*էնքան լաւա, վեր վեր մաջին մին շլթաւ չի կա*) or "his wife is an *šaltākh* (shameless)" (*ատոր կընիկը շլթախին մեկն է*) [50: 247]. In the Armenian dialects of Dersim [3: 157] and Kharberd [34: 267-269], the term is found slightly corrupted in the form *š(ə)rt'ākh*.

Another good example of *šiltāgh* is found in the ethnographic notes about the Armenian community of Karadagh (Iran) of the early 20th century. The eyewitness and the author, who was from Karadagh itself, explains the essence of *šiltāgh* with a vivid example. When a peasant was hurrying on his donkey in the morning to work in the fields, border guard soldiers approached him and demanded his donkey (or demanded that he take them somewhere on the donkey). The peasant could not leave the case and give up the donkey, and then he would take money out of his pocket prepared in advance, give it to the soldiers, and they would let him go, and the latter would go to work quietly. This was *šiltāgh*, i.e. the lawless taking of money, because the soldier could not leave his service, especially under the pretext of demanding money [14: 529; 570].

**In conclusion**, we can say that *šiltāqāt* as a fixed tax obligation clearly appears after the second half of the fifteenth century. This is evidenced by the decrees of the Aq-Qoyunlu and the Safavids, as well as written sources of the time. The

term *šiltāq* or *šiltāqāt* had different meanings depending on historical reality and era, as an illegal, unlawful tax (but only from the point of view of Shariah) or extra taxing, as illegality, pretext, calumny, robbery and oppression.

The mentions of the term and the definitions of the phenomenon in the Armenian sources attest to all the above-mentioned significations, and as for the dialects, the meanings "fictitious pretext" and "something illegal, illegitimate" or making an excuse were especially prevalent there. In the Armenian historical sources, the term is found in the 16th century, and in Armenian dialects the word was in use up to the 20th century.

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**ՇԻԼԹԱՂԱԹԻ ԱՐՏԱՀԱՅՏՈՒՄՆԵՐԸ ՀԱՅԿԱԿԱՆ ՊԱՏՄԱԿԱՆ  
ԻՐՈՂՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐՈՒՄ**

*Գոռ Մարգարյան*

**Բանալի բառեր՝** Շիլթաղաթ, շիլթաղ, ստուգաբանություն, իլխանական, հարկային համակարգ, անօրինական հարկում, հայկական աղբյուրներ, Նախջիվանի:

Հոդվածում փորձ է կատարվել ներկայացնել որպես հարկային եզրույթ, չարաշահում, ապօրինի հարկահանություն, տուգանք և տարբեր այլ նշանակություններով հայտնի շիլթաղաթ երևույթի՝ հայկական ուշմիջնադարյան իրականության մեջ արտահայտումներն ու կիրառության դեպքերը, ընկալումներն ու դրա վերաբերյալ մեկնաբանությունները: Բացի այդ քննվում է հայկական աղբյուրներում և բարբառներում տեղ գտած եզրույթի նշանակությունը, հայտվելու պատճառներն ու ժամանակաշրջանը և նրան հարիր իմաստային նրբերանգները:

## ХАРАКТЕРИСТИКА ВОЕННОГО СОСЛОВИЯ (ПАЖИЛАЛ) В АВАРСКОМ НУЦАЛЬСТВЕ НА ОСНОВЕ СРЕДНЕВЕКОВЫХ ПИСЬМЕННЫХ ИСТОЧНИКОВ И УСТНОЙ ТРАДИЦИИ\*

*Шахбан Хапизов, Магомед Шехмагомедов*

### **Аннотация**

*На основе дагестанских арабоязычных источников XVI-XVII вв. мы устанавливаем наличие в Аварском нуцальстве военного сословия - Пажилал. Проживали они по крайней мере с IX в. до второй половины XIV в. в крепости Акаро в нескольких километрах к северу от Хунзаха - столицы Аварского нуцальства. В письменных источниках подчеркивается, что в отличие от остального населения они не платили налогов казне. Более того, по другим источникам они получали оплату за свою военную службу и имели целый ряд сельскохозяйственных угодий, которые сдавали в аренду и получали дополнительные доходы, позволявшие им сосредоточиться исключительно на своем занятии, не отвлекаясь на сельскохозяйственные и прочие работы. Привлечение устной традиции, материалов археологических раскопок, письменных источников XIX - начала XX в., а также архивного материала XIX в. позволяет внести дополнительные штрихи и полнее охарактеризовать предмет нашего исследования. Комплексное рассмотрение всех имеющихся в нашем распоряжении фактов, а также введение в научный оборот нового и чрезвычайно ценного источника - соглашения Пажилал от XVII в. позволило нам провести ретроспективное исследование с выявлением всех отличительных особенностей данного института средневекового государства на Восточном Кавказе. Нами также прослежены некоторые аналогии между отдельными составляющими военных институций Аварского нуцальства с подобными явлениями в истории Армении, Грузии и особенно - Ирана. Это помогло нам выявить иранские корни некоторых терминов и прийти к выводу о сложении данного компонента военной культуры Аварского нуцальства в результате иранского влияния на местные традиции.*

**Ключевые слова:** Дагестан, Хунзах, военное дело, история государства и права, источниковедение.

Хотя столица Аварского нуцальства - Хунзах находится на ровном горном плато, его расположение у крутого скального обрыва делает аул с двух сторон почти совершенно неприступным. Северо-западная же сторона была окружена башнями, соединенными крепостной стеной, или же ограду составляла цепь близко расположенных трехэтажных домов, выходящих глухими стенами наружу [1:82-84]. В Хунзахе помнили о наличии семи довольно больших башен, расположенных с северной и северо-западной стороны аула.

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Фундамент одной такой башни был выявлен при раскопках христианского могильника в местности Тад-раал. Добавим также, что стена, образованная стенами крайних домов, закрывавшая доступ в Хунзах с севера и северо-востока, имела укрепленные ворота. Недаром название этого места *Кавудахъ* (авар. - «у ворот»), сейчас более известное как *Сверуда* (авар. - «у поворота»). Как пишет русский офицер, побывавший в 1830-х гг. в Хунзахе, «он расположен на неровной плоскости и стоит над самою пропастью, которая делает его с двух сторон совершенно неприступным. Он состоит из трех частей или куч строений, разделенных между собою небольшими полями и пустырями... В нескольких местах стоят, совершенно отдельно от домов, высокие, четырехугольные башни, с бойницами в три и четыре ряда, между которыми (башнями) в случае опасности, накладывают высокие каменные стены, оцепляющие таким образом все три части Хунзаха, которые после опять разбираются, - а место занимаетя полем»[1:82-84].

Эту природную защищенность дополнял второй (после стен самого Хунзаха) пояс укреплений, стоявших по краям плато. Именно они защищали отдельные естественные проходы, открывающие врагу путь на Хунзах, и особенно вышеназванные главные дороги. Что же касается укрепленных замков, то они, по сообщению Д.М. Атаева, располагались, например, в местностях Матлас, Чинна. Этот пояс укреплений обеспечивал защиту всех многочисленных населенных пунктов Хунзахского плато. Однако главное внимание в обеспечении безопасности было уделено укреплению самого плато.

Иги-щулатли (*Игиль шулалги* - «укрепление на Иги») представляло собой систему укреплений, возведенных с южной и юго-западной сторон хунзахского плато, где на отдельных расширениях чрезвычайно узкого гребня хребта, являющегося отрогом горы Акаро, до сих пор сохраняются развалины башен, а также крепостных стен, воздвигнутых из массивных, прекрасно обработанных камней. Укрепление Акаро находилось в юго-восточной части вершины одноименной горы на высоте 2,2 км. От него на юг отходили оборонительные стены, доходившие до местности Иги-Раал, которая заканчивается высоким отвесным скальным обрывом в сторону долины реки Авар-ор. Здесь сохранились развалины крепостного сооружения, возведенного на известковом растворе из обработанного камня [2: 30-31].

Как указывалось выше, плато имеет отвесные, обрывистые края. Возможные подступы к плато перекрывались прочными сооружениями замкового типа с постоянным гарнизоном - в селениях Чинна, Матлас, Иги-Щулатли и Сиух. Таким образом, в обороне аулов Хунзахского плато применялась давно известная на Кавказе система, практикуемая, кстати, и у сванов, заключающаяся в защите округа целой общины, а не отдельного селения. Именно поэтому почти все аулы на Хунзахском плато расположены на довольно доступных, открытых местах [3].

Данное обстоятельство, то есть эффективность лишь совместной защиты от врага, исторически являлось, как представляется, одним из главных факто-



ров, обуславливающих необходимость единой военной структуры, обеспечивающей защиту самого хунзахского плато и Аварского нуцальства в целом [4: 11-12]. Кажется, в числе прочих, это обстоятельство породило становление среди хунзахцев своего рода военного сословия, охарактеризованного Абдурахманом Газикумукским в XIX в. следующим образом: «как аварцы выходят на джихад: они стекаются без красивой нарядной одежды, но с богато отделанным оружием на резвых скакунах. С древних времен их мужчины считаются самыми храбрыми в Дагестане, а потому и наибы их от-важны» [5:142].

Это военное сословие известно в Хунзахе как *Пажилал* (авар. - «[обитатели] сторожевых пунктов», в современном аварском языке, в частности хунзахском говоре автором зафиксировано еще одно значение данного термина - «пограничники»), а их профессиональной обязанностью называется защита границ и организация военных походов. Выявленные нами архивные данные 1884г. говорят о наличии во второй половине XVII в. «войска и охранительной стражи от нападений неприятеля, во главе стоявших тогда хунзахским обществом»[6:4]. Им был предоставлен ряд льгот, в том числе право не платить налоги в казну, им выделялись специальные земли - пашни, сенокосы и хутора, с которых они получали доходы. В Хунзахе старожилы до сих пор помнят их традиционные многодневные застолья, проходившие в день зимнего солнцестояния (*цIвайитIаса бакъ лъугъараб мех*), на которые не допускались те, кто не являлся членом военного сословия.

В состав *Пажилал* входили несколько тухумов Хунзаха, не имевших между собой кровного родства и в большинстве своем проживавших в квартале *Самилах* [7:87-88]: *Дайитилал* (квартал *ХIорихъ*), *ПандуникIилал-Угъузилал* (квартал *ЧиIгIухъ*), *БацIукъилал-Тавулал* (квартал *Лъарахъ*), *Нагизилал* (квартал *Лъарахъ*), *ХIарикилал* (квартал *ХIорихъ*), *Халилал* (квартал *Самилахъ*), *ХIаитIихилал* (квартал *ХIорихъ*), *КъулачIилал* (квартал *Самилахъ*), *Хочолал*, *АтахIилал*. Помимо Хунзаха, о существовании сословия *Пажилал* известно в селениях, возникших на местах бывших сторожевых пунктов по окраинам хунзахского плато (*Ахалчи*, *Гацалух* и т.д.). К примеру, *Ахалчи* был образован несколькими тухумами, входившими в состав *Пажилал* и жившими в укрепленном пограничном поселении *ЦIункIалутIа* [8:319].

Этнограф А.Ф. Федотова на основе записанных ею преданий, указывает, что «хунзахцы могли выставять 700 всадников, которые выходили на бой. Охрана состояла из 7 человек, живших там, где теперь лежит аул *Батлаич*. От этой стражи и произошел *Батлаич*. Так и другие аулы, например: *Сух*, *Химагоро*, *Шотота*, *Ахалчи*, образовались от проживавших на этих местах хунзахских сторожевых постов, которые были обязаны немедленно сообщать в Хунзах о всех грозящих опасностях» [7:22-23].

Как пишет этнограф А. Исламмагомедов, «в объединение *Пажилал* входили несколько тухумов. Их считают основателями аула (*Ахалчи*). Люди этого тухума жили в трех аулах: *ГъацIалухъ*, *Верх. Ахалчи*, *Ниж. Ахалчи* и

во всем были солидарны. Они клялись в верности своему союзу, быть вместе в горе и радости. Их праздник - Кюдокъо. Специально для этого существовал участок земли Кюдокъодул хурзал, урожай которого шел на расходы, связанные с празднованием» [9:15].

Пажилал имели земли в Хунзахе, Батлаиче, Андыхе, на горе Акаро. Зимой Пажилал жили в Хунзахе, летом - на горе Акаро [7:87-88]. Согласно сведениям А.Ф. Федотовой, «во главе этого общества (тухума) стоял Чеггерчи. У него был помощник - Кулачи Али. Жил Чеггерчи на горе Акаро, как царь. На праздники собирал деньги со своих земель в Хунзахе, Батлаиче, Андыхе. Собирались на праздники только мужчины. Пили бузу, ели много сухого мяса и чеснока. Бросали кружку, к кому повернется она, тому и пить. Женщин приглашали на свадьбу, а на других праздниках они только готовили. Собирались поочередно у каждого члена тухума. Хозяин дома готовил на всех». Члены сословия Пажилал жили богато и пользовались уважением в Хунзахе. В Аварском нуцальстве они получали с некоторых селений налоги «медом и курами» [7:87-88].

О крепости на горе Акаро пишет Е.И. Козубский: «Верстах в 5 от Хунзаха к югу на горе Акаро находятся развалины селения или крепости того же названия. Акару имеет вид трехугольника, с двух сторон окруженного обрывом, а с одной (западной) двумя рядами стен, отстоящих одна от другой на расстоянии 400 шагов; в стенах с западной стороны были ворота; кладка стен на извести. По преданию, Акару соединялось цепью с Танусом, которую поддерживала башня в сел. Гонох» [10:157].

Таким образом, Акаро являлся укреплением с постоянным гарнизоном. Эти сведения подтверждаются наличием здесь «остатков толстых стен, сложенных из массивного камня на извести». Кроме того, с вершины Акаро просматривается почти вся центральная Авария и потому в качестве наблюдательного пункта его можно считать идеальным [11]. На территории поселения Акаро существовал также храм X-XIV вв. [12:5-7].

Сведения о проживании Пажилал на горе Акаро приводят и краеведы З. Гаджиев и З. Алиханов. По их словам, на горе Акаро находилась одноименная крепость, в которой находились Пажилал, которые не платили никаких налогов в казну Аварского нуцальства [13], более того - сами нуцалы платили за их службу [14]. Эти сведения содержатся и в средневековой исторической хронике «Тарих Дагестан», согласно которой царь Сарира собирал налоги с «жителей всего Дагестана, от вилайата Чаркас до города Шамах, исключая только местечко Акари» [15:98], т.е. крепость Акаро.

О том, что в средневековом Аварском нуцальстве только Пажилал, жившие в крепости Акаро не платили налогов говорит также устная традиция, зафиксированная в середине XX в. (Магъало къоларел Пакаро магларда тЮгьир чIарал Пажилал гурони рукIун гьечIо) [13]. Более того, хунзахский старожил, фольклорист З. Гаджиев писал, что нуцалы платили Пажилал, жившим жителям Акаро (ПакаротIесел / Пажилал) за военную службу [14].

Об институте Пажилал сохранились некоторые данные и в архивных хранилищах. Жители селений Нитаб, Датуна и Накитль заявили в 1884г. Сословно-поземельной комиссии Дагестанской области, что они вынуждены были вносить ежегодную плату за пользование землями по следующей причине: «Мы из Хунзаха и заселились на своих землях. Во время войны Хунзахского общества с Орта-Харахи, наши уздени не явились в нужное время и на села был наложен штраф в пользу войска и охранительной стражи от нападений неприятеля, во главе стоявших тогда Хунзахским обществом» [6:4].

В качестве иллюстрации к нашему исследованию мы хотели бы привести арабоязычный документ, составленный исходя из палеографического анализа во второй половине XVII в. Это соглашение представителей сословия Пажилал, регламентирующее их взаимные обязательства и закрепляющее юридически фактически сложившееся положение вещей. В документе приведено название - Пажилал, правда названы они арабским термином «племя». Вероятно, составитель не знал как удачнее охарактеризовать характер этого объединения. Ниже приводим текст перевода документа:

*Именем Аллаха Милостивого ко всем на этом свете и лишь к уверовавшим на том. Вся хвала Аллаху Господу [обитателей] миров. Да благословит Аллах и приветствует Мухаммада его род и всех сподвижников. Далее. И да пребудет также мир с теми, кто не нарушает договор и обет.*

*Все члены племени (?) Пажилал, и стар и млад собрались и заключили взаимное соглашение и нерушимый договор о том, что каждому из них следует отдать одного годовалого барана<sup>1</sup> или его стоимость тому кто попал в большую беду<sup>2</sup> [из их племени; рода], будь то убийство им свободного человека или кого-либо невольника или же если произошла порча его имущества из-за пожара или другого бедствия. Что касается дома, в котором проживает отец и двое братьев<sup>3</sup>, то с них полагается один молодой баран или его стоимость. Тот же кто стал самостоятельным<sup>4</sup>, женившись и переселившись в свой отдельный дом или же просто переселившись в отдельный дом, то он также обязан отдавать молодого барана или его стоимость. С того, кто остался без отца и брата также полагается один молодой баран или его стоимость, вне зависимости от того проживает он в своём доме или в чужом и вне зависимости от того является он достигшим половозрелости или же все еще ребенком.*

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<sup>1</sup> В тексте - джаз'а (араб. جذعة), что означает полугодовалая овца или баран. В самом тексте дается пояснение этому слову на аварском как «Хоржо», что означает «не окотившаяся годовалая овца» или «годовалый баран».

<sup>2</sup> В тексте - ал-бала' ал-машхур (буквально: «общезвестное бедствие, беда»). Скорее всего быть это калька с аварского *Клудияб балагь*. В таком случае это выражение следует перевести как большая или великая беда.

<sup>3</sup> Подразумеваются сыновья одного отца.

<sup>4</sup> Буквально: «отделился».

После чего, они<sup>5</sup> также пришли к взаимному согласию и договорились что того отказался давать молодого барана или его стоимость тому кто попал в беду, такового следует считать исключенным из их числа и не подчинившимся их правилам и порядку<sup>6</sup> до Судного дня и не станут далее они поддерживать его в том случае если его коснется большая беда и расстанутся они с ним подобно небесам и земле<sup>7</sup>.

Также каждый из них услышав о том, что кто-либо из их числа попал в большую беду должен сказать: «Спешите к дому того, кто попал в беду!». Тот же кто не явился [по зову] с того взыскивается баран в пользу Пажилал, в том случае если у него не было уважительной нормам<sup>8</sup> причины.

Красота речи кроется в ее краткости, однако здесь пришлось ее удлинить по множеству причин и важности цели.

Аналогичный институт, по этим сведениям, имелся и в соседнем аварском бо (союз общин) Хиндалал. Согласно сведениям Сословно-поземельной комиссии Дагестанской области от 1884г., «коренными» селениями, составившими союз Хиндалал являлись селения: Аракани, Кудутль, Рихуни, Балахуни, Унцукуль, Гимры, Харачи, Зирани, Щулатута, Могох, Гоцо, Уркачи, Шагада, Буцра, Моксох, Ашильта, Кахабросо, Бетль, Инквалита и Игали. «Эти селения составили дружественный союз и защищали друг друга в смутные и военные времена» [6:21]. В союзе Хиндалал, «состояла стража в 300 человек, которые объезжали все селения (из всех же и набранная) и помогали джамаатам подчиняться всех уздедей общим приговорам и водворяли порядок. Предводителем этой стражи был назначаем из главного селения Унцукуля уздедей. В этом же селении разбирались недовольные уздедей решениями своего общества» [6:42b]. Если исходить из того, что организацией походов из Дагестана в Южный Кавказ в XVII - начале XIX вв. занимались в основном Хунзах и Хиндалал, становится очевидной роль института Пажилал в этих военных акциях.

Вместе с тем, в Хиндалале членство в этой военной структуре не носило наследственного характера и потому вряд ли можно говорить о тождественности военного сословия Пажилал, сложившегося на хунзахском плато, воинской дружине Хиндалала. В аварском языке такого рода единица носила название *галаб*, под которым подразумевался «вооруженный отряд, контролирующий соблюдение правопорядка, выполняющий определенные полицейские функции». Фактически, это была дружина *гелов* (*гелазул кьокьа*), а *гел* имел несколько функций - судебный исполнитель, «аульный полицейский», помощник сборщика податей. Таким образом *галаби* (множественное число от термина *гел*) назначались старшинами и были судебными исполни-

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<sup>5</sup> Т.е. Пажилал.

<sup>6</sup> Буквально: «нормам».

<sup>7</sup> Буквально: «случится между ними раскол подобно...».

<sup>8</sup> Буквально: «явной».

телями и своего рода полицейскими. Вместе с тем, в Андалале, согласно данным Дагестанской сословно-поземельной комиссии, функции судебных исполнителей выполнялись другим должностным лицом, именуемым в аварском языке термином *магъуш*: «его обязанностью было арестовывать и изгонять людей, признанных вредными, вместе при содействии сельских мангушов, и взыскивать штрафы, и исполнять решения судьи. Алаби были старше и следили за общественным порядком» [6:31b]. То есть, в Андалале имелось более строгое разграничение полномочий: *магъуш* являлся судебным исполнителем, причем имелись мангуши всего Андалала и каждого селения в отдельности, которые подчинялись первым, а *галаби* выполняли полицейские функции, следя «за общественным порядком». В большинстве аварских бо (союзах общин) *мангъуш* - это «глашатай».

Возвращаясь к сословию Пажилал, отметим, что руководителем Пажилал и одновременно «главнокомандующим» войска Аварского нуцальства называется *майндур*. В XVIII - нач. XIX вв. эту должность занимали представители тухума Дайитилал, а в XVII в. зафиксированы представители Хаштихилал и других тухумов. Касаясь этимологии данного термина, следует отметить, что прослеживается аналогия данного термина с грузинским *мтавари* и армянским *мндавар*. Согласно исследованию Э. Хуршудяна, армянский титул *mndavar* зафиксирован только у армянского историка Фавстоса Бузанда (V век), который пишет о персидском «мндаваре» Андигане, пришедшем с 400-тысячной армией в поход на Армению [16:351]. В переводе М.А. Геворгияна под редакцией С.Т. Еремяна, этот термин переведен в одном месте как «полководец», а в другом как «военачальник» [17:109;114]. Э. Хуршудян выдвигает гипотезу, что *mndavar* у Фавстоса Бузанда возник в результате ошибки переводчика из *gndavar*>*gundavar*. Сам термин *gundavar* (букв. «ведущий войско») возник, по его мнению, «на почве древнеармянского» языка путем соединения двух заимствованных слов из среднеперсидского (парфянского): *gund* и *-awar*. В такой форме в древнеармянской литературе термин не зафиксирован, но следует обратить внимание на аналогичного значения слова: *gndapet* (из среднеиранского *gundbed*) и *gundsalar* (из среднеперсидского) [16:351].

Вместе с термином *майндур*, в аварском языке имеется еще один термин для обозначения представителя военного сословия. Это слово *байар*; его вариант - *мийар* [18:797]) имеет два значения: 1. дворянин, важный человек; 2. высокопоставленный офицер. Этимология его восходит к коренному лексическому фонду дагестано-нахской языковой группы, являясь обозначением мужского начала. Отметим, что оно имеет весьма древние аналогии в родственных языках. И.М. Дьяконов обращал внимание на то, что хурритское слово «мари-(анне)» и урартское «мари» («категория воинов») сохранилось в дагестано-нахских языках со значением «мужской, мужчина, муж; смелый» [19:10]. Н. Нозадзе в своей монографии, посвященной хурритской лексике приводит слово *maruanni* и переводит его как «молодой воин, дворянин»;

«рыцарь, колесничий»; а также *martianni* - «люди, военные» [20:39]. Таким образом, термин *байар* в конечном счете исходит от коренного слова - обозначения мужского начала, а также имеет аналогии в родственных языках, в т.ч. уже мертвых языках Ближнего Востока, среди которых, прежде всего, следует отметить хурритское слово *марйан-ни* (-ни - суффикс множественного числа, используемый и в современном даргинском языке) и чеченское *майра* - «муж» [21:161].

Таким образом, как история государственности, так и языковой материал показывает, что традиции военного дела в Дагестане сложились в результате симбиоза местной и привнесенной из средневекового Ирана или Византии культур.

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**ՌԱԶՄԱԿԱՆ ՎԵՐՆԱԽԱՎԻ (ՓԱԺԻԼԱԼ) ԲՆՈՒԹԱԳԻՐԸ ԱՎԱՐԱԿԱՆ ՆՈՒՑԱԼԻՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՄԻՋՆԱԴԱՐՅԱՆ ԳՐԱՎՈՐ ԱՐԲՅՈՒՐՆԵՐԻ ԵՎ ԲԱՆԱՎՈՐ ԱՎԱՆԴՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՀԻՄԱՆ ՎՐԱ**

*Շահբան Խապիզով, Մագոմեդ Շեխմագոմեդով*

**Բանալի բառեր՝** Դաղստան, Խունզախ, ռազմական գործ, պետության և իրավունքի պատմություն, աղբյուրագիտություն:

16-17-րդ դարերի դաղստանյան արաբալեզու աղբյուրների հիման վրա Ավարական խանությունում (նուցալիությունում) հաստատվում է Փաժիլալ ռազմական դասի առկայությունը: Առնվազն IX դարից մինչև XIV դարի երկրորդ կեսը նրանք բնակվել են Ակարո ամրոցում, որը գտնվում է ավարական նուցալիության մայրաքաղաք Խունզախից մի քանի կիլոմետր հյուսիս:

Գրավոր աղբյուրներում ընդգծվում է, որ, ի տարբերություն մնացած բնակչության, նրանք հարկեր չեն վճարել: Ավելին, ըստ այլ աղբյուրների, նրանք վարձատրվել են զինվորական ծառայության համար և ունեցել են գյուղատնտեսական հողատարածքներ, որոնք վարձակալության են տվել և ստացել լրացուցիչ եկամուտներ: Վերջինս էլ իր հերթին թույլ է տվել նրանց կենտրոնանալ բացառապես իրենց հիմնական զբաղմունքի՝ զինվորական ծառայության վրա:

Բանավոր ավանդությունների, հնագիտական պեղումների նյութերի, 19-րդ դարի - 20-րդ դարի սկզբի գրավոր աղբյուրների, ինչպես նաև 19-րդ դարի արխիվային նյութերի ներգրավումը թույլ է տալիս ավելի ամբողջական բնութագրել ուսումնասիրության առարկան: Մեր տրամադրության տակ եղած բոլոր փաստերի համալիր դիտարկումը և նոր ու չափազանց արժեքավոր աղբյուրի՝ 17-րդ դարի Փաժիլայան համաձայնագրի հետազոտությունը թույլ տվեցին հետահայաց ուսումնասիրություն կատարել՝ բացահայտելու Արևելյան Կովկասի միջնադարյան այս պետության տվյալ ինստիտուտի բոլոր տարբերակիչ հատկանիշները:

Մենք նաև որոշակի զուգահեռներ ենք հայտնաբերել Ավարական նուցալիության ռազմական վերնախավի որոշ հատկանիշների և Հայաստանի, Վրաստանի և հատկապես Իրանի պատմության մեջ արձանագրված նմանատիպ երևույթների միջև: Այդ ամենը օգնեց բացահայտելու որոշակի եզրույթների իրանական արմատները և գալ այն եզրակացության, որ Ավարական նուցալիության ռազմական մշակույթի այս բաղադրիչը ձևավորվել է հիմնականում իրանական ազդեցության արդյունքում:



**CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MILITARY ESTATE (PAZHILAL) IN THE AVAR  
NUTSALDOM ON THE BASIS OF MEDIEVAL WRITTEN SOURCES AND ORAL  
TRADITION**

*Shahban Khapizov, Magomed Sheykhmagomedov*

**Keywords:** Daghestan, Hunzakh, warfare, history of state and law, source studies.

On the basis of the Daghestani Arabic-language sources of the 16th-17th centuries we establish the presence of a military estate in the Avar Nutsaldom known as Pazhilal. They lived at least from the IX century until the second half of the XIV century in the fortress Akaro, a few kilometers north of Khunzakh, the capital of the Avar Nutsaldom.

The written sources emphasize that, unlike the rest of the population, they did not pay taxes. Moreover, according to other sources, they received payment for their military service and had a number of agricultural plots, which they rented out and received additional income that allowed them to concentrate exclusively on their occupation, without being distracted by agricultural and other work.

Oral tradition, archaeological excavations, written sources of the 19th - early 20th centuries as well as archival material of the 19th century allows us to characterize more thoroughly the subject of our study.

A complex consideration of all the facts at our disposal and the introduction of a new and extremely valuable source - the Pazhilal agreement of the 17th century - allowed us to conduct a retrospective study to identify all the distinctive features of this institution of the medieval state in the Eastern Caucasus. We have also traced some analogies between certain components of the military institutions of the Avar Nutsaldom with similar phenomena in the history of Armenia, Georgia, and especially - Iran. This helped us to identify the Iranian roots of certain terms and come to the conclusion that this component of the military culture of the Avar Nutsaldom was formed as a result of Iranian influence on local traditions.

## MILITARY-POLITICAL CONFRONTATIONS IN THE KHANATES OF THE SOUTH CAUCASUS IN 1768-1774 AND EREKLE II\*

*David Merkviladze*

### **Abstract**

In 1768, Fatali Khan of Quba together with Hussein Khan of Shaki took Shamakhi. Soon, however, the former also tried to subdue the Shaki Khanate. For this purpose, Fatali offered King Erekle II of Kartli-Kakheti and Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh to campaign against the Shaki Khanate. But failed to get their consent. For his part, the Khan of Shaki asked Erekle II for help. The King demanded that Fatali Khan reconcile with the Khan of Shaki and threatened to provide military assistance to Hussein Khan.

Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh also asked Erekle II for help in case of Fatali Khan's aggression. Thus, an alliance between Erekle II, Hussein Khan and Ibrahim Khan against Fatali Khan was formed. The allies aimed to restore the rule of Aghasi Khan in Shamakhi, even on the condition of vassalage to Fatali Khan. In case of refusal, they intended to return the Quba Khanate to its former borders.

The Russian government tried to limit the activity of Erekle II in the ongoing confrontation between the South Caucasian Khans. Nevertheless, in 1770, Erekle II sent an army to Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh to repel the attack of Fatali Khan. As a result, Fatali Khan's campaign in Karabakh ended in failure.

In November-December 1773, the Avar Khan Muhammad-Nutsal IV, along with Hussein Khan and Aghasi Khan, campaigned to Shamakhi. King Erekle helped the Avars militarily. Erekle II sent a detachment of Muslim Borchaly Kazakhs against Fatali Khan, in order to make the participation of his subordinates less noticeable. But this did not go unnoticed by Russian intelligence.

At the same time, it is incorrect to name Erekle II as an ally of the Dagestani leaders united against Fatali Khan in the subsequent campaign of 1774. The King's participation in the hostilities during this campaign is not confirmed by any source.

**Keywords:** King Erekle, South Caucasia, Quba, Fatali Khan, Khanate, Shaki, Shamakhi, Karabakh, Muhammad-Nutsal.

From the second half of the 1760s, significant political shifts started in the Khanates of the South Caucasus. This was manifested first by the considerable strengthening of Fatali Khan of Quba and his subjugation-oppression of the neighboring khanates, and then by forming various military-political coalitions against him, in which King Erekle II of Kartli-Kakheti was more or less involved.

As early as 1759, with the help of neighboring Dagestani leaders, Fatali Khan conquered the Derbent Khanate [15: 129; 1: 202].<sup>1</sup> Derbent Khanate could not

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boast of a large territory or population, but its strategic and economic importance was immense.

Later, Fatali Khan turned his forces against Shamakhi, that is the Shirvan Khanate.<sup>2</sup> However, the success of Quba Khan in this direction was greatly hindered by Hussein Khan of Shaki (1758-1780) [13: 92]. Fatali managed to win Hussein Khan over and got him to change sides. Apparently, Fatali Khan promised Hussein Khan a large share in the event of conquering the rich Shirvan Khanate - located between their possessions. In the summer of 1768, as a result of the complete mobilization of its own forces and those of the allies (including Daghestani mercenaries), Shamakhi, attacked simultaneously from the west and east, surrendered. The brothers ruling Shamakhi were captured (subsequently, Muhammad Said Khan was imprisoned in Derbent jail by Fatali Khan. Aghasi-Khan, as a younger and more energetic opponent, had his eyes gouged out).<sup>3</sup> According to the agreement, the Shirvan Khanate was divided between Fatali Khan and Hussein Khan and Naibs (governors) were appointed by the respective parties to govern each area. Very soon, Fatali Khan ousted Hussein Khan's Naib from Shamakhi and took over all of Shirvan. This made Hussein his mortal enemy [5: 160; 21: 11-12; 1: 224-225]. On 10 September, 1768, Temir Khamzin - the ruler of Enderey, wrote to Potapov - the commandant of Kizlyar, that a quarrel had broken out between Fatali Khan and the Khan of Shaki and the governors appointed by the son of Haji Chalabi (Hussein) had been expelled from Shamakhi [19: 121].

Fatali Khan was not satisfied with the conquest of Shirvan and set his sights on Shaki. In August or early September, 1768, the Khan of Quba and Derbent proposed to King Erekle II of Kartli-Kakheti and Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh, that they all attack Shaki together.<sup>4</sup> Erekle II, for whom the appearance of an aggressive and dangerously growing state in the vicinity of his kingdom was unacceptable, did not accept the proposal of Fatali Khan. Ibrahim of Shushi was well aware of the example of Fatali Khan betrayal of the khan of the Shaki. Ibrahim Khan had significant reasons for concern, as by annexing Shirvan, Fatali Khan created an advantageous foothold against the Khanates of Shaki and Karabakh [1: 215]. Although Russian spies reported that they were unaware of the addressees' response to the offer, subsequent events make it clear that this method of Fatali Khan did not work. He failed to involve either the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti or the Khanate Karabakh in this adventure.

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<sup>1</sup> Different years are given as the date of Derbent's capture by Fatali-Khan: 1758 [3: 78], 1760 [10: 6; 12-13], 1765 [7: 378; 8: 250].

<sup>2</sup> The khanate, with Shamakhi as its capital city, was also called the Shirvan Khanate.

<sup>3</sup> These stories are narrated in the works of different authors [7: 429; 5: 160; 10: 8: 253; 3: 79-80; 21: 10-11; 15: 130; 1: 217-222]. It should be noted that 1766 [7: 429], and 1767 [5: 160; 10: 3: 79-80] are mentioned as different dates for the taking of Shamakhi and conquest of the Khanate.

<sup>4</sup> On September 10, 1768 Russian Consulate Official I. Matveev, merchant S. Sharipin from Astrakhan and clerk E. Zamyatin sent to Shirvan to clarify Fatali Khan's plans reported to Russian consul Sulyakov. For this document, see [2: 160].

Nevertheless, Fatali Khan did not give up his plans to take Shaki and for this, he again resorted to the tried and tested path - he started recruiting Dagestani mountaineers to use them against Hussein Khan.<sup>5</sup>

Obviously, it was at this time that Hussein Khan asked King Erekle for help. The Governor of Astrakhan reported about this request to the State Collegium of Foreign Affairs. It is also mentioned that “after that Erekle sent a man to Fatali Khan, to encourage him to reconcile with Shaki Khan, but if he did not agree to that, Erekle would help Hussein Khan, no matter where they would fight each other”.<sup>6</sup> Apparently, King Erekle also prepared an army to be sent to Shaki. This provided good results. In the description of the environs of his state, which was supposed to be handed to Count N. Panin, in June 1769, Erekle II noted: when with the help of the Dagestanis, the Khan of Quba “took Shirvan, he attacked Shaki Khan and defeated him. When we heard about this, we helped Shaki Khan with his army, and thanks to our help Quba Khan had to give up his ambitions. He decided on reconciliation and they reconciled” [16: 359].<sup>7</sup> Consequently, this time King Erekle announced military support for Hussein of Shaki in the event of an attack by Fatali Khan.

Besides Hussein Khan, Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh also asked Erekle II for help in case of an attack by Fatali Khan. The king also encouraged him to provide appropriate assistance when needed.<sup>8</sup> Thus a political alliance of three rulers - Erekle II, Hussein Khan and Ibrahim Khan was formed in order to stop the rise of Fatali Khan. The former ruler of Shamakhi, Aghasi Khan, also joined this alliance. At the time, the deposed khan and his loyal supporters had settled on the banks of the Kura River (apparently within the Karabakh khanate). G. Bogolyubov, the consul of Russia in the city of Anzali, reported on this alliance and its goals on 28 May, 1770: “When Fatali Khan of Derbent took over Shamakhi in the last two years and announced his intentions to move further together with the Lezghins, the concerned Khans of Shaki and Karadagh (sic. should be Karabakh - D. M.) called on Erekle to unite and unanimously demanded that Fatali Khan, although he kept Shamakhi under his subordination, would permit the robbed and expelled previous khan of Shamakhi to be its proprietor and that in the case of resistance, the two mentioned [khans] with the common forces and especially Erekle himself, wanted to bring Fatali back within the borders of the old dominion and confiscate something more from them” [17: 270-271]. Thus, the goal of the allies, concerned about the unbridled aggression of Fatali Khan, was to restore the abolished Shamakhi Khanate, and return Aghasi Khan from exile as its ruler. If Fatali Khan agreed to

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<sup>5</sup> Potapov, the commandant of Kizlyar, reported this to the Foreign Ministry on September 17, 1768. See [19: 122].

<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, G. Abdullayev, who refers to the quote from the relevant document, does not indicate the date of the mentioned report, see [2: 72], and we have not yet been able to see this document in full, which is stored in the Russian archives (РГАДА, ф. Перс., д. 16, л. 279).

<sup>7</sup> For the Russian translation of the letter at the time, see [20: 435; 4: 93-97].

<sup>8</sup> РГАДА, ф. Перс., д. 17, л. 44 [2: 72].

this request, the allies would also agree to leave Shamakhi Khanate in a position subordinate to Fatali Khan (of course, with the maintenance of complete internal autonomy), but if Fatali Khan resisted, with joint forces they would capture the territories conquered by Fatali Khan, i.e. return the Quba Khanate into its former borders.

Meanwhile, conspiracies of the locals against the rule of Fatali Khan did not subside in Shamakhi. Behind these conspiracies were the restless Aghasi Khan, on the one hand, and Hussein Khan of Shaki, on the other. In the summer of 1769, after suppressing one of these conspiracies, Fatali forced Hussein Khan to swear allegiance to degrading conditions, which also included the obligation to protect the borders of Shamakhi Khanate appropriated by Fatali Khan.<sup>9</sup>

By this time, the Russian government had already managed to persuade Erekle II to get involved in the Russo-Ottoman war. Because of this, the king's activity in the ongoing confrontation between the khans became a matter of concern for Russian diplomacy. It was for this reason that in May of the following year, consul Bogolyubov advised the Council of Foreign Affairs that the Russian imperial court persuade King Erekle not to interfere directly in the confrontation between the neighboring khans and to be satisfied with only moral support for the khans of Shaki and Karabakh. It is noteworthy that at the same time the consul understood perfectly well that the interests of Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom demanded that Fatali Khan not be further strengthened by the conquest of Shaki and Karabakh and he even emphasized this in his letter. In addition, G. Bogolubov believed that the king should care about establishing peace between the Khans, not about kindling enmity [17: 271].

From the above, as well as from the situation of the time, it can be concluded that the advice of the Russian consul was based on two circumstances: 1. At that time, the Kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti Kingdom was an ally of Russia in the war against the Ottomans and its military activity, even formal, within Iran's sphere of influence, could have irritated Karim Khan, neutral in the ongoing war, which was undesirable for Russia. The neutrality of the Iranian ruler was important for Russia under the ongoing war with the Ottomans; 2. Fatali Khan was considered a political friend and economic partner of Russia and St. Petersburg was interested in maintaining this relationship. The Ottomans tried very hard to turn the Daghestani and Transcaucasian rulers against Russia. In this regard, any more or less large-scale action would have been impossible without Fatali Khan's participation.

Hence, the difficult situation in the region significantly increased Fatali Khan's political weight [15: 132]. King Erekle was well aware, that Fatali Khan was trying to establish himself as a reliable ally for Russia, which was accompanied by a certain restriction by Russia on the King's activity against the strengthening of the Khan. The desire to undermine Fatali Khan's credibility in the eyes of the Russian

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<sup>9</sup> This was reported to the Russian Foreign Ministry by Sulyakov - the Russian consul in Salyan. See [2: 163].

government must be explained by the emphasis in Erekle' letter to the Imperial Court during the Russo-Ottoman War that Fatali Khan had conquered Shamakhi under Ottoman influence on the condition that the Khan would reinforce naval fortresses [16: 359]. Presumably, the King's words imply that Fatali would close his ports in the Caspian Sea for Russian warships.<sup>10</sup>

Erekle II allied with the Khan of Karabakh as a counter to Quba Khan's rising power. Fatali Khan was able to more or less annex almost all the Transcaucasian khanates north of the Kura River and also extended his influence to the West Caspian Khanates south of the Kura (Javad and Talish or Lankaran Khanates). The Karabakh Khanate hindered Fatali Khan's expansionist plans for the other Khanates in the South Caucasus [1: 514]. Therefore, in addition to Shaki and Shirvan, it was necessary for him to conquer Karabakh as well [cf. 8: 253]. However, the military-political alliance of King Erekle and Ibrahim Khan posed an insurmountable obstacle to Fatali Khan's plans. Thanks to the support of the Georgian king, Ibrahim Khalil Khan turned his Khanate, located between the lower reaches of the Kura and Araks rivers, into an impregnable fortress inaccessible to Fatali Khan and extended his influence to other neighboring khanates (Ganja, Karadagh). Consequently, Fatali was very hostile to Ibrahim Khan of Karabakh. He was also very dissatisfied with the fact that King Erekle zealously sought to subjugate some of the Khanates (Ganja, Yerevan, Nakhichevan) south of the Kura.

It was not difficult to see that having neutralized of the resistance of the Khan of Shaki, Fatali Khan took up arms against the Khan of Karabakh. As M. Sulyakov - the consul of Russia in Salyan noted in his report, after receiving the oath of allegiance from Hussein Khan, Fatali Khan ordered his troops to be ready for a "secret operation". This operation most likely meant a campaign against the Karabakh Khanate [2: 163].

Despite warnings from the Russian authorities, Erekle II could not simply wait to see how Fatali Khan's campaign in Karabakh would end. How important it was for the king to protect Karabakh from Fatali Khan is also evidenced by the fact that in March 1770, when the King of Kartli-Kakheti and his army set off to campaign against the Ottomans in Akhaltsikhe pashalik, he still managed to send another army of 4,000 to Ibrahim Khan to repel Fatali Khan's impending attack. According to Erekle II himself, this army consisted of Armenians, Tatars and a small number of Georgians [16: 546].<sup>11</sup>

The sources have it that Fatali Khan campaigned in Karabakh in early April 1770. On April 12, Bogolyubov, the consul of Russia in the city of Anzali, reported to the Russian Foreign Ministry that Fatali Khan had crossed the Kura and was ravaging the villages of Karabakh with the army of the Lezghins. He even ap-

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<sup>10</sup> It is difficult to say how true this statement of Erekle II was. It could have been a diplomatic maneuver.

<sup>11</sup> In his report to Count N. Panin from 5 April, 1770, nobleman Mouravyov wrote about this assistance provided to Ibrahim Khan by Erekle [20: 216; 16: 555].

proached the city of Shushi to besiege it. Fatali Khan pursued very far-reaching goals. According to consul Bogolyubov, there were rumors that after taking Shushi, Fatali Khan was going to continue his way to Tabriz or even directly to Karim-Khan's domains themselves [16: 566].<sup>12</sup>

Fatali Khan indignantly wrote to Queen Catherine II that when he sent the troops assembled from various places against the Khan of Karabakh, to help the latter, Erekle II sent his son with the Georgian army<sup>13</sup> [2: 72].

