



BULLETIN
OF THE INSTITUTE OF
ORIENTAL STUDIES

VOLUME II, ISSUE 2

YEREVAN
«COPY PRINT» PRINTING HOUSE
2022

ԲԱՆԲԵՐ
ԱՐԵՎԵԼԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԻՆՍՏԻՏՈՒՏԻ

ՀԱՏՈՐ II, ՀԱՄԱՐ 2

ԵՐԵՎԱՆ
«ՔՈՓԻ ՊՐԻՆՏ» ՏՊԱԳՐԱՏՈՒՆ
2022

P. - ISSN 2738-2710
E. - ISSN 2738-2702

**BULLETIN
OF THE INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES (BIOS)**

Published by the decision of the Scientific Council of the Institute of Oriental Studies of NAS RA

The periodical has been published since 1960.

Until 2021 the periodical was named “The Countries and Peoples of the Near and Middle East”

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Computer design and pagination - Tigran Apikyan
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Web page: <http://www.orientcpnme.am/>

BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES, Volume II/2 (35) / - Yerevan: Institute of Oriental Studies of NAS RA, 2022. 178 p.

The current issue of the “Bulletin of the Institute of Oriental Studies” includes studies on the ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary history of the countries of the Southwest Asia, as well as issues of source studies and philology. A considerable part deals with the ongoing developments and processes in the Eurasian region. The periodical may be of interest for the orientologists, specialists in the field of Armenology and international relations.

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ԲԱՆԲԵՐ ԱՐԵՎԵԼԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԻՆՍՏԻՏՈՒՏԻ (ԲԱԻ)

Տպագրվում է ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի գիտական խորհրդի որոշմամբ

Գլխավոր խմբագիր՝ Ռոբերտ Ղազարյան

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Խմբագրական խորհրդի հասցե՝ ՀՀ, ք. Երևան 0019, Մարշալ Բաղդամյան պող. 24/4

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ԲԱՆԲԵՐ ԱՐԵՎԵԼԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԻՆՍՏԻՏՈՒՏԻ, համար II/2 (35)

– Երևան: ՀՀ ԳԱԱ արևելագիտության ինստիտուտ, 2022.- 178 էջ:

«Բանբեր Արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի» մատենաշարի հերթական հատորն ընդգրկում է Հարավ-արևմտյան Ասիայի երկրների հին և միջին դարերի պատմության, նոր և նորագույն ժամանակների, ինչպես նաև աղբյուրագիտության և բանասիրության հարցերի վերաբերյալ հետազոտություններ: Զգալի տեղ է հատկացված տարածաշրջանի քաղաքական զարգացումների, միջազգային հարաբերությունների և այլ հիմնախնդիրների լուսաբանմանը: Նախատեսվում է արևելագետների, հայագետների, միջազգայնագետների համար:

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ԲՈՎԱՆԴԱԿՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ

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(քաղաքական պատմություն)» Երևան, «ՔՈՓԻ ՊՐԻՆՏ»

հրատարակչություն, 2022 թ., 252 էջ,

DOI: 10.54503/978-9939-9012-5-1, մենագրության վերաբերյալ..... 169

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ՀՈԴՎԱԾՆԵՐ

ARTICLES

ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL SYSTEM AND ECONOMY OF THE KINGDOM OF KANESH*

Robert Ghazaryan

Abstract

The state of Kanesh was one of the state formations established in Asia Minor during the Bronze Age. It played a significant role in the process of formation and establishment of the Hittite state (mid-XVII century BC - early XII century BC). The city was the second center of the Hittite state after Kussara, and its territory served as a base for the further expansion of the Hittite state. It is important to emphasize that the city was also the capital and the center of the international trade network (in more than forty cities) organized by Assyrians. The state structure of Kanesh, its system of government also had an influence on the Hittite