Undoubtedly, the above-mentioned military assistance provided by the King of Kartli-Kakheti was the reason why Fatali Khan's campaign in Karabakh ended in failure. This is why upon his return to Shamakhi, the unsuccessful Khan, by threat and force took the money to pay the mercenary army from locals [17: 459]. The military assistance of Erekle II to the khans opposed to Fatali Khan did not end there. The South Caucasian khans opposed to Fatali Khan, had a new ally in the person of the Khan of Avaria. On December 15, 1773, nobleman Andrei Filatov, informed the Commandant of Kizlyar that Erekle had sent his subordinate Tatars called Borcaly Kazakh (Борчалы Казак) to help the Khan of Avaria, when the latter, together with the Khans of Shaki and Ganja and Aghasi Khan campaigned against Shamakhi. However, the number of these auxiliary troops remained unknown to the Russian officer. Additionally, he seems to have heard that the King's son was with them as well.<sup>14</sup>

Based on this reference, G. Abdullayev dates these events to the end of November or December 1773. In his words, the leaders of the Avar army, Bulach Mirza and Muhammad Mirza, were killed on the battlefield during this unsuccessful expedition [1: 520-522].<sup>15</sup>

Here G. Abdullayev makes two critical errors. The first inaccuracy is the date of the battle. It is known that the Transcaucasian Khans organized two joint campaigns with the participation of the Avar army to expel Fatali Khan from Shamakhi. In the first campaign, the Avars were indeed commanded by Bulach and Muhammad.<sup>16</sup> At that time, the Avars were hired by Hussein Khan of Shaki and by

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<sup>12</sup> G. Abdullayev, quoting a small passage from this letter, points to June 15, 1770 as the date of Bogolyubov's report. Apparently, he did not use the original document, unlike V. Macharadze, who points to the archival data different from Abdullayev's when publishing main part of the report, where it is stated that the document is the original.

<sup>13</sup> РГАДА, ф. Перс. д.15, л.135.

<sup>14</sup> See the relevant document in the book: [2: 167].

<sup>15</sup> A. Murtazaev also dates this battle to 1773 [18: 148]. In the earlier published work, G. Abdullayev dated the campaign, supported by Erekle II, to 1774: "In 1774, the combined forces of the Shaki and Karabakh Khans, the former Aghasi Khan of Shirvan, and a number of feudal lords of southern Dagestan, with the support of Erekle II, came out against Quba Khanate. Severe battles took place at Shamakhi springboard. Quba was the winner." [2: 73].

<sup>16</sup> They are often referred to as the sons of the Khan of Avaria [3: 80; 14: 376; 15: 131], but also as the brothers of the Khan of Avaria [5: 160]. However, Muhammad-Mirza was a younger brother of Muhammad-Nutsal IV and the co-ruler of Avar Khanate, and Bulachi (junior) - his son [12]. The fact

November 1771 they had already arrived in Shaki [9: 195; 19: 138-139]. Before February 6, 1772 a decisive battle had already been fought between them and Fatali Khan. On this day - Shamkhal of Tarki Murtazali informed the Governor of Astrakhan about the battle and its consequences [19: 139-140].<sup>17</sup> Therefore, this battle is presumed to have taken place not in 1773, but earlier, in the winter, December-January 1771-1772.

Second is the issue of Erekle's military assistance to the Allies. It is clear that in his letter, Filatov refers to the second campaign to Shamakhi, when Avar Khan Muhammad-Nutsal IV (1735-1774), aka Nursal-Beg the ruler of Khunzakh,<sup>18</sup> also driven by the thirst for revenge, participated in the subsequent campaign to Shamakhi with his army. According to Filatov, King Erekle sent part of his army to the Avar Khan to assist him. Initially, the allies managed to take Shamakhi, but later they were defeated by reinforcements from Fatali Khan. Earlier, the Khan, who was invited to negotiations in the enemy's military camp, was treacherously killed.<sup>19</sup>

Filatov's letter does a great service in dating the aforementioned events. It shows that at the time of the writing the letter i.e. by 15 December, 1773, the allies had already taken Shamakhi, and Fatali Khan had sent a courier to Shamkhal of Tarki to hire Dagestani mercenaries, in order to expel his opponents. Therefore, taking Shamakhi away from Fatali Khan with the participation of the troops sent by Erekle probably occurred in November or early December 1773 (during the expedition led by Muhammad-Nutsal and not by Bulach and Muhammad), but Fatali Khan may have taken Shamakhi back by early 1774. Consequently, the dating of the Avar Khan's expedition in 1774 does not seem justified [cf. 15: 132; 2: 73; 1: 522; 11: 107-108].<sup>20</sup>

It seemed remarkable to G. Abdullayev, that in order to prevent the strengthening of Fatali Khan, Erekle II went so far as to support the Avar Khan, even though the latter "constantly bothered Georgians with his attacks" [1: 520]. In this case, apparently, it has not been considered that after the second campaign of the Dagestanis to Georgia under the command of Muhammad-Nutsal which ended in

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that these individuals were the brother and nephew of the Khunzakh ruler is confirmed by primary and more reliable data [9: 195; 19: 138-139].

<sup>17</sup> On 2 March, 1772, Muhammad-Nutsal Khan, the ruler of the Avaria, himself wrote to Commandant Parker of Kizlyar.

<sup>18</sup> "Nutsal" was the title of the Avar Khans, the variety of which is "Nursal" in Georgian sources. However, it sometimes became a supplement to a proper name. In such cases, in neighboring countries, "Nutsal" was often considered a proper name. P. Butkov also refers to the above-mentioned Nutsal as Mersel-Khan. As for Khunzakh, it was the center of the Avar Khanate and because of this the whole region was referred to by that name.

<sup>19</sup> We get detailed information about these events from 19<sup>th</sup>-century authors [5: 161; 10: 3: 81].

<sup>20</sup> We also encounter 1773 as a general date for the campaign of the Nutsal of Avaria [14: 376]. P. Butkov incorrectly dates the mentioned events to 1772 [8: 254].



failure (at Kvareli fortress, 1755), Nutsal decided to reconcile with Erekle II and later he even received wages from the king [16: 360-361; 20: 437].

It is noteworthy that Muhammad-Nutsal had already been to Djaro-Belokani a year earlier to take revenge on Fatali Khan. At that time due to the lack of food caused by bad harvest, the Avar Khan was forced to withdraw most of his accompanying army. So, he asked King Erekle for food and auxiliary troops to utilize against Fatali Khan [20: 491]. Erekle II did not refuse, but he set his own conditions. It became difficult to reach an agreement between the King and the ruler of Khunzakh. Due to the lack of sufficient military forces, Muhammad-Nutsal demanded monetary compensation from Fatali Khan in exchange for the blood of his killed relatives and, in case of refusal, threatened to attack in future [20: 492]. As it turns out from subsequent events, Fatali Khan did not agree to pay the compensation, and Nutsal returned the following year with a large army, in search of revenge. It is noteworthy that Russian military officials in Georgia demanded from Erekle II “not to touch the Persian Khans for any reason” [20: 492]. Presumably because of this situation, King Erekle sent a detachment of Muslim Borchaly Kazakhs against Fatali Khan, so that in this way his participation in the anti-Quba coalition would be less noticeable. However, as we have seen above, even this covert military move by the King did not go unnoticed by Russian intelligence.

Fatali Khan’s revenge on Muhammad-Nutsal in an unacceptable manner gave an additional excuse for the unification of Dagestani leaders, who had already had eyes on the lands of the neighboring Khanates (Nukha, Quba, Shamakhi) of the South Caucasus, against the Khan of Quba. Eventually, most of the Dagestani rulers: Muhammad Khan of Kazi-Kumukh (1743-1789); Omar Khan of Avaria (1774-1801 - the son and heir of the murdered Nutsal); Muhammad Tishsiz (toothless), the ruler of Kazanish; Rustam Kadi of Tabasaran and others, gathered around Amir Hamza [15: 133].

In the same 1774 on Gavdushan valley this alliance of the Dagestanis severely defeated Fatali Khan, who lost most of his possessions.

It is incorrect to name Erekle II, who allegedly “opposed Fatali Khan in alliance with the Khans of Karabakh and Shaki”, a member of the union of Dagestani leaders, united against Fatali Khan [შდრ. 14: 377]. It should be noted that there is no indication on the basis of which source this conclusion was made. It is noteworthy that the King of Kartli-Kakheti and his allies (the Khans of Shaki and Karabakh) are not at all mentioned when talking about subsequent expeditions against Fatali Khan with the participation of the Avars. Apparently, their names were mistakenly associated with a later expedition.

Historical sources do not confirm King Erekle’s participation in the Dagestani allied war against Fatali Khan (e.g., the battle of Gavdushan, etc.) after the death of Muhammad Nutsal.

Thus, Fatali Khan became the main rival of Erekle II in the fight for supremacy in the Eastern Caucasus. Therefore, after Fatali Khan became the sole ruler of Shamakhi and posed a threat to the Khans of Shaki and Karabakh, King

Erekle expressed political support for the latter two and even provided military support to Ibrahim Khan, during Fatali Khan's attack on Karabakh. The Georgian king is also believed to have been in the alliance of the Nutsal of Avaria and rulers of the South Caucasus, aimed at expelling Fatali Khan from Shamakhi. The army sent by King Erekle also participated in the battle that took place at the time, though somehow disguised, because the Russian government called on him to refrain from interfering in the confrontation between the Transcaucasian Khans. But at the same time, participation of Erekle II in the second coalition, formed against Fatali Khan, in which the leading forces were entirely Dagestani rulers, is not observed.

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**ՌԱԶՄԱՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆ ՀԱԿԱՄԱՐՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԸ  
ՀԱՐԱՎԱՅԻՆ ԿՈՎԿԱՍԻ ԽԱՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐՈՒՄ 1768-1774  
ԹՎԱԿԱՆՆԵՐԻՆ ԵՎ ՀԵՐԱԿԼ II-Ը**

*Դավիթ Մերկվիլաձե*

**Քանալի բառեր՝** Հերակլ արքա, Հարավային Կովկաս, Ղուբա, Ֆաթալի խան, խանություն, Շաքի, Շամախի, Ղարաբաղ, Մուհամմադ-Նուցալ:

1768 թվականին Ղուբայի Ֆաթալի խանը Շաքիի Հուսեյն խանի հետ միասին գրավեցին Շամախին: Շուտով նա փորձեց իրեն ենթարկել նաև Շաքիի խանությունը: Այդ նպատակով Ֆաթալի խանը Քարթլի-Կախեթի թագավոր Հերակլ II-ին և Ղարաբաղի Իբրահիմ խանին առաջարկեց արշավել Շաքիի խանության դեմ: Սակայն այդ համաձայնությունը չկայացավ: Իր հերթին Շաքիի խանը օգնություն խնդրեց Հերակլ II-ից: Վերջինս պահանջեց, որ Ֆաթալի խանը հաշտվի Շաքիի խանի հետ և սպառնաց ռազմական օգնություն ցույց տալ Հուսեյն խանին:

Ղարաբաղի Իբրահիմ խանը նույնպես օգնություն խնդրեց Հերակլ II-ից ընդդեմ Ֆաթալի խանի: Այսպես ստեղծվեց Հերակլ II-ի, Հուսեյն խանի և Իբրահիմ խանի դաշինքը ընդդեմ Ֆաթալի խանի: Դաշնակիցները նպատակ ունեին վերականգնել Աղասի խանի իշխանությունը Շամախիում, նույնիսկ Ֆաթալի խանին նրա ենթարկվելու պայմանով: Հրաժարվելու դեպքում նրանք միացյալ ուժերով մտադիր էին Ղուբայի խանությանը զրկել իր նվաճած տարածքներից:

Ռուսաստանի կառավարությունը փորձեց սահմանափակել Հերակլ II-ի գործունեությունը հարավկովկասյան խաների միջև շարունակվող դիմակայությունում: Այնուամենայնիվ, 1770 թվականին Հերակլ II-ը բանակ ուղարկեց Ղարաբաղի Իբրահիմ խանի մոտ՝ Ֆաթալի խանի հարձակումը ետ մղելու համար:

Արդյունքում Ֆաթալի խանի արշավանքը դեպի Ղարաբաղ ավարտվեց անհաջողությամբ:

1773 թվականի նոյեմբեր-դեկտեմբեր ամիսներին ավարական խան Մուհամմադ-Նուցալ IV-ը Հուսեյն խանի և Աղասի խանի հետ միասին արշավեց դեպի Շամախի: Հերակլ թագավորն օգնեց ավարական խանին: Հերակլ II-ը Ֆաթալի խանի դեմ ուղարկեց Բորչալուի մուսուլման ղազախի ցեղերից բաղկացած մի ջոկատ, որպեսզի հնարավորինս չընդգծի իր անմիջական մասնակցությունը պատերազմին: Բայց դա աննկատ չմնաց ռուսական հետախուզության կողմից:

Միևնույն ժամանակ, սխալ է Հերակլ II-ին անվանել դադստանցի առաջնորդների դաշնակից, որոնք միավորվել էին Ֆաթալի խանի դեմ 1774 թվականի ռազմական գործողությունների ժամանակ: Թագավորի մասնակցությունն այս ռազմարշավին չի հաստատվում ոչ մի աղբյուրով:

## **SOME OBSERVATIONS ON YUSUF AKÇURA AND HIS ARTICLE “THREE WAYS OF POLICY”\***

*Nelli Minasyan*

### **Abstract**

In his article, “Three Ways of Policy”, Yusuf Akçura, one of the founders of the ideology of Pan-Turkism, summarizes the political discussions in Ottoman society in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. In this article he analyzes the doctrines of Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Pan-Turkism. The author argues that the doctrines of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism have exhausted themselves and are failed policies for the Empire. Additionally, he expounds the effectiveness of the policy of Pan-Turkism and formulates its conceptual principles.

The purpose of this article is to analyze the main doctrines presented in Akçura's famous work. The main focus was on the ideology of Pan-Turkism and the author's observations connected with it. In this context, we have considered the idea of Turkic unity, which is still relevant today.

He presents two important circumstances: first, he talks about other Turkic peoples and brings the ideas of Turkic unity to the political agenda. Second, Akçura understands earlier that the multiethnic Ottoman Empire must become a nation-state, which the author connects with Pan-Turkism. Akçura's Pan-Turkism ideas continue to be viable because even today the ideas of Turkic unity have an important place in Turkey's domestic and foreign policy agendas.

**Keywords:** Yusuf Akçura, Ottoman Empire, Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, Turkism, Pan-Turkism, nationalism, Turkic peoples, Turkic unity, Pan-Turanism.

### **Yusuf Akçura and the Ideology of Ottomanism**

Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935) has a special place among Turkish intellectuals in the first decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. He was born in Russia, but later he studied, lived and worked in the Ottoman Empire [29: 9-13]. He joined a secret opposition organization against Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876-1909) when he was studying in the Ottoman Military college (Harbiye Mektebi). But the organization was revealed by the government, and its members, including Akçura, were exiled to Libya, from where he managed to escape to Paris [28: 26]. In Paris, he met famous sociologists and philosophers of the time, such as Albert Sorel, Anri Bergson, Emile Durkheim, Gabriel Tarde, Lucien Levy-Bruhl, Charles Seignobos and others [29: 28; 6: 321]. These thinkers greatly influenced on the formation of Akçura's views, in particular Sorel with his nationalist and Durkheim with his sociological ideas [28: 56-57].

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The activity of Akçura can be divided into two periods. The first period began from 1903 when he returned from France to Russia. This is when he wrote his famous article “Three Ways of Policy” (Üç Tarz-i Siyaset)<sup>1</sup> [22]. It was published in the 24<sup>th</sup>, 26<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup> issues of the “Türk” newspaper in Cairo in 1904, respectively on April 14<sup>th</sup>, 28<sup>th</sup> and May 5<sup>th</sup> [29: 30-31]. His activities were more ideological during this period. The second period of Akçura's activity began after the coup of the “Young Turks” in 1908, after which he was able to return to the Ottoman Empire. He was active in spreading, institutionalizing and implementing the ideas of Pan-Turkism<sup>2</sup> [13: 42-43; 1: 248-283; 3: 64-114]. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Akçura joined the Turkish nationalist movement [30: 31-35]. After the declaration of the Turkish Republic, he participated in the development of the ideology of Kemalism and some of his Pan-Turkic ideas were carried out in the context of the reforms implemented by Mustafa Kemal.

Yusuf Akçura became the founder of political Pan-Turkism through the influence of his article “Three Ways of Policy”. In fact, before Akçura, Pan-Turkism was mainly a cultural movement and was interpreted in terms of cultural developments. However, Akçura gave this movement political meaning and, according to F. Gergeon, the article “Three Ways of Policy” is the first example of this fact [27: 2]. In this article, the author presents his concept of Pan-Turkism and then draws parallels between three political doctrines: Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism. This discussion is not accidental, as the Turkish intelligentsia of the time was discussing the doctrines and ways to preserve the Empire. Akçura was interested in this issue too, so he tried to find the most effective way to preserve the Empire.

At first, we will write about the doctrine of Ottomanism, because that is the first doctrine the author discusses in the article. At the roots of the ideology of Ottomanism were some members of the Turkish intelligentsia and the bureaucratic elite of the time, who created a secret group, called Patriotic Alliance (İttifak-ı Hamiyet), in 1865 [15: 20-21]. The newspapers “Description of ideas” (Tasvir-i Efkar)<sup>3</sup> of Namık Kemal and “Monitor” (Muhbir) of Ali Suavi were the functional organs of the organization that criticized the policy of *Tanzimat*. Patriotic Alliance published its program in 1867 and by this came about the founding of the Young

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<sup>1</sup> Akçura published this article in 1912 in Istanbul as a pamphlet. The article was republished in 1976. In the introductory part of the article and regarding the Pan-Turkism put forward by Akçura was a quote by the Turkish professor Enver Ziya Karal, and at the end were the analysis of Ali Kemal and Ahmet Ferit (Tek-First).

<sup>2</sup> He made a great contribution to the creation of Pan-Turkic organizations such as Turkish Association (Türk Derneği), Turkish Homeland Association (Türk Yurdu Cemiyeti), Turkish Hearths Association (Türk Ocaklar Cemiyeti).

<sup>3</sup> The newspaper “Description” was founded by Ibrahim Şinasi in 1862, but from 1865 in the newspaper was edited by Namık Kemal.

Ottomans' [15: 22] organization<sup>4</sup> [15: 45-48]. The Young Ottomans (Yeni Osmanlar or Genç Osmanlar) published newspapers as well as books and leaflets in an attempt to spread their ideas. However, these activities were limited, as many sections of the society were not literate, and the published materials (in Ottoman) were far from the spoken language which was Turkish.

It should be noted that the discussions on reforms were continued in various layers of Ottoman society during this period. According to the Tanzimat, the non-Muslim population would be given equal rights. The aim of the reforms was to strengthen the central government, to resolve internal conflicts, to ensure the security of all subjects of the Empire and to secure the property of subjects regardless of their religion. In the words of Turkish historian Kemal Karpat, the goal was to achieve "political, economic and social integration" [9: 85]. However, these reforms did not materialize, and they also created new administrative, economic and social problems [10: 262-264]. The Young Ottomans offered solutions: "political liberalization, limitation of bureaucratic dictatorship and confirmation of the parliamentary system" [19: 42]. In other words, one of their primary goals was to establish a constitutional monarchy.

One of the key foundations of the Ottoman doctrine was the concept of the Ottoman nation. It meant the unity of all the nations of the Empire without religious differences. Christians then became Ottoman subjects and not the members of a separate *Millet* [4: 43]. It is important to note that even the Turks did not unequivocally treat the view of the doctrine of Ottomanism. Part of the ruling elite was against the promises of equality. They took the progressive ideas of Europe, such as nation, citizenship, homeland, but since in Europe these ideas led to the creation of independent, politically united nation-states, and then they aimed to stifle the national liberation aspirations of the Christian peoples in the Ottoman Empire. According to scholar R. Safrastyan, the main goal of Ottomanization or "assimilation" programs was to assimilate non-Turkish peoples [4: 47]. On the other hand, Ottomanism was mainly an intellectual movement and it did not turn into a mass movement. In our opinion, Pan-Turkists made use of the situation when they tried to spread the ideas of Turkism and Pan-Turkism among the common people.

Y. Akçura mainly discusses the issue of creating an Ottoman nation within the framework of Ottoman doctrine. According to Y. Akçura, the real goal of the existence of the Ottoman nation should be the proclamation of political rights and equal responsibilities for Muslims and non-Muslims living in the Ottoman territories, in this way establishing perfect equality between them and giving them complete freedom of thought and religion. The goal of all this should be the creation of an "Ottoman nation" (Osmanlı milleti), which was a new nationality, united in a

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<sup>4</sup> The founders and active members of Young Ottomans were İbrahim Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ali Suavi, Ziya Pasha, Mustafa Fazıl Pasha, Midhat Pasha and others. Monitor (Muhbir) was the main organ of the organization, but soon there were complaints connection with the newspaper and Namık Kemal began to publish the newspaper Freedom (Hürriyet).

common state, like the American nation, where there are religious and racial differences [22: 19]. In fact, Akçura's ideas were progressive for that period, but in the case of the Ottoman Empire they could not be implemented. First of all, we are dealing with a theocratic state, where religion continued to be the key principle and the second, the goal of the Ottoman leadership was to assimilate the subject nations, not to create conditions for common coexistence. On the other hand, Akçura concludes that the High Ottoman State must be preserved as a final result of these difficult processes with its unique form within the old borders [22: 19]. Thus, the main goal of the author is the preservation of the Ottoman Empire.

Y. Akçura was one of the intellectuals who spoke out about the problems of other Turkic peoples. In this regard, he notes that the policy of Ottomanism is a local internal matter, so Turks and the Muslims living outside of the Empire were not very interested in it [22: 19]. According to the author, this policy was preferable and practical for the Ottoman domains in the early and the late 19<sup>th</sup> centuries [22: 20]. However, the author makes other observations in connection with the last decades of the century. According to him, the ideas of nationalism were spread in Europe through the French Revolution and the French model of nationalism was taken as a basis encompassing its well-known principles, of the French Revolution, in particular freedom of conscience, not origin or ethnicity. These ideas found some responses in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, the policy of creation of the Ottoman nation was adopted by Mahmud II (1808-1839) and his successors, which was self-deception according to the author. They were trying to unite peoples of different ethnic and religious backgrounds around the idea of one united nation by the mottos of freedom, equality, security and brotherhood [22: 20] (it was only an expression and was far from reality - N. M.). Influenced by these ideas, Mahmud II said: "I want to see a religious difference between my subjects only when they enter their mosques, synagogues, churches ..." [14: 13-40]. Akçura refers to French emperor Napoleon III (1852-1870), who was pursuing an active policy trying to create nations according to French principles and to make reforms. Inspired by such ideas, the reforms were carried out by Abdul Aziz (1861-1876) in the region and their manifestation was the establishment of Galatasaray Lyceum. Of course, all these actions were of a cosmetic nature and substantive changes were not made.

The situation in Europe changed as a result of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-1871, when Prussia won. Akçura presented this as a victory for the German interpretation of nationality, over the French interpretation. This symbolizes that nationality was based on ethnicity, which, in Akçura's words, "I believe is closer to reality". The author then states: "I believe that the illusion of the creation of the Ottoman nation is in the past, far from with the French Empire and like it never can be reborn" [22: 20].

Y. Akçura in his article "Three Ways of Policy" mentions five reasons why the policy of Ottomanism is no longer useful for the Empire and, consequently, has failed. First, the author observes the reality that the Muslims, especially the Ottoman Turks, do not want to mix or assimilate with the non-Muslims, because this



policy will put an end to their 600-year domination and sovereignty. In this case, they will be on an equal degree with their *rayahs* and as a result they will have to allow them into the government and army. The Ottoman monopoly in these spheres would be abolished. On the other hand, they would have to be engaged in trade and industry, which they didn't consider honorable. The second reason was the religious factor. Muslims did not want to be equated with non-Muslims, first and foremost from a legal point of view, and they thought that *dhimmi* (Zimmi) should always remain second-class citizens. Third, non-Muslims did not want to unite with Muslims, because they had a past, their own culture, and they had established states that had been destroyed by the Ottomans. Besides that, the self-consciousness of the subject peoples was quite high, so they were striving for independence, and they would never give up that struggle. The author concludes that in reality none of these peoples is eager to form a national union with their enemy and they would strive for independence in every possible way. Fourth, Akçura mentions the threat of Russia. According to him, the greatest enemy of the Ottomans was Russia, which had influence in the Balkans, as it wanted to have influence on the Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles), Anatolia, Iraq, Istanbul, the entire Balkans and the Holy Lands. The author notes that by occupying Anatolia, Russia would completely control the rich and productive region and, spreading to Iraq, the Empire could complete its Asian conquest and end its old rivalry with Britain. As a result, Russia would acquire political and economic leverage by acquiring the straits and the main part of the Ottoman Empire. Russia would have then connected the vast territories of the Balkans, united the southern Slavs and put a cross at the top of St. Sophia. The author concludes that the achievement of these goals requires the weakening, decline and disintegration of the Ottoman state. According to Akçura, the fifth reason was European public opinion and the struggle between Christianity and Islam. They wanted to save Christians from Muslim domination, to rid Europe and Christian territories of unbelievers. Some of them were more humanistic and gave a scientific color to their demands, wanting to save the European nations from the barbaric Turks, who know nothing but war. They offered to return these Asians to the deserts of Central Asia, where they originated. In such conditions, according to the author, despite all the external difficulties, the individuals in charge of the Ottoman government tried to create an Ottoman nation, relying on the support of some European states (especially France, represented by Napoleon III). Akçura emphasizes that this task cannot be overcome, and their aspirations will end in failure. Besides, the number of unfavorable conditions was growing. Abdul Hamid's policy increased the hostility and divided between Muslims and non-Muslims and the latter doubled their aspirations for their independence. Under such conditions, the European public opinion intensified against the Turks. France, which supported the implementation of the idea of the Ottoman nation, lost its power and became the supporter of Russia. The author concludes that the conditions internally and externally had become more and more unfavorable, so the policy of Ottomanism was nothing more than a waste of time [22: 28-30].

### **Yusuf Akçura's observations on Pan-Islamism**

Akçura also discusses another doctrine known at the time, namely Pan-Islamism. Pan-Islamism was raised to the state level during the reign of Abdul Hamid. The policy of Islamism (İslamcılık) first of all meant a return to the basic principles and traditional systems of Islam such as education and public morals [12: 22]. The adoption of the policy of Pan-Islamism was the turning point in the Russo-Turkish war in 1877-1878, and the summits and agreements of San Stefano and Berlin. As a result of the Berlin agreement: Serbia, Montenegro and Romania gained independence, Bulgaria was granted broad autonomy until full independence in 1908, Kars, Ardahan and Batumi passed to Russia, Cyprus was given to England for the organization of the Berlin Summit, and Austria occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina [11: 148]. The Ottoman leadership understood that the fall of the Empire and the loss of her territories was an ongoing process, so there was a need for a new ideology and actions. Under the circumstances, Abdul Hamid adopted the policy of Pan-Islamism, which consisted of two parts. The first part was the so-called internal Pan-Islamism, which aimed to prevent national liberation aspirations among the Christian population. The policy, according to K. Karpat, “allowed the ruling elite to emphasize loyalty to the Arabs in an effort to preserve the Islamic nature of the state” [9: 107]. The second part was to unite all the Muslims of the world. Ethnic differences would not be considered here, but religion and its advantages would be taken as a general basis. Abdul Hamid emphasized Islam and the title of Caliph [8: 20-21]. The main goal of the Sultan's policy of Pan-Islamism was to claim that he was the Caliph of all Muslims, so he could unite them under his rule [12: 36]. Hamid attached great importance to Muslim clerics. Thus, he personally appointed many *Qadies*, teachers and *Ulems* that he sent to Egypt, Crimea, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria [17: 260]. In addition, he hosted influential Muslim leaders in Istanbul and his goal was to spread the influence and speech of the Sultan-Caliph through them. Abdul Hamid's goal was to establish an Islamic caliphate, unify Muslims and strengthen institutions of the Caliphate and the Sultanate [25: 96].

Akçura notes that the ideas of Pan-Islamism were initially mere thoughts mainly presented in the press but later they gradually acquired practical significance. Already in the last years of the rule of Sultan Abdul Aziz the word Pan-Islamism was often heard in diplomatic dialogues and steps were being taken to establish diplomatic relations with some Muslim leaders in Asia [22: 22]. According to Akçura, with this policy the Ottoman Empire again acquired the character of a theocratic state (in our opinion, it never changed - N. M.), which they tried to change with the Tanzimat [22: 23]. It should be noted that even during these reforms, the Ottoman Empire continued to remain a theocratic state.

Akçura, discussing the pros and cons of Pan-Islamism, asks this question: how useful is it for the Empire? The author first mentions that this form of politics will deepen the already existing competition and enmity between the peoples of the Empire and this will lead to the weakening of the state [22: 31]. Akçura notes that

in the face of such unfavorable conditions, the policy of Pan-Islamism nevertheless has an advantage and that is to unite all Muslims, including Turkic peoples, to create an Islamic state or union [22: 31]. In fact, Akçura remains committed to the idea of uniting the Turks in his article and this shows that Islam was considered a unifying factor for the Turkic peoples. According to Akçura, it is important to prepare the necessary grounds for the creation of such a union for establishing various organizations and structures based on religion and to strengthen spiritual ties. All this is necessary first for the survival among the powerful states. Then, over time, these processes will be strengthened, and it will be possible to create a stable spiritual union, which will stretch to a part of Asia and half of Africa and will be able to resist external and internal challenges [22: 31]. Islam is one of the religions that underpins the political and social systems of the state. In fact, when the Arabs began their achievements under the banner of Islam, the process of Islamization began in parallel. Many peoples who converted to Islam lost their ethnic and national features, traditions, social structures and language. According to Akçura, Islam is a powerful assimilation pot, where people of different ethnic groups and different beliefs were united around common systems [22: 32]. The author thinks that the rise of Islam was inside a well-organized political organization: the Constitution was the Quran, the official language was Arabic, and it had an elected leadership and sacred place [22: 32]. But over time this system started to weaken, when Islam splitted in two, the conflicts arise between Persians and Arabs and the influence of non-Arab elements intensified (he does not mention the conflicts between Arabs and Turks - N. M.). On the other hand, Christian states were getting stronger and gradually taking control of Muslim territories. Moreover, under the influence of the West, ethnic and national ideas begin to develop which had previously been oppressed by Islam [22: 32]. Then Akçura concludes that the religious belief was still quite strong among Muslims, the ideas of atheism was not yet widespread and the followers of Islam were still ready to make any sacrifices for the sake of their religion [22: 32].

Akçura mainly attests to Christian states for the failure of the policy of Pan-Islamism. They established their control over many Islamic countries and regions, and, according to the author, they can use any means to prevent the formation of a Pan-Islamic union [22: 33]. The author here refers to the fact that in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, all Asian states were in colonial or semi-colonial conditions. In fact, the author considers the implementation of the ideology of Pan-Islamism as unlikely, but he still leaves an important place for religion. Akçura suggested pursuing two policies of unity at the same time - Turkic and Muslim. Moreover, Muslim unity was to be led by the Turks. Thus, Akçura left open the question of the advantage of the policy of Islamism or Turkism for the Ottoman state [5].

### **The concept of Pan-Turkism of Yusuf Akçura**

The third way of policy represented by Y. Akçura was Pan-Turkism. The author presents Turkism as a “still newborn child” [23: 173], therefore, in his opinion, it has the opportunity to develop and spread. Akçura begins this passage by talking about the benefits of the policy of Pan-Turkism. According to him, such a policy, when all Turks would live in the Ottoman Empire, is a perfect union in both ethnic and religious aspects. It is supposed to unite non-Turkic Muslim groups, who will have to be Turkified and assimilated with the Turks [22: 33]. This applied to the Christian population which lived in the Empire and hindered Turkic unity. In such conditions, they will be subject to systematic influence, and as a result they will lose their nationalities and eventually assimilated. According to the author, the main service of the policy of Pan-Turkism will be to unite all Turks, which are spread over most of Asia and in the eastern parts of Europe, belong to the same linguistic family, to the same ethnic group and essentially have the same religion (here he refers to the fact that the Turkic-speaking peoples are mainly followers of Sunni Islam and a small part follow Shia Islam - N. M.) [22: 33]. In fact, Akçura speaks about Turan or Pan-Turanism. As mentioned by H. Pulton “The idea of Turanism - a unification of all Turkic peoples from the Balkans to China in one country called “Turan” - can be seen initially in Akçura's ideas” [16: 82]. The Armenian scholar Zarevand considers Akçura the founder and theoretician of political Pan-Turanism [1: 17]. In fact, the author puts forward the idea that the unification of the Turkic peoples will create an opportunity for the preservation, development and territorial expansion of the Ottoman Empire. In this sense, he seems to be charting a new path for the Ottoman and then Turkish policy.

Akçura considers the abovementioned to be the advantages of the policy of Pan-Turkism and in parallel the author also mentions the negative factors. According to him, non-Turkic Muslim nations can be separated from the Ottoman Empire (most likely the author means the Arabs - N. M.) and can't be assimilated by the Turks, therefore, this policy will lead to division among Muslims and under such conditions, non-Turkic Muslim nations will refuse to have any serious relations with the Ottoman state [22: 34]. Additionally, according to Akçura, there are internal difficulties working against the policy of Pan-Turkism. First of all, the policy of Pan-Islamism creates unfavorable conditions. Due to the emphasis ethnic and nationalist ideas, it may not be possible to create a strong union among Muslims on the basis of Islam. According to Akçura, external factors also hinder the unification of Turkic peoples, notably Christian states, among which Russia is actively working against this policy. During this period the Turkic peoples were mainly located in Tsarist Russia, so the author considers Russia as the main obstacle. On the other hand, Akçura thinks that international situation favored Turkey, so he expresses the idea that Christian rulers could even sponsor this policy that will be directed against Russia [22: 35].

Y. Akçura tries to find ways and put forward universal principles around which it will be possible to organize the unification of the Turkic peoples. Thus, he

notes that the majority of Turks are Muslims, so could be an important factor in the establishment of a Turkic union [22: 34]. Therefore, in his article, Akçura considers the social role of Islam as an important component in Turkish society and in the process of forming national self-consciousness. At the same time, he acknowledges that religion alone cannot be the binding force for a Turkic union. According to Akçura, Islam is losing its power, as it was transforming into an individual rather than a social phenomenon [20: 59]. Thus, he did not reject the factor of religion, but mentioned that it can be useful in the processes of Turkish nation-building. That is, Islam continues to serve the people and thus maintained its political and social viability.

When introducing the concept of Pan-Turkism, Akçura presents some basic principles. Thus, we must put at first the principle of ethnicity. Akçura considered ethnicity and language as one of the important features for the description of a nation. According to J. Landau: "This primacy of the interests of "the race of the Turks" and "the world of the Turks" obviously constituted Akçura's own conception of Pan-Turkism and Pan-Turk policy, as elaborated in his books, articles and lectures [13: 44]. His vision of Pan-Turkism considered the world of the Turks as one indivisible entity, with evident signs of both cultural ties (language, history, customs) and material bonds (blood, race)" [13: 44; 23: 23-26]. In this context, Akçura has given the description of the "Turk": "when we say Turks which is represented in science by the words Turk-Tatar, and sometimes Turk-Tatar-Mongol, we mean all tribes and peoples which originated from a common race, with the same traditions, very close to each other in their languages and mixed by historical life. In this regard various Iranian and European and some Ottoman writers called to Tatars as Kazan peoples, Azeris... etc, with them the Kyrgyz and Yakuts are also included in explanation of the Turk" [23: 33-34; 24: 1]. As we see, Akçura is trying to realize the idea of a Turkic world or a united Turkic people which should strive for cultural and then political unity.

Akçura paid a lot of attention to language. For him, it was necessary to simplify the Turkish language, to clear it of Arabic and Persian words. That is, the language must be simple, closer to the vernacular through which would make it possible to write in a language understandable to the people and to spread it among the people. In essence he was a supporter of linguistic Turkism. In addition to language, he pays attention to history<sup>5</sup> [11: 390]. According to Akçura, Turkic national history should not be limited to the Ottoman Empire, but should also include the history of the early Turkic states, and especially the history of its heroes such as Oghuz, Genghis, Temur, Ulugh Bey and others [22: 35].

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<sup>5</sup> Akçura participated in the development of a "new historical concept". He was the "founder" and president of the Turkish Historical Research Society (Türk Tarihi Tetkik Cemiyeti-TTTC) in 1931. The next year, Akçura organized the first meeting of the TTTC, where he mentioned the goals and new directions of studying Turkish history.

Akçura stands at the foundation of Turkish nationalism (*Milliyetçilik*) and many of his ideas about Turkism later became its definition. He has provided significant space to the presentation of the description and formation of the nation. Akçura's national ideas began to take shape during his years of study in France [26: 99]. Akçura was the first intellectual to coordinate Turkish nationalism as a political project and more effectively explained nationalist terminology than Namık Kemal [21: 198]. Akçura's Turkism had deep effects on the ideology of the Republic [7: 203]. He defined nationalism as a human collectivity with common ethnic and linguistic roots and a common social conscience [20: 60]. In fact, the author uses the basic ideas of Pan-Turkism, when describing Turkish nationalism. But Akçura found Pan-Turkism as fraught with difficulties as the other two policies and there was yet no national consciousness among the Turks [6: 322]. He concluded his article with a question: was it not likely to appeal to the Turkish people when the other two policies collapsed?

In essence, Akçura was not driven by emotions, but considered the possible political benefits and harms. With this article, he tried to persuade the Ottoman political elite to choose a new policy, that is, Pan-Turkism, the goal of which was to unite the Turkic countries and peoples, and Turkism, aimed to turn the Ottoman Empire into a Turkish nation state. In fact, before Akçura, the ideas of Pan-Turkism were considered mainly within cultural boundaries and Akçura's most important contribution was to give a political definition to the Pan-Turkist movement.

## **Conclusion**

Thus, in the article “Three Ways of Policy” Yusuf Akçura presents new ideas for the Ottoman domestic and foreign policy. The policies of Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism could not solve the internal and external problems of Ottoman society and Akçura was one of the first to notice this. On the other hand, in the context of the search for the preservation of the Empire, Akçura presents the doctrine of Pan-Turkism and considers it the only real political program.

We see that Akçura emphasizes two important circumstances. First, he was the first to start talking about other Turkic peoples and offered a vision to unite them. In this way, he in fact brings the ideas of Turkic unity to the political agenda and at the same time giving a political interpretation of Pan-Turanism. The role of Akçura should also be considered in this context when from the idea of the Islamic unity of Abdul Hamid there was a transition to the idea of Turkic unity. Second, Akçura understood early on that the multiethnic Ottoman Empire must become a nation state. In his article, he argues that in this case, the policy of Pan-Turkism is critical to this process.

On the other hand, Akçura along with other famous Pan-Turkist intellectuals (İsmail Gaspıralı, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Ali Huseynzade, Ziya Gökalp and others) of the time began the process of institutionalizing the ideas of Pan-Turkism, discussing issues of Turkic identity, culture, history, literature and language. Additionally, the conceptual principles put forward by Akçura, such as ethnicity, Turkified Islam, his

definitions of nation and nationality became important components of Turkish nationalism. The viability of Akçura's idea of Pan-Turkism is evidenced by the fact that they are still the basis of Turkish nationalism and are widespread in present Pan-Turkic circles in Turkey and other Turkic states. The ideas of Turkic unity presented by Akçura are topical and they are the basis of Turkey's policy towards other Turkic countries.

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**ՈՐՈՇ ԴԻՏԱՐԿՈՒՄՆԵՐ ՅՈՒՍՈՒՖ ԱՔՉՈՒՐԱՅԻ «ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆՈՒԹՅԱՆ  
ԵՐԵՔ ՁԵՎ» ՀՈՂՎԱԾԻ ՎԵՐԱԲԵՐՅԱԼ**

*Նելլի Մինասյան*

**Քանալի բառեր՝** Յուսուֆ Աքչուրա, Օսմանյան կայսրություն, օսմանիզմ, պանիսլամիզմ, պանթյուրքիզմ, ազգայնականություն, թյուրքական ժողովուրդներ, թյուրքական միասնություն, պանթուրանիզմ:

Յուսուֆ Աքչուրան իր «Քաղաքականության երեք ձև» հոդվածով, որը լույս էր տեսել Կահիրեում հրատարակվող «Թյուրք» (Türk) թերթի 24-րդ, 26-րդ և 27-րդ համարներում, ամփոփում է 19-րդ դարի վերջին և 20-րդ դարի սկզբին օսմանյան հասարակության մեջ առկա քաղաքական քննարկումները և ըստ այդմ հանդիսանում է պանթյուրքիզմի գաղափարախոսության հիմնադիրներից: Այս հոդվածում նա վերլուծում է օսմանիզմի, պանիսլամիզմի ու պանթյուրքիզմի վարդապետությունները: Հեղինակը հիմնավոր փաստարկներով գտնում է, որ



օսմանիզմի ու պանիսլամիզմի վարդապետությունները սպառել են իրենց և ըստ էության դրանք կայսրության համար ճախողված քաղաքականություններ են: Մյուս կողմից հիմնավորում է պանթյուրքիզմի քաղաքականության արդյունավետությունը և ձևակերպում է նրա հայեցակարգային սկզբունքները:

Աքչուրայի մոտ մենք տեսնում ենք երկու կարևոր հանգամանք՝ նախ նա առաջինն էր, ով սկսեց խոսել թյուրքական մյուս ժողովուրդների մասին՝ առաջարկելով նրանց միավորելու տեսլականը: Այդպիսով նա փաստացի քաղաքական օրակարգ է բերում թյուրքական միասնության գաղափարները, միաժամանակ տալով պանթյուրանիզմի (թյուրքական բոլոր ժողովուրդների միավորումը Բալկաններից մինչև Չինաստան «Թուրանի» սահմաններում) քաղաքական մեկնաբանությունը:

Այս ենթատեքստում պետք է դիտարկել նաև Աքչուրայի խաղացած դերը, երբ արդուլիամիդյան իսլամական միասնության գաղափարից անցում է կատարվում դեպի թյուրքական միասնության գաղափարը: Երկրորդ՝ Աքչուրան ավելի վաղ է հասկանում, որ բազմաէթնիկ Օսմանյան կայսրությունը պետք է վերածվի ազգային պետության և այդ գործընթացը անհնար է կազմակերպել օսմանիզմի և պանիսլամիզմի քաղաքականությունների միջոցով: Նա իր հողվածում փաստարկում է, որ տվյալ դեպքում կարևոր և գործնականում կիրառելի է պանթյուրքիզմի քաղաքականությունը:

Մյուս կողմից Աքչուրան, ժամանակի հայտնի պանթյուրքիստ մտավորականների (Իսմայիլ Գասպրալը, Ահմեդ Աղաօղլու, Ալի Հյուսեինզադե, Ջիյա Գյոքալի և այլք) հետ միասին սկսեց պանթյուրքիզմի գաղափարների ինստիտուցիոնալացման գործընթացը՝ քննարկելով թյուրքական ինքնության, մշակույթի, պատմության, գրականության ու լեզվի հարցերը, որոնք ներկայումս ևս քարոզվում են թյուրքական պետությունների հետ միասնականացման քաղաքականության համայնապատկերում: Բացի այդ, Աքչուրայի առաջ քաշած հայեցակարգային սկզբունքները, ինչպիսիք են էթնիկ պատկանելությունը, թյուրքականացված իսլամը, ազգի ու ազգայինի նրա բնորոշումները, դարձան թյուրքական ազգայնականության կարևոր բաղադրիչները: Աքչուրայի ներկայացրած գաղափարների կենսունակության մասին է վկայում այն, որ դրանք այսօր էլ դրված են թյուրքական ազգայնականության հիմքում, ինչպես նաև նրա գաղափարները ներկայումս քարոզվում ու ներկայացվում են ներկայումս պանթյուրքական շրջանակների կողմից: Հարկ է նշել, որ Աքչուրայի գաղափարները շարունակում են մնալ արդիական նաև մեր օրերում, խոսքը հատկապես վերաբերում է թյուրքական միասնության գաղափարներին, որոնք դրված են թյուրքախոս երկրների նկատմամբ իրականացվող Թուրքիայի քաղաքականության հիմքում:

## THE COVERAGE OF SITUATION OF WESTERN ARMENIANS AND CILICIAN ARMENIAN'S MASSACRE IN 1909 IN THE PAGES OF EGYPTIAN ARMENIAN PERIODICAL "ARSHALOUYS"\*

*Myasnik Esoyan*

### **Abstract**

The administrative, economic, educational and military reforms carried out by the Wali of Egypt Muhammad Ali made Egypt a strong and stable state, laying a solid foundation for its development. The reforms of Muhammad Ali also had a positive impact on the Egyptian Armenian community. By the end of the 19th century, Armenian cultural life in Egypt had become more active, the number of schools had increased, new cultural and educational unions and organizations had appeared, and new periodicals were being published. At the beginning of the 20th century, Armenians occupied a prominent place in the Egyptian society. Armenians had churches, schools, cafes, and various Armenian newspapers were published in Egypt. Additionally, Armenians were the most prominent distributors of tobacco - there were many Armenian kiosks in various markets around the country. Around town, one could often meet an Armenian shoemaker, pharmacist, baker, doctor, teacher, tailor, etc.

**Keywords:** "Arshalouys", Egyptian Armenian periodical, Western Armenians, Armenian massacres, regime, Cilicia.

### **Introduction**

At the beginning of the 20th century, Egypt was considered one of the largest cultural centers of the Armenians, where many prominent Western Armenian intellectuals came together and played an invaluable role in the development of the Egyptian Armenian press. The *Arshalouys* national, literary and political periodical edited by Armenian intellectual Yeghishe Torosyan was published in Cairo in 1899 [22:57]. In the first period (1899-1905) *Arshalouys* was a three-day newspaper, in the second period (1908-1914) - a weekly newspaper, and from 1905-1907 it was not published [18:321]. The purpose of this article is to analyze the political viewpoints and topics discussed in *Arshalouys* and to evaluate the role of the Egyptian-Armenian newspaper in the history of the Egyptian Armenian press and in Armenian socio-political thought in general.

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\* The article was submitted on April 6, 2022. The article was reviewed on April 26, 2022.

### **The main sections and purpose of Arshalouys**

*Arshalouys* was an independent newspaper and did not belong to any Armenian political party [21:703]. The periodical was staffed by H. Shatryan, H. Shamlyan, A. Gasparyan, G. Balasanyan and others. The newspaper had national, local news, foreign news, women from the world, letterbox and other sections [19:348]. Articles on the situation of the Western Armenians and massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia in 1909 were published in the national news and letterbox sections.

Despite its long existence, the Egyptian Armenian periodical has not left a big mark in the history of Armenian social and political thought. The main goal of *Arshalouys* was the liberation of Armenia, like other Egyptian Armenian periodicals of the early 20th century. However, unlike the famous Egyptian Armenian periodical "Pyunik" of the early 20th century, which saw the liberation of Armenia only as the outcome of an armed struggle, armed self-defense in the pages of *Arshalouys*, if not rejected at all, was considered as a last resort. The Egyptian Armenian periodical had high hopes for the Young Turk authorities, so it offered peaceful methods of struggle. The periodical sought to draw the attention of Egyptian Armenians to national issues. In addition, the purpose of the magazine was to promote the improvement of the political, economic, spiritual and social life of the Armenian nation. In its publications, it criticized the Ottoman dictatorship and exposed the Hamidian dictatorship.

The Egyptian Armenian periodical criticized the working style of the Armenian national parties, and blamed the Armenian authorities and party leaders for the unhappiness of the Armenian people, who instead of building industrial and educational institutions in the country, wasted huge sums on various senseless actions. Moreover, they became more cruel, unjust dictators than the Turkish pashas, or the Persian khans [12:1].

The periodical pays a great deal of attention to educators involved in the educational development of the nation. Being busy with various household chores, mothers are unable to devote much time to raising their daughters. In this case, the role of the educator is greatly enhanced. The periodical notes that educating girls does not mean just giving girls foreign manners and teaching them several European languages. It is priority to instill self-awareness, dignity, and inspire the idea of will, strength and longevity. This sentiment is summarized thusly: "In a word, a mother, a woman, who with her unwavering description can overcome the difficulties of life [13:1]". At the same time, the periodical regrets that there are very few such educators in the Armenian society.

At the same time, being a literary periodical, *Arshalouys* gave place to works of art, the main theme of which was also the liberation of the Homeland. In addition, *Arshalouys* introduced the Egyptian-Armenian reader to Eastern Armenian cultural life and published works dedicated to the life and activities of various Armenian writers, touching on the theme of the homeland.

### **The coverage of the situation of Western Armenians**

The Egyptian Armenian periodical was concerned about the situation of the Armenians of Western Armenia and tried to communicate to the Egyptian Armenians, concisely, the plight of the Western Armenians in 1899-1914. Alongside European newspapers, the Egyptian Armenian periodical reports some information about Armenian-Turkish and Armenian-Kurdish clashes in Western Armenia at the end of 1899. *Arshalouys* periodical reports that on November 9 in 1899 an Armenian group of 120 people from the territory of the Russian Empire entered the Alashkert plain and fought with Turkish troops and Kurdish detachments near the village of Astur. Inflicting heavy casualties on the Turks and Kurds and leaving 15 dead and 2 captives, the Armenian group managed to return to the territory of the Russian Empire. After this incident, the governors of Bitlis, Mush and Van ordered the Hamidiye regiments to be more ruthless towards the Armenian population. Citing the British newspaper "Tan" the periodical reports that the situation of the Armenians was terrible, the bread supply was almost exhausted, and there would be a famine soon, as the Ottoman authorities forbided the organization of donations to the Armenians, fearing that the money could be used for other purposes. Although in the beginning of December the Patriarchate of Constantinople sent 150 gold for the needs of the Western Armenians of the Erzurum, Van, Bitlis and Kharberd vilayets, but it was "a drop of water in the bottomless ocean [2:2-3]". It should be noted that in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the situation of the Armenian peasantry was deteriorating due to the heavy tax policy pursued by the Ottoman authorities and Kurdish bandit attacks. There were many state taxes in Western Armenia. Taxes were collected with all severity, and the taxation process often ended with confiscation of property and crops.

In early November of 1899 bloody Armenian-Kurdish clashes took place also in the city of Erzurum, which was witnessed by the German traveler T. Belck who wrote about it a telegram to the "Frankfurter Zeitung" newspaper. The German traveler informs that the Armenians were attackers who were armed with Russian weapons, and that 50 casualties were registered on both sides. Peace has been established only with the help of the Turkish regular army. The German telegram ends with words of praise for the governor of Erzurum, whose efforts ended the clashes. The Berlin correspondent of London's "Daily Chronicle" newspaper, conveying this information to the newspaper's editorial office on November 16, added that he received the impression from Belck's telegram that the governor of Erzurum had asked him to spread information about the attacks of those Western Armenians in the European press. In connection with this telegram, both the correspondent of the London newspaper and the editorial office of *Arshalouys* agreed that "there will be a great bloodshed and that Turkish officials will try to keep it a secret [1:2-3]".

In the letter box section, the Egyptian Armenian periodical regularly published various telegrams addressed to the editorial office from the city of Arabkir in Western Armenia. In the article "Letter from Arabkir" *Arshalouys* publishes the

letter of the elder of Arabkir Sargis Gralyan about the situation in Arabkir. Located in the valleys of the mountains, the urban population was in constant need of help from outside. In 1905, due to drought, the harvest was reduced, wheat stocks were sharply reduced, and a famine began, which left the population in misery. The author of the letter considers the main reason for the misery of the population of Arabkir to be the frequent repressions by the authorities in the early 20th century, which led to the exodus of the wealthy and prosperous class of the region. The cessation of trade was an equally important factor in the plight of the Armenian population of Arabkir [3:2-3]. In addition to the difficult socio-economic situation in Arabkir, cases of forced Islamization were increasing. In connection with this issue, the Egyptian Armenian periodical publishes the telegram of the Prelate of Arabkir, Archimandrite Meruzhan Ashkharhuni, regarding Islamization published in the "Arevelq" newspaper on March 2 in 1909. In the telegram, Archimandrite Meruzhan Ashkharhuni reports that the wife of Hambardzum Papazyan, a resident of the village of Shpik in Arabkir, was kidnapped by the Turks and forced to convert to Islam. The Archimandrite asks for urgent steps to protect the rights of Armenian women [4:3].

After the Armenian massacre in Cilicia, the situation gradually deteriorated in Western Armenia as well which did not escape from attention of the Egyptian Armenian periodical. In the article "The State of Armenia" the periodical presents a telegram of the vicarage of the Vicar General of Van Sarachyan sent to the National Patriarchate of Constantinople on the general insecure situation in Van and Bitlis. In particular, the bishop reports that a Kurdish thug Mehmet and his gang besieged the village of Reyes Oval for about six hours on October 16 in 1912, and at the same time two Armenians were killed in the village of Kvas, and this situation is universal [16:2]. Another article reports that Musa and Gassim beys in Baghesh became more restrained, traveling in the province became extremely dangerous, and thugs killed an Armenian on the road to the village of Khaltik in mid-November in 1912 [17:2].

### **The description of the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia in 1909**

The most covered topic of the second period of the Egyptian Armenian periodical is the coverage of the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia in 1909. In the publications on the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia, the periodical presents the telegrams of the caring leader of Adana, Bishop Mushegh, sent to the National Patriarchate of Constantinople. In the telegrams, he relays information about the victims and the migrants. On April 7, 1909 the Catholicos of Cilicia Sahak telegraphed to the National Patriarchate that the city of Adana was under siege, the civilian population was sheltered in monasteries, and if immediate measures were not taken, the physical existence of the entire Armenian population could be called into question. In their turn, on April 7, the "Reorganized Hunchakians" of Adana send a telegram to the Center of Constantinople, where they urged the provision of self-defense

means to Adana along with bread supplies. The death toll as of April 7 was more than 1,000, a quarter of which were Muslims [5:3-4], the number of refugees reached 27,000 [10:3]. It is difficult to present the exact number of victims of the Armenian massacres in Cilicia, as the Young Turk authorities often hide the corpses, but it is still accepted as 30,000-40,000 people [20:204-205].

After the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia, the Egyptian Armenian community was not left out of the care of the needs of the Armenian immigrants. A fundraising committee was formed in Alexandria, which organized a fundraiser among Egyptian Armenians and transferred the money raised to the AGBU to meet the needs of Armenian refugees in Cilicia [6:3].

In the aftermath of these events, several commissions of inquiry were set up by the Ottoman authorities, the activities of which became a real plague for the Armenians. The tribunal of military officers sent to Adana began to distort reality from the very beginning, blaming the victims for the massacres. The Egyptian Armenian periodical covers the coverage of some verdicts published by the military court. On May 9, the Egyptian Armenian periodical was telegraphed from Adana that a military tribunal was conducting a rigorous investigation, in which 149 Muslims and 113 non-Muslims were arrested, and the looted property was returned to its rightful owners [8:2], 412 Muslims and 124 non-Muslims were imprisoned in Mersin and Kozan [10:3]. In another issue, the periodical states that by the verdict of the military court on May 28, 1909, 9 Muslims and 6 non-Muslims were executed [9:1], and Adana leader Bishop Mushegh Serobyán was sentenced to 101 years in prison by the Adana military court for inciting Armenian massacres [12:3].

In the publications on the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia, the Egyptian Armenian periodical paid a lot of attention to covering the causes of the massacre, revealing and exposing the organizers. In the article “The Adana massacre and press” the periodical presents the translation of the report published in the Paris newspaper “Journal” on April 23. The French newspaper accuses Armenians of inciting the Adana massacre, “who exhausted the patience of the Turks because of their extreme demands and their narrow-minded nature [7:2]”. The Adana correspondent of the newspaper notes that the Armenian theaters in Cilicia performed plays whose heroes drove the Turks out of Asia Minor, openly spread hate against Turks in schools, and prepared students for an impending uprising [7:2]. Referring to the telegrams of the caring leader of Adana Bishop Mushegh the periodical criticizes the Ottoman authorities' unfounded arguments justifying the Armenian massacres, during which a revolutionary movement was formed among the Armenians, in which the Armenians wanted to restore the Armenian kingdom. Such conversations preceded the massacres [14:1]. To study the causes of the Armenian massacres in Cilicia, it is necessary to analyze Armenian-Turkish relations. The restoration of the constitution as a result of the coup in 1908 caused discontent among the Turkish-Kurdish population, as Christians were to have equal rights. One of the reasons for the massacre was religion, which was used by the enemies of the con-

stitution to seize the opportunity to turn Muslims against Christians. Among the reasons for the massacres was the return of a part of the Armenian peasantry who migrated from Cilicia during the Hamidian massacres, which caused great dissatisfaction among the Turks and the Kurds. The Adana-based "Itidal" newspaper, which provoked anti-Armenian sentiments with its articles, played a malicious role in the Cilician massacres. It is true that the governor of Adana stopped the publication of "Itidal" newspaper by the order of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but, as the Egyptian Armenian periodical notes, that order was preceded by the termination of the publication of two Armenian newspapers [10:3]. However, the main goal of the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia in 1909 was to completely evict and expel the Armenians from Cilicia in a monstrous ploy to "ensure the integrity of the Ottoman Empire" and state policy. Examining the details of the massacre and the official European bulletins, it becomes clear to *Arshalouys* that Abdul Hamid II and the constitutional government both took part in the massacre. Referring to the Constantinople-based press, the Armenian Egyptian newspaper reports that after studying the verdicts in Adana, one gets the impression that Armenians and Turks were equally involved in organizing the Adana uprising [9:1]. The periodical mainly blames the Sultan's regime for organizing the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia, noting that living under centuries of dictatorship and accustomed to blood-thirsty morals, the Young Turks could not transform in one year and build a full-fledged constitutional country where justice would prevail. The Egyptian Armenian periodical hopes that soon the old morals will disappear, and the new constitutional authorities will be able to build a new quality state, where different nations can live side by side in harmony. At the same time, the periodical does not share the calls of Armenian national figures to prepare for self-defense, noting that this step will not improve the situation of Armenians. The author of the article emphasizes that when the Armenians of Cilicia did not wage an armed struggle in the late 19th century, no Armenian massacres would take place. Later, after taking up arms, the massacres multiplied, stating that "This is a fact that no one can deny [11:1-2]". In fact, the Egyptian Armenian periodical was enthusiastic about the promises of the Young Turks after the overthrow of the Hamidian dictatorship in 1908-1909 and believed that the Young Turks would build a new country where justice would prevail. The periodical saw the improvement of the situation of the Armenians of Western Armenia, the solution of the Armenian question with the democratization of the Turkish constitutional monarchy, and therefore offered peaceful methods of struggle, considering armed struggle to be extreme. However, in the publications in 1910-1914, the periodical finally changes its attitude towards the constitutional authorities and it is convinced that the latter are the descendants of the Hamidian regime and they have a sense of Turkish supremacy over foreigners, which can lead to newly organized massacres. In particular, the article "The State of Turkey" states that it was naive to think that after 30 years of Hamidian dictatorship, rapid peace and calm would be established in the Ottoman Empire. Enthusiasm for the

implementation of the Constitution was gradually declining. The new authorities were gradually giving up their promises (press, free expression) and “If this process continues unabated, there is no doubt that the greedy steps of the Ottoman government will gradually lead to the old regime... [15:2]”.

Although in the pages of *Arshalouys* the flow of information about the situation of the Armenians of Western Armenia from 1899-1914 and the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia in 1909 was not very regular due to material difficulties and various restrictions imposed on the media by the Ottoman authorities, however, by studying the materials published in the periodical, it is possible to form a certain idea on the policy of persecution of Armenians by the Turkish authorities from 1899-1914.

Thus, we can prove that the main goal of *Arshalouys* was the liberation of Armenia and promotion of the improvement of the political, economic, spiritual and social life of the Armenian nation. In its publications, *Arshalouys* criticized the Ottoman dictatorship and exposed the Hamidian dictatorship. The Egyptian Armenian periodical was concerned about the situation of the Armenians in Western Armenia and tried to concisely communicate to the Egyptian-Armenians the difficult situation in Western Armenia in 1899-1914 and covered the causes of the massacre of the Armenians of Cilicia in 1909, exposing the organizers. It is true that they blamed the Hamidian regime for the massacre from the start. The periodical finally changed its attitude towards the Young Turks, concluding firmly that the latter are the descendants of the Hamidian regime. In addition, *Arshalouys*, being a literary periodical, introduced the Egyptian Armenian reader to Eastern Armenian cultural life and published works dedicated to the life and activities of various writers, touching on the theme of the homeland.

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**ԱՐԵՎՄՏԱԿԱՅՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԴՐՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԵՎ 1909 Թ. ԿԻԼԻԿԻԱԿԱՅՈՒԹՅԱՆ  
ՎՈՏՈՐԱԾԻ ՎԵՐԱԲԵՐՅԱԼ ԱՆԴՐԱԴԱՐՁԵՐ  
ԵԳԻՊՏԱԿԱՅ «ԱՐՇԱԼՈՅՍ» ՊԱՐԲԵՐԱԿԱՆԻ ԷՋԵՐՈՒՄ**

*Մյասնիկ Եսոյան*

**Քանալի բառեր՝** «Արշալոյս», եգիպտահայ պարբերական, արևմտահայություն, հայկական կոտորածներ, վարչակարգ, Կիլիկիա:

20-րդ դարասկզբի եգիպտահայ նշանավոր պարբերականներից է «Արշալոյս» ազգային, գրական և քաղաքական լրագիրը: Պարբերականի հիմնական նպատակը Հայաստանի ազատագրումն է եղել: «Արշալոյսը» ձգտել է նպաստել հայ ազգի քաղաքական, տնտեսական, հոգևոր և հասարակական կյանքի բարելավմանը: Այն իր հրապարակումներում քննադատել է օսմանյան բռնապետությունը, մերկացրել համիդյան բռնակալությունը: Եգիպտահայ պարբերականին մտահոգել է արևմտահայության կացությունն ու փորձել է իր հրապարակումներով, թեկուզև կցկտուր, եգիպտահայությանը հաղորդակից դարձնել 1899-1914 թթ. արևմտահայության ծանր դրությանը, 1909 թ. կիլիկիահայության կոտորածի պատճառների լուսաբանմանն ու կազմակերպիչների մերկացմանը: Ճիշտ է, սկզբնական շրջանում կոտորածի իրականացման գործում մեղադրում է համիդյան վարչակարգին և լիահույս է, որ սահմանադրական իշխանությունները էականորեն տարբերվում են համիդյան վարչակարգից, կկատարեն իրենց նախահեղափոխական խոստումներն ու արդարադատություն կհաստատվի Օսմանյան կայսրության տարածքում, սակայն 1910-1914 թթ. հրապարակումներում պարբերականը վերջնականապես փոխում է իր վերաբերմունքը երիտթուրքերի

նկատմամբ և համոզվում, որ վերջիններս համիոյան վարչակարգի հետնորդներն են: Բացի այդ, «Արշալոյսը», լինելով գրական պարբերական, եգիպտահայ ընթերցողին ծանոթացրել է արևելահայ մշակութային կյանքին, տպագրել տարբեր գրողների կյանքին ու գործունեությանը նվիրված, Հայրենիքի թեման շոշափող գեղարվեստական ստեղծագործություններ:

Թեև եգիպտահայ «Արշալոյս» պարբերականի էջերում 1899-1914 թթ. արևմտահայության դրության ու 1909 թ. կիլիկիահայության կոտորածի վերաբերյալ լրատվության հոսքն այնքան էլ կանոնավոր չէր՝ պայմանավորված նյութական դժվարությունների ու օսմանյան իշխանությունների կողմից լրատվության դեմ կիրառվող զանազան արգելքների հետ, այնուամենայնիվ, ուսումնասիրելով պարբերականի հրապարակած նյութերը, կարելի է որոշակի պատկերացում կազմել 1899-1914 թթ. թուրքական իշխանությունների հայահալած քաղաքականության վերաբերյալ:

## EARLY SOVIET ECONOMIC BORDER CONTROLS: EAST-WEST DIMENSION\*

*Oksana Ermolaeva*

### **Abstract**

In most studies early Soviet borders are explored as sites of confrontational interactions between the newly created communist state and local communities. Alternatively, they emerge in scholarly research as spaces of illegal transborder exchanges and commodities transfers, resulting in the loss of official revenues and gains for informal economies. Later, in increasingly politicized contexts, these interactions resulted in the gradual “cleansing” and “sealing” of borders. The current article argues that to regain control over the borders during their transition from bridgeheads of the revolution and commodity transit zones to hermetically sealed barriers and fortress walls that occurred throughout the 1920s - 1930s, the Soviet state for some time struggled in vain to discipline not only local communities, which used the newly created borders for their own means, but multiple border controllers themselves - border guards, but primarily the customs apparatus located along Russia’s lengthy borders. For almost a decade in the specific conditions of Eastern and Northwestern Soviet border sectors, the latter refused to abide to increasingly restrictive working conditions, abandon their privileges and rights, and to submit to the new border control agency - the Soviet Main Political Directorate (GPU).

**Keywords:** Soviet border control, borders of “secondary concern”, interagency rivalry, informal alliances, centre-periphery problems.

### **Introduction: Russian Borders in a Eurasian Space**

Throughout the ages multiple problems arose in attempts to delimit, secure, and control clear and stable Eurasian international borders, resulting in their repetitive redrawing. For example, currently some Russian borders around enormous territories previously annexed from neighboring states in the course of Russian imperial expansion, such as Ukraine, the Baltic States, Central Asia and South Caucasus, are now international borders with sovereign states. Other borderlands, such as far Eastern territories and Russian Karelia, sharing Russian administrative borders, are firmly entrenched in the vision of the Russian national state with distinctly weakened political and economic status while their external frontiers are properly ‘sealed.’

Soviet legacies of international border-drawing in the border areas of these regions are immense. Current Russia’s boundaries with China and Finland are conceptualized as inflexible lines and are still massively securitized. However, with

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the absence of a balance in the Russian border policy between strategic defense interests, security and control, and international transborder cooperation remains a poignant issue in both the Russian Far East and the Northwest [12: 414-415].

Low operational capacities of transborder infrastructures, such as customs management, has dramatically influenced the effectiveness of cross-border exchanges in these regions [16:73; 13: 11-18; 17: 271-301]. Their weakened economic and political status, abandoned military facilities in border districts, and desolation of sparsely populated border territories - also a Soviet heritage - makes evolution of Soviet border controls an important issue to explore from a historical perspective.

The current article, summarizing the bulk of the research on the ‘ensemble’ of early Soviet borders<sup>1</sup>, contains a comparative study of the early Soviet ‘border project’ in Russian Karelia (the case of the Soviet-Finnish border) and the Russian Far East (the case of the Sino-Soviet border under the FER, and later *Dalrevkom* administrative structures) - both marked as “borders of secondary concern” in documentation of the early Soviet period. It argues, that to regain control over the borders during the *transition* of their role from bridgeheads of the revolution and commodity transit zones to hermetically sealed barriers and fortress walls that occurred throughout the 1920s - 1930s, the Soviet state for some time struggled in vain to discipline not only local populations, which used the newly created borders to their own means, but multiple border controllers themselves - border guards, but primarily the customs apparatus of Russia’s lengthy borders. For almost a decade, the latter refused to abide to increasingly restrictive working conditions, abandon their privileges and rights, and submit to the new border controlling agency - the State Political Directorate (GPU)<sup>2</sup>.

Geographical boundaries of current study in its Eastern dimension are determined by the territories, which were part of the administrative subordination of the Far Eastern regional authorities on the land border with China. In the pre-revolutionary period these were the southern, most populated and economically developed areas of Amur Territory (Priamursky krai), in early Soviet times- respectively, the regions of the Far Eastern Republic (later FER), Far East region (*Dalnevostochnaya oblast*) (1922-1925) and the Far Eastern Territory (*Dalnevostochnyi krai*) (since 1926). In accordance with modern administrative-territorial arrange-

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<sup>1</sup> Usually, early Soviet borders are explored as sites of confrontational interactions between the newly created Communist state and local communities, later subjected to gradual ‘cleansing’ and ‘sealing,’ [7; 10; 23] or as spaces of illegal transborder exchanges and commodities transfers, resulting in the loss of official revenues, and gains to informal economies [19].

<sup>2</sup> Formed from the Cheka, the original Russian state security organization, on February 6, 1922. Despite the fact that from 1923 to 1934, instead of the GPU, the agency was called the OGPU (under the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR), the term GPU remained in the names of its local branches. The name “GPU” (not “OGPU”) was also widely used later, in the 1920s and the first half of the 1930s, in colloquial speech, and in fiction.

ments, the study area includes the southern territories of the Amur Oblast, the Primorsky and Khabarovsk Territories (*krayev*) and the Jewish Autonomous Oblast.

The Finnish-Russian border is the roughly the north-south international border between the Republic of Finland (a member of the European Union) and the Russian Federation. From its northern endpoint - a hill called Muotkavaara, where the borders of Norway, Finland and Russia meet, extending deep into the depths of the frosty ground, it cuts through 1340 kilometres of uninhabited taiga forests, rivers and lakes, and sparsely populated rural areas until it meets the Baltic Sea on the South [8:13]. On the shore of Gulf of Finland there is a maritime boundary between the respective territorial waters, terminating in a narrow strip of international waters between Finnish and Estonian territorial waters. Current research focuses on the border strip within the framework of the Karelian Labour Commune (established in 1920), and later the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (created in 1923).

### **The Early Soviet “Border Project” as a Conceptual Change**

The shift from the Russian Empire to the Soviet Union had a tremendous effect on how state borders were conceptualized and secured. Concern over security in protecting the socialist project from capitalist encirclement led to a number of radical changes in the management of border controls. At the very beginning of the establishment of Soviet authority, Felix Dzerzhinsky, the chairman of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka), proclaimed, “the border is a political divide, and it is a political body that must protect it.” Therefore, in 1920, a Special Division of the Cheka, became the responsible agency for Soviet border protection. Later, in September 1922, this institution, then renamed into the State Political Administration (GPU) and the Border Guards of the USSR (*Pogranichnye voiska SSSR*), was placed under the aegis of the NKVD (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs).

Throughout the 1920s, the principles of Soviet borders’ protections were elaborated upon and in the course of the collaboration of various Soviet governmental and Communist party agencies (such as NKID [Commissariat of Foreign Affairs], *Pogranichnaya Okhrana* [Soviet Border Guard Department] of the OGPU, Defense Sector of GOPSLAN, the SNK [*Sovnarkom*] and Politburo). However, major role in the establishment of economic control over Soviet borders was ascribed to the Central Anti-Smuggling Commission, which was comprised of leading GTU (Main Customs Directorate) administrators and top GPU officers, with analogous commissions created in most Soviet borderlands. From the creation of this inter-agency administrative body on December 8, 1921, under the chairmanship of Vasily Ulrikh, assistant to the KRO GPU chief A. Artuzov, and up to its dismantlement<sup>3</sup>, its activities were marked by constant conflicts between the OGPU and the Customs

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<sup>3</sup> The commission along with its local branches existed until 1927, when the final power transfer to the OGPU was accomplished [1:253].

under the aegis of NKVD over the leading role in ‘combatting contraband,’ generating a cornucopia of mutual accusations [3: F. 413. Op. 14. D. 190. L. 13 -19].

At a regional level, economic control over the borders was divided between these two major agencies. Under Article 5 of the “Border Protection Regulations of the USSR” from 1923 on, border protection was assigned to the Soviet Border Guard as a structural unit of the OGPU. On the issue of “combating espionage and smuggling,” Soviet border guard units were subordinated to the Counter-Revolutionary Sections (KRO) of the local GPU branches. At the same time, “combat smuggling” was not removed from customs institutions under the aegis of the General Directorate of Customs within the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade (NKVT). This “dual power” regime was aggravated by contradictory legislation on duties and obligations of these agencies.

The VchKa order from February 27, 1923, signed by Assistant Head of the VchKa I. Unshlicht and the Chief of the Administrative Directorate of the VchKa H. Jagoda, prevented an increase in interference of border guard institutions into customs work, on the grounds of ‘unauthorized searches, arrests, and the paralysis of the customs work,’ stating “an immense economic significance of the customs institutions directly at the border” [3: F. 413. Op. 14. D. 190. L. 5]. However, on May 4, 1923, a meeting of the Central Commission for the Struggle with Contraband headed by Customs Administration head A. I. Potiaev<sup>4</sup>, and attended by the representatives of the NKVT, NKF, and GPU, represented by I. S. Unshlicht, Vice-Chairman of the GPU, significantly reduced the rights of customs authorities and laid the foundations for a rivalry for power and resources at Soviet borders [3: F. 413. Op. 11. D. 210]<sup>5</sup>. Although contradictions over border regime regulations and contraband bonuses between the GPU border guard and customs officials were present at all Soviet borders<sup>6</sup>, in the specific conditions of Russian Karelia and the Far East they became especially pronounced.

### **Early Soviet Border Control: Regional Variations.**

With Finland becoming independent in 1917, the 1245.6 km long border of Russian Karelia was confirmed as a boundary between two sovereign states. However, as with all other Soviet borders, the turmoil of civil war meant that the demarcation line was porous, almost unguarded and open to frequent violations. In Finnish historiography, the conflict was defined as multiple Wars for Kindred Peoples (*heimosodat*), fought between 1918 and 1922. Inspired by Finnish nationalistic ideology,

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<sup>4</sup> Potyayev A. I., GTU chief 1922-1927, arrested on July 28, 1936, sentenced by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR on May 27, 1937, upon the accusation in participation in a counter-revolutionary terrorist organization; shot on May 28, 1937.

<sup>5</sup> An instruction was accordingly sent to the district customs administrations: [1: F. P- 275, Op. 1, D. ½. L. 48, 60].

<sup>6</sup> They were present, albeit much less pronounced in the Petrograd (from 1924 - Leningrad) guberniya at the border controls along Soviet-Finnish border [2: F. P-3944. Op. 1. D. 2. L. 18. 51; F. P-3441. Op. 7. D. 7. L. 1, 5; F. P -2205 Op. 1. D. 56].

Finnish right-wing radicals and nationalist activists wanted to unite all the Finno-Ugric peoples in Finland, Russia, and Estonia and expand the borders of Finland to the east. Thousands of Finnish volunteers took part in military expeditions into the Russian regions of Ingria, the Karelian Isthmus, East Karelia, White Sea Karelia, and Pechenga [3:290]. These cataclysmic events resulted in large-scale population displacement and transborder migrations. Part of the border population (especially in Northern Karelia), called the Karelian refugees (*karbezhtsy*), fled to Finland between 1919-1921. Some returned under the terms of a Soviet amnesty from 1923 to 1926 and extended by the Bolshevik regime as part of its general settlement of frontiers for diplomatic and security reasons. The establishment of the national Soviet republic (Karelian Labour Commune), later Karelian ASSR neighboring the “bourgeois” Finland opened a new page in the history of the embattled northern frontier.

Soviet Karelian regular border protection was created in the autumn of 1922, when a separate border corps (OPK) of the Soviet GPU troops was created, which included 7 border districts. By the end of 1924 the Karelian border with Finland, coinciding with the administrative border delineated in the nineteenth century, was partially blocked by GPU border guard detachments. In 1919, a customs chain was installed along the Karelian border, and from August 1922 onwards it was managed by the Petrozavodsk Customs district, as a branch of the Petrograd customs area<sup>7</sup>.

Similar developments occurred at the Far East. During the events of the revolution of 1917 and the Civil War, Karelia and the Far Eastern territories witnessed the collapse of imperial administrative structures, a change of power and intermittent interventions. These turbulent events resulted in the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic (FER). This was the result of the legacy of Russian expansionism and Bolshevik efforts to export the revolution to Mongolia, Korea, China, and Japan, as well as that of various local regionalists, who aimed for independence or strong regional autonomy for distinct Siberian and Far Eastern communities and whose efforts culminated in the short-lived Far Eastern Republic of 1920-1922 [18:4]. The need to keep the Russian Far East within a Russian state, Soviet or not, and to protect it from Japanese imperialism became the main slogan during the consequent the FER’s absorption into the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR) after the Japanese evacuated from the region’s continental part in 1922. At the beginning of 1922, customs management was transferred to the Ministry of Finance of the FER [12: L. 14-25], while January 4, 1923, marked the birth of the DVO - *Dalnevostochnyi pogranichnyi okrug* [20: 15-18].

Several factors impacted emerging economic border controls and interagency relations at these border sectors. Understaffed border control institutions, general lack of financing, the absence of adequate mobility infrastructures for both border

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<sup>7</sup> [1: F. P-544. Op. 1. D. 1/3. L. 97]. Prior to the revolution, however, in Northern Karelia, part of Archangelskaya guberniya, a customs office and several customs outposts were operating.

guards and customs officials<sup>8</sup> impacted in combination with physical border specifications and harsh environmental and climatic conditions, resulting in heavy illegal trafficking<sup>9</sup>, informal alliances, and permanent interagency conflicts.

Lack of human resources for border protection vividly manifested itself in both regions, with long strips of these borders left completely unguarded. By March 1927, the border guards of the GPU of the KASSR numbered only 1,805 people (90% of them peasants). This was almost five times fewer than estimated as necessary for securing this particular border area several years earlier [3: F. 413. Op. 14. D. 7. L. 147, 149-150]. Accordingly, Petrozavodsk Customs included 9 customs outposts with each a staff of just two to four officials, and a customs office in Petrozavodsk [1: F. P-544. Op. 1. D. 1/3. L. 97].

Similarly, in 1922, the Soviet Far East total land border was 7000 km in length, which was more than five times longer than the Soviet Karelian one, and on more than 15000 km of the marine border there were just 9 border guard detachments (*pogranotryady*) and 2 separate border commandants' offices (*komendatory*) with a staff of 2259 - just slightly exceeding the number that staffed Karelian border [6: 115]. The slightly reformed customs infrastructure was largely based on previous imperial arrangements and consisted of just 10 customs outposts (compared to the 9 Karelian ones), 26 customs *zastav* and 63 *tamposta* - all belonging to four customs inspectorate districts: *Chitinsky*, *Blagoveschensky*, *Khabarovskii*, and *Vladivostokskii* [3: F. 372. Op.11. D. 98. L. 14-15]. Such a dramatic lack of border control infrastructures was partly caused by general Soviet strategic-military planning, based on the perception of both the Karelian and Far-Eastern frontiers being relatively stable, and not posing imminent threats and military dangers until the end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s [11].

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<sup>8</sup> Even in 1927, 520 horses were the only means of transportation for the Karelian border guards [1: F. P-690. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 78]. At the Far East the situation was even worse. At the Sino-Soviet border in mid-1920s, poorly staffed and armed officers of *Blagoveschensk* and *Vladivostok* districts were helpless against paramilitary bands, accomplishing contraband transfers reaching 30 to 40 *podvody*, accompanied by convoys and armed with machine guns.

<sup>9</sup> Total value of the contraband smuggled through Karelian sector of the Soviet-Finnish border was small (primarily due to the fact it almost exclusively consisted of provisions, textiles, and agricultural instruments. [1: F. P-690. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 79]. Still, the traffic itself was dense and well-organized smuggling networks covering several villages were exploited by Soviet Counterintelligence that introduced new features into the complex world of illegal transborder encounters, common for all Soviet Western borderlands during the decade after the revolution [10; 19]. At the Far East, the report of the Dal'revkom, the Far Eastern Revolutionary Committee, estimated the value of contraband assets in 1924 at the borders of the Soviet Union's Far East at about one-third those of its European borders. The population in the European territories, however, was ninety times the population of the Soviet Far East [23: 129]. The imports consisted of alcohol and consumer goods, and exports of gold, opium, fur, and bioresources. Apart from large scale gold and furs trafficking - the Far Eastern countryside, as did the Karelian, was actively consuming contraband manufactured goods and foodstuffs, with primary reasons being "a far route to the legal trade," and gaps between prices for contraband and legal goods. In 1925, price discrepancies sometimes extended 500%, far exceeding the Karelian average of 70% [1: F. P -544. Op. 2. D. 3/58. L. 44].



Physical border specifications, problematic terrains and insularity of border zone topographies remained major “persistent” problems for border control mechanisms inherited from the Russian Empire. In Karelia, the remoteness of most parts of the border, harsh conditions, and rugged terrain combining water obstacles, marshes, and boreal forests became key factors that made actual effective border control impossible [1: F. P-690. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 78]. Water routes, freezing in winter and the nature of the terrain frequently made roads impassable, contributing to failed border controls and sometimes resulted in total border control paralysis in some sectors of the Karelian borderland [1: F. P - 689. Op. 1. D. 8/81. L. 123]. Customs outposts, inspected every several years, operated in almost complete isolation, and correspondence usually arrived once a month.

The factors of remoteness and physical specifications of the state border that resulted in troubled connections between the Petrozavodsk Customs Inspectorate and Karelian customs outposts were even more pronounced at the Far Eastern sector of Sino-Soviet frontier. In analogous conditions of isolation of customs and border guard outposts, absence of phone and telegraph connections with most parts of the border regions, and lack of mobility infrastructures, throughout the 1920s Moscow repeatedly complained about extremely poor 'live connection' with the DVO and increasingly ‘centrifugal forces’ in border management. An ‘irresistible force’ of ‘immense spaces’ aggravated growing ‘apathy’ of the DVO Customs sections [1: F. P-378, Op. 4, D. 6].

In comparison with Russian Karelia, one of peculiarities of the Soviet control over this border strip was *interchangeability* of border guard and customs functions, with the term ‘armed customs’ (*boevye tamozhni*) actively used in correspondence of the Far Eastern Customs Directorate. While in some areas customs officials had to protect the border from armed bands and frequently fell prey to them, local border guards were usually entrusted with customs control functions in the “areas where there was no possibility of installing customs stations [1: F. P-378. Op 4. D. 6. L. 20]. Additionally, contrary to Russian Karelia, where state border protection remained a prerogative of Soviet controlling agencies, the Far Eastern sector of the Sino-Soviet border up to the end of the 1920s witnessed the active involvement of local communities in exercising economic border regime. Far Eastern fishing supervision and village councils remained actively involved in performing customs functions [1: F. P-378, Op. 4, D. 6. L. 16].

The emerging need for regular on-site inspections of both border sectors became a challenge for Soviet officials who had to innovate. In Karelia, for example, winter inspections could only occur by horseback on frozen rivers and lakes through a complex system of tract-country and water communication, and even then, they failed to inspect all the institutions [1: F. P-544. Op. 2. D. 4/68. L. 83]. During Moscow Chief Customs Directorate inspections of the Sino-Soviet border, even ‘the smartest inspectors’ could visit only ‘armed customs’ (*boevye tamozhni*), with a large number of border control institutions remaining unsupervised [1: F. P-378. Op 4. D. 6. L. 20].

At both borders multiple cases were registered of border guards and customs officials involved into informal smuggling networks with the locals, taking bribes for contraband transfers. With delays in regular food and commodities deliveries, persistent housing shortages, as well as unsuitable living and working conditions, involvement in smuggling became an important source for the survival of border controllers [1: F. P-690. Op. 1. D. 27. L. 55; 14]. Border guards and customs officials who were settled (and actually working) in crowded peasant (and sometimes smugglers') houses frequently assisted in or disregarded contraband operations, and even enrolled as seasonal workers on peasant lands. Throughout the 1920s, while the tone of the central appeals for "combating contraband" became more alarmed, customs officials in localities became increasingly unwilling to treat the problem seriously; they preferred to send faked or blank reports that denied the existence of the contraband traffic at their locations [1: F. P-544. Op. 3. D. 1/6. L. 12].

Moreover, while local communities went on with using the border for their needs at both border sectors, border controllers engaged in interagency rivalry over contraband incomes, border regulations, and informants' networks [6: 38; 15: 323; 1: F. P-378. Op. 4. D. 3; F. P-690. Op. 1. D. 27]. The report on border security of a famous Soviet Bolshevik leader, Ieronim Uborevich, at the *Dalrevkom* meeting from February 10, 1923, commented on the 'dual power regime' at the Sino-Soviet border and noted that the Main Political Directorate had 'failed to remove the border control from the customs.' He states that "...I have no idea how to discipline them, to record them, cleanse them, and how finally to reduce their numbers...they have an advantage over us, for the material condition of our troops is truly sorrowful..." [9:127]. In Karelia, Sylvestr Demenchuk, Head of Petrozavodsk Customs Inspectorate (1922-1924), also repetitively complained of the customs outpost officials refusing to cooperate en masse with local GPU border guards, which in some areas resulted in the almost total 'collapse' of the 'combat against the contraband' [1: F. P-544. Op. 3. D. 1/6. L. 12]. Interagency conflicts, erupting during the legal cross border trade operations at both border sectors involved foreign trade missions as well as local SNK [1: F. P-544, Op. 2, D. 4/68. L. 96; 6: 39].

Control over informants' networks remained a hot button issue until 1927 [1: F. P-544. Op. 1. D. 2/1. L. 175; F. P-544, Op. 2. D. 4/68. L. 96]. The Customs Directorate of People's Commissariat of Trade possessed a staff of authorized agents actively used by the local branches, while GPU officers actively objected to customs agencies' intelligence functions. Despite reprimands and sanctions, customs officials at both border sectors actively managed their own informants' networks up to the year 1927 and perhaps even later [1: F. P-378. Op. 4. D. 3. L. 20; 14: 114-116].

This situation was aggravated by the fact that up to the end of the 1920s at both border strips the GPU repeatedly failed to create their own working efficient informers' networks. At the Russian Far East, the GPU resorted to posting ads in the local newspapers to attract the informants. In Karelia, stubborn resistance of the

local peasantry to report on their neighbors engaged in illegal border crossings and smuggling and enroll as informers was repetitively noted in the GPU KASSR reports. The same reluctance is reflected in the contents of the contraband cases throughout 1920s. Only a decade later, when the concept of the ‘endangered border’ and Soviet ‘spy mania’ was finally instilled into the mass consciousness of the 1930s, Soviet denunciation practices became a distinguishing feature of the Stalinist political modernity in the already ‘cleansed’ borderland regions.

### **The End of “Dual Power Economic Border Control”**

The end of the 1920s and beginning of the 1930s marked a transition from New Economic Policy to Stalinist Command Economy. They also opened the door for Joseph Stalin’s border securitization. The demolition of the Soviet customs apparatus in 1930 [1: F. P-378. Op 4. D. 6. L. 1] was followed by a sharp increase in OGPU border guard numbers and the introduction of strict security measures in border zones [1: F. P-378. Op 4. D. 6. L. 1].

In November 1929, a joint Moscow session of the Soviet OGPU and the Customs Directorate of NKVT, headed by the Deputy Chief of the *Narkomtorg* Lev Khinchuk and the GTU chief A. Vinokur, attended by the chiefs of all major Soviet customs inspectorates, marked the end of the ‘NEP’ border regime. At the beginning of this meeting, complaints on increasing “GPU pressures,” expressed by the DVO Customs chief Kuzovlev, received active support from several leading provincial GTU officials. However, in the response of GPU officers, these complaints were qualified as empty ‘yamming’ (*slovobludie*) [1: F. P-378. Op 4. D. 6. L. 20]. Concluding the meeting with a response to multiple complaints of other Soviet Customs chiefs on grave problems in interagency cooperation and failing customs managers’ relations with local GPU bosses, Lazar Kogan, an Assistant Chief of the Main Directorate of the Border Guard and the Troops of the OGPU, stated: “We should close this question once and for all; all false complaints on part of the GTU staff about ostensible GPU pressures are attempts at sabotage, so from now on they should be firmly rebutted and investigated” [1: F. P-378. Op 4. D. 6. L. 4].

In Soviet Karelia, after a radical cut in customs personnel numbers and removal of most of their functions in favor of the GPU, (including determining dislocations of export centres and control over transborder transfers of commodities,) a manager of the *Kem* Customs, Pyotr Piho, filed a petition to the GPU of the Karelian ASSR. On the grounds that remaining administrators at the customs posts along the Finnish border now had ‘plenty of spare time,’ he proposed their transfer under the jurisdiction of the chiefs of the nearest GPU border guard outposts [1: F. P-378. Op. 4. D. 6. L. 10]. Karelian GPU rejected the proposal, finding the offer “highly impractical”, and suggestions on the involvement of the heads of the customs outposts in the GPU activities ‘totally unacceptable,’ [1: F. P-378. Op. 4. D. 1/8. L. 7-10] resulting in the final decay of local customs.

During Soviet border securitization that started in the late 1920s and continued throughout the 1930s, in dramatically transforming geopolitical contexts, and in-

creasing Soviet “war scares,” the Western as well as Eastern Soviet borderlands became sites of “cleansing operations,” and later, in the 1930s, of dramatic displacements of populations. Both borders were finally “sealed” with the destruction of their borderland societies that resulted from Stalinist anti-espionage operations and deportations at the end of the 1930s [21]. What is less known, in 1937-1938, a large share of the high and mid-rank ex-customs staff were repressed with the standard charges of “counter-revolutionary agitation,” “espionage” and “sabotage” [20].

## Conclusion

Throughout the 1920s, reflecting Moscow’s ambiguous policies on the borders’ protection at the Sino-Soviet as well as Soviet-Finnish border sectors, multiple interagency conflicts occurred among various border controlling agents of the same - Soviet - state. In both cases, they were aggravated by the lack of precise directives as to the new Soviet borders’ purpose, conflicting aspirations and countervailing tensions of ideology and expediency inherent in Soviet policy-making of the early 1920’s, confusion and troubled connections between central (Moscow), provincial inspectorates, and border guard and customs outposts directly at the borders. While customs institutions were subordinated to the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Trade (NKVT) and operated to keep the border open and *functioning*, Soviet GPU leading officials, who, focused on *sealing* the border starting in the late 1920s, fought with them for control over ‘porous’ borders. Moreover, contradictions in economic border controls were fueled by local actors, border guards and customs officials directly at the borders, for most of whom the borders became not objects of the state control, but resources for survival in conditions of underfinancing, isolation in harsh conditions, and impossibility of controlling illegal transborder encounters of local communities. Confusion in border controls and local ‘power struggles’ were ended by increasingly assertive OGPU policy by the end of the 1920s.

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### **Abbreviations:**

Karelian ASSR - Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1923-1940).

FER - Far Eastern Republic (1920 - 1922).

Dalrevkom - the Far Eastern Revolutionary Committee (1922 - 1926).

GPU - State Political Directorate, (1922-1923); from 1923 to 1934 -OGGPU (Joint Joint State Political Directorate under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR).

NKVD - People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (1917 - 1930; 1934 - 1946).

NKID - People's Commissariat Foreign Affairs (1917 - 1923).

GOSPLAN - The State Planning Committee (1921 - 1991).

SNK - Council of People's Commissars (1923-1946).

KRO GPU - Counter-Revolutionary Section of the GPU.

NKVT - People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade of the USSR.

NKF - the People's Commissariat for Finance (1918-1991).

DVO - Far Eastern area.

GTU - Main Customs Department, established in December 1921 and responsible for state control over the customs stations; a part of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Trade.

The Karelian ASSR - The Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1923-1940).

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**ՎԱՂ ԽՈՐՀՐԴԱՅԻՆ ՏՆՏԵՍԱԿԱՆ ՍԱՀՄԱՆԻ  
ՎԵՐԱՀՍԿՈՂՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ. ԱՐԵՎԵԼՔ-ԱՐԵՎՄՈՒՏՔ  
ԶԳՎԱԾՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ**

*Օկսանա Երմոլաևա*

**Քանալի բառեր՝** խորհրդային սահմանային վերահսկողություն, «երկրորդական անհանգստության» սահմաններ, միջգերատեսչական մրցակցություն, ոչ պաշտոնական դաշինքներ, կենտրոն-ծայրամաս խնդիրներ:

Ուսումնասիրությունների մեծ մասում վաղ խորհրդային սահմանները դիտարկվում են որպես նորաստեղծ կոմունիստական պետության և տեղական համայնքների միջև առճակատման վայրեր: Գիտական հետազոտություններում այդ տարածքները ներկայացվում են նաև որպես անօրինական անդրսահմանային փոխանակումների և ապրանքների փոխանցման տարածքներ, որոնք հանգեցնում էին պետական եկամուտների նվազման և անօրինական տնտեսությունների հարստացմանը: Հետագայում, ավելի ու ավելի քաղաքականացված համատեքստում, այս փոխազդեցությունները հանգեցրին սահմանների աստիճանական «մաքրման» և «կնքման»:

Սույն հոդվածում ուսումնասիրության առարկա է դարձել նաև այն, որ Խորհրդային պետությունը 1920-ական թթ. պայքար էր մղում կարգ ու կանոն հաստատելու սահմանային գոտիներում, փորձում կարգի հրավիրելու ոչ միայն տեղական համայնքների ներկայացուցիչներին, որոնք օգտագործում էին նորաստեղծ սահմանները իրենց նպատակների համար, այլև սահմանապահ և մաքսային ծառայությունների աշխատակիցներին: Այդ խնդիրները հատկապես ակնառու էին խորհրդա-չինական և խորհրդա-ֆիննական սահմանային գոտիներում: Այստեղ խնդիրներ կային նաև տարբեր խորհրդային վերահսկող պետական կառույցների միջև համագործակցության, կադրային քաղաքականության, փաստաթղթավորման հարցերում:

## **ВОДНЫЕ ПРОБЛЕМЫ В ОТНОШЕНИЯХ ИРАНА И АФГАНИСТАНА\***

*Армен Израелян*

**Ключевые слова:** Иран, Афганистан, талибан, вода, водохранилище, река, дельта, Гильменд, Герируд, Теджен.

### **Аннотация**

Водные проблемы между Ираном и Афганистаном являются следствием демаркации границы между двумя странами на разных исторических этапах. За последние 150 лет между Ираном и Афганистаном было подписано четыре соглашения об использовании воды пограничных рек, но они так и не были реализованы в полной мере.

В итоге стороны обвинили друг друга в невыполнении взятых на себя обязательств. В силу ряда объективных и субъективных факторов нерешенность водного вопроса на сегодняшний день создала атмосферу недоверия между Ираном и Афганистаном, препятствующую развитию программ, направленных на долгосрочное сотрудничество.

Вопрос водных ресурсов является очень чувствительным для Ирана и Афганистана. Возникновение экологических, сельскохозяйственных, экономических, социальных, правовых, политических и военных факторов, на протяжении десятилетий еще больше осложнило ситуацию.

Каждая сторона представляет обоснованные аргументы для защиты своих прав относительно использования воды пограничной реки Гильменд. Однако подписанный в 1973г. и единственный действующий на сегодняшний день договор при наличии вышеперечисленных факторов не в состоянии решить возникшие проблемы. В условиях глобального потепления, роста населения и растущего спроса на продукты питания стороны не могут прийти к консенсусу по продлению существующего соглашения или подписанию нового.

В статьях иранских и афганских авторов в основном можно заметить попытку обосновать официальные подходы данной страны относительно водной проблемы. Среди доступных источников по этому вопросу - исследования, проведенные бывшим заместителем министра иностранных дел Ирана Аббасом Арагчи по «водной дипломатии», в которых, помимо обсуждения проблем, предлагаются решения.

В рамках данной статьи оценивается роль воды в пограничных спорах между Ираном и Афганистаном в разные исторические периоды. Объективно представлены позиции сторон по вопросу о правах на воду, оценены и проанализированы существующие риски.

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### **Вступление**

В 17-х-20-х веках, до провозглашения независимости Афганистана в 1919г., в результате столкновений между иранской и афганской правящими династиями границы между Ираном и Афганистаном несколько раз менялись<sup>1</sup>. Границы современного Ирана и Афганистана были окончательно проведены между Ираном и Великобританией по Парижскому договору, подписанному в 1857 году [13].

После колонизации Индии территории Ирана и Афганистана стали играть очень важную роль для Великобритании с точки зрения предотвращения продвижения России. Великобритания и Россия, исходя из геополитических интересов, в 1907г. разделили территории Ирана и Афганистана на зоны влияния, что фактически лишило эти страны суверенитета. В такой ситуации урегулирование пограничных споров между Ираном и Афганистаном было предоставлено третьей стороне, а именно Великобритании, Турции и США. Поскольку указанные страны при проведении границы между Ираном и Афганистаном руководствовались своими интересами, в результате проведения демаркации между сторонами, не удалось найти такое решение вопроса водопользования пограничной реки Гильменд (в иранских источниках «Гирманд»), которое удовлетворило бы Иран и Афганистан.

Разногласия между Ираном и Афганистаном из-за реки Гильменд касаются не только правовых вопросов. На решение проблемы также влияют геополитические, экономические, экологические, исторические, гуманитарные и цивилизационные факторы.

Иран и Афганистан как суверенные страны впервые начали прямые переговоры по решению водного вопроса в начале 1970-х годов. В 1973г. был подписан первый и единственный действующий по сей день договор.

### **Экологическое значение реки Гильменд и озера Хамун**

Две реки протекают через границу Ирана и Афганистана. Река Герируд (Теджен) течет из Афганистана на запад, достигает границы с Ираном, а затем течет на север в Туркменистан. Однако основные разногласия [16:35] между Ираном и Афганистаном связаны с рекой Гильменд. Река берёт начало в горах Гиндукуш, протекает по территории Афганистана (90% находится в Афганистане) на протяжении более 1000 км, питаясь по пути 5 источниками, доходит до границы с Ираном. Иран расположен в нижней части реки. Бассейн Гильменда составляет 150 тыс. км<sup>2</sup>, а площадь дельты - 18 200 км<sup>2</sup>,

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<sup>1</sup> В результате англо-афганской 1-й (1839-1842гг.) и 2-й (1878-1880гг.) войн. Великобритания значительно увеличивает свое влияние в Афганистане, усиливая свои позиции в Индии и Персидском заливе. Согласно договорам, подписанным между Ираном и Россией (Гюлистан 1813г., Туркменчай (1828г. Ахал 1881г.), а также между Ираном и Великобританией (Париж 1857г.) Иран несет серьезную территориальную потерю.

40 % которой находится на территории Ирана. В районе бассейна реки проживает около 8 миллионов человек. Гильменд - единственный источник воды для провинции Систан и Белуджистан ИРИ, которая является самой бедной провинцией Ирана с точки зрения водных ресурсов.

По сравнению с соседними странами Афганистан имеет выгодное географическое положение с точки зрения управления речным стоком. Все соседи находятся в более нижней позиции по сравнению с Афганистаном. В Афганистане 84,6% воды, необходимой для сельского хозяйства, обеспечивается реками, 7,9% родниками, 7% родниками кариз (*традиционная подземная гидротехническая система*) и 0,5% искусственными прудами, 31% сельскохозяйственных земель Афганистана орошается рекой Гильменд [35:4]. Водные ресурсы Афганистана составляют 70 миллиардов кубометров в год. Только 20% его используется для нужд страны, 80% поступает в Иран, Пакистан и Среднюю Азию [3].

В последние десятилетия Афганистан построил несколько крупных водохранилищ<sup>2</sup> и плотин на реке Гильменд. Они являются причиной споров между Ираном и Афганистаном по водному вопросу.

Реки Гильменд, Фарах, Хаш и Ардаскан текут с юго-запада Афганистана к иранской границе, пересекаясь друг с другом и образуя озеро Хамун. 70% озера находится в Иране, а другая часть в Афганистане. Это третье по величине озеро в Иране. В многоводные годы в озере собирается около 3,2 км<sup>3</sup> воды. Однако в период засухи количество воды уменьшается, достигая 1,2 км<sup>3</sup>. Когда уровень озера Хамун падает, озеро делится на 4 части. «Хамун Сабери» - самый глубокий, расположенный на севере. «Хамун Пузак» - расположен на северо-востоке Афганистана. «Хамун Шапур» и «Хамун Гильменд» расположены на юге. Когда вода озера Хамун достаточно наполняется, вышеупомянутые четыре части объединяются в одно озеро. После подъема уровня озера часть воды, залитой в озеро Хамун с территории Афганистана, вновь возвращается из Ирана в Афганистан, образуя озеро «Гудзаре» [34:34].

За последние десятилетия более 400 деревень в иранской провинции Систан и Белуджистан опустели из-за высыхания озера Хамун. Жители мигрировали в соседние провинции [7]. Иранская провинция Систан и Белуджистан ежегодно получает 1,6 млрд м<sup>3</sup> воды от реки Гильменд. Однако для удовлетворения потребностей государства в воде необходимо 1,8-2 млрд м<sup>3</sup> воды [17]. По мнению Кабула, вода должна поступать из Афганистана в Иран, а затем возвращаться оттуда в Афганистан, заполняя озеро Хамун. Однако Иран строя искусственные озера в Систане<sup>3</sup>, накапливает в этих озерах излишки воды полученной из Гильменда. В результате вода реки не

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<sup>2</sup> «Камал хан», «Каджаки», «Кухаки», «Шах Абдулла», «Шурабе», «Дахане», «Ханабад».

<sup>3</sup> Иран утверждает, что построил искусственные озера, чтобы контролировать наводнения, приходящие из Афганистана.

возвращается в Афганистан из Ирана, что приводит к высыханию реки Хамун в Афганистане.

### **Посреднические усилия Великобритании, Турции и США по решению водной проблемы**

Великобритания направила две посреднические миссии для разрешения споров между Ираном и Афганистаном относительно [33:6] совместного использования воды реки Гильменд. Первую миссию возглавил британский офицер Фредерик Джон Голдсмит, комиссии которого было поручено сначала решить вопрос о принадлежности провинции Систан, а затем заняться рекой Гильменд [28:17].

Согласно соглашению [33:59], подписанному в 1872г., между Ираном и Афганистаном при поддержке комиссии Голдсмита в 1872г., граница между двумя странами проходит по основному течению реки Гильменд<sup>4</sup>. Однако комиссии Голдсмита не удалось окончательно разрешить разногласия относительно использования воды реки Гильменд, также разногласия относительно механизмов, методов распределения воды и юридических вопросов [35:7].

Афганистан, получив поддержку Великобритании, занял более жесткую позицию в переговорах с Ираном. В частности, политические власти Афганистана придерживались мнения, что, поскольку Гильменд берет начало в Афганистане, следовательно она находится под контролем-юрисдикцией Афганистана, следовательно, «эксклюзивное право» реки принадлежит Афганистану.

Иран скептически отнесся к решению комиссии Голдсмита, утверждая, что комиссия отдала приоритет интересам Афганистана<sup>5</sup>, не учитывая права на воду жителей нижней части Гильменда.

Изменение русла реки в дельте вызвало новые разногласия между Ираном и Афганистаном. Начавшиеся в 1896г. переговоры на этот раз проходили при посредничестве другого британского солдата, Генри Макмагона. В 1904 году комиссия Макмагона предложила разделить воду реки Гильменд поровну между пограничными районами Ирана и Афганистана. Однако согласно решению, принятому в 1905г., 2/3-я часть воды Гильменда в дельте реки отводилась Афганистану, а 1/3 - иранской провинции Систан. Фактически, доля Ирана от реки Гильменд уменьшилась с 62% до 33% [16:37].

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<sup>4</sup> Согласно соглашению, «стороны не должны предпринимать шаги, которые вызовут проблемы в удовлетворении потребности в воде».

<sup>5</sup> По словам Ирана, после подписания соглашения по просьбе Афганистана Голдсмит добавил в соглашение пункт, согласно которому афганцам разрешалось рыть отдельные каналы от реки Гильменд.

В 1919г. с момента обретения Афганистаном независимости [42] и после образования в Иране династии Пехлеви в 1925г. стороны получили возможность принятия суверенного решения пограничного вопроса.

Политика Реза-шаха Ирана и Мохаммада Надир-шаха Афганистана по установлению добрососедских отношений, а также процесс формирования «Саадабадского пакта» помогли Ирану и Афганистану временно отложить в сторону свои разногласия [31:487] относительно вопроса воды реки Гильменд и решить водные проблемы путем взаимовыгодного диалога. В 1927г. между Ираном и Афганистаном были подписаны соглашения о дружбе и безопасности [11:606].

В период формирования «Саадабадского пакта» в контексте начавшихся интеграционных процессов между странами региона - Ираком, Турцией, Ираном и Афганистаном - начался процесс решения пограничных вопросов между упомянутыми странами. В 1934г. Иран и Афганистан решили делегировать демаркацию границы Турции. В 1937 г. по инициативе Турции было подписано временное соглашение о равном разделе воды реки Гильменд между Ираном и Афганистаном. Турецкий генерал Фахреддин Паша Алтай был полномочен проследить за его реализацией [29:216]. После подписания «Саадабадского пакта» срок временного договора 1939г. был продлен. Согласно измененному соглашению, стороны могли использовать необходимую воду из любой части района, от плотины<sup>6</sup> «Камал хан» (на территории Афганистана, 47 км от иранской границы) до плотины «Лехшак» [41:56].

При изучении 150-летней истории Ирана и Афганистана наблюдается одна закономерность. Во время ухудшения внутренней ситуации в одной из этих стран одна из сторон либо отказывается выполнять свои обязательства по договору, либо создает такие инфраструктуры, чтобы иметь возможность использовать больше воды.

Накануне Второй мировой войны, когда Реза-шах ушел от власти в Иране, Афганистан, воспользовавшись нестабильной ситуацией Ирана, отказался ратифицировать соглашение 1937г. и продолжил политику строительства плотин. Афганистан при поддержке США построил в 1949 году 110-километровый объездной канал на реке Гильменд, также водохранилища «Каджаки» и «Богра». Для преодоления нового кризиса Иран попытался поднять водную проблему на трибуне ООН. Однако благодаря

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<sup>6</sup> Согласно пункту 2 Договора правительство Афганистана обязалось не строить новые водохранилища (каналы) для водопользования, кроме уже построенных плотин «Чаар бурджаки» и «Камал хан», которая была последней точкой вододеления, в результате чего доля воды противоположной стороны уменьшится. В соответствии с 8 пунктом договора стороны обязуются не предпринимать никаких действий, которые привели бы к уменьшению доли воды другой стороны на участке от «Камал-Хана» до «Дуст-Мохаммада», который являлся последней точкой вододеления.

усилиям США этот процесс был приостановлен, в результате чего США предложили Ирану сформировать беспристрастную комиссию по водораспределению реки Гильменд. Учитывая геополитическую ситуацию в регионе и сложившуюся в результате действий СССР неблагоприятную обстановку в области безопасности Иран принял предложение США [16:41].

По решению американской комиссии доля Ирана от вод реки Гильменд была установлена в среднем на уровне 22 м<sup>3</sup> в секунду. Во время засухи эта цифра могла еще больше снизиться.

Достигнутые при поддержке Великобритании, Турции и США договоренности положили начало сложному процессу демаркации границ между Афганистаном и Ираном. В этом смысле сторонам удалось зафиксировать значительный результат. Однако с точки зрения решения водной проблемы не удалось принять решение, приемлемое для обеих сторон.

### **Особенности договора подписанного между Ираном и Афганистаном в 1973 году относительно реки Гильменд**

В контексте соперничества, возникшего в 1960-ые годы между СССР и США из за Афганистана, Иран с целью занятия благоприятной позиции на переговорах по водному вопросу предоставил Афганистану 300 миллионов долларов для осуществления сельскохозяйственного проекта в бассейне Гильменд [27:398]. В этот период между Ираном и Афганистаном налаживается взаимовыгодное экономическое сотрудничество. Афганистан использовал территорию Ирана как основной транзитный маршрут, а Иран использовал территорию Афганистана как крупный рынок для экспорта иранских товаров [15:163].

С постепенным развитием сельского хозяйства потребность в воде увеличилась. В 1970-1972гг. из-за зафиксированной засухи в 1970-1972гг. уровень воды реки Гильменд значительно снизился, что вызвало беспорядки в Систане.

Иран и Афганистан, понимая важность решения внутренних и внешних вызовов, начали вести интенсивные переговоры для подписания всеобъемлющего соглашения по вопросу воды. 13 марта 1973г. Иран и Афганистан подписали соглашение по реке Гильменд [30].

По соглашению Иран должен получать 820 млн м<sup>3</sup> воды в год. Доля Ирана в дельте реки составляла 22 м<sup>3</sup> в секунду. В соответствии с соглашением, чтобы вода реки поступала в озеро Хамун, вода дельты Гильменда не должна была использоваться. Иран должен был купить 2 м<sup>3</sup> воды из Афганистана. Кроме того, Иран получает дополнительные 2 м<sup>3</sup> воды в качестве дара от шаха Афганистана Мохаммада Захера шаху Ирана Мохаммаду Резе. В результате общая доля Ирана в воде реки Гильменд составляет 26 м<sup>3</sup> в секунду.

Договор 1973 года отличается от других соглашений, подписанных ранее, своей легитимностью и тем, что он был приемлем для обеих сторон. Если

предыдущие договоренности между Ираном и Афганистаном были достигнуты в полукOLONIALных условиях и в результате внешнего давления, то в этом случае страны имели более высокий уровень суверенитета.

Переворот в 1974г. в Афганистане и Исламская революция в 1979г. в Иране, ввод советских войск в Афганистан, возникшая в результате нестабильная ситуация в Афганистане, ирано-иракская война, а также гражданская война, начавшаяся в Афганистане в начале 1990-х гг., объективно не позволили Ирану и Афганистану углубить начатое сотрудничество по решению водных проблем.

### **Подходы Ирана и Афганистана в области обеспечения прав на воду**

После Исламской революции вопрос воды всегда был в повестке дня всех правительств Ирана и Афганистана. Стороны, ссылаясь на подписанный в 1973г. и действующий до сих пор договор подчеркнули, что верны [49] своим обязательствам по договору, подчеркнув необходимость разрешения разногласий в правовом порядке [43].

В 1970-1990гг. из-за долгой засухи значительно сократились водные ресурсы рек Гильменд и Теджен. В Иране и Афганистане в связи с ростом населения потребление воды увеличилось, создав новые проблемы. В 2001г. из Гильменда в иранскую провинцию Систан утекло всего 48 млн м<sup>3</sup> воды, в результате чего озеро Хамун полностью высохло.

Первый серьезный водный кризис между Ираном и Афганистаном возник в 1996 году, когда пришедшие к власти талибы перекрыли сток воды из реки Гильменд к иранской границе. В целях давления на талибов Иран попытался перевести обсуждение решения проблемы в ООН [32:245].

В целом Иран и Афганистан не имеют разногласий по принципам договора в 1973г., проблема была связана с выполнением договора. Согласно договору, Иран имеет право направить представителей в район «Каджак» находящийся в верхней части реки для измерения воды. Однако в 2002г. по соображениям безопасности Афганистан не разрешил Ирану посетить этот район. Отсутствие информации не дало Ирану возможности оценить на каких условиях Афганистан выполнил свои обязательства.

Изучение событий последних двух десятилетий показывает, что Иран и Афганистан в основном уклоняются от выполнения своих обязательств, когда внутренняя ситуация в одной из стран становится напряженной. Стороны, иногда пользуясь сложившейся ситуацией, увеличивают свою долю воды из приграничных рек за счет строительства новых инфраструктур. Например, Иран и Туркменистан, воспользовавшись нестабильной ситуацией в Афганистане, в 2004г. на пограничной реке Теджен (Герируд) построили водохранилище «Дружба» [12], игнорируя позицию Афганистана несмотря на то, что Теджен берет свое начало из Афганистана.

Афганистан в ответ на такие действия для регулирования стока воды из приграничных рек построил водохранилище Салма [1] на реке Теджен при

поддержке Индии. После его эксплуатации поток реки Теджен к иранской границе после значительно уменьшился [19].

В 2001-2014гг. во время ответных визитов лидеров Ирана и Афганистана водный вопрос всегда был одним из ключевых в двусторонней повестке. 2001 г. восстановительные работы в Афганистане после падения режима талибов, также формирование политической системы и неблагоприятная ситуация с безопасностью вокруг ядерной программы Ирана в период президентства Махмуда Ахмадинежада (2005-2013гг.) не позволили сторонам достичь содержательного соглашения по водным вопросам, но на этом этапе сторонам удалось справиться с кризисом, возникшим из-за проблемы воды.

В первый период президентства Хасана Рухани (2013-2017гг.), согласно принятой иранским правительством концепции политики соседства, Тегеран попытался обеспечить системное решение своих проблем с Афганистаном. В ходе встреч с афганскими властями иранская сторона подчеркнула необходимость создания совместной комиссии [18] по сотрудничеству в области водных ресурсов и экологии, подписания отдельного соглашения по решению экологических проблем озера Хамун [40]. В своей работе «Водная дипломатия» заместитель министра иностранных дел Ирана Аббас Арагчи (2018-2021гг.) предложил [8:97] использовать возможность, предоставляемую концепцией «виртуальной воды», для разрешения водных проблем с соседями и превратить «водный конфликт» во взаимовыгодное сотрудничество<sup>7</sup>.

До государственного переворота талибов в Афганистане (август 2021г.) в повестку дня Ирана и Афганистана входило подписание документа о стратегическом партнерстве, одним из пунктов которого было решение водных вопросов [44:89]. За последнее десятилетие водная проблема с Афганистаном стала играть большое значение для безопасности Ирана. Об этом свидетельствуют заявления духовного лидера Ирана Али Хаменеи [9] и начальника Генерального штаба ВС ИРИ Мохаммада Багери [10], в которых подчеркивается необходимость безоговорочной реализации прав Ирана на воду.

За время правления Ашрафа Гани (2014-2021гг.) правительство Афганистана реализовало ряд проектов по управлению водными ресурсами страны [2]. Их главная цель - достижение энергетической независимости [46], увеличение орошаемых территорий сельскохозяйственного значения и борьба с опустыниванием [37].

По мнению Ирана, если сторонам удастся решить вопросы активизации озера Хамун и возникновения песчаных бурь [21], то не только будет восстановлено взаимное доверие между двумя ираноязычными странами, но

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<sup>7</sup> Идея торговли «виртуальной водой» заключается в том, что страна, у которой есть проблема с водой, может получать воду из соседней страны, взамен возвращая ей такую сельскохозяйственную продукцию, для производства которой требуется значительное количество воды, но это страна не имеет достаточных возможностей для ее производства.

и появится возможность развивать взаимовыгодные и долгосрочные программы. В ответ на обвинения Ирана в адрес Афганистана в создании экологических проблем, Кабул призывает Тегеран политизировать водную проблему [5], вместо того чтобы отвлекать внимание общественности [17] от социальных проблем Систана, эффективно управлять водными ресурсами страны, не создавая экологических проблем для соседней страны [52]. Кстати, из-за атмосферы недоверия Иран и ещё одна ираноязычная страна - Таджикистан, до сих пор не могут наладить эффективное сотрудничество [20:279].

Для Афганистана неприемлем подход Ирана [23], согласно которому потребность в воде должна учитываться при определении доли речной воды. По утверждению афганской стороны, река Гильменд является сезонной рекой, следовательно невозможно обеспечить Иран регулярной водой [47].

Во время президентства Ашрафа Гани не только обострились разногласия между Ираном и Афганистаном из-за воды, но и стороны начали говорить друг с другом на языке предварительных условий и угроз. Иран пригрозил прекратить помощь афганским беженцам [53], а Афганистан заявил, что больше не будет предоставлять Ирану бесплатную воду [4]. Президент Афганистана потребовал от Тегерана поставки нефти в Афганистан в обмен на поставку более 820 млн м<sup>3</sup> воды [25].

Анализируя официальные позиции Ирана и Афганистана, можно констатировать, что подходы сторон к водному вопросу принципиально различаются, а действия противоречивы. Иногда проблемы пытаются решить путем сотрудничества, но в то же время используются инструменты давления [48] с целью получения больше воды из Афганистана<sup>8</sup>.

### **Водная проблема в Исламском эмирате Афганистана**

После второго переворота талибов в Афганистане в 2021г. водный фактор вновь стал играть ключевую роль.

В настоящее время в силу ряда факторов Исламская Республика Иран по-прежнему уклоняется от официального признания талибов, выдвигая ряд предварительных условий. Однако в то же время иранские власти находятся в активном контакте с временным правительством талибов, пытаясь решить вопросы, связанные с афганскими беженцами, водными проблемами и безопасностью границ.

Если Ашраф Гани предлагал Ирану сделку «вода в обмен на нефть», то талибы пытались использовать формулу «вода в обмен на признание». В

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<sup>8</sup> Например, в одном из своих выступлений депутат парламента Ирана Мохаммад Саргази предупредил, что «если Афганистан не будет поставлять Ирану достаточно воды, то Иран перестанет оказывать помощь афганцам». Он намекнул, что Иран снабжает водой и топливом жителей поселения Зарендж в Афганистане. Около 3,5 миллионов афганцев используют иранскую питьевую воду Ирана.



ответ иранская сторона предлагает формулу «вода в обмен на поддержку афганских беженцев, проживающих в Иране» и «вода в обмен на предоставление транзитного маршрута Афганистану».

После визита [50] министра иностранных дел временного правительства талибов Амира Хана Мутаги в Тегеран в январе 2022г. высокопоставленные официальные лица Ирана заявили, согласно решению талибов, необходимое количество воды из водохранилища «Камал-хан» будет направлено в Иран. В то время как официальные иранские СМИ расценили это событие как дипломатическую победу [26] правительства президента Ирана Эбрагима Раиси, талибы отрицали, что вода «Камаль Хан» течет в Иран, и утверждали, что водохранилище открыто по просьбе жителей афганского района Нимруз.

После опровержения талибов беспокойство в иранской провинции Систан быстро переросло в акции протеста [38]. В январе 2022 года жители Хамуна, Забола и Нимруза на нулевой ирано-афганской границе в населенном пункте Милак, организовали акцию протеста, требуя [39], чтобы Афганистан обеспечил права Ирана на воду из Гильменда. Демонстранты требовали от иранских властей начать серьезные переговоры с афганскими властями, угрожая закрыть для талибов импортно-транзитный маршрут [14].

31 января 2022 года официальный представитель МИД Ирана Саид Хатибзаде призвал талибов соблюдать взятые на себя обязательства [45], отметив, что Афганистан в 2021 году поставил в Иран только 5% воды. В связи с этим, по словам посла Ирана в Афганистане Бахадура Аминиана, почти все правительства Афганистана, в том числе и талибы, отвели в пустыни поток миллионов м<sup>3</sup> воды, который должен был поставляться в Иран, чтобы он не дошел до Ирана [22].

Случаи инцидентов из-за проблемы воды между Ираном и Афганистаном во время короткого правления талибов показывают, насколько уязвима обстановка в плане безопасности. Поэтому до официального признания правительства талибов не удастся избежать пограничных инцидентов, более того - достичь содержательных договоренностей по водным, а также другим вопросам.

### **Заключение**

1. Для основательного решения водного вопроса между Ираном и Афганистаном необходимо, чтобы между сторонами создалась атмосфера взаимного доверия. Факторы безопасности, также социально-экономические и экологические факторы, возникшие в последние два десятилетия, препятствуют формированию такой атмосферы. Попытки иранских и афганских властей найти комплексное решение проблемы после Исламской революции не увенчались успехом. Водный вопрос сейчас настолько усложнился, что решить его можно только при наличии политической воли. Однако, поскольку обе стороны не могут игнорировать социально-экономическое положение населения и социальное давление при принятии

политического решения, они будут более склонны к принятию популистских решений во избежание обострения внутренней ситуации.

2. Направления гидрополитики, проводимой Ираном и Афганистаном, свидетельствуют о том, что стороны и в будущем продолжат использовать водный фактор как инструмент давления.

3. Оценивая заявления военно-политического руководства Ирана по водному вопросу, можно констатировать, что водный вопрос уже давно перестал быть вопросом чисто экологического и сельскохозяйственного значения. Учитывая этнорелигиозную картину иранской провинции Систан и Белуджистан и вызовы, угрожающие провинции (терроризм, сепаратизм), силы безопасности Ирана крайне чувствительны к водной проблеме. Афганистан - стратегически важный сосед для Ирана. Водный вопрос является важным фактором, который ставит Иран перед серьезной дилеммой. С одной стороны, Тегеран не может ставить под угрозу двусторонние отношения из-за социально-экономических проблем провинции Систан-Белуджистан, но, с другой стороны, нерешенность водного вопроса может обострить и без того напряженную ситуацию в провинции Ирана Систан и Белуджистан, что приведет к пограничным столкновениям, которые в свою очередь могут перерасти в масштабный конфликт.

4. Продолжающиеся вооруженные столкновения на границе Ирана и Афганистана после формирования временного правительства талибов в Афганистане, а также тот факт, что соседние с Афганистаном страны официально не признали правительство талибов, делают практически невозможным достижение четких договоренностей с талибами.

5. Иран, несмотря на жесткие публичные заявления, в своей реальной политике продолжит проводить осторожную политику в отношении талибов. Поскольку если они будут давить на талибов в вопросе воды, то талибы просто перекроют воду реки Гильменд, протекающей в Иран, как они это сделали в 1990-е годы. В этом случае Ирану придется прибегнуть к жестким мерам для решения проблемы, что, однако, не исходит из стратегических интересов Ирана.

6. Тот факт, что Иран не исключает вариант пересмотра соглашения 1973 года, исходя из потребностей жителей бассейна реки Гильменд, никогда не будет приемлем для Афганистана. Спрос на воду у обеих сторон будет расти. Река Гильменд физически не в состоянии удовлетворить требования сторон. Взаимное давление может обеспечить только краткосрочные решения. Следовательно, решить водный вопрос комплексно можно только путем взаимных уступок (Иран может либо заплатить за бесперебойную, регулируемую подачу воды нефтью, либо не брать с Афганистана деньги за транзит) путем подписания нового соглашения в результате реальных шагов.

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## THE WATER ISSUE IN IRAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS

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**Keywords:** Iran, Afghanistan, Taliban, water, dam, river, delta, Hilmend, Harirud, Tejen.

The problems with the Iranian-Afghan water issue are the result of the demarcation of the border between the two countries caused by external interference at different historical periods. Over the past 150 years, four agreements have been signed between Iran and Afghanistan on the use of water from border rivers, but they have never been fully implemented.

The issue of water resources is a very sensitive for Iran and Afghanistan. Over the years, the emergence of complex environmental, agricultural, economic, social, legal, security, political and military factors has exacerbated the situation.

Out of geopolitical interests, Great Britain and Russia divided the territories of Iran and Afghanistan into zones of influence in 1907, essentially depriving these countries of

their sovereignty. In this situation, the settlement of border disputes between Iran and Afghanistan was entrusted to a third party, namely Great Britain, Turkey and the United States.

Since the aforementioned countries were guided by their own interests when drawing the border between Iran and Afghanistan, as a result of the demarcation between the sides, it was not possible to find a solution to the water use of the Helmand River that would satisfy both Iran and Afghanistan.

Iran and Afghanistan, as sovereign states, first began direct talks to resolve the water issue at the beginning of the 1970s. In 1973, the first and the only contract still in force was signed.

In order to fully resolve the water issue between Iran and Afghanistan, it is essential to create an atmosphere of mutual trust between the two sides. The security, socio-economic and environmental factors that have emerged over the last two decades have hindered the formation of such an atmosphere. Attempts by the Iranian and Afghan authorities to find a comprehensive solution to the problem after the Islamic Revolution have failed. The water issue is now so complicated that it can only be resolved through political will. However, since both sides cannot but consider the socio-economic situation of the population and social pressures when making a political decision, they will be more inclined to make populist decisions in order to avoid aggravation of the internal situation.

The hydropolitical policy directions pursued by Iran and Afghanistan indicate that the sides will also continue to use the water factor as a tool of pressure in the near future.

Evaluating the statements of the Iranian military-political management on the water issue, it can be stated that the water issue has long ceased to be a merely ecological and agricultural one. Given the ethno-religious picture of the Sistan-Baluchestan province of Iran and the challenges threatening the province (terrorism, separatism), Iranian security forces are extremely sensitive to the water issue.

Afghanistan is a strategically significant neighbor for Iran. The water issue is the possible factor that puts Iran in a serious dilemma. On the one hand, Tehran cannot jeopardize bilateral relations due to socio-economic problems in Sistan-Baluchestan, but on the other hand, failure to resolve the water issue can exacerbate the already tense situation in the province, leading to border clashes, which, in turn, could escalate into a large-scale conflict.

Regular armed clashes on the Iranian-Afghan border since the formation of the Taliban interim government in Afghanistan, as well as the fact that Afghanistan's neighboring countries have not formally recognized the Taliban authorities, make it almost impossible to reach definite agreements.

Iran, despite tough public statements, will continue to pursue a cautious policy towards the Taliban in its real politics. If it puts pressure on the Taliban over water issue, the Taliban will simply block the flow of the Hirmand River into Iran, as they did in the 1990s. In that case, Iran will have to resort to tough measures to solve the problem, which, however, is not in Iran's strategic interests.

The fact that Iran considers the matter of reviewing the contract of 1973 while taking into account the needs of the people of the Hirmand River Basin is unrealistic and it will never be acceptable for Afghanistan. The demand for water on both sides will increase. The Hirmand River is not physically able to meet the demand of both sides. Mutual pressure can only ensure short-term solutions. Consequently, the water issue can be resolved comprehensively only through reciprocal concessions (*Iran can either pay for*

*uninterrupted, regulated water supply with oil or not charge transit money from Afghanistan)* and by signing a new agreement based on this compromise.

## ՋՐԻ ԽՆԴԻՐԸ ԻՐԱՆԻ ԵՎ ԱՖՂԱՆՍՏԱՆԻ ՀԱՐԱԲԵՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐՈՒՄ

*Արմեն Իսրայելյան*

**Քանալի բառեր՝** Իրան, Աֆղանստան, թալիբան, ջուր, ջրամբար, գետ, Հիլմենդ, Հարիռուդ, Թեջեն:

Իրանի և Աֆղանստանի միջև ջրի հարցում առկա խնդիրները պատմական տարբեր շրջափուլերում այդ երկու երկրների միջև արտաքին միջամտությամբ իրականացված սահմանազատման հետևանք են: Վերջին 150 տարվա ընթացքում Իրանի և Աֆղանստանի միջև սահմանային գետերի ջրերի օգտագործման վերաբերյալ 4 համաձայնագիր է ստորագրվել, որոնք, սակայն, երբեք լիարժեք չեն կատարվել:

Ջրային ռեսուրսների հարցն Իրանի և Աֆղանստանի համար չափազանց զգայուն հարց է: Տասնամյակների ընթացքում բնապահպանական, գյուղատնտեսական, տնտեսական, սոցիալական, իրավական, անվտանգային, քաղաքական և ռազմական գործոնների առաջացումն ավելի է բարդացրել իրադրությունը:

Մեծ Բրիտանիան ու Ռուսաստանն աշխարհաքաղաքական շահերից ելնելով 1907 թ. Իրանի և Աֆղանստանի տարածքները բաժանեցին ազդեցության գոտիների՝ փաստացի այդ երկրներին զրկելով ինքնիշխանությունից: Այդպիսի իրադրությունում Իրանի և Աֆղանստանի միջև սահմանային վեճերի կարգավորումը վերապահվեց երրորդ կողմին, համապատասխանաբար Մեծ Բրիտանիային և Ռուսաստանին:

Քանի որ վերոնշյալ երկրներն Իրանի և Աֆղանստանի միջև սահմանը գծելիս առաջին հերթին առաջնորդվել են իրենց շահերով, կողմերի միջև իրականացված դեմարկացիայի արդյունքում այդպես էլ չի հաջողվել սահմանային Հելմանդ (Հիրմանդ) գետի ջրի օգտագործման վերաբերյալ այնպիսի լուծում գտնել, որը կբավարարեր Իրանին ու Աֆղանստանին:

Իրանն ու Աֆղանստանը՝ որպես սուվերեն երկրներ, առաջին անգամ ջրի խնդրի լուծման նպատակով ուղիղ բանակցություններ են սկսել 1970-ական թթ. սկզբին: 1973 թ. ստորագրվել է առաջին և մինչ օրս գործող միակ պայմանագիրը:

Իրանի և Աֆղանստանի միջև առկա ջրային խնդիրը հիմնովին լուծելու համար անհրաժեշտ է, որպեսզի կողմերի միջև փոխվստահության մթնոլորտ ձևավորվի: Վերջին երկու տասնամյակի ընթացքում ի հայտ եկած անվտանգային, սոցիալ-տնտեսական, բնապահպանական գործոնները խոչընդոտում են այդ-

պիսի մթնոլորտի ձևավորվմանը: Իսլամական հեղափոխությունից հետո Իրանի և Աֆղանստանի իշխանությունների՝ խնդիրը համապարփակ լուծելու փորձերը ծախողվել են: Ջրային խնդիրը ներկայումս այնքան է բարդացել, որ հարցը հնարավոր է լուծել միայն քաղաքական կամք ցուցաբերելով: Սակայն, քանի որ երկու կողմն էլ քաղաքական որոշում կայացնելիս չեն կարող հաշվի չառնել բնակչության սոցիալ-տնտեսական իրավիճակն ու հասարակական ճնշումները, ներքին իրադրության սրումից խուսափելու նպատակով ավելի շատ հակված են լինելու պոպուլիստական որոշումներ ընդունելու:

Իրանի և Աֆղանստանի վարած հիդրոքաղաքականության ուղղությունները վկայում են, որ կողմերն առաջիկայում ևս ջրի գործոնը շարունակելու են որպես ճնշման գործիք կիրառել:

Գնահատելով ջրային խնդրի վերաբերյալ Իրանի ռազմաքաղաքական դեկավարության հայտարարությունները՝ կարելի է փաստել, որ ջրի խնդիրը վաղուց դադարել է լինել զուտ էկոլոգիական և գյուղատնտեսական նշանակության հարց: Նկատի ունենալով Իրանի Սիստան և Բելուջիստան նահանգի էթնոկրոնական պատկերը և նահանգին սպառնացող մարտահրավերները (ահաբեկչություն, անջատողականություն)՝ Իրանի անվտանգության ուժերը ջրի խնդրի նկատմամբ չափազանց զգայուն են:

Աֆղանստանն Իրանի համար ռազմավարական կարևորություն ունեցող հարևան է: Ջրային խնդիրն այն կարևոր գործոնն է, որն Իրանին լուրջ երկընտրանքի առջև է կանգնեցնում: Մի կողմից Թեհրանը չի կարող Սիստան և Բելուջիստան նահանգի սոցիալ-տնտեսական խնդիրների պատճառով սպառնալիքի տակ դնել երկկողմ հարաբերությունները, սակայն, մյուս կողմից էլ ջրի խնդիրը չլուծելը կարող է սրել առանց այն էլ լարված իրադրությունն Իրանի Սիստան և Բելուջիստան նահանգում՝ հանգեցնելով սահմանային բախումների, որոնք էլ իրենց հերթին կարող են վերաճել լայնածավալ հակամարտության:

Աֆղանստանում թալիբների ժամանակավոր կառավարության ձևավորումից հետո Իրանի և Աֆղանստանի սահմանին պարբերաբար տեղի ունեցող զինված բախումները, Աֆղանստանի սահմանակից երկրների կողմից թալիբների իշխանությունը պաշտոնապես չճանաչելու հանգամանքը գրեթե անհնար են դարձնում թալիբների հետ հստակ պայմանավորվածություններ ձեռք բերելու հնարավորությունը:

Իրանը, չնայած հրապարակային կոշտ հայտարարություններին, իրական քաղաքականության մեջ թալիբների նկատմամբ կշարունակի զգուշավոր քաղաքականություն վարել: Քանի որ, եթե ջրի հարցում թալիբների նկատմամբ ճնշում գործադրի, ապա թալիբները պարզապես Իրան հոսող Հիլմանդ գետի ջուրն ամբողջությամբ կփակեն, ինչպես դա արել են 1990-ականներին: Այդ դեպքում Իրանը խնդիրը լուծելու նպատակով ստիպված կլինի դիմել կոշտ միջոցների, ինչը, սակայն, չի բխում Իրանի ռազմավարական շահերից:

Այն որ Իրանը դիտարկում է 1973 թ. պայմանագիրը վերանայելու հարցը՝ հիմք ընդունելով Հիլմանդ գետի ջրային ավազանի բնակչության կարիքները,



իրատեսական չէ, և երբեք ընդունելի չի լինի Աֆղանստանի համար: Ջրի պահանջարկը երկու կողմի մոտ էլ գնալով մեծանալու է: Հիրմանդ գետը ֆիզիկապես չունի կողմերի անհրաժեշտ պահանջարկը բավարարելու հնարավորություն: Փոխադարձ ճնշումները միայն կարճաժամկետ լուծումներ կարող են տալ: Հետևաբար ջրային խնդիրը կարող է համապարփակ լուծում ստանալ միայն փոխադարձ զիջումների (*անխափան, կանոնակարգված ջրամատակարարման դիմաց Իրանը կարող է կամ նավթով վճարել, կամ Աֆղանստանից տարանցման գումար չգանձել*) և իրատեսական քայլերի արդյունքում նոր պայմանագրի ստորագրմամբ:

## **IN THE FLOW OF HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A THEORETICAL PROFILE OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA\***

*Orazio Maria Gnerre*

### **Abstract**

This paper intends to evaluate some elements that make up the worldview of contemporary China. To do this, these factors are dealt with (among others): the positioning that China assumes and wants to assume on the planet, and the ensemble of geopolitical theories that derive from it; and the conception of politics with respect to centralization / decentralization issues. In addition to this, the role of the economic (and geoeconomic) vision of contemporary China is also highlighted, in particular in relation to the thoughts of Xi Jinping expressed in 2017 at the Davos Forum. It becomes important to understand, in this sense, the idea of globalization and multipolarity that China extends, as a guiding principle, to its foreign policy. This is because it is based on cultural roots of distant ancestry. Through these interrelated interpretative levels, it is possible to understand the function that China plays within the contemporary world and its contribution of ideas and visions.

**Keywords:** People's Republic of China, International relations, Geopolitics, centralization, decentralization.

### **Introduction**

Much has been said and written about cultural roots and their outcomes of Chinese politics. The problem that we want to assert with this text is that the Chinese conception has profound developments and premises of a geo-spatial type. Trying to understand contemporary China simply through some interpretations of the state-party-army relationship of the Maoist era, or with some formulations of President Xi Jinping extrapolated from the context of origin can certainly be useful, but it does not define a perspective that, for him, nature is much larger. Chinese thought is the theoretical perspective of a great power that lives immersed in the global world and that, since the regeneration of the state, was perfectly aware of the weight it could play in world balance. But for China, international politics is not a mere game of powers, but a holistic vision that moves from the local to the global. This perspective, in reality, can be traced in many ways as a general pattern of national "world views", but in China it has been formulated in a very coherent way and presents some essential elements that we are going to expose here.

### **China and the world**

Talking about the People's Republic of China is very important today. Even if they

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are not used to thinking in these terms, China is in fact one of the two powers that have emerged unscathed and in good health from the Cold War. Although it did not fight it as a pre-eminent “warrior”, it experienced strong moments of tension with both sides: the United States and the Soviet Union.

Simplistically associated in the Western imagination with the history of Eastern Communism, it has actually established itself as an autonomous power and decisive political force in the dynamics of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, thanks to a particular and highly personal theoretical profile, as well as an independent reading of world political and social events.

To understand therefore the theoretical profile of contemporary China, it will be necessary to take into account two fundamental elements: its recent history and its geopolitical positioning, both of which it derives from its effective geographical position in terms of access to resources and administration of the territory, as well as its place within the dense network of international relations. In a single word, China's relationship with the “world”, here understood as a cognitive link between space and history, where these two factors, in a corresponding relationship, influence each other.

First of all, it will be necessary to clarify how China properly entered modernity and was confronted with a true technical development only starting from the communist revolution. Previously, it has experienced that phenomenon also known as the “great divergence”, for which the West has overtaken the East since the beginning of the second millennium, leaving an impressive gap between these two worlds, in the areas of technical-scientific development and productive forces [6:17].

Paradoxically, in ancient times China, predominantly administered through the imperial institution, distinguished itself precisely for its important scientific discoveries and great technological inventions, as well as for an administrative system that, despite its obsolescence, lasted right up to the revolution. The separation that therefore took place between East and West was both the result of a certain impetus that took place in the European Middle Ages [8:1-30], for which there was even talk of a “medieval industrial revolution” [2], and of contextual factors among the most disparate.

As Diamonds reminds us, however, China suffered this actual fracture much later than the rest of the world, if it is true that “at the beginning of the 1400s, China held the technological supremacy. He invented, among other things, gunpowder, compass, cast iron, paper and printing. Almost a century before Europeans embarked on ocean navigation, China regularly sends shipments of up to 28,000 men to the east coast of Africa, embarked on fleets of hundreds of ships, much larger than Columbus's caravels” [1].

A very common reading that justifies the overcoming by the West first and the widening of the gap then is that of a political nature, a thesis supported by Diamonds himself, for which the determining factor for the divergence between Europe and China would have been an isolationism that prevented this country

from accessing the resources provided by colonial businesses [1]. This constitutes, as we shall see, a very important precedent with respect to the Chinese “world view”. In summary, few correct choices, in a period of technological development that is capital for the future of all humanity, have determined which sectors of the globe would be able to access those factors necessary for the exponential growth of development. However, that China had been a “victim” of a certain completely contextual asymmetry was also a common opinion in Europe, which over time had passed from the reverential relations it had with the so-called Indies and as witnessed by Marco Polo's *Million* or by the travels of evangelizers like Matteo Ricci, to an ever-greater political interference in the country. This sentiment was all contained in Napoleon's famous assertion that China should be left in its stupor, because the world would tremble when he woke up.

As written by Carl Schmitt, the construction of the international political framework of the modern world took place through the affirmation of Eurocentrism following the Peace of Westphalia and the subsequent colonial partition of the world [14]. This phenomenon has cut off from the organization of the new world the nations that did not belong to Christianity, that is, to the European assembly<sup>1</sup>. The Asian nations, including China and Japan, from the nineteenth century onward (a period marked by the great social and technical repercussion of industrialization and the rise of the United States of America which put Eurocentrism in crisis) had to live under constant threat from the West. With industrialization, a new type of social relationship was affirming, the capitalist one, and a new form of colonization, that is, imperialism. The scholar Han Suyin summarizes the real condition of China in this particular situation as follows:

“[In] the period 1840-1949 [...] there were unequal treaties, extra-territorial rights, war indemnities, concessions, occupation by foreign troops, massacres, looting of Chinese cities . [...] The Chinese economy was shattered by the double shock of Western aggression and internal disintegration caused by the corruption and inefficiency of the Manchus. The destruction of the economic base of feudalism, the peasant economy, created a labor market and a market for industrial products, opening up to capitalism the possibility of developing also in China. But Chinese capitalism could not develop, because there was already another, and much stronger one. Mao Tse-Tung wrote: “First of all, the creation of a capitalist society in China will not be allowed by international capitalism, that is, by imperialism. The whole history of modern China is the history of the imperialist aggression against China, of the imperialist opposition to the independence of China and the development of its own capitalism”.

Western monopoly capitalism exported capital to the areas it dominated to benefit from their raw materials and cheap labor, precisely because it feared the rise

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<sup>1</sup> “Christianity” was the name given to all European peoples, but not necessarily to all Christian peoples, as shown by the exemplary case of the Kingdom of Ethiopia, which despite being Christian, nevertheless suffered colonialism.

of rival Asian industrial powers and had an overwhelming superiority in controlling outlets. Any Chinese attempt at autonomous capitalist development and industrialization was bound to run up against deliberate obstacles. [...] Massive industrialization by a strong and independent bourgeoisie was impossible. And it was not allowed to protect indigenous production on the domestic market. Western capitalism imposed control over customs, tariffs on imports, international trade, communications; the customs and railway revenues were used for the payment of war indemnities and the repayment of loans” [17:33-35].

This highlights another point of capital importance: how the communist revolution in China was in effect a national liberation struggle that inaugurated the long period of transformation that was decolonization.

When Mao made the decision to continue fighting Chiang Kai-shek after the Second World War, he defined a decisive breaking point between what would be the Chinese line of conduct and the positions and fixed points of the Soviet Union. If Stalin famously inaugurated the doctrine of “socialism in one country”, according to which the pole of aggregation and command of the world communist strategy was to be solely the Soviet Union, in alliance with “progressive” regimes of different nature around the rest of the globe, Mao's idea was quite different. He received the order from the Soviet Union to govern with the Kuomintang, but he did not accept it, laying the first stone for the construction of the Chinese road to socialism.

After the war of liberation from the Japanese occupation, Mao's priority became to expel all foreign imperialist influences and lay the foundations for a general modernization of the country. To do this, it was not possible, according to Mao, to persist in the alliance with the Kuomintang, much less to submit to the orders of the Third International which promoted it.

Mao's idea that each country had its own path to socialism [10], and which in fact was implemented in Deng Xiaoping's formulations on “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, promoted an international action of non-interference, favoring cooperation over political and military confrontation. It has often been reiterated, during the tug-of-war between the United States and China over the development of nuclear power, while the United States attempted a containment policy towards the Asian country, that this weapon would only serve self-defense purposes. At the same time, the Chinese government reiterated that any imperialist operation by the West would be opposed to the benefit of the nations under attack, in compliance with the country's guiding principles.

The break with Khrushchev, and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet technical personnel from China in 1960, with “[the] breaking of 343 contracts for experts and appendices to these contracts, [and the] abolition of 257 arrangements for scientific cooperation and technique” [17:91] gave way to a phase of freeing up knowledge and technical skills from abroad, strengthening China in the medium term.

All this helped to understand the importance of establishing a new system of

anti-hegemonic international relations, which will be implemented in the Non-Aligned Movement. In fact, the Bandung conference of 1955 was already moving in this direction. The focus on the Third World, in line with Mao's conceptualizations of the center and periphery, was part of the overall view of China.

The autonomy of China in the theoretical field also asserted itself in socio-economic matters, with the phase of reforms inaugurated by Deng. "Socialism with Chinese characteristics", so-called market socialism, veered in the direction of independent development in economic and social terms. Already the Chinese predilection for the structuring of a strong agricultural economy on which to build development set some not insignificant divergences from the Soviet Union, as well as clearly from the Western field, but the conception of an entirely innovative economic system in the imagination of the relations between the market, the productive forces and the power of the working class were fundamental in this distancing.

Of course, arguing that the reason why China survived the war unscathed was solely an economic one is an understatement: it is well known the importance that the United States gave to it in diplomacy as a political pivot to shift the confrontation with the Soviet colossus, but it was certainly spared from the crisis of socialism that occurred in the USSR also thanks to its innovative economic system, which kept in mind the growth characteristics intrinsic to the market.

However, after the symbolic end of an era, that of the bipolar conflict, China has moved towards a new phase of history with tools suitable for the new context. It turned out to be, more and more and better, a new world actor who has emerged from the tug-of-war between the blocks. Not only has it equipped itself with an apparatus of means necessary to "play" at its best on the international chessboard, but it has itself created the conditions of the era we are living in. Furthermore, it also has an autonomous and in some ways innovative conception of international relations, here understood in their side meaning of coexistence between nations and cooperation.

Not only was it a point of reference in the decolonization phase: we can say without a doubt that today, certainly together with India, it is at the forefront of the "reconvergence" movement, therefore a propulsive center of an unparalleled reterritorialization. The "great convergence" is characterized by an ever-greater growth in the standard of living of populations once disadvantaged in terms of economics and technical advancement. It is impossible to deny an important role to China in this great historical movement, considering at least the role of driving force of the Asian regional economy and the launch and support of important integration processes, especially from the energy point of view. To date, China is the second largest economy in the world by GDP per capita, a far cry from its conditions only sixty years ago. As Han Suyin points out, it has the largest population in the world on its side, which has made up for the initial lack of means in terms of labor force [17]. But this vast population, in addition to being a great

competitive advantage, also corresponds to the commitment that the Party has taken on for its livelihood, and its liberation from conditions of actual misery, towards progressive and constant improvement of living conditions.

The rise of China on the world stage brings with it very important transformations. This convergence process also makes us question the transformation of the international political system and could bring us a step closer to greater equality and cohesion between human groups [9].

### **Economy and society: the Chinese vision**

As we have said, one of the strengths that characterizes China in its present dimension is its independent vision of the socio-economic sphere. This modern state was born from a communist revolution. This historical element, still present in the collective memory as in the institutional one, carries with it a theoretical legacy and real repercussions in the present.

It is urgent once again to reiterate that the Chinese model has developed on very different paths from the Soviet one, which also nourishes its own legacy in the Russian Federation. Unlike Russia, however, this political tradition has not suffered a general collapse, and indeed has remained motionless in the national ideal Olympus. Rather, the coincidence that Mao postulated between socialist society and modern national history made it possible for socialism to evolve organically with society without dogmatic rigidities or irreparable fractures.

The general principles that were already affirmed by the revolution and by Mao, and which today are still fundamental for contemporary China, are those of national independence, which today is combined with the principle of respect for the national sovereignty of states, and the realization of a harmonious and socialist society. This last principle is more and more explicit by the Party, which to date extends the principle of harmony between the parties to the international scenario.

Beyond the *Great Leap Forward* and productive effort that China undertook to achieve after the revolution, it is important to underline how it created a system centered on developing a solid agricultural base for the country. Born in an agricultural region, Mao already promoted agricultural studies in the period of the *red bases*, thinking about the possible socialist organization of agricultural work. It is no coincidence that the role of agricultural laborers was very important in the revolution. Obtaining food self-sufficiency, as mentioned, served as the basis for the industrial development of the country. Although China is now an importer of grains, the lesson received from the socialist organization of agricultural production was that of the importance of greater decentralization of production.

A fundamental agrarian reform for the country was launched in 1952, through which the feudal system that blocked the country's growth in economic terms was abolished. The ten-year plan for the development of agriculture launched in 1956 had the aim of modifying, through agricultural labor, the whole of society, mobilizing it towards changing uses and practices. But it was in 1958, with the foundation of the communes, that the principle of decentralization was fully

explicit and put into practice. This principle, which gave a certain autonomy to the productive centers, thus created the foundations of a model that was also reflected in the political organization or military doctrine for nuclear war, which at the time was one of the main threats facing humanity. To date, the importance of equal and decentralized development is affirmed by the coordination of the same with regard to the regions [12:33], despite the endemic problems that manifest themselves in the accumulation mechanisms typical of moments of economic growth.

This pre-eminent role that in China was attributed to work, and in particular to the primary sector of agricultural production, is automatically reflected on society and therefore on morality. President Xi Jinping, for example, in line with Mao's traditional ideas on the subject, proposed in 2014 that national artists return to the countryside to better understand socialist values. There is no doubt that, for socialist thought as it has manifested itself at every latitude and in every form, work is one of the primary factors of human life. From work, both material and intellectual, comes production and improvement, that is, a qualitative increase in the standard of life, not in a merely material sense. This principle, often disregarded or abandoned in Western post-ideological societies, is still alive in China, and this too is a factor worthy of consideration when approaching the Chinese question.

The primacy of the productive element over the speculative one has two significant implications when we talk about the People's Republic of China: the first is that of the primacy of the real economy, the second is the importance of redistribution.

“China's financial rules are unlikely to match Wall Street's. The most likely scenario [if the Yuan becomes the dominant currency] would be the following: a world characterized by a much smaller size of the financial services sector (as a percentage of GDP) than today, similar to when the United States emerged as a hegemonic power towards the end of the Second World War. In the 1950s, financial services accounted for about 1% of US GDP, while in 2007 they accounted for more than 8%. [...] If China dictates the rules of global finance, it is possible to hypothesize a world less dependent on financial engineering and fast profits, which have so much inhibited development and real innovation. It would expand the use of equity rather than debt to finance business, and venture capital funds would not be the preserve of a privileged few. [...] Surely China is not the only country to provide capital to its entrepreneurs. The United States and Israel, for example, also finance manufacturing companies, but their funds are often directed towards those projects that have potential military applications (or in any case to extremely limited sectors), while China has supported solar energy projects, biotechnology and other sectors in ways completely disconnected from its military apparatus.

A Chinese-funded global world would likely see an explosion of public works. Not only did China constitute one of the first empires in the history of mankind, precisely through the construction of dams, bridges, canals and other structures for civilian use [11], but also in recent decades it has shown that it is capable of



transforming the own country and its material relations with the rest of the world. The increase in infrastructures in the world<sup>2</sup>, as it is happening, would create, if properly designed, more job opportunities and would increase the number and quality of economic activities, thus guaranteeing widespread economic development following an increase in access to credit and to the markets” [12:205-206].

Moreover, this “widespread economic development” is theorized by the government precisely as a corrective to the polarization between center and periphery due to the accumulation of capital. There is no doubt that the problem of redistribution processes is one of the fundamental issues in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, especially considering the possibility of creating economically depressed areas even in advanced countries, as in the case of the Appalachian Mountains region in the United States of America.

In this regard, it should be remembered that President Xi defined that “the commitment to eradicate poverty reflects China's people-centered philosophy” [21]. However, there is no doubt that the United States, currently the world's largest economy, recorded a poverty rate of 11.9% [18] in 2017, whereas China had reached 0.5% [19] a year earlier. This underlines how the Asian country “for decades [...] has experienced a sustained reduction in poverty rates” [19]. This type of commitment, which saw the first concretizations with the founding of the new China, would not even be conceivable without the central role that the state has assumed and assumes in the process of national development, and it certainly would not have been possible if the country had been subjected solely to the pressures of market forces, internal and external.

To date, China, in a new phase of international politics, and especially after the world détente between great powers<sup>3</sup> that took place with the end of the Cold War, has overcome a certain economic closure based on the guiding principle (however valid in many respects) of self-sufficiency. China has opened up to David Ricardo's teaching on the mutual benefit that nations can obtain from trade, and is a global promoter of this conception. Indeed, we can assert that it believes that trade is the main road on which diplomacy is grafted, and that a win-win relationship between nations centered on trade is the only way to overcome what Xi has called the Thucydides trap, the risk that the great powers run of weakening and destroying each other in unnecessary wars instead of collaborating in mutual development.

However, this vision is accompanied by a desire to review international relations in a non-hegemonic sense, and this brings with it some important consequences on the economic level: first of all the importance of building an international infrastructural network for the creation of a new geography of energy; secondly, the creation of important diplomatic relations with the nations exporting

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<sup>2</sup> A phenomenon in which China plays a prominent role.

<sup>3</sup> However, it has not put an end to the competition, nor has it put an end to the outbreak of wars, which have actually increased in number despite decreased in intensity.

raw materials and energy; finally, the attempt to promote a progressive de-dollarization, both to the advantage of the Yuan [12:205-206] and of other currencies such as the Euro.

All of this interacts with the global reality in various ways. On the one hand, China promotes a very clear idea of international relations, while on the other it modifies world political conditions with its very existence and thanks to its considerable specific weight.

### **Multipolarity**

The term "multipolarity" has often taken on different shades of meaning. Although it is clear to everyone that the Cold War represented a "bipolar" phase of world politics, and that something similar to a "unipolarism" of American origin has succeeded it, the current condition in which the world finds itself is uncertain. Under these new conditions, Antonio Gramsci's words remain valid according to which "the old dies and the new cannot be born" [5]. It is therefore not clear whether we are still living in a unipolar phase, albeit undermined by the rise of new prominent regional players, if we are in an effective multipolarity where the United States, China, the European Union and the Russian Federation are the main players, or if you are in a median condition between these first two.

To better understand the phase we are experiencing and also anticipate the changes of the future it is necessary to clarify the terminology. The concept of "multipolarity" is itself unclear. In the West, the interpretation prevails that it is a moment of interregnum in which, with the United States of America having lost the scepter of hegemony, other emerging poles would take its place without being able to override one another. It is also not clear whether this period is what we are experiencing or is yet to come.

To come to our interpretation<sup>4</sup>, we must begin by asserting that, in fact, there is incontrovertibly a crisis of US hegemony. The reasons are disparate, but the results are there for all to see. Although the context of history is by its nature surprising in its final outcomes, it is evident that the emergence of the aforementioned regional poles and of increasingly advanced actors in technological and economic terms is a considerable challenge for the previous international order. This is, moreover, strictly connected with the phenomenon we have already spoken of, the "great convergence", for which some peoples left on the sidelines of history are quickly making up for the time lost in the race for development. This is due to many reasons, one of which is certainly the centrifugal power of technology, which is opposed to the centripetal power of capitalist accumulation.

This phase, in which a power loses its grip on certain territorial areas, and in which new actors emerge in a still asymmetrical and partly chaotic context, can in our opinion be defined as "polycentrism", without disturbing the category of

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<sup>4</sup> I dealt with the difference between polycentrism and multipolarism in [3].

multipolarity. The concept of polycentrism emphasizes precisely on the multiplication of the centers of power that influence the web of international politics with their actions. Multipolarism, on the other hand, which could also be interpreted synonymously, is more correctly to be interpreted as a new form of multilateralism.

In fact, multipolarity is strongly supported by some countries in the international context, and the People's Republic of China is one of them. The general vision of China with respect to international politics is however very distant from an anarchic world fragmentation of the decision-making sphere, but is rather based on an alternative idea to the current one of globalization.

In the face of growing US protectionism that has manifested itself with the Trump administration, Xi Jinping's 2017 speech at the Davos Forum has already drawn a first difference between the globalization of poverty and "economic globalization", as he has called the advantages of international trade:

"Many of the problems troubling the world are not caused by economic globalization. For instance, the refugee waves from the Middle East and North Africa in recent years have become a global concern. Several million people have been displaced, and some small children lost their lives while crossing the rough sea. This is indeed heartbreaking. It is war, conflict and regional turbulence that have created this problem, and its solution lies in making peace, promoting reconciliation and restoring stability. The international financial crisis is another example. It is not an inevitable outcome of economic globalization; rather, it is the consequence of excessive chase of profit by financial capital and grave failure of financial regulation. Just blaming economic globalization for the world's problems is inconsistent with reality, and it will not help solve the problems.

From the historical perspective, economic globalization resulted from growing social productivity, and is a natural outcome of scientific and technological progress, not something created by any individuals or any countries. Economic globalization has powered global growth and facilitated movement of goods and capital, advances in science, technology and civilization, and interactions among peoples" [20].

It becomes clear in this discourse, how for the authorities of China there is a substantial difference between the forms of reproduction of misery generated by the dominant model of globalization, and a legitimate globalization of trade based on more precise and symmetrical rules.

And again, it is important to note that the People's Republic of China, like the Russian Federation which shares many geopolitical interests with it, is very respectful of the UN, in which it is also a member of the Security Council. That an international institution brings together the representatives of all countries and assists the concertation of global solutions to world problems is one of China's major interests. Rather, the regulatory role of international politics assumed by the United Nations, especially regarding the latest events in the Middle East, has often come into conflict with US exceptionalism. Not least among the issues, there is the

one for which the US has recently cut the funds to the World Health Organization following the explosion of the coronavirus epidemic of 2020, accusing the same institution of conniving the alleged Chinese responsibilities.

All this fits completely with the project also promoted by China of the BRICS [4], that is the deployment of the emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa and precisely China which has promoted in more than one case projects aimed at the greater redistribution of world power. That this project, like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, not only serves to cope with commercial and political competitors, but to promote greater stability and integration between countries is evident from the fact that the BRICS have promoted the integration of several projects, customs unions, industrial cooperation and active participation in global governance.

In the last period, following a style already seen in contemporary history, the United States has preferred to "close" itself commercially and attack a certain type of internationalist approach that has also often distinguished them in world politics. The term "globalism", which is endowed with a certain polysemic, has re-emerged directly in the political language of President Trump, not so much to designate the distortions of financial globalization or the imposition of the law of one country on others, but to negatively define the political concertation between states and the processes of international democracy of the United Nations. This process of the opening and closing of the United States, already investigated by Carl Schmitt as a means that the United States used to defeat Eurocentrism and establish itself as a hegemonic power [14], is also at the heart of Carlo Maria Santoro's reflection [13].

However, it is in this that we understand the difference between polycentrism as a fact and multipolarity as a project. If the United States, by withdrawing from the international scene, is pushing the advancement of polycentrism, a phase of relative political chaos (to which Xi also referred in his 2017 speech at the Davos Forum), so are China and the other countries that support a multipolar option believe that the integrative moment is fundamental to ensure a better future than the present. If the terms "polycentrism" and "multipolarism" seem analogous, even terminologically overlapping, in reality they refer to two very different concepts. The "centers" of polycentrism clearly represent those points of accumulation of political and capitalist power which are settling down, in economic terms, after the breaking of a monopoly similar to that produced by the phenomenon of Schumpeterian creative destruction. The "poles" of multipolarism, on the other hand, were already conceived as centers of irradiation of a framework of spatial order and integration by the forerunners of the multipolar idea, to be traced in Karl Haushofer with his geography of *pan-ideas* [7], and in Carl Schmitt with his conception of the great geopolitical spaces [16].

This integrative role, within a global reterritorialization that proceeds on the economic vector in general and energy in particular, has been completely assumed by China, whose activism in the development of infrastructural networks has precisely this purpose. Multipolarity for China is the project of a non-chaotic

globalization, in which the positive forces released and multiplied by the international market can be controlled and guided. The role of classical concepts such as State and People, which are experiencing difficult periods in the limitless extension of market dominance, is however very important and still central to China. A globalization that threatens these terms of reference is clearly seen as a dangerous globalization, a globalization of risk. Multipolarity therefore represents for China the necessary path to safeguard some non-negotiable principles with the mandatory nature of economic and technical development: the only safeguard against generalized poverty. This is accompanied by an idea typical of the Chinese people in their existence, and reiterated by Xi at the 2017 Davos Forum, according to which in moments of crisis it is only the union of efforts, in this case a global union, that makes it possible to solve problems [20].

### **Conclusions**

As we have seen, there are many aspects that structure Chinese thought today. All of these have very deep roots both in the tradition of thought of this civilization and in the policy launched with the Mao revolution. What we can clearly observe is how the world view, the conception of international relations, the role of China among other nations, the issue of centralization / decentralization and economic perspectives are all interrelated in Chinese thought, constituting a specific order of reasoning. It is therefore essential to take these principles into account, and to read the policy of the Asian country in light of them, on pain of not understanding the consequences of certain actions and declarations of its decision makers.

The role of the People's Republic of China is increasingly important on the international scene, and therefore it becomes important to understand how this actor relates to this scenario. One of the lessons of China's approach to international relations is that globality is always composed of multiplicity. We should continue to keep this basic concept in mind, in order not to fall into the traps of a thought that escapes the fundamental realism of the "concept of the political" [15].

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**ՊԱՏՄՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԵՎ ՄԻՋԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ՀԱՐԱԲԵՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ  
ՀՈՍՔՈՒՄ. ԺԱՄԱՆԱԿԱԿԻՑ ՉԻՆԱՍՏԱՆԻ ՏԵՍԱԿԱՆ ՆԿԱՐԱԳԻՐԸ**

*Օրացիո Մարիա Գներե*

**Բանալի բառեր՝** Չինաստանի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետություն, միջազգային հարաբերություններ, աշխարհաքաղաքականություն, կենտրոնացում, ապա-կենտրոնացում:

Արդի չինական քաղաքական մտքի զարգացման վրա բավականին մեծ ազդեցություն են գործել բազմաթիվ՝ քաղաքական, հասարակագիտական, տնտեսագիտական և այլ գործոններ: Այդ գործոնները շատ խորը արմատներ ունեն ինչպես չինական քաղաքակրթական իմաստասիրական ավանդույթի, այնպես էլ Մաո Ցզե Դունի (1893-1976 թթ.) 1966-1975 թթ. իրագործած «Մշակութային հեղափոխությամբ» սկսված քաղաքականության մեջ: Ամենայն հստակությամբ

կարելի է դիտարկել, որ պետք չի չինական աշխարհայացքը, միջազգային հարաբերությունների չինական աշխարհայացքային հայեցակարգը, Չինաստանի դերը այլ երկրների հետ հարաբերություններում, կենտրոնացման/ապակենտրոնացման խնդիրը և տնտեսական հեռանկարները փոխկապակցված են չինական աշխարհայացքում՝ կազմելով հիմնարար հատուկ կարգ: Հետևաբար, կարևոր է հաշվի առնել այդ սկզբունքները և ասիական երկրի հետ քաղաքականությունը դիտարկել այդ լույսի ներքո:

Ակնհայտ է, որ Չինաստանի Ժողովրդական Հանրապետության դերը միջազգային ասպարեզում՝ լինի տնտեսական թե քաղաքական՝ գնալով ավելի է կարևորվում: Հետևաբար անհրաժեշտ է հասկանալ, թե ինչպես է Չինաստանն առնչվում այս կամ այն գործընթացներին:

Սույն հոդվածում փորձ է արվում գնահատել ժամանակակից չինական պետության աշխարհայացքի որոշ բաղկացուցիչները: Այս առումով դիտարկվում են նաև հետևյալ հանգամանքները՝ Չինաստանի զբաղեցրած դիրքը աշխարհում և դրանից բխող աշխարհաքաղաքական տեսությունները, ինչպես նաև կենտրոնացման և ապակենտրոնացման հարցերը: Առանձնացվում է նաև ժամանակակից Չինաստանի տնտեսական դերի տեսականը ըստ նրա ղեկավարների պատկերացումների: Այս խնդիրների ուսումնասիրումը կարևոր է նաև ապագայի աշխարհակարգի մասին որոշ տեսական դրույթներ առաջ քաշելու առումով:

## THE WORD *GAT'Ā* IN THE ARMENIAN LANGUAGE\*

*Hasmik Hmayakyan*

### Abstract<sup>1</sup>

Գաթայ *gat'ay* (pronounced *gat'a* in the modern Eastern Armenian) is an ancient traditional festive cake, which was baked during various Armenian celebrations. Its baking process was sometimes itself accompanied by special traditions. However, it should be noted that the word *gat'a* used today, which means ‘cake in the form of *baġarġ* (traditional Armenian festive bread) containing abundant fat and sugar’ [4: 214] is not found in ancient Armenian sources [3: 499-500]. *Gat'ay* is met for the first time in Vardan Ayegektsi's fable ‘The Pig and Gata’ in the following passage: «Ասաց 'ի առակաց, թէ խոզն գաթայ մի գտեալ ուտէր. նայ խորիսն 'ի վայր կու թափէր եւ վասն պարանոցին միաբերութեան զի վիզն ոչ կարէր շեղել. որ զգլուխն 'ի վեր կալնուր. յայնժամ բերնցիք'ի վեր անկեալ եւ ետես արեգակն. զի խոզն զբոլորութիւն արեգականն աջօք չէ տեսեալ: Եւ այնժամ ասաց, թէ զոր չէի կերեր, կերայ եւ զինչ չէի տեսեալ, տեսայ. զի այլ ոչ գաթայ էր կերեր եւ ոչ արեգակն տեսեր [7]:

"It is said in a fable that a pig was eating *gat'ay* it had found, the pig was dropping *xoriz* as it was not able to move its neck as it was attached to its head. As soon as it raised its head in order to raise its mouth it saw the sun. The pig had never seen the entire sun disk. And then it said I ate what I have never eaten and I saw what I have never seen. If it had not eaten *gat'ay*, it would have never seen the sun<sup>2</sup>.

The word *գաթայ* (*gat'ay*) is encountered often in Middle Armenian including medieval lyric poetry [11: 131].

**Keywords:** *gatay*, Armenian, Hittite, <sup>NINDA</sup>*gatai/katai-*, pastry, bread, wedding, etymology.

### The word *gat'ay* in the Armenian language

Despite being widespread in the Armenian festive and ritual system and daily life, the word *gat'ay* has no clear etymology in the Armenian language [3: 499-500]. According to the prominent Armenian linguist Hrachya Acharyan, this word is found in more than two dozen Armenian dialects in the form *գաթայ-կաթայ gat'ay-kat'ay*, which is a type of pastry, prepared differently in various parts of historical Armenia with the use of sugar, oil, *xoriz* (filler), or nuts and honey, without sugar, salt, etc [2:214]. The word is also present in Turkish - *kete*, in

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<sup>2</sup> Translation by the author of the article.



Kurdish - *kade, kadik* [2:214], in Georgian *კადა* (*k'ada*) [36: 575], etc., the origin of which is unknown [2: 214-215]. In recent years in Georgia, however, it has been referred to as *Եռմեջրո ճատ* ('Armenian gata') [37].

Gevorg Jahukyan considers the similarity of the Armenian word *gat'ay* and the French *gâteau* 'pie' to be accidental [21:144]. *Gâteau*, originally, *gastel* derives from German *wastel* [8: 179].

*Gat'ay* is considered a part of words *գաթաղուղուլու գաթ'ագուգու* – 'a small gat'a' and *գաթաղախախաղի* (*gat'axatik*), sent as an invitation to wedding, found in Armenian dialects [15:227-228].

Sahak Vardapet Amatuni in his *Hayoc' bar' u ban* pointed out to the word *gat'ay* used in works of the Armenian publicist Mesrop Taghiadjan (1803-1585) and famous Armenian writer Perch Proshian (1837-1907) and others [5:123].

According to Stepan Malkhasiants, *gat'ay* is a pastry in the form of *balarj* made differently and different places, e.g. *gat'ay* of Yerevan, *gat'ay* of Akhaltskha, etc. The word *gat'anaxš*, which is a round wooden tool used to make patterns on *gat'a* is derived from the word *gat'a* [28:403].

### **Gat'a in the Armenian festive system**

*Gat'a* is an integral part of the most important Armenian festivals and wedding ceremonies [30:183]. For example, *gat'a* would be taken as a gift to the bride's house on the wedding day or a few days before by the groom's relatives; they would place an odd number of *gat'a* over a tray with *pakhlava*. For example, in New Nakhichevan, where the Armenian traditions were very well respected, a couple of days before a wedding, the groom's parents would gather to bake *t'el-gat'a*<sup>3</sup> with their female relatives and aged women of the neighborhood. Several bags of flour, oil and sugar were prepared beforehand. The aged women would come with their *oxlawus* to roll out layers of *gat'a*, preparing filler (*xoriz*), cut *gat'a* and then bring pieces to bake in an oven. On the eve of the wedding, the groom's young relatives, riding two or three horses with their *khurjins* (Armenian traditional shoulder bag) stuffed with *gata*, visited their relatives' houses, distributing one *gat'a* to each of them, thus inviting them to the wedding [31:24].

*Gat'a* was very popular among the Armenians of Dersim, where a number of *gat'a* types were baked: *čas gat'a*, *khorisov gat'a*, *lollik gat'a*, which was used by the mother-in-law to invite the groom when the latter would visit her to kiss her hand. It was noteworthy that young wives from the groom's side would put *kar'ev gat'a* in the pockets of young husbands; there was even a folk saying: "I wish to be a new groom to receive a *gata* from new brides." The next type was moon-shaped

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<sup>3</sup> *T'el-gat'a* was popular among the residents of Nor Nakhijevan: it was prepared from thin layers of oiled dough, stuffed with *xoriz*, it was pressed with a thin wooden roller (*okhlava*) which made patterns on it [23:85].

*gat'a* baked for children, called *lusnak*. There are other types of *gat'a* such as *tapaki gat'a*, *khoris*, *pokel*, etc [14: 235:236].

There were many interesting customs related to *gat'a* in Arčak, but in Arčak it was not called '*gat'a*', but sweet *balarj*, which replaced *gat'a*. There was an interesting custom in Arčak, when on the way to the bride's house, the bridesmen (*azapbaši*) would pick up the groom on a horse and would go to the bride's house while dancing. Two persons would follow them while carrying a sieve on their heads or under their arms, one filled with 20-30 pieces of sweet *balarj*, which, as mentioned, was the equivalent of *gat'a*, and the other with two trays of *halva*. *Balarj* and *halva* would be brought with similar sieves from godfather's house, also accompanied by the music of the *zur'na* and *dhol* [6: 69].

In Javakhk, the baking of *gat'a* was very important during wedding preparations accompanied by a number of preparatory ceremonies. On the Friday preceding the wedding, a woman whose flour sieve was full of raisins would hold a bottle of *oli* (vodka), would walk around the whole village visiting the godfather's and other villagers' houses saying: "Let's go to this person's house for *gat'at'ux* (baking of *gat'a*), let a similar celebration be in your house" and would invite the people with a cup of *oli* each and would give the close relatives of bride and groom a pair of candles. Then those invited would take butter, eggs, milk, etc. with them and go to groom's mother's house to congratulate her.

After the celebration dinner in the groom's house, a large bowl was placed in the middle of the house and the wife of the village priest would light two candles in front of the bowl accompanied by the music of *zur'na* and *dhol* in order that the groom be luminous (a similar custom existed in Van). She would cover her face with red veil, so the future wife would be shy and sift flour in silence and the groom would be tacit. Then six women would give coins to the priest's wife and cover their heads with red veils while sifting flour one by one.

According to traditional beliefs, if the priest's wife did not sift flour, the bride would 'go crazy'. After sifting flour, the guests would have supper and leave, and then only the godmother and a few relatives would stay at the groom's house. They would bake about 100 pairs of *gat'a*, would have dinner again, and leave for their own homes taking one *gat'a* each.

At the same time, several young people would throw a rope onto *ert'ik* (a light opening in traditional Armenian house) from the yard shouting: "Let the bride live in happiness, let her hands be skillful" and the family members would tie *gat'a* to the end of the rope. The boys would pull it out and leave [26: 248-249].

In Varanda, *gat'a* was considered an obligatory part of the gifts brought by the co-parents-in-laws on a tray (*xonča*) [27: 158].

*Gat'a* also was a part of rituals performed in the *Mijink* (the middle, or the 24<sup>th</sup> day of Great Lent), during which *balarj gat'a* of *Mijink* was baked. The *balarj* or *gat'a* was given to family members, domestic animals, and it was also offered to the earth. *Gat'a* was baked by aged women, and in some places dough was

kneaded by men, which had a ritual meaning, while a bead, a ring and a coin were put in it for fortune telling [1: 219-220].

Round *gat'a* were moulded and patterned with tool called *gat'anaxš*, a moulder hand pressure applied for round shaping. They were used not only for moulding and patterning *gat'a*, but also for making patterns on ceremonial breads which traces back to ancient tradition in the Armenian Highlands. Samples of ancient *gat'anaxš* have been found in different regions of Armenia, made of wood or clay around 16-50 cm in diameter, containing deep counter relief patterns in rose and star shapes [29: 131-133]. The earliest samples of similar clay pressures can be found in the Neolithic VI-II layers of Çatal-Hüyük, which date back to the VII-VI millennia BC, thus testifying the presence of such moulders in Asia Minor [29: 133-134].

A number of examples brought from the above ethnographic material is a proof of presence of ancient traditions related to *gat'a* in various parts of historical Armenia, which may indicate that *gat'a* has long been an integral part of daily life of Armenians and their ritual system. However, as it was already mentioned, surprisingly the word *gat'ay/gat'a* was not recorded in ancient Armenian sources, and it does not have a clear etymology.

### **An Attempt of Etymology of the Word *գալթայ gat'ay***

The names of various meals and bread types related to them have been preserved in Hittite texts. The ritual texts give an abundance of details about each part of the sacrificial procedure and the meal that follows it [10: 77].

For example, <sup>NINDA</sup>*aladdari-* [34:13] is one of the famous Hittite breads, considered to be Hurrian in origin. Grigor Kapantsyan compared this with the Armenian word *աղանդեր alander* ('dessert') [24:333], though this interpretation is considered wrong [32: 32]. It is known that the Hittites paid special attention to many different sacrifices offered to the gods, in particular various bread types [12: 43]. In general, by special rites, the gods "received daily bread and beverage offerings" every day, according to their hierarchy and importance [9: 43-44]. One of the most famous sacred breads is the Hittite storm-god's bread loaf <sup>NINDA</sup>*harsi-* [33: 190]. It is often encountered in Hittite texts. We also come across to <sup>LÚ</sup>*harsiyala-*, probably a special servant serving the bread [33: 194]. It appears even in the Hittite law 164-165. "If anyone goes (to someone's house) to impress (something), starts a quarrel, and opens \* 3 5 either the (homeowner's) sacrificial bread or libation wine, he shall give one sheep, 10 loaves of bread, and one jug of ... beer, and reconsecrate his [20: 132]."

Next type of bread is <sup>NINDA</sup>*hazizi-*, is falling within our focus of interest, which probably means 'ear-bread' and which was once compared with the Armenian word *hac* 'bread' by Gevorg Jahukyan, who, however, considered it [21: 453] a possible loanword in Hittite from Armenian, as the scholar supposed this word to be of Armenian origin, but in our opinion, the Armenian origin of this word needs further examination.

The following Hittite bread types are of great interest: NINDA.LÀL ŠA ZÍZ (wheat honey bread/pastry), barley, e.g. NINDA ZÍD.DA.ŠE (barley bread), beans, e.g. NINDA.LÀL GÚ.GAL.GAL (bean honey bread/ pastry), lentils, e.g. NINDA.LÀL GÚ.TUR (lentil honey bread/pastry) and porridge, e.g. NINDA BA.BA.ZA (porridge pap/flour bread) [12: 44]. NINDA.ÉRIN - soldiers' bread and BAPPIR beer bread [12:47].

And one of these many bread types is the above-mentioned <sup>NINDA</sup>*gatai/katai*- found in Hittite sources, the composition of which, unfortunately, is unknown. It is found with the following writing: ka-a-ta-i (KUB XXXV 82 i 1) and ga-ta-a-i (XXXII 129 + 814 / b, i 21; 1262 / v rev 9 '), ga-ta-[a-i] (KBo XIII 248 i 22') [19: 168].

In our opinion, the Armenian word *գաթայ* *gat'ay* can be traced to the above-mentioned <sup>NINDA</sup>*gatai*- 'a kind of cake' found in Hittite cuneiform texts, which so far has no clear etymology in the Hittite language [34: 76; 35:542].

## Conclusion

The significant role of *gat'ay/gat'a* in the Armenian festive system is evidence that it was common in Armenian cuisine from ancient times; the fact that this word is not recorded in the ancient Armenian sources does not mean that it was not used in the Armenian language especially as the word is present in various Armenian dialects. In addition, numerous *gat'anaxš* discovered during archaeological excavations serve as a proof that this pastry was common in the Armenian Highlands.

In our opinion, the word *gat'ay*, which has no clear etymology in Armenian, may be etymologically related to the word *gatai/katai* of the Hittite cuneiform texts meaning 'a type of baked bread' which does not have an exact etymology in Hittite.

As known, already from mid-1920s such scholars as N. Martirosyan, G. Kapancyan, Hr. Acharyan, I. Dyakonoff, T. Schultheiss, A. Kammenhuber, G. Jahukyan, N. Mkrtychyan, A. Kosyan and others contributed to the study of interactions of the Hittite-Luwian languages and the Armenian language. A significant number of the list of Hittite-Luwian loanwords in Armenian comprise household and culture words [13: 65-72; 22:313-315; 25: 63-65; 16; 17:201-202; 18]. If our point of view is correct, this word can be added to the above list.

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#### ABBREVIATIONS

AAL - Annual of Armenian Linguistics (Cleveland).

AJNES - Aramz. Armenian Journal of Near Eastern Studies.

PBH - Patma-banasirakan handes (Historical-Philological Journal), Yerevan.

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## «ԳԱԹԱՅ» ԲԱՌԸ ՀԱՅՈՑ ԼԵՂՎՈՒՄ

## Հասմիկ Հնայսկյան

**Բանալի բառեր՝** գաթայ, գաթա, գաթանախշ, խեթերեն, հայերեն, ստուգաբանություն, <sup>NINDA</sup> *gatai/katai*, թխվածք, տոնածիսական, մշակութային:

Գաթան հնագույն ավանդական տոնածիսական թխվածք է, որը թխվել է հայկական ամենատարբեր տոների ժամանակ, և անգամ նրա թխման գործընթացը ևս երբեմն ուղեկցվել է հատուկ ավանդույթներով: Սակայն հարկ է նշել, որ արդի հայերենում այսօր գործածվող «գաթա» բառը, որը նշանակում է «բաղարջի ձևով թխվածք՝ առատ յուղով, շաքարով» հին մատենագրության մեջ վկայված չէ, դրա առաջին հիշատակությունը Այգեկցու առակում է:

«Գաթայ» ձևով այն բազմիցս հանդիպում է միջին հայերենում և ուշ միջնադարյան քնարերգության մեջ: Չնայած այս խմորեղենի խիստ տարածվածությանը հայկական տոնածիսական համակարգում և կենցաղում, «գաթայ» բառը ստույգ ստուգաբանություն չունի հայերենում: Ըստ Հր. Աճառյանի այն հանդիպում է երկու տասնյակից ավելի բարբառներում «գաթայ-կաթայ» ձևով:

«Գաթայ»-ից կազմված են համարվում բարբառներում հանդիպող «գաթագուգու»- փոքրիկ գաթա և «գաթախատիկ»՝ հարսանիքն հրավիրելու նպատակով ուղարկված գաթա բառերը:

Ըստ Ստ. Մալխասեանցի, «գաթայ»-ն խմորեղեն է՝ բաղարջի ձևով, որ պատրաստվում է տարբեր ձևերով և տարբեր վայրերում, հայտնի է, օրինակ, Երևանի գաթայ, Ախալցխայի գաթայ և այլն:

«Գաթայ» բառից է կազմված «գաթանախշը», որը կլոր փայտյա գործիք է, որով գաթայի վրա նախշեր են անում: Գաթանախշերը կիրառվում էին ոչ միայն գաթայի, այլև ծիսական հացերի վրա ևս դաջվածքներ անելու համար և ունեին հնամենի ավանդույթ Հայկական լեռնաշխարհում:

Հոդվածում հանգամանալից քննարկվում են գաթայի հետ կապված տարբեր ավանդույթները: Օրինակ, Նոր Նախիջևանում հարսանիքից մի երկու օր առաջ փեսայի ծնողները հավաքում էին իրենց ազգական և հարևան ծեր կանանց «թել-գաթա» թխելու համար, և հարսանիքի նախօրեին փեսայի երիտասարդ ազգականները ձիեր հեծած, խուրջիները լցրած «թել-գաթայով»՝ շրջում էին ազգականների տներով, բաժանում նրանց մի-մի գաթա՝ հրավիրելով հարսանիքի:

Գաթան շատ տարածված էր Դերսիմի հայերի շրջանում, որտեղ թխում էին մի շարք տարատեսակներ՝ «ճաշ գաթա», «խորիսով գաթա», «լրլիկ գաթա», «կառն գաթա» և այլն:

Ջավախքում հարսանեկան պատրաստություններում խիստ կարևոր տեղ էր տրվում գաթայի թխմանը, որն ուղեկցվում էր մի շարք նախապատրաստական արարողություններով. տան կենտրոնում դնում էին տաշտը և դիող-զուռնայի ու-

ղեկցությամբ երեցկինը ծնկաչոք տաշտի առաջ դրա երկու ծայրերին մոմ էր վառում, որ հարսը պայծառ ու լուսավոր լինի, (նման սովորույթ եղել է նաև Վանում) և կարմիր քողը գցելով երեսին, որ ապագա հարսը ամոթխած լինի, լուռ մաղում էր այլուր, որ հարսը լռակյաց լինի, հետո վեց կանայք կոպեկներ էին տալիս երեցկնոջը և հերթով կարմիր գլխաշորը գցելով գլխներին՝ մաղում էին այլուր:

Ըստ հավատալիքների, եթե գաթաթուփսի այլուրը երեցկինը չմաղեր, հարսը կխելագարվեր: Նրանք շուրջ 100 զույգ գաթա էին թխում և մի-մի գաթա վերցրած գնում իրենց տները: Մի քանի երիտասարդներ էլ երդիկից պարանը գցելով բղավում էին. «Բագդաւոր հարս ըլի, ձեռքն ու ոտքը ուղութով ըլի», և պարանի ծայրին տնեցիք գաթա էին կապում, որը տղաները քաշում ու հեռանում էին:

Վերոնշյալ ազգագրական նյութերից բերված մի շարք օրինակները վկայում են գաթայի հետ կապված հնամենի ավանդույթների տարածվածության մասին պատմական Հայաստանի տարբեր վայրերում, ինչը կարող է վկայել այն մասին, որ գաթան հնուց ի վեր եղել է հայոց կենցաղի ու ծիսապաշտամունքային համակարգի անբաժանելի մասը:

Մեր կարծիքով հնարավոր է, որ վերջինս ստուգաբանորեն կապված է խեթերեն սեպագիր տեքստերում հանդիպող <sup>NINDA</sup> *gatai/katai*- «մի տեսակ թխվածքի կամ հացի տեսակ» ստույգ ստուգաբանություն չունեցող բառի հետ: Հայտնի է, որ խեթերենից հայերենին են անցել մի քանի տասնյակ բառեր, որոնցում զգալի թիվ են կազմում նաև կենցաղային ու մշակութային բառերը, և մեր առաջադրած տեսակետի ճշմարտացիության դեպքում, այս բառը կարող է համարել վերջիններիս շարքը:



## ENCLITIC PRONOUNS IN THE ANBARĀNI DIALECT OF TALYSHI\*

*Hakob Avchyan*

### Abstract

Enclitic pronouns are used in most of New West Iranian languages. They are mainly used for marking the possessor, as well as objects, besides, those Iranian languages and dialects, which show ergative patterns, make use of enclitic pronouns for marking the agent in ergative constructions. This paper deals with the enclitic pronouns and their functions in Anbarāni, one of the Northern Talyshi dialects, spoken in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Where it is possible the features of Anbarāni enclitics will be compared with some other West Iranian languages.

**Keywords:** Talyshi, Anbarāni, West Iranian, enclitics, pronouns, dialectology, Iranian languages, Iranian linguistics.

### 1. Introduction

Talyshi, classified as belonging to the Northwestern Iranian group of languages, includes a wide range of dialects, which, based on phonological, grammatical and lexical factors, are traditionally divided into three main clusters: Northern, Central and Southern [1, 14, 18]. Anbarāni is a Northern Talyshi dialect spoken in the Anbarān district (baxš) of Namin sub-provincial district (*šahrestān*) (Ardabil province) of Iran, in the city of Anbaran and adjacent villages. This paper is based on the fieldwork carried out in Aminjān (now a part of Anbarān city [2]) and aims to analyze the functions of the enclitic pronouns in Anbarāni.

The enclitic pronouns in Anbarāni are as follows: -əm, -e/-ə, -əš, -əmun, -en, -əšun (see Table 1). The forms of 1S and 3S, like the New Persian enclitic pronouns (-am, -aš, resp.), derive from Old Iranian genitive/dative pronominal clitics \*-mai, \*-šai [6: 161-162]. The origin of the form for 2S is unclear [7: 115]. The plural enclitics are formed from the singular forms by adding the plural suffix -un (=Az.Tal. -on, NP. -ān) < OIr. Genitive pl. ending \*-ānām [19: 103].

**Table 1.** *Enclitic pronouns in the Anbarāni dialect of the Talyshi language*

	Sg.	Pl.
1 <sup>st</sup>	-əm	-əmun
2 <sup>nd</sup>	-e/-ə	-en
3 <sup>rd</sup>	-əš	-əšun

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Although in the Talyshi dialect of Anbarān (and generally in Northern Talyshi) and in New Persian these enclitic pronouns generally have common origin, they are completely different from each other in their functions. While in the Persian language, especially in colloquial speech, pronominal enclitics have a very broad usage [11], in Anbarāni their use is quite limited.

## 2. Expression of Possession

The expression of possession is one of the main functions of the Persian enclitic pronouns. In the language data collected during my fieldwork, such a function of the Anbarāni enclitics is not found. Still, the use of pronominal enclitics in possessive function rarely occurs in Anbarāni, and D. Paul calls it “an innovation borrowed from Persian”:

*čaš-əš ba vača hamu-anda a-gini.*  
 eye-3sg. to kid goat field-LOC. PVB.-fell.3sg.  
 ‘His eye fell on a kid goat in the field’ (Paul 2011: 80)

For expressing the relation between a noun and who possesses it, in Anbarāni special possessive pronouns are used<sup>1</sup>.

Thus, in the Talyshi dialect of Anbarān, enclitic pronouns have two main functions: expressing ownership (predicative expression of possession) and marking the agent in constructions.

## 3. Predicative expression of possession, ownership (‘to have’)

In Anbarāni, there is no verb ‘to have’ and the state of having, owning, controlling something is expressed by the enclitic pronouns, combining with the existential verb *heste* - ‘to exist, there is’

<i>ila</i>	<i>yul-a</i>	<i>boγ-əmun</i>	<i>heste</i>
A	big-LNK.	garden-enc.1pl.	exist

### ‘We have a big garden’

<i>avun</i>	<i>arbob-in</i>	<i>Iyan</i>	<i>māhbub-a</i>	<i>ka-šun<sup>2</sup></i>	<i>heste.</i>
they	rich-COP.3pl.	And	beautiful-LNK.	house-Enc.3pl.	exist

<sup>1</sup> The possessive pronouns in Anbarāni are as follows: 1S *čəmān* ‘my’, 2S *əštə* ‘your’, 3S *čavə* ‘his/her’, 1P *čama* ‘our’, 2P *šama* ‘your’, 3P *čavun* ‘their’. These pronouns are analytical forms consisting of the preposition *čə* (<OIr \*hačā-) and oblique forms of personal pronouns (in Northern Talyshi only 1<sup>st</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> person singular personal pronouns have oblique forms, in Anbarāni these are *mān(ə)* and *avə*, respectively). As for 2S and 2P forms, according to Boris Miller, these pronouns also consist of the preposition *čə*, and in the 2P form the consonant *č* ceased to be pronounced because of its articulating similarity with *š* [7: 115].

<sup>2</sup> When the enclitic pronouns attach to a word ending in a vowel, they lose their initial vowel (except of 2S which only consists of the vowel ‘e’).

### ‘They are rich and they have a beautiful house’

In all probability this structure is a result of Turkic influence on the Talyshi language<sup>3</sup>: in ‘Türki Azari’, spoken in East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan, Ardabil, Zanjan and in some other regions in Iran, the meaning of the verb to have is also expressed by means of possessive suffixes and the adjective *var* ‘existent, there is/there are’, e.g. *iki qardaš#n var* ‘I have two brothers’ [5: 37].

Along with this Turkic form in Anbarāni the ownership can also be expressed by a structure, including the postposition *ro*<sup>4</sup> (cf. NP. *rā* < OIr. \**radi*) and the verb *heste*, which is typical for a number of Iranian languages<sup>5</sup>:

*šəma-ro čān gəla hoa heste?*

You.PL-for how many CL. sister exist

#### How many sisters do you have?

Ahmadə-ro yul-a māhbub-a čaš-un heste.

Ahmad.OB.-for big-LNK. beautiful-LNK. eye-pl. exist

#### Ahmad has big beautiful eyes.

The third way for expressing the meaning of the verb ‘to have’ is the combination of two above-mentioned constructions, when both the postposition *ro* and enclitic pronouns are used:

<i>aštə</i>	<i>žen-ə=ro</i>	<i>čān</i>	<i>gəla=š</i>	<i>hoa</i>	<i>hest=e?</i>
your	wife-OBL=for	how many	CL=ENC.3S	sister	exist=COP.3S

#### How many sisters does your wife have?

## 4. Marking the agent of ergative constructions

Talyshi has what has been called split ergativity [see 3] or Tense-Sensitive Alignment [see 4]: the ergative pattern appears only in the clauses in which the predicate is a transitive verb used either in past simple, present perfect or past perfect tenses.

<sup>3</sup> Such a construction with enclitic pronouns for expressing the meaning of the verb ‘to have’ is not typical for West Iranian languages. The semantic extension of *dār/dāšt* ‘to keep, hold’ to ‘to have’, as found in Persian, is considered as an innovation, while the majority of the dialects mark possession by the copula preceded by the indirect object [17: 259].

<sup>4</sup> The postposition *ro* in Anbarāni expresses the meaning of benefactive case where English would use ‘for’. Unlike Modern Persian, where now the postposition *rā* marks the direct object if the latter is definite, Anbarāni *ro* preserves the meaning of Old Iranian \**radi*- (cf. OP. *rādiy* ‘on account of’), as it was in Middle Persian, see [13: 210, 10: 126]

<sup>5</sup> The meaning of the verb ‘to have’ was expressed through an identical construction in Middle Persian (*Pāpak rāđ pus-ē hast* ‘Pāpak has a son’ [10: 127], as well as in Early New Persian (*ō-rā du pīsar būd-and* ‘he had two sons’ [17: 259]). Such a structure can also be found in other new West Iranian languages, for example, in Zazaki, *ji-rē lāžek b-en-o* ‘she has a boy’ [9: 570].

In Anbarāni Talyshi ergative constructions, the logical subject (i.e. agent) is in oblique case<sup>6</sup> and marked by enclitic pronouns, while the object (patient) is in direct case:

*manə*<sup>7</sup> *zina*                      *aštə*    *dust*    *maktab=anda*  
 I.OBL yesterday                      your    friend    school-LOC

*vind=əm=e*<sup>8</sup>.

see.PST=ENC.1S=COP.3S

**‘Yesterday I saw your friend in the school’**

*merd-ə səγ=anda*<sup>9</sup>=š *penja arəšta bə*.

man-OBL                      stone=LOC=3S window                      break-PP                      be.SPT

**‘The man had broken the window with a stone’**

The placement of enclitic pronouns in Anbarāni displays great variety<sup>10</sup>, it can be attached to any component part of a sentence except the agent itself (if it is not

<sup>6</sup> There are two cases in Anbarāni: oblique and direct. Singular nouns in the direct case do not take any markers, while nouns in the oblique case are marked with the suffix *-ə*. Besides marking the agent in ergative constructions, one of the main functions of this suffix is the expression of possession, e.g. *ženə ka* ‘the woman’s house’, *Ahmadə dust* ‘Ahmad’s friend’ etc. The Anbarāni oblique case marker *-ə* corresponds to Az.Tal. *-i*. Boris Miller claims that it derives from Old Persian demonstrative particle *hya* [7: 79], while according to Wolfgang Schulze [12: 17] it corresponds to Old Persian *-ahyā* (genitive singular of *a*-stems), which in its turn goes back to Old Iranian case ending *\*-ahya* [16: 29]. It should be noted that in Anbarāni the morphological distinction between singular nouns in oblique and direct cases disappears when a word ends in a vowel, since they do not take the oblique case marker *-ə*, e.g. *kina čaš* ‘the girl’s eye’, *zoa māšin* ‘the boy’s car’ (in ergative constructions as well agents ending with a vowel are not marked by the suffix *-ə*, e.g. *kina aštān dust-əš vinde* ‘the girl saw her friend’).

As for the plural nouns, in Anbarāni (as well as in other Northern Talyshi dialects), there is no distinction between direct and oblique cases: all the plural nouns end in *-un (-n)*, e.g. *ženun olatun* ‘women’s dresses’, *merdun ba ka omen* ‘men came home’ (nominative construction), *merdun dəšmunun-əšun kəšte* ‘men killed the enemies’ (ergative construction). This is most likely due to the extension of the Western Middle Iranian plural oblique *-ān* to the plural direct [see 4: 135-138].

<sup>7</sup> The first-person singular personal pronoun *āz* has two oblique forms, *mān* and *mānə*, first of which is used for the object (patient) in ergative constructions, the second is used for the agent in ergative constructions, as well as for the direct object in nominative alignment.

<sup>8</sup> B. Miller [7: 168], comparing this marker with NP. *ast*, states that it should be considered as copula. D. Stilo [15: 374] defines it as the 3rd person singular enclitic form of the auxiliary verb, while D. Paul [8: 137] calls it transitivity marker.

<sup>9</sup> The postposition *anda* (> OIr. *\*antar-*, cf. NP. *dar*) in Anbarāni have two functions, besides serving as a general locative marker, it also functions for expressing comitative and instrumental meanings (unlike its Az.Tal. equivalent *ada* which is only locative).

<sup>10</sup> In ergative constructions the enclitic pronouns usually are inserted between the verb stem and the ergativity marker *-e*, but since the 2S enclitic pronoun coincides with that marker, for avoiding the hiatus *ee* (*əe*), it always detaches from the verb and attaches to another component of the sentence,

omitted). Thus, the above-mentioned examples can also have the following structures: 1. *mānə zīnam əštə dust maktabanda vinde, mānə zīna əštəm dust maktabanda vinde, mānə zīna əštə dustəm maktabanda vinde* etc., 2. *merdə səyanda penjaš arəšta bə* or *merdə səyanda penja arəštaš bə*.

It should be noted that in ergative constructions sometimes in clauses with completely clear context the enclitic pronouns can be omitted:

*mallo vot=e: əm čəmān zoa=y<sup>11</sup>.*  
Mullah say.PST=COP.3S this my son=COP.3S  
‘Mullah said: this is my son’

### List of Abbreviations

1pl. - the first-person plural	LNK. - linking vowel
1sg. - the first-person singular	LOC. - locative
2pl. - the second-person plural	NP. - New Persian
2sg. - the second-person singular	OBL. - oblique case
3pl. - the third-person plural	OIr. - Old Iranian
3sg. - the third-person singular	OP. - Old Persian
Az.Tal. - Talyshi dialects spoken in the Republic of Azerbaijan	Pl. - plural
CL. – classifier	PP. - past participle
COP. – copula	PST. - past stem
DIR. - direct case	PVB. - preverb
Enc. – enclitic	SPT. - simple past tense

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e.g. *tə a lazatina nun-e hārde?* ‘Did you eat that tasty bread?’. But if the clause consists of only the agent and the predicate, the enclitic pronoun is omitted, e.g. *tə vote: ogār!* ‘you said: come back!’.

<sup>11</sup> -y is the 3S enclitic copula form of the verb ‘to be’ attaching to the words ending with a vowel. When the words end with a consonant the form is -e, as shown in examples.

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## ԿՑԱԿԱՆ ԴԵՐԱՆՈՒՆՆԵՐԸ ԹԱԼԻՇԵՐԵՆԻ ԱՆԲԱՐԱՆԻ ԲԱՐԲԱՌՈՒՄ

*Հակոբ Ավչյան*

**Բանալի բառեր՝** թալիշերեն, Անբարանի բարբառ, արևմտաիրանական լեզուներ, կցական դերանուններ, բարբառագիտություն, իրանական լեզուներ, իրանական լեզվաբանություն:

Կցական դերանունները գործածվում են ժամանակակից արևմտաիրանական լեզուների մեծ մասում: Դրանք հիմնականում կիրառվում են մատնանշելու համար հատկացուցչին, ինչպես նաև ուղիղ խնդիրը: Բացի այդ՝ այն իրանական

լեզուներում, որոնք ունեն էրգատիվ համակարգ, կցական դերանունները ցույց են տալիս էրգատիվ նախադասությունների ենթակայի դեմքն ու թիվը:

Այս հոդվածում քննարկվում են Իրանի Իսլամական Հանրապետության տարածքում խոսվող հյուսիսային թալիշերենի Անբարանի բարբառի կցական դերանուններն ու դրանց գործառույթները:

Ի տարբերություն պարսկերենի՝ Անբարանի բարբառում կցական դերանունները գրեթե ցույց չեն տալիս պատկանելություն, այդ տեսանկյունից դրանք լուսանցքային կիրառություն ունեն: Այս բարբառում կցական դերանունների երկու հիմնական գործառույթներն են՝

1. կիրառվելով *heste* կա բայի հետ՝ արտահայտում են *ունենալ* բայի իմաստը, օրինակ՝ *ila yul-a boy-əmun heste* - *մենք մի մեծ այգի ունենք*:

2. էրգատիվ նախադասություններում (երբ նախադասության ստորոգյալը անցյալ կատարյալ, վաղակատար ներկա կամ վաղակատար անցյալ ժամանակաձևերով դրված անցողական բայ է) ցույց են տալիս ենթակայի դեմքն ու թիվը, օրինակ՝ *merdə səy-anda-š penja arəšta bə* - *տղամարդը քարով կոտրել էր պատրուհանը*:

## ON SOME TRANSFORMING ELEMENTS OF TRADITIONAL YEZIDI WEDDINGS PERFORMED IN ARMENIA\*

*Tereza Amryan*

### **Abstract**

The Yezidi wedding, due to its unique and different colours and elements, has been a subject of interest for their non-Yezidi neighbors. From time to time, it has been an object of interest for journalists, researchers and scientists as well. However, the transforming elements of the Yezidi traditional wedding have not been properly studied as of yet. In the framework of this article, some elements of Yezidi traditional weddings are examined: those elements have undergone various transformations due to external influences over the last few decades. The wedding ceremony is a more open, easily influenced and transformable ritual. Therefore, many elements of the traditional Yezidi wedding have partly been influenced by the Armenian wedding ritual and partly influenced by modern wedding trends. Many elements have been given a new appearance and interpretation, while some old ceremonies have been reborn and are performed in a new way. Additionally, some traditional forms of marriage (polygamy, levirate) have been forgotten among the Yezidis of Armenia. The study of the transformation of some elements of the traditional Yezidi wedding is important, as it can greatly contribute to the study of the dynamics of other ethnic transformative processes.

**Keywords:** Yezidi, wedding, element, transformation, bride, groom, custom, tradition, ritual.

The Yezidi wedding, due to its unique and different colours and elements, has been a subject of interest for their non-Yezidi neighbors. From time to time it has been an object of interest for journalists, researchers and scientists too [5; 12; 2]. However, the transforming elements of the Yezidi traditional wedding have not been properly studied as of yet. Therefore, in the framework of this article, we will present and examine some elements of Yezidi traditional weddings that have undergone various transformations due to external influences over the last few decades.

We have used the historical-comparative and qualitative research methods and made observations. We collected field ethnographic material in December 2021 and January 2022 in the Armavir and Aragatsotn provinces, as well as in Yerevan. Interviews were conducted with Yezidi men and women between the ages of 60-85.

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While studying the subject, we focused not only on the wedding ceremony itself but also on pre-wedding ceremonies and customs. In Yezidi traditional communities in the past (about 50-60 years ago), the wedding ceremony itself was not the only important part, but the ceremonies held before the wedding were also critical. For instance, a custom called *bindārūk* (lit. “under the tree”) was an opportunity for young boys and girls to get acquainted and communicate. *Bindārūk* was organized during the Spring or Summer. Young boys and girls gathered under a tree, got acquainted, and spent time together [14: 45]. During *bindārūk*, they played various games, had fun, enjoyed fortune-telling, and also managed to choose their future spouse [4: 239-240]. The existence of *bindārūk* shows that the will and the desire of young people was important in marriage issues as *bindārūk* was an opportunity for young people to get acquainted openly, communicate, and get closer to their future spouse before marriage. During the interviews, our informants mentioned that they used to perform *bindārūk* not only under a tree, but anywhere in nature, for example, on the bank of a river, on the slope of a mountain, etc. Many informants mentioned that wedding ceremonies were also a convenient place for young people to get acquainted, to get closer, and openly express feelings. Our informants also mentioned a custom called *barfōlān* (lit. “near the crib”) and *dōldāng* (lit. “crib”). On the eve of the feast of *Xidir Nabī* (*Khdr Nabi*)<sup>1</sup>, young boys and girls gathered in one of the houses in the village, sat near a crib, talked, made jokes, played games, tried to predict the future, and got acquainted with their future spouse. Today, the above-mentioned customs have been forgotten. One of the reasons is not only that the Yezidis do not live close together in some places as before, but also that young people have different and new environments and opportunities to get acquainted.

Yezidis call matchmaking or proposals *xwazgīnī* or *xwāzgīnī* (lit. “matchmaking”). The young boy’s father or uncle with other male and female relatives go to the girl’s father’s house to ask them to marry their daughter to the boy. The guests introduce the purpose of their visit, then one of the guests asks for a cup of water. The girl gives water or tea to the guests. At present, it is customary for a girl to serve coffee and sweets to the guests who come to their home for matchmaking.

If the family members of the girl agree to marry their daughter to that boy, they express their consent. The expression of the consent was called *arēkirin* (lit. “approval”, “consent”). Few days later an engagement - *nīšānī* (lit. “[putting a] mark”) could be arranged. The family members of the boy came to the girl’s house with gifts: they usually gave a piece of gold jewelry (bracelet, chain, necklace, or earring) as a symbol of the engagement. After that, the girl’s family members entertained the guests. Though nowadays a variety of gold jewelry could be presented during the engagement, in the last few decades the main symbol of an engagement has become the gold ring. After the engagement, the family members of the boy

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<sup>1</sup> In the Yezidi religion, *Khdr Nabi* is considered to be the patron saint and protector of people in love [1: 238].

usually open a bottle of brandy they have brought with them and drink with the hosts. The latter habits are definitely a result of the influence of modern Armenian customs.

During the engagement, very often, the size of the *qalan* (lit. “bride price”) was determined by mutual agreement. The process of determining the amount of the sum was called *qalanbirin* (lit. “to cut the *qalan*”). It was also customary among the Armenians of Aghdznik to give money to the bride’s family; the process of determining the amount of that money was called “cutting the *ḡālān*” [9: 56]. *Qalan* could be in the form of money, gold, or domestic animals (cows, sheep) [3: 48-49]. Many families now gradually give up the custom of giving and receiving *qalan*, and sometimes the amount of the *qalan* is small or symbolic. It can be said that giving or receiving *qalan* is a custom that is in the process of being forgotten.

Some 10-15 days after the engagement, a visit to the bride’s family took place: that visit was called *lēpirsyār*. During this visit, the groom’s family brought gifts for the bride and her family members. Our informants often mentioned that during *lēpirsyār* they used to take fruits, biscuits, and sweets placed in large baskets, even in big suitcases, to the bride’s father’s house. Some informants also emphasized that they took different gifts for the bride and her relatives.

A few months after the *lēpirsyār*, a ceremony called *šīrānī* (lit. “sweet”) took place. On the day of *šīrānī*, the family members of the groom took some gifts and also a part of the *qalan* to the bride’s father’s house. The girl’s family entertained guests in a proper fashion. At present, many families do not organize *lēpirsyār* and *šīrānī*. Instead, they have a more luxurious *nīsānī* – engagement ceremony. Thus, it can be said that *lēpirsyār* and *šīrānī* have partially merged.

Before the wedding, they chose a *sardawātī* (lit. “the person leading the wedding”). The *sardawātī* not only played the role of toastmaster during weddings, but was also considered to be a person of equal status as the groom’s father. *Sardawātī* usually participated in the organization of the wedding, sometimes shared expenses with the family of the groom, and gave gifts to the bride and groom. The wife of the *sardawātī* was called *barbūk* (lit. “near the bride”, “[the person] accompanying the bride”). *Barbūk* accompanied the bride during the wedding ceremony and helped her, etc. In the last few decades, the concepts of the Yezidi *sardawātī* and *barbūk* have been greatly influenced by the image of the godfather and godmother of the Armenian wedding. Traditionally, there were no bridesmaids in Yezidi weddings. At present, however, the bride is often accompanied by her unmarried sisters or unmarried female friends. This is also an obvious influence from Armenian weddings.

The groom’s unmarried brothers or friends that accompany him during the wedding are called *birāzavā* (lit. “the brother of the groom”). Previously the groom was accompanied by one *birāzavā*, but now there may be several young, unmarried men with the groom. They can be the groom’s unmarried brothers or friends. Yezidis, like Armenians, sometimes call the *birāzavā* an *āzāb yēybāyr* (lit. “groomsman”). This is also a result of being influenced by Armenian weddings.

In the past, wedding ceremonies lasted two or three days. The groom's relatives gathered at the groom's house. On the first day animals were slaughtered for the feast, and that day was called *rōžā gōštī* (lit. "the day of the meat"). On the second day, the bride was taken to the groom's house and the party continued. On the third day, the groom's closest relatives gathered at his house for entertainment. At present, Yezidi weddings usually last one day. The custom of celebrating weddings for several days has not been forgotten among the Yezidis. However, they no longer do that for the sake of convenience.

*Birāzavā* and friends of the groom cut a branch from a fruit tree without using a saw or an ax and bring it home. Young girls and boys decorate the branch with fruits, sweets, colorful ribbons. Then they tie a beautiful cloth or a scarf on the branch, and the guests can put gifts or money on that scarf. That gifts and the money are then given to the *birāzavā*. That branch is called *dārā mirāzā* (lit. "the tree of the dreams") or *dārā zavē* (lit. "the tree of the groom"). Now, in addition to fruits, people decorate the tree with candies. Usually, the *birāzavā* takes the branch and dances with the guests. People used to leave the tree near the groom's house for a few days. As nowadays weddings are not often performed at home (but rather in restaurants or wedding halls), the branch can also be put near the wedding hall.

In Yezidi traditional weddings, the groom did not go to the bride's house to bring her. Usually, the groom's relatives went to bring her. They often went to the bride's house on horses. There was usually a small table near the bride's house full of food and beverages. The men gathered near that table, drank, and wished for the newlyweds to be happy. The women danced and entered the bride's house and brought gifts for the bride, which were put on trays. The red veil called *xēlī* was very important. The women helped the bride to put on clothes. The Yezidi wedding dress of the bride was not white, it was a colorful dress in accordance with traditional costume. After the bride had dressed, one of the groom's female relatives or *barbūk* placed the *xēlī* on the bride's head. It covered the bride's head and face. At present, Yezidi brides put on white clothes and white veils that do not cover their faces. This is also obviously the result of the influence of modern wedding trends.

In the past, the bride's relatives used to give a *gateaux* (Arm. *gata*) to unmarried girls. They danced with the *gateaux*, then put it under their pillow and had a dream. Nowadays the custom of giving a *gateaux* is almost forgotten, and unmarried boys and girls are given candies and *tārōsīks*.<sup>2</sup> Giving a *tārōsīk* is also the result of influence from modern Armenian wedding rituals.

Before the wedding, the parents of the bride prepare the dowry in advance, which is called *jihēz*. *Jihēz* is the property that the bride takes with her to the groom's house. The custom to give a dowry is not unique to Yezidis, but is present in the cultures of other peoples in the region [19: 35]. In general, the dowry con-

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<sup>2</sup> *Tārōsīk* is a decorated sweet or a candy, which during the wedding ceremony is given to the unmarried young people.

sists of bedding, fabrics, furniture, clothes, and personal items [4: 259]. Some women informants emphasized that their dowries included not only the items bought by their parents, but also socks, and even carpets woven by themselves.<sup>3</sup> Nowadays, many people also include furniture in the dowry.

Before taking the bride to the groom's home, the *sardawāṭī* and another male relative show the dowry to the guests, praise it and thank the bride's paternal family for everything.<sup>4</sup> The men who present the dowry are considered to be special guests called *xwandī* (lit. "invitee", "special guest"). The dowry is then sent to the groom's house. The custom of presenting the dowry is popular among the Yezidis to this day. Some families, however, do not provide a very big dowry and prefer to provide financial support to a young couple instead of a dowry. A special part of the dowry is an embroidered pillow from the family of the bride. It is given to the young couple and is called *balgīyē būkē* (lit. "the pillow of the bride"). This pillow symbolizes the idea of growing old together. That pillow is decorated, and young people often pass it to each other when dancing.

Guests used to enter the house or a tent. Men and women sat at separate tables and were entertained. Nowadays, while leaving the house of the father of the bride the guests are either entertained at the bride's father's house and then go to the house of the groom and are entertained there too, or they go to a restaurant or wedding hall together. When the bride is about to leave the house, her younger brother or another male relative stands near the door with a knife, keeps it on the door, and does not allow the bride to go out. The *sardawāṭī* or *birāzavā* give money and gifts to the child, then he opens the door and allows the bride to leave. According to our elderly informants, the custom to stand near the door and to hold a knife on the door is also an influence from Armenian wedding traditions.

Traditionally, the brother or a male relative of the bride took her hand, and they went out of the paternal home. Then the wife of the *sardawāṭī* called *barbūk* took over and accompanied the bride. Nowadays the bride's brothers take the bride near the groom's car and see her off. Once it was popular for the bride to ride a horse and go to the groom's home. If their homes were near each other or were in the same village, all the guests with the bride walked to the groom's house. Before going to the groom's home, the bride was first taken to the house of the *sardawāṭī*. The *sardawāṭī* and *barbūk* gave presents to the bride, then they continued on their way [3: 59; 4: 260-261]. As mentioned, weddings nowadays are generally organized in restaurants or wedding halls, so the cars of the guests go directly to the restaurant or the wedding hall.

The ceremony of taking the bride from her paternal house was called *būk sīyārķirin* (lit. "to [make] the bride ride"). The existence of such an expression is

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<sup>3</sup> It is noteworthy that among Armenians, the dowry often included not only made items, but also items made by the bride [7: 10-18].

<sup>4</sup> In the Armenian environment, it is customary to present a dowry in some regions. For example, the people of Karabakh used to present the dowry and said: "Long live"/"Good for you" [17: 121].

probably due to the fact that the bride traditionally went to the home of the groom on horseback. At present, though the bride is not taken on horseback, they still continue to use the term *būk s̄yārkin* for taking the bride from her paternal home.

A “hero” called a *řūvī* (lit. “fox”) had an interesting role in Yezidi traditional weddings. A male relative of the groom who first arrived at the groom’s house and informed them that the bride will soon arrive was called a *řūvī*. The mother of the groom gave money or gifts to the *řūvī* who brought good news. Nowadays, one of the groom’s friends or relatives sometimes tries to reach the groom’s home and inform them that the groom and bride are coming.

At the entrance to the groom’s house (or at the entrance to the wedding hall), the mother of the groom meets the young couple, puts *lāvāš*<sup>5</sup> on their shoulders, and gives them honey to eat. When the bride and the groom enter the building, the groom’s mother puts plates under their feet, and they break the plates. People believe that by breaking the plates, evil is destroyed. This is also an innovation in the Yezidi wedding and an obvious influence from the Armenian wedding. Nowadays green and red ribbons are very often tied cross-linked to the groom’s chest. The ribbon is called a *kōsband*. This ribbon is an obvious innovation in the Yezidi wedding and is unique to the Armenian tradition.<sup>6</sup> As a rule, the green ribbon is tied at the groom’s house, and the red one is tied at the bride’s house. Our informants insisted that the *kōsband* was not popular before among Yezidis.

After the bride arrives, the groom and *birāzavā* stand on a high place (they used to stand on the roof of the house), where a decorated branch called the *dārā mirāzā* is placed. The *birāzavā* throws a pillow called *balgīyē būkē* to his friend three times, who returns the pillow each time. Then the *birāzavā* dances and hits the pillow on the head of the groom three times. The groom shakes the branch, then throws an apple at the bride. Some people consider the apple to be the symbol of fertility. However, others consider it to be a symbol of the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Garden of Eden. By throwing the apple the man seems to exact revenge upon the woman who persuaded him to eat the apple and become exiled from the Garden of Eden.

After entering the house of the groom, the bride was traditionally taken to a separate room. The groom entered the room, opened her veil and left. A table was prepared for entertainment at the groom’s house or in a tent. Men and women sat at separate tables. The *sardawātī* played the role of toastmaster. The wife of the *sardawātī* accompanied the bride and then took her out to dance. Now the table is mainly put in the wedding hall, and there are separate tables for men and women. Nowadays aside from the wife of the *sardawātī*, the bride is accompanied by her unmarried sisters or female friends. They are called bridesmaids, which is also an

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<sup>5</sup> *Lāvāš* is a thin bread which is traditionally baked in a *tonir* oven.

<sup>6</sup> In Karabakh (Artsakh), during weddings people used to tie red and green woven threads to the neck of the groom and the right hand of the bride. The people of Artsakh called it *kārmīr-kānāč* (lit. “red-green”) [17: 119].

obvious influence from Armenian weddings. The bride and the groom did not sit next to each other. Now, however, the bride and the groom sit next to each other in the wedding hall.

The custom of painting the fingers of the guests with *henna* had a special place in the Yezidi traditional wedding. As a rule, prepared *henna* was passed around by the guests, and people dipped their fingers into the *henna*. The color of the *henna* remained on their fingers for several days as a symbol of the wedding. Now, the custom of painting the fingers with *henna* has been partially forgotten. Some families, however, keep that custom in a modified way. For example, they paint a tree, a heart or a fruit on the hands or nails of young people using *henna*.

During traditional Yezidi weddings, national melodies were played, and people danced the *gōvand*. People usually dance the *gōvand* holding each other's pinky fingers, putting three steps to the right, two steps to the left. Now young people dance not only the traditional *gōvand*, but also various rhythmic dances.

On the wedding day, as a rule, the *nakah* or *nakh*<sup>7</sup> ceremony is performed. During this ritual, the parents and relatives of the bride and groom give their consent for their marriage. The groom's family takes responsibility for taking care of the bride in all situations of the life.<sup>8</sup> Sometimes the *nakah* is performed on the day of the engagement or wedding. During this ceremony, a Yezidi priest (*sheikh*)<sup>9</sup> is present. The fathers of the groom and the bride (if there is no father, uncles or other male relatives) join their thumbs, swear to protect the newly formed family, and promise to take care of each other in the case of diseases, failures, misfortunes [4: 257-258]. Very often Yezidis call *nakah* "Yezidi civil registration" (registration of civil acts). In addition to *nakah*, the Yezidis also perform the ceremony *ma'r birīn*. *Ma'r birīn* is an integral part of the Yezidi marriage. The ceremony should be held by a Yezidi *sheikh*. This ceremony is sometimes performed immediately after the *nakah*. During this ceremony, the *sheikh* prays and wishes happiness for the young couple. After *ma'r birīn* the newlyweds are legally considered to be a couple and can enter the nuptial chamber. Among Muslim peoples, the property that the groom gives to the bride during marriage is called *mahr* (Pers. *mēhrīyē*). The *mahr* belongs only to the wife and can be used by her in the case of widowhood or divorce at the request of her husband. It is wrong to equate it with the money given to the bride's paternal family (*qalan* or *kalim*); *qalan* is a remnant of old local customs. As far as the *qalan* resembles *mahr*, it has survived among many peoples who were converted to Islam [16: 164]. In the Yezidi tradition, *mahr*

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<sup>7</sup> In Islam, *nikāh* means actually entering into a marital relationship, which concludes the entire marriage ceremony. Sometimes the word *nikāh* is used as a synonym for *zawāj* (lit. "marriage") [16: 190].

<sup>8</sup> The word *zawāj* in spoken language of the Yezidis is more commonly used for the marriage of male people. When talking about the marriage of women, they use the expression *mēr kirin* (lit. "to go to the man").

<sup>9</sup> The Yezidi society consists of three castes: *sheikhs* (*šēx*) and *pirs* (*pīr*) are priests, and *mrids* (*mirīd*) are secular Yezidis [1: 76-80].

has become *ma'r* and has a completely different meaning and significance. Apparently, the custom of giving *qalan* was powerful in the Yezidi tradition and has not lost its place to *mahr*. Thus, *mahr* has not disappeared, but gained a new role in the Yezidi ritual system. It is not unusual because many elements of Islamic origin have developed in a unique way in the closed Yezidi community [18: 210].

It has already been mentioned that Yezidi society consists of three castes - *sheikhs*, *pirs* and *mrids*. Marriage between the members of these three castes is prohibited. The marriage of Yezidis with non-Yezidis is also banned [8: 233-236].

In the past there were some marriage forms that are now forgotten among the Yezidis of Armenia. These forms of marriage were: *řavāndin* (lit. “to kidnap”, “abduction”), *běřtkkartma* (lit. “scratch on the crib”), *bardēlī* (lit. “exchange”), polygamy and *levirate* [3: 42].

*Řavāndin* was the abduction of the bride by the groom or his family. The custom was once popular in the cultures of other peoples in the region [15: 51]. There are many tales in Yezidi folk tradition related to the abduction of girls. Very often after kidnapping a girl, the families of the young people became enemies and fought. The kidnapers gave money to the family of the girl in order to reconcile, and hostilities ceased [4: 230].

*Běřtkkartma* was once popular among the Yezidis of Armenia and also among other peoples of the region [13: 12; 11: 70-73]. In this case, the decision to marry was made while the girl and boy were still children and were in their cribs. The cribs of the two children were marked, they were considered to be husband and wife [3: 44].

*Bardēlī* is the marriage of girls in exchange. In this case, the groom's sister married the bride's brother [4: 250]. Nowadays this form of marriage is not popular at all.

At present, polygamy is not accepted in the Yezidi community of Armenia. However, it is mentioned in some sources and in Yezidi folk tradition that polygamy was accepted among them and also had a social component [4: 243]. One of the reasons for polygamy was the infertility of the wife or the fact that she did not have a son after giving birth to several daughters.<sup>10</sup> The lack of sons very often pushed men to have a second wife. The wives of the same man are called *hēwī*. One of the *hēwī*-s was called *jinā sara* (lit. “chief woman”) and had special privileges. For example, difficult tasks were mostly performed by the younger women [3: 46].

Another form of polygamy is called *sardārūniřtin* (lit. “to sit [on something]”) [3: 42]. If a woman had an extramarital affair with a married man, she could go and sit in that man's house, on the bed and stay there as a second wife [4: 250]. In such cases, even a wedding ceremony did not take place, but the husband was obliged to give *qalan* to the paternal family of his new wife.

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<sup>10</sup> The custom of having a second wife for such a reason is also popular among other peoples of the region [10: 55].

There is evidence that among the Yezidis *levirate* marriage was common, when a man could marry his dead brother's wife. In the case of such a marriage, a wedding ceremony did not take place and *qalan* was not given to the paternal family of the woman [3: 46-47]. This form of marriage has completely disappeared among the Yezidis of Armenia. However, our older informants mention that such marriages took place especially during wars and tragedies when many men had been killed or died. Interestingly, there is no special term in the Yezidi language for a levirate marriage.

The wedding ceremony is a more open, easily influenced and transformable ritual. Therefore, many elements of the traditional Yezidi wedding were partly influenced by the Armenian wedding ritual and partly influenced by modern wedding trends. Those elements experienced a unique development, transformed, and got a new appearance and interpretation. Some elements of the traditional Yezidi wedding have been partially preserved, although they have lost their meaning and former significance. Some old rituals were reborn and are performed in a new way. Additionally, some traditional forms of marriage have been forgotten among the Yezidis of Armenia. The study of the transformation of some elements of the traditional Yezidi wedding is important, as it can greatly contribute to the study of the dynamics of other ethnic transformative processes.

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## ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆԱԲՆԱԿ ԵՉԴԻՆԵՐԻ ԱՎԱՆԴԱԿԱՆ ՀԱՐՍԱՆԻՔԻ ՓՈԽԱԿԵՐՊՎՈՂ ՈՐՈՇ ՏԱՐՐԵՐԻ ՇՈՒՐՋ

*Թերեզա Ամրյան*

**Բանալի բառեր՝** եզդիական, հարսանիք, տարր, փոխակերպում, հարս, փեսա, սովորույթ, ավանդույթ, ծես:

Եզդիական հարսանիքն իր յուրօրինակ և գունեղ տարրերի շնորհիվ հաճախ է հետաքրքրել հարևան ժողովուրդներին: Ժամանակ առ ժամանակ եզդիական հարսանիքը քննվել է լրագրողների, հետազոտողների և գիտնականների կողմից: Այս հոդվածի շրջանակներում քննության ենք առել եզդիական ավանդական հարսանիքի որոշ տարրեր. վերջին տասնամյակների ընթացքում այդ տարրերը ենթարկվել են տարբեր փոխակերպումների արտաքին ազդեցությունների պատճառով:

Եզդիական ավանդական հարսանիքի վերափոխվող ծեսերը, սակայն, պատշաճ կերպով չեն քննվել:

Հարկ է նշել, որ հարսանեկան արարողությունը բաց ծես է, որը կարող է ենթարկվել արտաքին ազդեցությունների և հեշտությամբ վերափոխվել: Ուստի հայաստանաբնակ եզդիների ավանդական հարսանիքի շատ տարրեր մասամբ կրել են հայկական հարսանեկան ծեսի, մասամբ՝ ժամանակակից միտումների ազդեցությունը: Այդ տարրերից շատերը ձեռք են բերել նոր բովանդակություն և նոր մեկնաբանություն, մի շարք հին արարողություններ էլ վերածնվել են և նորովի են կատարվում: Բացի այդ, ամուսնության որոշ ձևեր (բազմակնություն, լևիրատ) վերացել են Հայաստանի եզդիների շրջանում: Եզդիական ավանդական հարսանիքի տարրերի վերափոխման ուսումնասիրությունը կարևոր է, քանի որ այն կարող է մեծապես նպաստել էթնիկ այլ գործընթացների փոխակերպման դինամիկայի ուսումնասիրությանը:

**MS № 1467 OF ARABIC SCRIPT MANUSCRIPTS COLLECTION  
OF THE MATENADARAN AS A NEWFOUND EXAMPLE OF THE  
"COLLECTION OF VERSE DICTIONARIES"<sup>\*1</sup>**

*Ani Avetisyan*

**Abstract**

The present article touches upon a series of Ottoman Turkish manuscripts from the Matenadaran's Arabic script manuscripts collection, an example of a unique collection in Ottoman Turkish manuscripts known as the "Collection of Verse Dictionaries" MS No. 1467, in order to provide the first detailed study.

These collections were compiled at the religious-educational institutions called tekke or dergāh, and the medrese. They were compiled as language textbooks, in order to provide easy learning of languages (Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish) through the simultaneous use of several verse dictionaries and to be engaged in the process of learning languages by heart.

The unique copy of the Matenadaran's "Collection of Verse Dictionaries" includes 3 complete copies of bilingual (Arabic-Ottoman Turkish) and trilingual (Arabic-Persian-Ottoman Turkish) verse dictionaries of the 14th-15th, 17th and 19th-century writers: copies of Ferišteoğlu 'Abdullaṭīf ibn Melek's (proper name was 'Abdullaṭīf 'İzzeddīn et-Tirevī) "Luġat-i Ferišteoġlū" and Bosnalı Ebū l-Fāzīl Muḥammed (Meḥmed) ibn Aḥmed er-Rūmī's "Şubha-i Şıbyān" Arabic-Ottoman Turkish and also complete copy of Adanalı Ḥōca Meḥmed Ḥayret's (proper name was Meḥmed Behāeddīn Ḥayret) "Tuḥfe-i Zībā" (known with another titles as "Tuḥfe-i Dürri" or "Tuḥfe-i Ḥayret" or "Tuḥfe-i Se Zebān") Arabic-Persian-Ottoman Turkish verse dictionaries.

The article presents in detail the works included in the collection. At the same time, it has touched upon the methodology of writing verse dictionaries in classical Turkish literature, their structural features, the significance and role of dictionaries in Turkish society, religion, literature and education. The purposes of writing verse dictionaries in all cases were to teach languages, to develop and spread literary speech, and to practice in prosody (especially in 'Arūz meter).

The comprehensive presentation of the collection is even sufficient for it to become a part of the manuscripts of the four collections, already known in foreign collections as the "Collection of Verse Dictionaries", in order to become a source of new research opportunities for local and foreign specialists.

**Keywords:** The collection of Arabic script manuscripts, Matenadaran, Ottoman Turkish manuscripts, Dictionary, Verse dictionary, Collection of Verse Dictionaries, Tuḥfe, Luġat-i Ferišteoġlu, Şubha-i Şıbyān, Tuḥfe-i Zībā.

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<sup>1</sup> This is only a small part of our study; the upcoming book includes 30 manuscripts of bilingual and trilingual dictionaries of the Arabic script manuscripts collection of the Matenadaran.

## Introduction

In the Ottoman Turkish manuscripts, which are part of the Arabic script manuscripts collection of the Matenadaran, there are many "Collections" (*Mecmū'ā*), which are separate sources of study both in structure and in the variety of material covered.

Initially, in classical Turkish literature, notebooks (*defter*) made up of various works, fragmentary quotations recorded from works, up to everyday issues (current calculations, bills, etc.) related to instructions were perceived as a collection [12:8].

Later, these notebooks were replaced by the currently perceived "Collections", which were compiled by both masters and students during the workshops on a regular and mixed basis with irregular principles. Also, there are samples implemented by one hand.

The collections are valuable resources for outlining the temporal heritage of literature, history and culture. They are especially important in terms of revealing unknown works, even the names of new poets, writers, historians, unpublished works of famous writers, and even the prototypes of printed works.

Referring to the collections and the circumstances of their writing, Turkish researcher Atabey Kılıç notes that there are already some attempts to classify the collections, and points out that the Turkish researcher Güney Kut singled out several types of "Collections" and classified them theoretically:

a. "Similar Collections" ("Nāẓire Mecmū'alari"), which include works of the same content,

b. "Collection of Poems" or "Collection of *Dīvāns*" ("Mecmū'a-i Eş'ar" or "Mecmū'a-i Devavin"),

c. "Collections of works related to the same issue" (e.g., "Collection of Medicine Works" ("Mecmū'a-i Edviye"), "Collection of History Works" ("Mecmū'a-i Tevāriḥ"), "Collection of Letters" ("Mecmū'a-i Münşe'āt"), etc.),

d. "Mixed Collections" ("Karişik Mecmū'alari"), which include verse and prose works of various contents, often in different (e.g., Arabic, Persian, Turkish) languages,

e. "Collections compiled for famous people" (e.g., sponsor of the writer or scribe, ruler of the period, owner of collection etc.) [12:8-9].

Attempts at classification of collections should be considered conditional, as the studies are ongoing and many collections with new patterns may emerge.

The "Dictionary Collections" ("Mecmū'a-i Luḡat", "Cāmī'ü'l-Luḡat", "Luḡat Mecmū'ası", "Sözlük Mecmū'ası") are also a separate category in the collections, which as the title states, include dictionary examples and are intended for teaching languages in schools. An example of such a collection is mentioned in MS No. 210

of the Library of the Turkish Linguistic Society, which includes 9 dictionaries related to Persian<sup>2</sup>.

In the history of the Turkish codicology, the collections, which are known as the "Collection of Verse Dictionaries" ("Manzūm Sözlük Mecmū'ası") are also mentioned. Usually, more than one verse dictionary is included in them.

So far, four copies of the "Collection of Verse Dictionaries" are known, i.e., the Library of the Mevlânâ Museum MS No. 4026 (Mevlânâ Müzesi Kütüphanesi 4026 No'lu Mecmua)<sup>3</sup>, the Library of Süleymaniye in Istanbul, Collection after the name of Reşid Efendi MS No 977 (Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Reşid Efendi No. 977)<sup>4</sup> and also MS No 876 at the same library (Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, No. 876)<sup>5</sup> and the last one is the National Library's MS No 2727 (Milli Kütüphane No. 2727)<sup>6</sup>. A number of articles have been published about these collections in various scientific journals.

These collections were compiled mainly at the religious-educational institutions called *tekke* or *dergâh*<sup>7</sup>, and the *medrese*<sup>8</sup> [12:7].

In fact, they were essentially compiled as language-textbooks, with the purpose to provide ease of learning languages (Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish) with the simultaneous use of several verse dictionaries and to be involved in the process of learning languages through memorizing (*ezberci eğitim* - learning by heart).

A new example of such a "Collection" is **MS No. 1467**, which we find out in the Arabic script manuscripts collection of the Matenadaran. Our collection

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<sup>2</sup> The dictionaries are "Luğat-i Müşkilât-i Şāhnāme", "Risāle fi Beyānī Ma'na'l-Çalab", "Luğat-i Fārisī", "Şihāh-i 'Acemiyye", "Tuḥfet ül-Hādā" ("Luğat-i Dānistān"), "Luğat-i 'Arabī", "Luğat-i Gülistān", "Luğat-i Bostān", "Luğat-i Bahāristān". See in detail [2].

<sup>3</sup> 3 verse dictionaries are included: Sunbulzāde Vehbī "Tuḥfe-i Vehbī", Muğlalī İbrāhīm Şāhidī Dede "Tuḥfe-i Şāhidī", Meḥmed ibn Aḥmed er-Rūmī "Şubḥa-i Şıbyān". See in detail [8], [12].

<sup>4</sup> 8 verse dictionaries are included: Ḥusām ibn Ḥasan el-Ḳonevī "Tuḥfe-i Ḥusām" (or "Tuḥfe-i Ḥusāmī"), Muğlalī İbrāhīm Şāhidī Dede "Tuḥfe-i Şāhidī", Lāmī Çelebī "Tuḥfet ül-Lāmī", 'Osmān ibn Ḥuseyin el-Bosnevī "Luğat-i Manzūme", 'Alī "Naẓm ül-Esāmī", Luṭfullāh Ḥalīmī ibn Ebī Yūsuf "Luğat-i Halīmī", Luṭfullāh (Le'ālī) "Tuḥfe-i Muḳaddimet ül-Luğat", Behā'uddīn ibn-i 'Abdurrahmān el-Malkaravī "U'cūbet ül-Garā'ib". See in detail [13].

<sup>5</sup> 9 verse dictionaries are included: Şemsī "Cevāhir ül-Kelimāt", Luṭfullāh Ḥalīmī ibn Ebī Yūsuf "Baḥr ül-Ġarā'ib" (2 copies), 'Alī "Naẓm ül-Esāmī", Muğlalī İbrāhīm Şāhidī Dede "Tuḥfe-i Şāhidī", Ḥusām ibn Ḥasan el-Ḳonevī "Tuḥfe-i Ḥusāmī", [Kalender] "Luğat ibn Kalender", Bedrūddīn Ebū Naşr Mes'ūd ibn Ebū Bekr el-Ferāhī "Nişāb us-Şıbyān" (2 copies). See [6:3].

<sup>6</sup> 3 verse dictionaries are included: Meḥmed ibn Aḥmed er-Rūmī "Şubḥa-i Şıbyān", Muğlalī İbrāhīm Şāhidī Dede "Tuḥfe-i Şāhidī", Sunbulzāde Vehbī "Tuḥfe-i Vehbī". See reference to this [1].

<sup>7</sup> The *sufī* spiritual center (monastic complex), formerly a home for *dervişes*, was later transformed into an institution, which included a mosque, a meeting place, a school, a library, a guest house, a hospital, a charitable center, and more.

<sup>8</sup>The founding of the *medrese* is connected with the Seljuk leader Turgut Bey (1040, Nişapur), whose traditions continued during the Ottoman period (under Sultan Meḥmed II (1432-1481)) and lasted until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, with some changes in the curriculum. In fact, education in the *medreses* were primarily based on Islamic religion, culture, law, religious ideas, beliefs, and then included language, literature, grammar, etiquette, rhetoric, arithmetic, history, geography, medicine, translation and other subjects.

contains three verse bilingual (Arabic-Ottoman Turkish) and trilingual (Arabic-Persian-Ottoman Turkish) dictionaries copied in the 19th or mid-19th century. Before discussing the content of the collection, we should first understand what verse dictionaries are, what their structure is and for what purpose they were created.

### **The writing methodology of verse dictionaries**

Verse dictionaries and works in Islamic literature were first compiled in Arabic and Persian literature, then in classical Turkish literature in more extensive and valuable examples [5:7]. The works of Turkish authors have become guidelines for the development of Turkish lexicography.

The first example of a bilingual (Arabic-Persian) verse dictionary in Islamic literature belongs to Bedrüddîn Ebû Naşr Mes'ûd ibn Ebû Bekr el-Ferâhî (d. 640 / 1242-1243) entitled "Nisâb us-Sıbyân" written in AH 618 / 1220-1221AD which has become an Arabic-Persian textbook-dictionary in Iran, Central Asia, as well as in India [10:67].

A tradition of writing verse dictionaries was especially prominent in classical Turkish literature and classified into three groups: Persian-Ottoman Turkish, Arabic-Ottoman Turkish, Arabic-Persian-Ottoman Turkish [10:66].

About 82 verse dictionaries from which 28 Persian-Ottoman Turkish, 20 Arabic-Ottoman Turkish, 17 Arabic-Persian-Ottoman Turkish, 1 Ottoman Turkish-Armenian, 1 Ottoman Turkish-Bosnian, 8 Ottoman Turkish-Greek, 1 Ottoman Turkish-Bulgarian, 1 Ottoman Turkish-Arabian-Persian-Afghan (Pashto)-Hindi, 3 Ottoman Turkish-Albanian, 1 Ottoman Turkish-French, 1 Ottoman Turkish-German verse dictionaries have been written in the territory of the Ottoman Empire.

The first Persian-Ottoman Turkish verse dictionary in Turkish-literature belongs to Konyalı Hüsâm ibn Hasan (Hüsâm ibn Hasan el-Konevî) titled as "Tuḥfe-i Hüsâm" or "Tuḥfe-i Hüsâmî" which was written in AH 802/1399-1400 AD<sup>9</sup>, and the last one is Aḥmed Remzî Aқыurek's "Tuḥfe-i Remzî" written in AH 1343/1924 AD<sup>10</sup>, which is the last verse dictionary written in the Ottoman Turkish period.

The first Arabic-Ottoman Turkish verse dictionary was written by Ferişteoğlu 'Abdullaṭîf ibn Melek in AH 795/1392 AD and called "Luğat-i Ferişteoğlū". The

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<sup>9</sup> The full title of the dictionary is "Tuḥfe-i Hüsâmî ez-Müeltekât Sāmî". It was written with a resemblance to the Arabic-Persian dictionary entitled "Nasīb ül-Fıtyân" or "Nesīb üt-Tıbyân" written by Hüsameddîn Hasan bin 'Abdülmü'min el-Hoyî. It consists of 20 *kıtas* (300 *beyts*) and 5-*beyt hatime* (epilogue), a total of 305 *beyts*. There are given 1350 Persian words equivalents in Ottoman Turkish provided. See [15:111-113].

<sup>10</sup> The author gave as the second title "Uşküfe" ("Flower" or "Bud") both in the preface and epilogue of the dictionary. It begins with prose and 37 *beyt*-verse prefaces, and ends with 18 *beyt*-epilogue. The dictionary section consists of 29 *kıtas* (261 *beyts*), includes 1250 Persian words with the repetitions of lexical items. See [15: 427-430].

last Arabic-Ottoman Turkish verse dictionary belongs to Yaḥyā Efendi (or Efendi Yaḥyā) entitled "Luḡat-i Yūsuf" written in AH 1241/1826 AD<sup>11</sup>.

The first trilingual (Arabic-Persian-Ottoman Turkish) verse dictionary was compiled by Behā'uddin ibn 'Abdūrrahmān Malkaravī in AH 827/1424 AD and entitled "'U'cubet ül-Garā'ib fī Naẓm ül-Cevāhir ül-'Acā'ib"<sup>12</sup>. The latest one is Süleymān Ḥayrī's "Ḥayr ül-Luḡat" dictionary written before 1891 AD<sup>13</sup>.

The most valuable example of the verse bilingual dictionaries is 15th-16th-century Turkish poet Muḡlalī Ibrāhīm Şāhidī Dede's (Şāhidī, Mevlānā Şāhidī)<sup>14</sup> Persian-Ottoman Turkish dictionary entitled "Tuḥfe-i Şāhidī"<sup>15</sup>, which was written as a *naẓīre*<sup>16</sup> to Ḥusām's "Tuḥfe-i Ḥusāmī" in AH 920 /1514-1515 AD or AH 921/1515-1516 AD. It is the most copied dictionary. Only in Ankara National Library (Ankara Milli Kütüphanesi) there are more than 40 manuscripts of the dictionary [15:208]. The work was published five times between 1848-1867 AD [10:67].

Another famous example is the 18th-19th-century Turkish poet Sunbulzāde Vehbī's<sup>17</sup> "Tuḥfe-i Vehbī" Persian-Ottoman Turkish verse dictionary.<sup>18</sup> It was written as an imitation of Şāhidī's work in AH 1196 /1781-1782 AD. The vocabulary was copied in large numbers and published about 60 times [10:67].

In particular, the verse dictionaries were widespread in Turkish as well as Turkish-speaking society until the middle of the 19th century. They were used as textbooks in pre-schools, known as *şıbyān mektebī*, *mekātib-i ibtidā'i*, *ilk mektep*, popularly known as *maḥalle mektebī*, *tāş mektep* and by other names<sup>19</sup>, and later also in *medreses*, which were large in volume and presumably already in a large number of words [7:119-120].

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<sup>11</sup> It is a small dictionary, consisting of 6 pages, a total of 114 *beyts*. The author dedicated it to his son Yūsuf. See in detail [4].

<sup>12</sup> The dictionary is especially known by the short title "'U'cubet ül-Garā'ib". It consists of a preface, 36 *kıtas*, a total of 400-436 *beyts*. See [10:68], [5:15-16].

<sup>13</sup> It consists of 3000 *beyts*. See [15:410].

<sup>14</sup> He was the author of *Dīvāns* and *Meşnevīs*. Şāhidī was born in AH 875/1470-1471 AD in Muḡla, province of Menteşe. He entered like his father the order of *Mevlevīs* and became a *Şeyḫ* of the *Mevlevīs Order*. He died in AH 957/1550 AD. See [21:139b].

<sup>15</sup> It contains a prologue in *meşnevī* verse, 27 *kıtas* and an epilogue with *ebced* (chronogram).

<sup>16</sup> A poem written in imitation of one another poet's poem.

<sup>17</sup> His proper name was Muḡammed ibn Reşīd (or Rāşīd). He was born in Marāş. After completing his studies in his native town, he settled during the reign of Muştafā III (1757-1774 AD) in Constantinople and obtained employment as secretary to Yenişehirli 'Oşmān Efendi and the *Re'īs ul-Kutub* (head clerk) Ismā'īl Beg. Vehbī died at Constantinople in AH 1224 /1809-1810 AD. See [21:144], [19:242].

<sup>18</sup> It contains a prologue in *meşnevī* verse, 57 *kıtas* and a *meşnevī* titled "İştīlāḫāt-i 'Acem" ("The Idiomatic Expressions of Persian"), short epilogue with *ebced* (chronogram).

<sup>19</sup> Schools of the same name were first opened in Iznik, Bursa, Edirne, and later in Istanbul. 5 (sometimes referred to as school-age 4) -10-year-old boys and girls studied in those schools. They were taught Persian, Arabic, Turkish, recitation of the *Qur'ān*, etiquette, Islamic law (*fiḫh*), history, grammar, arithmetic, and literature, and got especially acquainted with Iranian literature through *Rūmī's "Maşnavī"*, *Sa'dī's "Golestān"* and *Bostān"*, *Firdawsī's "Şahnāme"*.

The primary purpose of verse dictionaries was to introduce students to foreign languages - Persian, Arabic, as well as Ottoman Turkish (*elsine-i şelāşe*), to facilitate language learning, develop and spread literary speech and practice in prosody (especially in *Arūz* meter).

For studying Persian and Arabic, verse dictionaries such as Şāhidī's "Tuḥfe-i Şāhidī" and Vehbī's "Tuḥfe-i Vehbī" and "Nuḥbe-i Vehbī", Ferišteoğlu's "Luġat-i Ferišteoġlū" and Muḥammed (Meḥmed) ibn Aḥmed er-Rūmī's "Şubha-i Şıbyān" were often included in the curriculum.

Verse dictionaries have been valued for their choice of vocabulary, especially with the intention to facilitate the comprehension of the *Qur'ān* (*Kur'ān-i Kerīm*) and Hadith (*Ḥadīṣ*), as dictionaries significantly contain incomprehensible words (*ġarīb*) of them, and in classical Islamic literature the dictionaries were evaluated by the intricate vocabulary of the *Qur'ān* and in particular, by the 13th-century Persian *sufi* poet Mevlānā Cellāleddīn-i Rūmī's poem "**Meşnevī**".

Adjacent to these lexicons, dictionaries also include the everyday vocabulary of the vernacular of the time, Persian or Arabic words and idiomatic expressions (*iştilāḥāt*) that are currently obsolete (*arkaik, eskicil*) or preserved as synonyms in oral and literary speech. In some cases, the dictionaries also include the grammatical rules of the primary language with comments, linguistic, metrical and literary information, as well as religious sections.

Verse dictionaries were also evaluated as literary works. Bilingual and trilingual verse dictionaries were composed not only of simple word combinations, but there were also works created in two or three languages (like a *mülemma* 'poem) which developed artistic thought and interesting readability works, which enriched the languages with vocabulary and linguistic-structural means of expressions. In this case, the rich linguistic culture of the Persian and as well as the Arabic languages with the religious and fictional lexicon flowed into the Turkish language, automatically helping to form Ottoman Turkish as the official literary language of the Ottoman Empire [3:161].

In particular, the verse dictionaries are known by such titles as "Nişāb" ("Generation", "Beginning")<sup>20</sup>, "Tuḥfe" ("Gift")<sup>21</sup>, "Naẓm" ("Composition"), "Manzūme" ("Verse", "Poem"), "Luġat" ("Dictionary") [14:151].

The verse dictionaries generally start with the preface written in *meşnevī*<sup>22</sup> poetic form where the author of the work glorifies God, prays for successful implementation of the work, then include a chapter explaining the purpose of writing the book (*Sebeb-i telīf*). The main portion of the dictionary consists of "Kıta"s or

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<sup>20</sup> It was used by Ferāḥ (or Farāḥ) who was the author of the first bilingual (Arabic-Persian) verse dictionary titled "Nişāb us-Şıbyān". See [14:151].

<sup>21</sup> The title "Tuḥfe" was firstly used by Ḥusām (Hüsām) who was the author of the first bilingual (Persian-Ottoman Turkish) verse dictionary called "Tuḥfe-i Ḥüsāmī" or "Tuḥfe-i Hüsām". See [5:9].

<sup>22</sup> The poetical form with *Arūz* meter that is used in Iranian, Arabic and Ottoman Turkish literature.



"Baḥir"s<sup>23</sup> arranged in alphabetical order with different versification and an epilogue (*ḥātīme*) written again in *mesnevī* or only in other short verse-forms, where the author prays to God for the successful completion of the work, gives again the title of the work and author's name, at the end of which there is often a *beyt* representing a chronogram (in *ebced* form) where the year of dictionary's composition is stated by *mısrā'* (*hemistiche*) or by a phrase or word written in *mısrā'*. In some of the vocabularies after the epilogue include lists with the numerical value of letters (*hesāb-i ebced*) from *elif* to *ğayn* (1-9 (ط-ا), 10-90 (ص-ی), 100-1000 (ق-غ)).

The *ķiṭās* can be written both in *mesnevī* and *naẓm*<sup>24</sup>, *müstezād*<sup>25</sup>, *terkīb-i bend*<sup>26</sup> and other verse-forms [14:151].

The titles of the *ķiṭās* are in Persian or Arabic depending on the languages of the dictionary. The first part of the titles usually mentions the letters of the alphabet at the end of the poetic lines indicating the sequence of the *ķiṭās* (*Ķiṭā-i elif*, *Ķiṭā-i bā*, etc.) or the following numbers (*Ķiṭā-i evvel*, *Ķiṭā-i s̄ānī*, etc.), and in the second part the *baḥir* (*meter*)<sup>27</sup> of the *ķiṭā* is given (*Baḥr-i Hezec*, *Baḥr-i Kāmil*, *Baḥr-i Recez*, *Baḥr-i Remel*, etc.) (e.g. القطعة السادسة عشر في البحر هـ ج). In some cases, only the *baḥir* of the *ķiṭā* is given as a complete title of the *ķiṭā* (e.g. قطعه در بحر هـ ج / قطعه در بحر وافر مثنى) or both the *baḥir* and *vezin* (*mnemonic words of the meter or meter formula*)<sup>28</sup> at the same time (e.g. قطعه اخري في بحر المديد فاعلان/قطعه اخري في بحر الطويل فعولن مفاعلن), and sometimes, the general formulation of group of words included in the *ķiṭā* (e.g. قطعه دلکش و پر جنبش و خوب و رعناً, trans. as "Ķiṭā of heart taking, great festivity and beauty [Ķiṭā of eloquent words]").

Each *ķiṭā* ends with *taktī beyt* (*metrical couplet*)<sup>29</sup> where the *ķiṭā*'s *vezin* (*mnemonic words of the meter*) and *baḥir* (*meter*) are given. In some dictionaries the *taktī beyt* was given both at the beginning and the end which are already perceived as additional metrical couplets, can refer to the same *ķiṭā* or the next one, and even sometimes entitled "el-Multeḥaḫ" ("Added") or "Ķiṭā". This part has

<sup>23</sup> In this case, the *Ķiṭā* and *Baḥir* are used in the sense of *part* or *section*.

<sup>24</sup> It is a form of descriptive poetry that has the same structure as *ķiṭā* and *rubā'ī*.

<sup>25</sup> It is one of the poetic forms of classical literature, a poem consisting of long and short lines of poetry.

<sup>26</sup> A poem consisting of three or more *bends* (*couplets*). Each *bend* consists of 6-10 *beyts* and is called *terci'-ḥāne*, after which the next *bend* is repeated.

<sup>27</sup> The basic *baḥirs* of the Arabic poetry which are used in classical-Turkish-literature are 16: *Tavīl*, *Mezīd*, *Basīl*, *Kāmil*, *Vāfir*, *Hezec*, *Recez*, *Remel*, *Serī*, *Hafīf*, *Münserih*, *Muzārī'*, *Muktedab*, *Muctess*, *Mütekarīb*, *Mütedarik*. The three *Cedīd*, *Müşākil*, *Karīb baḥirs* ("Buḥur-i Muḥatessa") are used only in Persian-literature and never used in Ottoman Turkish-literature. See [1:186-191].

<sup>28</sup> *Vezin* consists of 8 *cūz* or *teffīl*, e.g. مستعلن مستعلن مستعلن / مفاعلن فعلان مفاعلن فعولن / مفاعلن مفاعلن فعولن etc.

<sup>29</sup> It is equivalent to the terms *beyt-i humāyūn* and *beyt-i müzeyyel*. For example, İbrāhīm Şāhidī calls the *beyt-i humāyūn* in following section *بیت همایون // یزردم انده بر بیت همایون* of his verse dictionary. The term *ķiṭā-i rubū'iyye* is also used in the commentaries of verse dictionaries.

been added especially in subsequent copies of the dictionaries that were missing in the original and earlier copies.

The numbers of *kitās* (or *bahirs*) are different. The bilingual verse dictionaries include 10-81 *kitās* and 11-100 *kitās* are in the verse trilingual dictionaries [16:433]. According to this the number of *beyts* are also different: about 100-1300, total 500-5,000 words [14:151-152].

The only exceptions are Nazīm's (Nezīm Frakulla) "Der Beyān-i Turkī Ma'a Lisān-i Arnabūd" Ottoman Turkish-Albanian verse dictionary consisting of 10 *beyts* (totally 60 words), Refī'i Kalayī's "Manzūm Luġāt-i Ermeniye" Armenian-Ottoman Turkish dictionary consisting of 79 *beyts*. The last one is Luṭfullāh's (known by the name Le'ālī) "Tuḥfe-i Muḳaddimet ūl-Luġāt" Persian-Ottoman Turkish dictionary consisting of 4 *kitās* (84 *beyts*) and including 250 words.

In one *mısrā'* the definitions of three, sometimes four or five words are given. For the exact pronunciation of the words (also for studying) *hareke* or *haraka* (vocalization) were given, which are often separated by red ink especially in handwritten examples of the dictionaries. Even Eastern Arabic numerals are indicated at the top or bottom of word units for easy search of bilingual or trilingual pairs from 1 to 9 ((<sup>١</sup>-<sup>٩</sup>) also from 1 to 10 (<sup>١</sup>-<sup>١٠</sup>) or from 1 to 12 (<sup>١</sup>-<sup>١٢</sup>) and etc.

Sometimes the initials of each language (Persian, Arabic, Ottoman Turkish) are written in the lower or upper parts of words to separate and differentiate languages, for example ف (فارسی / Fārsī), ع (عربی / 'Arabī), ت (ترکی / Turkī) and in Ottoman Turkish, for words borrowed from Arabic and Persian initials like ع (عربي / 'Arabī - Turkī) and فت (فارسی ترکی / Fārsī-Turkī) are given.

In conclusion, the authors of dictionaries have always spoken about the importance, practicality, simplicity and the role of verse dictionaries in language-learning, eventually hoping that their dictionaries would become an important source of imitation and will be included in the learning process like their predecessors.

### **MS No. 1467 of the Arabic script manuscripts collection of the Matenadaran**

**MS No. 1467** is a newfound example of the "Collection of Verse Dictionaries" in the Arabic script manuscripts collection of the Matenadaran. It consists of 78 folios, where 1a, 10a, 28a-9a folios are blank, the paper is Western, written area is 14x19.5 cm, the text panel is arranged in two columns and one column (ff. 34b-44a), set within a complex red frame (9.5x15 cm.), between 8-15 lines to the page are written in *nesih* script, catchwords are at the left bottom of each verso page, the entire text is in black, subtitles, the numbers and letters at the bottom of words are in red, the binding is of marbled paper (red, white, brown) with a cover spine of brown artificial leather, board of cardboard, and a doublure of paper. The list of the works is written on doublure A<sup>b30</sup>. The manuscript is in satisfactory condition. The

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<sup>30</sup> Doublure A<sup>b</sup>: The list of works:

binding paper and the artificial leather spine are worn out, the folios are newly stitched, and the quire is broken.

The collection<sup>31</sup> also includes 3 bilingual and trilingual verse dictionaries, two of which are Arabic-Ottoman Turkish verse dictionaries: the first one known as the "Şubha-i Şıbyān" written by the 17th-century poet Bosnalı Ebū l-Fāzl Muḥammed (Meḥmed) ibn Aḥmed er-Rūmī, the "Luġat-i Ferišteoġlū", written by the 14th-15th-century writer Ferišteoġlu 'Abdullaṭīf ibn Melek, and the Arabic-Persian-Ottoman Turkish verse dictionary known as the "Tuḥfe-i Zībā" written by the 19th-century poet-translator Adanalı Ḥōca Meḥmed Ḥayret.

On folios 10b-27b of the collection is the complete copy of the Arabic-Ottoman Turkish verse dictionary "Şubha-i Şıbyān" (صَبْحَةُ صَبِيَّانٍ, *The Children's Bead*) [23:f.10b]<sup>32</sup>. The dictionary consists of a prologue, 31 *kıta* and 16 *bahir* (47 in total) and an epilogue. The text panel is arranged in two columns and the number of lines is 15.

From the epilogue (خاتمه , "Ḥātime"), which is also the scribal colophon, we find that the copy was compiled in AH 1258 on 2 *Receb*/on August 9, 1842 AD, without mentioning the name of the scribe [23:f.27b]<sup>33</sup>.

In the prologue of the work the author highlights the importance of his dictionary, noting that it is as relevant as Ibn Ferište's dictionary (meaning the first Arabic-Ottoman Turkish dictionary - A.A) and like it contains words taken from the *Qur'ān* [23:f.11b]<sup>34</sup>.

Unlike authors of similar dictionaries, Meḥmed ibn Aḥmed er-Rūmī does not say anything about himself in the preface. Researchers found out the name of the author of the dictionary from printed copies or commentaries (*şerḥ*) written on the dictionary. Hence the name of the author is given with variations such as Meḥmed ibn Aḥmed er-Rūmī, Ebū l-Fazl Muḥammad ibn Aḥmed er-Rūmī and er-Rūmī Bosnevî Ebū l-Fazl Muḥammed Aḥmed [11:91].

The dictionary was written in AH 1033/1624-1625 AD, according to the phrase جلی نظم of the hemistiche جلی نظم اوله تاريخ تا اكا which is given at the end of

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صَبْحَةُ صَبِيَّانٍ ۱۲ ابن فرشته ۳۱ تحفه ۴۹ قصیده برده ۱ امالی شریف ۸

<sup>31</sup> In addition to these dictionaries, the manuscript also includes two small verse parts with other contents: On ff. 1b-6b is Imam al-Būsīrī's famous "Kaşīde-i Bürde" (قصیده برده), the Arabic ode dedicated to the Prophet Muḥammed; on ff. 7b-9b is an Arabic didactic ode (Islamic creed) by Imam Sirajuddin Ali al-Ushi's "Amālī Şerīf" (امالی شریف), that is commonly known by the title "Bad' al-Amālī" (الامالی).

<sup>32</sup> The beginning of the vocabulary: نام خدا ذکر ایدہ لم ابتدا منزل مقصوده اودر رہنما

<sup>33</sup> Colophon: فقد وقع اشروع و ختام هذه النسخة المسمى السبعة الصبيان في رجب الفرد يوم اثنين و مائتين خمسين ثمانيه و الف

(This recopy of "Şubhat ul-Şıbyān" was begun and finished on 2 *Receb* [the seventh month of Islamic Lunar Calendar] in the year of [AH] 1258/[on August 9, 1842 AD]).

<sup>34</sup> ابن فرشته لغتی کبی کنج اولدی و قران لغتن ایندی درج

the prologue and written in *ebced* form (chronogram) [23:f.11b]<sup>35</sup>. However, nothing is said about where the dictionary was written. It is suggested that it must have been written in Bosnia, according to the writer's birthplace and the research materials related to the dictionary.

There is no regularity for the number of *beyts* in a dictionary. It mainly consists of 455-465 *beyts*, of which only 420 *beyts* belongs to the dictionary part [10:6911:98]. In our copy, the number of total *beyts* are 458.

In the dictionary is given an explanation of about 2100 Arabic words with equivalents of 250 Persian and 1150 Ottoman Turkish words [9:22].

The author does not see the need for a quantitative calculation of the vocabulary (as stated in the preface of his work) in exchange for the complex work done, which is to cope with the translation of the words and the semantic interpretation [23:f.11b]<sup>36</sup>. First, the Arabic word is given in the dictionary, then the Ottoman Turkish equivalent and semantic explanation of the word, and in some cases Persian as well. As the author also writes in the preface, "I bring the translation of the word next to every word [23:f.11b]<sup>37</sup> and then, I give both the *vezin* and *bahir* at the end of each *kıta*' [23:f.11b]<sup>38</sup>.

More than 60 manuscripts and 32 printed copies of the dictionary are known in various libraries around the world [10:73]. It has already been published in Istanbul and Cairo [9:20].

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On folios 29b-46a of the collection is "Luġat-i Ferišteoġlū" (لغت فرشته اوغلی) *Vocabulary of Ferišteoġlū* Arabic-Ottoman Turkish verse dictionary. It is a complete copy of the work and entitled "Hazā Luġat-i ibn Ferište" (هذا لغت ابن فرشته) translated as "This is Ibn Ferište's Dictionary") [23:f. 29b]<sup>39</sup>.

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<sup>35</sup> نظم جلی = 50+900+40+3+30+10 = 1033.

<sup>36</sup> لفظ مقدم عقبنجه همان

ترجمه سی بولدی اكا اقتران

لفظ ایله معناسی ایدوب از رواج

قالمدی سرخ رقمه احتیاج

<sup>37</sup> نظم خصوصنده ایدوب اهتمام

احسن ترتب ایله ویردم نظام

لفظ مقدم عقبنجه همان

ترجمه سی بولدی اكا اقتران

<sup>38</sup> قطعہ تمامنده دخی اشکار

هم لقب بحری و هم وزنی وار

The dictionary is written in 12 meters: *Baħr-i Recez*, *Baħr-i Hezec*, *Baħr-i Muctess*, *Baħr-i Mūtekārib*, *Baħr-i Remel*, *Baħr-i Mūnserih*, *Baħr-i Haḡf*, *Baħr-i Vāfir*, *Baħr-i Mūzārī*, *Baħr-i Serī*, *Baħr-i Kāmīl*, *Baħr-i Tavīl*.

<sup>39</sup> The beginning of the preface: حمد تابندر اول الله که عالمی علما ایله بزندی عنایت نظریله کوکلرین کوزتدی فهم  
طمر...

The beginning of the vocabulary section: خبر اتمک قبله اوپمک ذرع امک قول غلام  
خلق یرتمق خرق یرتمق اولو کشیدر همام

The work's text panel is arranged in two columns, only 34b-44a folios are in one column, the number of lines varies from 8 to 15. Parts for the titles of the *kiṭās* have been left to be supplemented later, but mostly they have remained incomplete, sometimes with the wording "Ve minhu eyzā" (و منه ايضا), translated as "This is from it"). There is no colophon that refers to date the text.

The author Feriṣteoğlu 'Abdullaṭīf ibn Melek wrote his work as a *gift* to his grandson 'Abdūrrahmān for the benefit of his education.

The dictionary begins with prose preface, consists of 22 *kiṭās* with various meters (total 267 *beyts*)<sup>40</sup>. It includes Ottoman Turkish equivalents of 1528 [5:10] Arabic words taken from the *Qur'ān*. If necessary, the dictionary includes semantic meanings of Arabic words explained in Ottoman Turkish rather than Persian equivalents. He assured that "the inclusion of Persian words will not benefit those who do not know the language" [23:f.29b]<sup>41</sup>.

The dictionary has been valued for being the first verse dictionary written in Ottoman Empire and having included the *Qur'ānic* vocabulary in the study-literature for the first time. Feriṣteoğlu's verse dictionary is quite simple in artistic and poetic terms. It is mainly a simple list of Arabic-Ottoman Turkish word pairs, from non-literary, allegorical poetic lines, keeping the rhyme according to the choice of word-series.

There are 66 known manuscripts of the dictionary [18:72]. It has been printed 7 times from 1801 to 1900 [10:68].

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On folios 47b-78b of the collection is the "**Tuḥfe-i Zibā**" (تحفة زيبا, *The Beautiful Gift*) trilingual Arabic-Persian-Ottoman Turkish verse dictionary [23:f.47b]<sup>42</sup>.

This copy of the work is untitled. It is revealed at the end of the work, which is actually the author's colophon that the dictionary was written in AH 1234/1819 AD (chronogram). The title "Tuḥfe-i Zibā" and author's name, Ḥayret, are also given [23:f. 78b]<sup>43</sup>.

The entire text of the dictionary is arranged in two columns, and the number of lines varies from 13 to 15. The sections for the title of dictionary and *kiṭās* are left blank. The latter added equivalent words in Ottoman Turkish are written next to some Persian and Arabic borrowed words in the prologue.

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<sup>40</sup> The dictionary is written in 6 meters: *Baḥr-i Remel*; *Baḥr-i Tavīl*, *Baḥr-i Recez*, *Baḥr-i Mūnserih*, *Baḥr-i Hezec*, *Baḥr-i Mūtekārib*.

<sup>41</sup> مستعمل لغات جمع ايدوب قرآن لغاتن انده درج قديم پارسييله ترجمه اتمنن كدردم زيرأ پارسي بلمسنه فائده ايتمز انكله فارسي دلي بلنمز مقصود الفاظ عربييه معناسيني بلمكدر تركي ترجمه ايله اكتفا اتدوم نافع اوله انشاء الله تعالي

<sup>42</sup> The beginning of the vocabulary: حمد اول الله عظيم الشانه: قيلدى تعليم بيان انسانه

<sup>43</sup> Author's colophon: يازدم اتمامنه تاريخ بهين ياپدى بو تحفة حيرت زيبا

In the prologue the author touches upon the circumstances of writing a beautiful trilingual (Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish) verse dictionary in the Ottoman tradition. He also speaks about the circumstances of the lexical vocabulary of the trilingual dictionary and its poetic style. The circumstances of utility in the writing of letters are also raised. According to the author, the dictionary is the result of his travels in Rūm (Ottoman Empire), Iran and Arabic countries. He considers it also as a service rendered to the ruler of Egypt during his stay in Egypt, Meḥmed 'Alī Paşa, the dedication of the dictionary to his grandson Mīr 'Abbās, and the happiness bestowed on him. He points out that the words' equivalents are written one after the other, often with semantic explanations [23:47b-48b].

The reference studies of the dictionary also provide a general structural overview of the dictionary, according to which the work consists of a 35-*beyt* prologue, 74 *kiṭās* and the epilogue consists of 13 *beyts*. The dictionary section alone consists of 821 *beyts*. There are 869 *beyts* in total. The dictionary includes 2900 words in total [14:152,17:135].

Our copy of the dictionary consists of the 35-*beyt* prologue, but only 71 *kiṭās* and the ending consists of 5 *beyts*. The dictionary section consists of 816 *beyts*, giving us 856 *beyts* in total.

Of course, there are obvious quantitative differences in composition between the Matenadaran's copy and the above-mentioned comparative study, but the numerical difference of the *kiṭās* may not prove the absence of this or that *kiṭā*, as extensive dictionary comparisons often show the presence of missing *kiṭās* as they could have been joined to the other one and it might seem that the *kiṭā* is missing.

As a regularity, the dictionary ends with a message to the generations, which we want to quote at the end of our article in the hope that future generations will perceive it: "Let the speech of the reader be polished, which is the desire of the writer's heart" [23:f.78b]<sup>44</sup>.

## Conclusion

In fact, the primary purpose of verse dictionaries was to introduce students to foreign languages - Persian, Arabic, as well as Ottoman Turkish (*elsine-i şelāşe*), to facilitate language learning, develop and spread literary speech and practice in prosody (especially in *'Arūz* meter).

In particular, the dictionaries were used as textbooks in pre-schools, known as *şibyān mektebī*, *mekātib-i ibtidā'i*, *ilk mektep*, and later also in *medreses* until the middle of the 19th century in Turkish and Turkish-speaking society.

The dictionaries were composed not only of simple word combinations, but there were also works created in two or three languages (like a *mülemma* 'poem') which developed artistic thought and provide interesting works for reading. They

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<sup>44</sup> اوقیانک فصیح اولسون لسانی  
بازہ نک کوکلنه ویرسون مرادی

enriched the languages with vocabulary and linguistic-structural means of expressions. In this case, the rich linguistic culture of the Persian and as well as the Arabic languages with the religious and fictional lexicon flowed into the Turkish language, automatically helping to form Ottoman Turkish as the official literary language of the Ottoman Empire.

Most of the verse dictionaries became important sources of imitation for each other and were included in the learning process like their predecessors. Even for teachers they were to become small methodological manuals, as they provided an explanation of the grammatical structures of the primary and transferable languages.

Thus "Collections of Verse Dictionaries" were compiled as language-textbooks, with the purpose of facilitating language learning (Arabic, Persian, Ottoman Turkish) with the simultaneous use of several verse dictionaries and to be involved in the process of learning languages through memorizing (learning by heart).

In fact, considering the colophons, the years of compositions, we should mention that our collection **MS No 1467** was compiled in the 19th or mid 19th century as a textbook. It was the time when such dictionaries were still used as textbooks in the Turkish educational system and were included in the language teaching or studying (in this case especially in Arabic) process.

It is not a coincidence either that the collection includes Imam al-Būṣīrī's famous "Ḳaṣīde-i Būrde" ode dedicated to the Prophet Muḥammed and as well as Imam Sirajuddin Ali al-Ushi's "Amālī Ṣerīf" (that is commonly known as "Baḍ" al-Amālī") didactic ode explaining the Islamic creed in Arabic. They were included in the religious elementary education curriculum as separate works in the original language.

So, even the comprehensive presentation of this collection can be considered sufficient for it to take its place in the manuscripts of four similar collections we have mentioned, which are known as the "Collection of Verse Dictionaries" in foreign collections. It may have all the preconditions to become a source of new studies for local and foreign researchers.

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**ՄԱՏԵՆԱԴԱՐԱՆԻ ԱՐԱԲԱՏԱՌ ԶԵՌԱԳՐԵՐԻ ՀԱՎԱՔԱԾՈՒԻ  
Հ<sup>մ</sup> 1467 ԶԵՌԱԳԻՐԸ ՈՐՊԵՍ «ՉԱՓԱԾՈՒ ԲԱՌԱՐԱՆՆԵՐԻ ԺՈՂՈՎԱԾՈՒԻ»  
ՆՈՐԱՀԱՅՏ ՕՐԻՆԱԿ**

*Անի Ավետիսյան*

**Քանալի բառեր՝** Արաբատառ ձեռագրերի հավաքածու, օսմաներեն ձեռագրեր, բառարան, չափածո բառարան, չափածո բառարանների ժողովածու, Թուհֆե, Լյուդաթ-ի Ֆերիշթեօղլու, Սուբհա-ի Սըբյան, Թուհֆե-ի Զիբա:

Հոդվածագիրն առաջին անգամ հոդվածի շրջանակում ներկայացնում է Մատենադարանի Արաբատառ ձեռագրերի հավաքածուի մաս կազմող օսմաներեն ձեռագրերի շարքում թուրք ձեռագրագիտության մեջ որպես «Չափածո բառարանների ժողովածու» անունով հայտնի **Հ<sup>մ</sup> 1467** եզակի ձեռագիր-օրինակը:

Նախքան ժողովածուի մատենադարանյան օրինակը ներկայացնելը, հեղինակը հոդվածի առաջին մասում հակիրճ անդրադառնում է ընդհանրապես ժողովածուների կազմման հանգամանքներին, նրանց նշանակությանը և տեսակներին, որոնց մեջ առանձնանում են նաև «Չափածո բառարանների ժողովածու» անունով հայտնի ժողովածուները:

Նշվում էձ, որ նման ժողովածուների կազմման միջավայր են մատնանշվում *թեքքե* կամ *դերգահ*, *մեդրեսե* կոչվող կրոնա-ուսումնական հաստատությունները: Դրանք կազմվել են լեզուների դասավանդման դասագրքերի նշանակությամբ: Այս կերպ ապահովվել է լեզուների (արաբերեն, պարսկերեն, օսմաներեն) դյուրին ուսուցումը մի քանի չափածո բառարանների միաժամանակյա գործածությամբ՝ դարձել են անգիրի միջոցով լեզուների ուսուցումն ապահովող կարևոր դասագրքային նշանակության աղբյուրներ:

**«Չափածո բառարանների ժողովածու»**ի մատենադարանյան եզակի օրինակում ընդգրկված են 14-15-րդ, 17-րդ և 19-րդ դարերի գրող-բանաստեղծ-թարգմանիչ-բառարանագիրների գրչին պատկանող թվով 3՝ Ֆերիշթեօղլու Աբդ էլ Լաթիֆ իբն Մելեքի «Լյուդաթ-ի Ֆերիշթեօղլու» և Բոսնալը Էբուլ-Ֆազլ


Մուհամմեդ (Մեհմեդ) իբն Ահմեդ էր-Ռումիի «Սուփա-ի Սըբյան» արաբերեն-օսմաներեն, նաև Ադանալը Հոջա Մեհմեդ Հայրեթի (բուն անունը՝ Մեհմեդ Բեհաեդդին Հայրեթ) «Թուհֆե-ի Ջիբա» (հայտնի նաև «Թուհֆե-ի Հայրեթ» կամ «Թուհֆե-ի Դուրրի» կամ «Թուհֆե-ի Սե Ջեբան» անուններով) արաբերեն-պարսկերեն-օսմաներեն չափածո բառարանների ամբողջական օրինակները:

Հոդվածագիրը չի բավարարվել միայն ժողովածուի համապարփակ ներկայացմամբ, այլ անդրադարձել է ընդհանրապես թուրք դասական գրականության, բառարանագրության մեջ ավանդույթ դարձած չափածո բառարաններ գրելու մեթոդաբանությանը, նրանց կառուցվածքային առանձնահատկություններին, թուրք հասարակությունում, կրոնական, գրական և կրթական բնագավառներում ունեցած նրանց նշանակությանն ու դերակատարմանը: Շեշտելով, որ չափածո բառարանների գրման նպատակները բոլոր դեպքերում եղել են՝ լեզուների ուսուցումը, գրական խոսքի տարածումն ու զարգացումը, տաղաչափական (մասնավորապես՝ *անուզին*) և չափածո խոսքարվեստին վարժեցնելը:

Ի վերջո ժողովածուի այս համեստ ներկայացումն անզամ բավարար է, որ այն նույնպես կազմի օտար հավաքածուներում «Չափածո բառարանների ժողովածու» անունով արդեն հայտնի չորս նույնանուն ժողովածուների ձեռագրաշարքերի մի մասը, դառնա տեղի և օտար մասնագետների համար նոր ուսումնասիրությունների աղբյուր:

## THE LIST OF PICTURES

1. MM MS Arb. No. 1467, Bosnalı Ebū l-Fāzıl Muḥammed (Meḥmed) ibn Aḥmed er-Rūmī, "Şubha-i Şıbyān", f. 10b.  
ՄՄ Ձեռ. Արբ. Հ<sup>մ</sup> 1467, Բոսնալը էբուլ-Ֆազլ Մուհամմեդ (Մեհմեդ) իբն Ահմեդ էր-Ռումի, «Սուփա-ի Սըբյան», էջ 10բ:
2. MM MS Arb. No.1467, Ferišteoğlu ‘Abdullaṭif ibn Melek, "Luġat-i Ferišteoġlū", f. 29b.  
ՄՄ Ձեռ. Արբ. Հ<sup>մ</sup> 1467, Ֆերիշթեոլլու Աբդ էլ Լաթիֆ իբն Մելեք, «Լյուղաթ-ի Ֆերիշթեոլլու», էջ 29բ:
3. MM MS Arb. No.1467, Adanalı Hōca Meḥmed Ḥayret, "Tuḥfe-i Zībā", f. 47b.  
ՄՄ Ձեռ. Արբ. Հ<sup>մ</sup> 1467, Ադանալը Հոջա Մեհմեդ Հայրեթ, «Թուհֆե-ի Ջիբա», էջ 47բ:



صیغه صبیان

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

کوستوری

نزل مقصوده اور در همنام اوله	نام خدا ذکر ابدالم ابتدا
اکا بناء نوله اوله تمام	نام خدا اوله اساسی کلمه
جله لغات اهلی انی یاداید	نام خدا جان ودلی یاداید
لایق آن خالق جن واناس	حمد و ثنانت و شکر و سپاس
تا ایدیه لر شکرینی و پرد زبان	بدایم بکارتک اولکت اولکته جنه ادره و پردی لک
علم عالم یعلم بالعلم	علم ایله حکمت و پروبایتدی کم
حکمتک فطره سی بحری محیط	نعتک صفره سی بر سبط
جننی کوسرتک ایچون شاه راه	قولورینه رحمتی جوق بادشاه
هم اکا ایندردی کتاب بین	عالمه کوندردی اول امین
حقی عیان ایلدی کوسردی بول	خلق بری قیلدی عتلا لندک اول
یسم قیا متده شفیع و نصیر	راه هدایتده سلج نصیر
احمد محمود محمد رسول	منی مقننده دعای قبول
رب و سلم باعم السلام	حق علیه هو خیر الا نام

اصطلاحی


هذا لغت ابن فرشته

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

حمد تا بندر اول الله که عالمی عالم ایله بزندی عنایت نظریه کورن  
 کوزندی نوم طبر حضرتنه چیتکین بلورندی علوم پکار لرزه  
 ارفقین آقندی صلوات سلام سید الانام رسولنا اوزرینه اولونکه  
 جیلان انوکله برکتدی دخی ال واصحابنه اولونکه شریعت انوکله  
 برکتدی بوند نصک فرشته اوعلی عبداللطیف حق اروزلرین روزی  
 نلسون ابد که جون اوغلم اوعلی عبدالرحمن ابنه الله نیاتها  
 او قومه بقلندی بنده اکا بر باد کار رساله نظم ایندم مستعمل اولون  
 لغاتی جمع ایدوب قرآن سریف لغات انده درج قلمم باری ایله ترجمه ایله  
 کیدرم زیرا باری بینه فائده اینتر انکله باری دخی بلنر مقصود الفا  
 عربیه معناس بکلدر ترکی ترجمه ایله ایلدم نافع اوله اده شاه الله تعالی

خبر اتم قبل او بک زرع کلک قول علم  
 خفا برتن فرق برتن اولونکی دهام  
 نهار برتنی بی بولون نقل برتنی بی عام  
 بیت بندک فقدا اتمک رمی کونک خال ملک  
 ازادنی

مقطعه  
ج



بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

حد اول الله عظیم الشانه قیلدی تعلیم بیان انانه

روح فخر الرسله الف صلوات وحی حق ایله کتور دی ایات <sup>علی</sup>

ال و اصحابه درود بسیار ایلدی هدیبری نقل انان <sup>حدیث</sup>

بعد از باعث تفصیل و بیان سب نظم لغات ه زبان <sup>دو اولی</sup>

خیل وقت اولدی که بو عبدکین <sup>چشم</sup> روم و ابرانده ایدوب سیرین <sup>پرو</sup>

کتمه فندم عربستانه مک اولدی خواهشه درونم مظهر <sup>داعتر</sup>

بعض احباب محاسن اندیشی دیدی خاطرده ندر بوتوش <sup>شوش</sup>

مصره کیت مصره که صالین پایه <sup>کوزل</sup> انده برا صیف کردون پایه <sup>عالی</sup>

وزرا ابجره اورر <sup>بیرمنه</sup> بلکه بو ملک جلا نده کینا <sup>لوکله</sup>

فیض حسن نظرید را کسیر <sup>ایشتر</sup> نیل احسانی ابد عالمی <sup>خود</sup>

نشان و احسانی المص <sup>حصار</sup> عرب و روم و عجمه مشهور <sup>نشان</sup>

شمدی قول قول بکلوب <sup>همه</sup> هب محمد علی باشایه کبدر <sup>همه</sup>

درکه دونبدر کرف امان <sup>مقارنه</sup> افتخار اینه انکله زمان <sup>خبر</sup>

کوفه



**ՀԱՂՈՐԴՈՒՄՆԵՐ**

**REPORTS**

## КАЗАХСТАН-МОНГОЛИЯ: 30 ЛЕТ ДИПЛОМАТИЧЕСКОГО СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВА\*

*Жалгас Адилбаев*

### **Аннотация**

В данной статье описываются итоги 30-летнего сотрудничества между Казахстаном и Монголией. Дипломатические отношения между Республикой Казахстан и Монголией установлены 22 января 1992 года. Состоявшиеся визиты Президента Монголии Н.Багабанди в 1998г. в Казахстан и визит Президента Республики Казахстан Н.Назарбаева в 1999г. в Монголию придали новый импульс развитию двусторонних отношений. С 1991г. по сегодняшний день между двумя странами было подписано более 40 соглашений и договоров. Официальный визит Премьер-министра Монголии У.Хурэлсуха в Казахстан 10-12 октября 2019 года запомнился своей масштабностью и содержательностью. За этот период проведено 8 заседаний МПК двух стран. Сегодня двусторонние отношения стабильно развиваются. Однако, в перспективе межгосударственные отношения между Казахстаном и Монголией должны выйти на новый этап развития. Для этого сторонам необходимо активизировать отношения на высшем уровне. Например, в этом году обсуждается организация официального визита Премьер-Министра Казахстана в Монголию. Активизация межпарламентского сотрудничества между двумя странами также присутствует в повестке обсуждения. Культурно-гуманитарные отношения двух стран имеют большие перспективы.

**Ключевые слова:** Казахстан, Монголия, дипломатия, сотрудничество, посольство, визиты, товарооборот, диаспора, торгово-экономическое, инвестиции.

22 января 2022г. исполняется 30 лет со дня установления дипломатических отношений между Казахстаном и Монголией.

Дипломатические отношения между Республикой Казахстан и Монголией установлены 22 января 1992 года [1]. В мае 1997г. дипломатическая миссия Республики Казахстан была открыта в г.Улан-Батор. С января 2007г. дипломатическая миссия преобразована в Посольство Республики Казахстан. В 1992 г. Посольство Монголии было открыто в г.Алматы. Состоявшиеся визиты Президента Монголии Н.Багабанди в 1998г. в Казахстан и визит Президента Республики Казахстан Нурсултана Назарбаева в 1999г. в Монголию придали новый импульс развитию двусторонних отношений. Президент Республики Казахстан К. Токаев дважды посещал Монголию в 2006г., будучи Министром иностранных дел

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РК, а в 2013г. в качестве заместителя Генерального секретаря ООН (для участия в Международной конференции «Новая демократия»).



*Чрезвычайный и Полномочный Посол Республики Казахстан в Монголии  
Адилбаев Ж.Ж.*

С 1991г. по сегодняшний день между двумя странами было подписано более 40 соглашений и договоров. Официальный визит Премьер-министра Монголии У.Хурэлсуха в Казахстан 10-12 октября 2019 года запомнился своей масштабностью и содержательностью [2]. В ходе встреч У.Хурэлсуха с Первым Президентом РК Нурсултаном Назарбаевым и Премьер-Министром РК А.Маминым стороны обсудили ряд вопросов касательно двусторонних отношений, достигнуты договоренности о совместной работе, в том числе поддержке и развитии торгово-экономического сотрудничества.

Участие Министра иностранных дел Монголии Б.Батцэцэг [3] в очередном заседании Совета министров иностранных дел Совещания по взаимодействию и мерам доверия в Азии (СВМДА) 11-12 октября 2021 года в г.Нур-Султан и особенно первый официальный визит в Казахстан 13-14 октября придали значительную поддержку для всестороннего развития сотрудничества. В ходе визита Министр иностранных дел Монголии провела плодотворные встречи с Президентом К.Токаевым, Премьер-министром А.Маминым и Министром торговли и интеграции Б.Султановым, а также официальные переговоры с руководством Министерства иностранных дел. Были подписаны Меморандум о взаимопонимании между Министерством иностранных дел Монголии и

Министерством Торговли и интеграции РК, а также подписан план сотрудничества на 2021–2024 годы между МИД РК и МИД Монголии.

Продолжает работу казахстанско-монгольская межправительственная комиссия по торгово-экономическому, научно-техническому и культурному сотрудничеству. За этот период проведено 8 заседаний МПК двух стран. Стороны договорились провести 9-е заседание межправительственной комиссии в Улан-Баторе в первом квартале текущего года. Подписано 8 соглашений в культурно-гуманитарной сфере. В соответствии с межправительственным соглашением ежегодно осуществляется обмен студентами двух стран.

В этом году исполняется 29 лет со дня подписания Договора о дружбе и сотрудничестве между Республикой Казахстан и Монголией [4]. Сегодня двусторонние отношения стабильно развиваются. Однако в перспективе межгосударственные отношения между Казахстаном и Монголией должны выйти на новый этап развития. Для этого сторонам необходимо активизировать отношения на высшем уровне. Например, в этом году обсуждается организация официального визита премьер-министра Казахстана в Монголию. Активизация межпарламентского сотрудничества между двумя странами также присутствует в повестке обсуждения. Безусловно, развитию торгово-экономических отношений будут способствовать выставки-ярмарки производителей двух стран, экономические форумы. Например, скажем «Выставка казахстанских производителей в г.Улан-Батор», «Торгово-Экономическая миссия». Мы возлагаем большие надежды на организацию деловых мероприятий в Улан-Баторе.

14 октября 2020г. в режиме онлайн прошли межведомственные консультации на уровне руководителей департаментов внешнеполитических ведомств Казахстана и Монголии. В этом году мы планируем продолжить начинание и обсудить развитие двусторонних отношений, на уровне заместителей Министров иностранных дел двух стран.

Существует большой потенциал для развития туризма между двумя странами. Например, 13 октября 2021г. Президент РК К.Токаев в ходе встречи с Министром иностранных дел Монголии Б.Батцэцэг[5] выразил заинтересованность в обмене опытом с монгольской стороной в туристическом кластере и предложил разработать туристический маршрут «По следам Чингисхана», с охватом регионов Казахстана и Монголии. Президент, отметив общую историю, близость двух народов, призвал к тесному сотрудничеству в сфере туризма.

Посольство вносит весомый вклад в углубление сотрудничества между регионами двух стран. Например, в ходе официального визита премьер-министра Монголии У.Хурэлсуха в октябре 2019г. подписан меморандум об установлении братских отношений между городами Нур-Султан и Улан-Батор. Принято решение об открытии и благоустройству (*озеленение, укладка брусчатки, освещение*) улицы Нур-Султан в монгольской столице. Началу

работ к сожалению препятствует продолжающаяся пандемия коронавируса. Однако мы надеемся, что в будущем две стороны приложат максимум усилий, чтобы открыть улицу. Кроме того, Посольство планирует обеспечить подписание меморандума об установлении братских отношений между городом Талдыкорган (Алматинская область) и Налайхским районом (г.Улан-Батор). В текущем году осуществляется работа подготовки проекта меморандума о сотрудничестве Восточно-Казахстанской области с Ховдским аймаком, изучается возможность введения авиарейсов по маршруту «Усть-Каменогорск-Өлгий», «Усть-Каменогорск»-Ховд».

На данные мероприятия приглашаются монгольские предприниматели, бизнесмены для принятия участия в международных выставках под названием «Jana Dala/Green Day 2022 Қазақстандық Дала күні», которые состоятся 13-14 июля текущего года в столице Казахстана и 28-29 июля в г.Костанай.

Двусторонний товарооборот в январе-ноябре 2021г. составил 50,7 млн. долларов США, в том числе экспорт составил 48,4 млн. долларов США, импорт 2,30 млн. долларов. За последние два года из-за пандемии COVID-19 произошло значительное снижение взаимной торговли. Конечно, это не соответствует экономическому потенциалу двух стран. Во внешней торговле Монголии Казахстан по-прежнему является нетто-экспортером.

Действует межправительственная комиссия по двустороннему торгово-экономическому, научно-техническому и культурному сотрудничеству. 25 ноября 2020г. 8-е заседание межправительственной комиссии было проведено в формате онлайн. В первом квартале текущего года в Улан-Баторе планируется организовать 9-ое заседание двусторонней межправительственной комиссии.

Между компаниями Symbat Engineering и Erdenes Alt Resource LLC продолжили обсуждение реализации проекта по строительству аффинажного завода переработки золота и серебра. Надеемся, что после пандемии возобновятся рейсы Нур-Султан-Улан-Батор авиакомпания SCAT и прямые рейсы Улан-Батор-Алматы от компании Hunnu Air.

В прошлом году сторонами проведена онлайн-встреча по вопросу образования совместного предприятия по переработке кожи и шерсти в Казахстане, в г.Кызылорда. Ожидается, что в текущем году делегация акимата Кызылординской области посетит с рабочим визитом Монголию и проведет соответствующие переговоры.

В 2021г. совместной рабочей группой экспертов проведены 4 онлайн-заседания по обсуждению проекта пенсионного соглашения между Правительством Республики Казахстан и Правительством Монголии. В настоящее время стороны работают над содержанием проекта соглашения.

В рамках работы по развитию инвестиционного сотрудничества можно отметить состоявшуюся 23 апреля 2021 года онлайн-встречу между АО «НК «Kazakh Invest» и Исполнительным агентством Правительства Монголии –

Национальным агентством развития, которая была посвящена вопросам привлечения двухсторонних инвестиций.

Участие сотрудников Исполнительного агентства Правительства Монголии - Национального агентства развития и Министерства иностранных дел Монголии в онлайн инвестиционном форуме «Almaty Investment Forum-2021» 2 декабря 2021 года также подчеркивает ход совместной работы в области инвестиции.

21 июля 2021 года состоялась онлайн-встреча между АО «ФНБ «Самрук-Казына» и депутатами Парламента Монголии по вопросу создания Фонда национального благосостояния. 14 сентября 2021г. при содействии Посольства состоялась онлайн-встреча между руководством Департамента цифровизации транспорта Комитета по транспорту Мининдустрии и инфраструктурного развития РК и Департамента реализации транспортной политики Министерства дорог и транспортного развития Монголии.

Участие делегации постоянного Комитета по вопросам природы и окружающей среды, продовольствия и сельского хозяйства Парламента Монголии возглавляемой председателем Комитета Х.Болорчулуун [6] 20-22 октября 2021 года в международной аграрной сельскохозяйственной выставке «Kazagro-2021» в столице Казахстана, ознакомление с деятельностью предприятия «KazBeef», производящего мраморную говядину, а также встреча с министром сельского хозяйства Е.Карашукеевым способствовали активизации двустороннего сотрудничества в сельскохозяйственной отрасли.

Казахстан заинтересован в использовании монгольского опыта развития легкой промышленности. В связи с этим в ноябре-декабре прошлого года Ассоциация легкой промышленности Казахстана и Монгольская ассоциация шерсти и кашемира, а также с участием представителей Министерства индустрии и инфраструктурного развития Казахстана и монгольской стороной проведены онлайн-встречи по вопросам обсуждения развития сотрудничества в сфере легкой промышленности.

По случаю 30-летия установления дипломатических отношений между Казахстаном и Монголией в первую очередь обмениваются поздравительными телеграммами руководители двух стран, а также главы внешнеполитических ведомств Казахстана и Монголии.

Кроме того, в этом году в Улан-Баторе состоится научно-практическая конференция, фотовыставка, будет опубликована развернутая статья Вице-премьера РК - Министра иностранных дел М.Тлеуберди по случаю 30-летия установления дипломатических отношений между двумя странами. Также планируется проведение и других мероприятий приуроченных к этой знаменательной дате.

Учитывая то, что в Монголии проживает самая многочисленная казахская диаспора за рубежом, Посольством в целях укрепления их связей с исторической родиной, осуществляется большая работа.

Например, проводятся регулярные встречи с Нажкей Тилеуханом, председателем Баян-Улгийской НПО «Жерлестер Алкасы» в г.Улан-Батор, общественной организации, содействующей сохранению родного языка, культуры и традиций этнических казахов, проживающих в Монголии. Нами обсуждается вопрос открытия класса казахского языка в университете «Идер» в г.Улан-Батор.

Наряду с этим в формате онлайн организовывался «круглый стол» с представителями казахской диаспоры в Монголии, в частности О.Хабсатар, официальным представителем некоммерческого акционерного общества «Фонд Отандастар» в г.Улгий, а также членами ОО «Жерлестер Алкасы» в аймаках Ховд, Дархан, г.г.Шарынкoл, Эрдэнэт. В ходе встречи предоставлена информация о мероприятиях и различных программах, проводимых Правительством Казахстана для наших соотечественников, проживающих за рубежом.

По инициативе Посольства в Улан-Баторе состоялось первое заседание «Совета старейшин». После обмена мнениями по вопросам продвижения национальных ценностей, уже в апреле 2021 года Посольство совместно с «Фондом Отандастар» в целях поддержания и развития казахского языка, запустило языковые онлайн-курсы для представителей казахского этноса, проживающего в Монголии.

По инициативе видного члена казахской диаспоры, руководителя ТОО «Turan World» Ашык Ерболата [7] и при поддержке Посольства в г.Улан-Батор проведена благотворительная акция «Источник жизни». В благотворительной акции по добровольной сдаче крови приняли участие наши соотечественники, проживающие в столице Монголии, и сотрудники посольства.

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### Список сокращений:

ООН - Организация Объединённых Наций

СВМДА - Совещание по взаимодействию и мерам доверия в Азии

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## **KAZAKHSTAN-MONGOLIA: 30 YEARS OF DIPLOMATIC COOPERATION**

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**Keywords:** Kazakhstan, Mongolia, diplomacy, cooperation, embassy, visits, turnover, diaspora, trade and economic, investments.

The article describes the results of 30 years of cooperation between Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Diplomatic relations between the republics of Kazakhstan and Mongolia were established on January 22, 1992. The visits of the President of Mongolia N. Bagabandi in 1998 to Kazakhstan and the visit of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan N. Nazarbayev in 1999 to Mongolia gave a new impetus to the development of bilateral relations. From 1991 to the present day, more than 40 agreements and treaties have been signed between two countries. The official visit of the Prime Minister of Mongolia U. Khurelsukh to Kazakhstan from October 10-12 in 2019 was memorable for its scale and content. During this period, 8 meetings of the intergovernmental commission of the two countries were held. Today, bilateral relations are developing steadily. However, in the future, interstate relations between Kazakhstan and Mongolia should enter a new stage of development. To do this, the parties need to intensify relations at the highest level. For example, this year the organization of an official visit of the Prime Minister of Kazakhstan to Mongolia is being discussed. The intensification of inter-parliamentary cooperation between the two countries is also on the agenda. Cultural and humanitarian relations between the two countries have great prospects.

## **ՂԱԶԱԽՍՏԱՆ-ՄՈՆԳՈԼԻԱ ԴԻՎԱՆԱԳԻՏԱԿԱՆ ՀԱՐԱԲԵՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ 30-ԱՄՅԱԿ**

*ժալգաս Ադիլբայև*

Հոդվածում նկարագրվում է Ղազախստանի և Մոնղոլիայի միջև 30 տարվա համագործակցության արդյունքները: Ղազախստանի Հանրապետության և Մոնղոլիայի միջև դիվանագիտական հարաբերությունները հաստատվել են 1992 թվականի հունվարի 22-ին: 1998 թվականին Մոնղոլիայի նախագահ Ն.Բագաբանդիի այցը Ղազախստան և 1999 թվականին Ղազախստանի Հանրապետության նախագահ Ն.Նազարբայևի այցը Մոնղոլիա նոր խթան հաղորդեցին երկ-

կողմ հարաբերությունների զարգացմանը: 1991 թվականից մինչ օրս երկու երկրների միջև ստորագրվել է ավելի քան 40 համաձայնագիր և պայմանագիր: Կարևոր էր հատկապես 2019 թվականի հոկտեմբերի 10-12-ը Մոնղոլիայի վարչապետ Ու.Խուրելյուխի պաշտոնական այցը Ղազախստան: Այս ընթացքում կայացել է երկու երկրների միջկառավարական հանձնաժողովների 8 հանդիպում: Այսօր երկկողմ հարաբերությունները անշեղորեն զարգանում են: Սակայն ապագայում Ղազախստանի և Մոնղոլիայի միջպետական հարաբերությունները պետք է թևակոխեն զարգացման նոր փուլ: Դրա համար կողմերը պետք է ակտիվացնեն հարաբերությունները ամենաբարձր մակարդակով: Օրինակ, այս տարի քննարկվում է Ղազախստանի վարչապետի Մոնղոլիա պաշտոնական այցի կազմակերպումը: Օրակարգում է նաև երկու երկրների միջև միջխորհրդարանական համագործակցության ակտիվացումը: Երկու երկրների մշակութային և հումանիտար հարաբերությունները նույնպես մեծ հեռանկարներ ունեն:

**ԳԻՏԱԿԱՆ ԿՅԱՆՔ**  
**SCIENTIFIC LIFE**





**INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE**  
**"ARMENIA-IRAN. HISTORICAL PAST AND THE PRESENT"**  
**(dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic**  
**relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of**  
**Iran)**

*Gohar Iskandaryan*

**Keywords:** Armenia, Iran, International conference, 30th anniversary, NAS RA, Institute of Oriental Studies, Cultural Center of the Embassy of the IRI.

"Armenia-Iran. The Historical Past and Present" international conference took place in the conference hall of the Presidium of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Armenia (NAS RA) on February 9-10, 2022. The conference was dedicated to the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI).

The Institute of Oriental Studies of NAS RA initiated the conference a year ago, circulating the call for proposals. This event is, in fact, a tribute to all the figures who contributed to the establishment and development of the diplomatic relations between Armenia and Iran.

The Cultural Center of the Embassy of the IRI in Armenia, as well as the Chair of Iranian Studies of the Faculty of Oriental Studies of the Yerevan State University (YSU) welcomed the initiative. The State Archives of the Republic of Armenia joined the efforts during the last organizational phase of the conference. Numerous Iranian Studies centers in different countries, including the University of Tehran, the Association of Iranian Studies, The German Oriental Studies Trust, the Caucasus Studies Institute, as well as the Chair of Iranian Studies of the Faculty of Oriental studies of YSU, quickly took up the announcement and shared on their social media pages. As a result, the organizing committee of the Conference received more than 50 applications from Iran, Lebanon, the United States, Pakistan, and Armenia. The organizing committee reviewed the materials and extended the invitation to participate in the conference to 35 scholars.

The conference consisted of five sessions. Message greetings by the Catholicos Karekin II, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of RA Ararat Mirzoyan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of IRI Hossein Amir Abdullahian were first read for the participants. The President of NAS RA Ashot Saghyan highly appreciated the organization of a conference on Armenia-Iran diplomatic relations and pointed out that deepening of the ties should be kept in the center of attention. The Academician-Secretary of the Division of Armenology and Social Sciences Y. Suvaryan recalled Iran's support for Armenia during the tough times in 1990s. The two members of the 11th convocation of the Iran Parliament, A. Shahverdyan and R. Beglaryan,

took part in the two-day work of the conference. In his speech, Robert Beglaryan stated that in parallel with the developed political relations, there is a need to make a focus on economic and security aspects in the bilateral relations. Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of NAS RA R. Ghazaryan noted that the manifold relations between the states have a centuries-long history, and a solid, well-established basis, forged in the fires of civilization, hence this relationship only need to be nurtured and strengthened. The director of the Institute of History of the NAS RA A. Melkonyan in his speech emphasized that unlike other regional powers, Iran from time to time showed a distinctly friendly attitude towards Armenia. V. Voskanyan, the Chair of Iranian Studies at YSU Department of Oriental studies, drew the attention to the fact that the Armenian-Iranian border with its historical changes is in fact one of the oldest borders in the world, and is the security guarantee of the two countries. The session was concluded with the speeches by the director of the National Archives of Armenia G. Arshakyan, the Counselor of the Cultural Center of the Embassy of the IRI in Armenia Seyyed Hossein Tabatabayi; and the Secretary of the Organizing Committee G. Iskandaryan, who presented the entire process of organizing the conference.

The third part of the conference was dedicated to the problems and mechanisms of overcoming the problems existing during the tenure of the former ambassadors, which, we believe, is one of the best ways to pass on institutional memory and experience to future generations. The ambassadors of RA to Iran V. Bayburdyan, G. Gharibjanyan, G. Arakelyan, A. Avagyan presented their reports. Bahman Ghasem, Ali Saghayan, Mohammad Rays, Seyed Kazem Sajadi, Abbas Badakhsan Zohuri spoke from the Iranian side. As a result of cooperation with the National Archives of the Republic of Armenia, the conference featured an exhibition presenting the entire database of documents signed between Armenia and Iran since 1918.

The fourth part of the conference was dedicated to the academic reports. The reports posed serious questions to the current developments in the Armenian-Iranian political relations and the existing problems. Member of the Academy R. Safrastyan, head of the department of Iranian Studies of the Institute of Oriental Studies G. Iskandaryan, Seyed Abbas Ahmadi from Tehran University, research fellow at the Institute of Oriental Studies A. Israelyan, Parvin Pour-Mohammadian from the Islamic Free University of Iran, research fellow at the Institute of History K. Mkrtychyan, Hadi Ajili from Alameh Tabatabai University in Tehran, Yeghia Tashjian from the American University of Beirut, Ali Ali Baba Darman from Tehran University presented remarkable reports.

The next day of the conference, on February 10, the conference organizers held simultaneously two sessions. While one session focused on culture, philology and archaeology (presenters: G. Gevorgyan, YSU; N. Yeranyan, Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography; A. Babayan, the National Association of the Armenian Studies and Research (NAASR), USA; Shohre Sadat Sajjadi, Alameh Tabataba University of Iran; H. Hmayakyan, the Institute of Oriental Studies; T. Mikael-

yan, the Institute of Oriental Studies; A. Yahya Masihin, Institute of Literature; and A. Bagratyan, the Institute of Literature) , the parallel session was entirely devoted to the issues of history (presenters: K. Kostikyan, the Institute of Oriental studies; H. Khorikyan, Shirak State University; Kh. Stepanyan, Armenian State Pedagogical University; Ivet Tajaryan, YSU; A. Tonoyan, the Institute of Oriental studies; G. Misakyan, YSU; L. Petrosyan, YSU; and A. Margaryan, YSU.

On February 10, the organizing committee summed up the results of the two-day international conference and awarded the participants with certificates.

As a matter of fact, the Institute of Oriental studies of NAS RA successfully united the scholars in Iranian Studies, hence as a follow up, the organizing committee decided to publish the materials of the conference in a separate volume.

The conference was widely covered both in the Armenian and Iranian media.

The conference also had a cultural component, the guests visited the Matenadaran - Research Institute of Ancient Manuscripts and enjoyed the concert of the State Symphony Orchestra of Armenia in the "Aram Khachaturian" concert hall.

Simultaneous translation of the conference was funded by the Science Committee of RA.

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**ՄԻՋԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ԳԻՏԱԺՈՂՈՎ «ՀԱՅԱՍՏԱՆ-ԻՐԱՆ.**

**ՊԱՏՄԱԿԱՆ ԱՆՑՅԱԼԸ ԵՎ ՆԵՐԿԱՆ»**

**(նվիրված Հայաստանի Հանրապետության և Իրանի Իսլամական  
Հանրապետության միջև դիվանագիտական հարաբերությունների  
հաստատման 30-ամյակին)**

*Գոհար Իսկանդարյան*

**Բանալի բառեր՝** Հայաստան, Իրան, միջազգային գիտաժողով, 30-ամյակ, ՀՀ ԳԱԱ, Արևելագիտության ինստիտուտ, ԻԻՀ դեսպանատան մշակութային կենտրոն:

2022 թ. փետրվարի 9-10 ՀՀ ԳԱԱ նախագահության նիստերի դահլիճում տեղի ունեցավ միջազգային գիտաժողով «Հայաստան-Իրան. պատմական անցյալը և ներկան» խորագրով, որը նվիրված էր Հայաստանի Հանրապետության և Իրանի Իսլամական Հանրապետության

միջև դիվանագիտական հարաբերությունների հաստատման 30-ամյակին:

Հայտարարությունը տարածվել էր մեկ տարի առաջ գիտաժողովը նախաձեռնած՝ ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի կողմից, ինչը, ըստ էության, հարգանքի տուրք է Հայաստան-Իրան դիվանագիտական հարաբերությունների հաստատմանը և կայացմանը նպաստած բոլոր գործիչներին:

Առաջարկը ոգևորությամբ ընդունվեց ՀՀ-ում Իրանի Իսլամական Հանրապետության դեսպանատան մշակույթի կենտրոնի, ինչպես նաև ԵՊՀ արևելագիտության ֆակուլտետի իրանագիտության ամբիոնի կողմից: Գիտաժողովի կազմակերպչական աշխատանքներին իր մասնակցությունը ցուցաբերեց նաև ՀՀ Ազգային արխիվը: Հայտարարությանն արագորեն արձագանքեցին աշխարհի իրանագիտական կենտրոնները՝ տարածելով իրենց էջում, այդ թվում Univeristy of Tehran, Association of Iranian Studies, The German Oriental Studies Trust, Caucasus Studies Institute, ինչպես նաև ԵՊՀ Արևելագիտության ֆակուլտետի իրանագիտության ամբիոնը և այլք: Արդյունքում Գիտաժողովի կազմումիտեն ստացավ 50-ից ավել հայտ՝ Իրանից, Լիբանանից, ԱՄՆ-ից, Պակիստանից, Հայաստանից: Նյութերին ծանոթանալուց հետո մասնակցության հրավեր ստացան 35 գիտնականներ:

Գիտաժողովը բաղկացած էր 5 մասից. ողջույնի ուղերձներ հնչեցին ՆՍՕՏՏ Գարեգին Բ. Ամենայն հայոց կաթողիկոսի, ՀՀ ԱԳՆ Արարատ Միրզոյանի, ԻԻՀ ԱԳՆ Հոսսեյն Ամիր Աբդոլլահիանի անունից: Ելույթով հանդես եկավ ՀՀ ԳԱԱ նախագահ Աշոտ Սաղյանը, ով կարևորեց Հայաստան-Իրան դիվանագիտական հարաբերություններին նվիրված գիտաժողովի կազմակերպումը, միևնույն ժամանակ արձանագրելով, որ հետևողականորեն պետք է ուշադրություն կենտրոնում պահել կապերի խորացումը: Ուշագրավ ելույթով հանդես եկավ ՀՀ ԳԱԱ Հայագիտության և հասարակական գիտությունների բաժանմունքի ակադեմիկոս-քարտուղար Յուրի Սուվարյանը, ով հիշեցրեց 1990-ական թվականների ծանր օրերին Իրանի կողմից Հայաստանին ցուցաբերվող աջակցության մասին:

Գիտաժողովի երկօրյա աշխատանքներին մասնակցեցին նաև Իրանի Իսլամական Հանրապետության 11-րդ գումարման մեջլիսի երկու պատգամավորները՝ Ա. Շահվերդյանը և Ռ. Բեգլարյանը: Ռոբերտ Բեգլարյանը իր ելույթում արձանագրեց, որ երկու երկրների միջև զարգացած քաղաքական հարաբերություններին զուգահեռ անհրաժեշտություն

կա մեր երկկողմ հարաբերություններում անցում կատարել տնտեսական և անվտանգային հարաբերությունների խորացմանը: ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի տնօրեն Ռոբերտ Ղազարյանը իր խոսքում նշեց, որ երկու պետությունների միջև փոխառնչությունները տարբեր մակարդակների վրա ունեն դարերի պատմություն և ունեն ամուր, կայացած հիմքեր, քանի որ դրանք թրծվել են քաղաքակրթական մակարդակի վրա և հարկավոր է միայն շարունակել և էլ ավելի ամրապնդել այդ կապերը: Ելույթով հանդես եկավ նաև ՀՀ ԳԱԱ պատմության ինստիտուտի տնօրեն Աշոտ Մելքոնյանը, ով իր ելույթում ընդգծեց, որ ի տարբերություն տարածաշրջանային այլ տերությունների, Իրանը Հայոց պետականության նկատմամբ ընդգծված բարյացակամ վերաբերմունք է ունեցել: ՀՀ ԵՊՀ Արևելագիտության ֆակուլտետի իրանագիտության ամբիոնի վարիչ Վարդան Ոսկանյանը ներկաների ուշադրությունը բևեռեց այն հանգամանքի վրա, որ Հայաստան-Իրան սահմանը, պատմական փոփոխություններով հանդերձ, ըստ էության տարածաշրջանի անփոփոխ պետական սահմաններից մեկն է, որն երկու երկրների անվտանգության ապահովման գրավականն է: Հաջորդիվ ելույթով հանդես եկավ Հայաստանի ազգային արխիվի տնօրեն Գրիգոր Արշակյանը, ՀՀ-ում ԻԻՀ դեսպանության Մշակույթի կենտրոնի խորհրդական Սեյյեդ Հոսեյն Թաթաթաթային և գիտաժողովի կազմակերպիչ քարտուղար Գոհար Իսկանդարյանը, ով ներկայացրեց գիտաժողովի ողջ կազմակերպման ընթացքը:

Գիտաժողովի երրորդ մասը նվիրված էր ՀՀ-ում և ԻԻՀ-ում նախկին և ներկա դեսպանների պաշտոնավարման շրջանում առկա խնդիրներին և հաղթահարման մեխանիզմներին, ինչը, կարծում ենք, ինստիտուցիոնալ հիշողությունը և փորձը հետագա սերունդներին փոխանցելու լավագույն ձևերից մեկն է: Զեկույցներով հանդես եկան ԻԻՀ-ում ՀՀ դեսպաններ Վահան Բայբուրդյանը, Գևորգ Ղարիբջանյանը, Գրիգոր Առաքելյանը, Արսեն Ավագյանը: Իրանական կողմից հանդես եկան Բահման Ղասեմին, Ալի Սադայիանը, Մոհամմադ Ռայիսին, Սեյյեդ Քազեմ Սաջադին, Աբբաս Բադախշան Զոհուրին:

ՀՀ ազգային արխիվի հետ համագործակցության արդյունքում կազմակերպվել էր նաև ցուցադրություն, որտեղ ներկայացված էր 1918 թվականից մինչ օրս առկա Հայաստանի և Իրանի միջև կնքված փաստաթղթերի ողջ շտեմարանը:

Գիտաժողովի չորրորդ մասը նվիրված էր գիտական զեկույցներին: Նշանակալից է այն փաստը, որ ամենալուրջ հարցադրումներով ներկայացվեցին հայ-իրանական քաղաքական հարաբերությունների այսօրվա

զարգացումները և առկա խնդիրները: Ուշագրավ զեկույցներով հանդես եկան ՀՀ ԳԱԱ ակադեմիկոս Ռուբեն Սաֆրաստյանը, ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի Իրանի բաժնի վարիչ Գոհար Իսկանդարյանը, Թեհրանի համալսարանից Սեյեդ Աբբաս Ահմադին, ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի գիտաշխատող Արմեն Իսրայելյանը, Իրանի Իսլամական Ազատ համալսարանից Փարվին Փուր-Մոհամմադիանը, ՀՀ ԳԱԱ պատմության ինստիտուտի գիտաշխատող Կարեն Մկրտչյանը, Թեհրանի Ալամե Թաբաթաբայի անվան համալսարանից Հադի Աջիլին, Եղիա Թաշճյանը՝ Բեյրութի Ամերիկյան համալսարանից, Ալի Ալի Բաբայի Դարմանին՝ Թեհրանի համալսարանից:

Գիտաժողովի հաջորդ օրը՝ փետրվարի 10-ին գիտաժողովը համաժամանակյա ընթանում էր երկու նիստով. առաջին նիստում, որը տեղի ունեցավ ՀՀ ԳԱԱ նախագահության նիստերի դահլիճում, բանախոսները ներկայացրեցին մշակույթի, բանասիրության, հնագիտության ոլորտի խնդիրները: Ելույթով հանդես եկան Գառնիկ Գևորգյանը ԵՊՀ-ից, Նժդեհ Երանյանը ՀՀ ԳԱԱ հնագիտության և ազգագրության ինստիտուտից, Անի Բաբայանը ԱՄՆ-ի Համազգային հայագիտական միությունից, Շոիրե Սադաթ Սաջճադին Իրանի Ալամե Թաբաթաբայի համալսարանից, Հասմիկ Հմայակյանը և Տիգրան Միքայելյանը ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտից, Անահիտ Յահյամասիհին և Արեգ Բագրատյանը ՀՀ ԳԱԱ գրականության ինստիտուտից:

Երրորդ նիստը, որը տեղի ունեցավ ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտում, ամբողջովին նվիրված էր պատմության հարցերին, որտեղ զեկույցմամբ հանդես եկան Քրիստինե Կոստիկյանը ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտից, Հովհաննես Խորիկյանը Շիրակի պետական համալսարանից, Խաչիկ Ստեփանյանը Հայկական պետական մանկավարժական համալսարանից, Իվեթ Թաջարյանը ԵՊՀ-ից, Արտյոմ Տոնոյանը ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտից, Գարիկ Միսակյանը, Լիաննա Պետրոսյանը և Անի Մարգարյանը ԵՊՀ-ից:

Փետրվարի 10-ին ամփոփվեցին երկօրյա միջազգային գիտաժողովի արդյունքները, մասնակիցներին տրվեցին հավաստագրեր:

ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտը փաստացի հաջողությամբ համախմբեց Հայաստանում գործող իրանագիտական միտքը և որպես ամփոփում կազմկոմիտեն որոշեց գիտաժողովի նյութերը հրապարակել մեկ ժողովածուի տեսքով:

Գիտաժողովը մեծապես լուսաբանվեց հայկական ու իրանական զանգվածային լրատվականներում:

Գիտաժողովը ուներ նաև մշակութային բաղադրիչ, հյուրերն այցելեցին Մատենադարան, իսկ երեկոյան՝ «Արամ Խաչատրյան» համերգատրապեդում ունկնդրեցին Հայաստանի պետական սիմֆոնիկ նվագախմբի համերգը:

Գիտաժողովի համաժամանակյա թարգմանությունը իրականացվել է ՀՀ Գիտության կոմիտեի ֆինանսավորմամբ:





**ՀԱՅԵՐԵՆ ԵՎ ՌՈՒՍԵՐԵՆ ԱՅՔՈՒԲԵՆՆԵՐԻ ԼԱՏԻՆԱՏԱՌ  
ԳՐԱԴԱՐՁՈՒՄՆԵՐ**  
**THE LATIN TRANSLITERATION OF THE ARMENIAN AND RUSSIAN  
ALPHABETS**

Հայերեն	Armenian Translit- eration	Русский	Russian Translit- eration
Ա ա	A	А а	A
Բ բ	B	Б б	B
Գ գ	G	В в	V
Դ դ	D	Г г	G
Ե ե	E	Д д	D
Զ զ	Z	Е е	E
Է է	Ē	Ё ё	Yo
Ը ը	ə	Ж ж	Ž
Թ թ	t'	З з	Z
Ճ ճ	Ž	И и	I
Ի ի	I	Й й	Y
Լ լ	L	К к	K
Խ խ	Kh	Л л	L
Օ օ	e'	М м	M
Վ վ	K	Н н	N
Հ հ	H	О о	O
Ձ ձ	Dz	П п	P
Ղ ղ	Ĝ	Р р	R
Ճ ճ	č'	С с	S
Մ մ	M	Т т	T
ԅ է	Y	У у	U
Լ լ	N	Ф ф	F
Շ շ	Š	Х х	Kh
Ո ո	Vo	Ц ц	Ts
Չ չ	Č	Ч ч	Č
Պ պ	P	Ш ш	Š
Ջ ճ	J	Щ щ	Šč
Ռ ռ	r'	Ъ	“
Ս ս	S	Ы	Y
Վ վ	V	Ь	‘
Տ տ	T	Э э	Ē
Ր ը	R	Ю ю	Yu
Յ չ	Ts	Я я	Ya
Ու ու	U		
Փ փ	p'		
Ք ք	k'		
և	Ev		
Օ օ	O		
Ֆ ֆ	F		

**ԲԱՆԲԵՐ ԱՐԵՎԵԼԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԻՆՍՏԻՏՈՒՏԻ**  
**(պարբերականը մինչև 2020 թ. կոչվում էր «ՄԵՐՁԱՎՈՐ ԵՎ ՄԻՋԻՆ**  
**ԱՐԵՎԵԼՔԻ ԵՐԿՐՆԵՐ ԵՎ ԺՈՂՈՎՈՒՐԴՆԵՐ») ՄԱՏԵՆԱՇԱՐ**

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**ԲԱՆԲԵՐ**  
ԱՐԵՎԵԼԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԻՆՍՏԻՏՈՒՏԻ

ՀԱՏՈՐ II, ՀԱՄԱՐ 1

Տպագրված է «ԲՈՓԻ ՓՐԻՆԹ» տպագրատանը:

Չափսը՝ 70x100 <sup>1/16</sup>: Տպ. մամուլը՝ 11.75  
Տպաքանակը՝ 70: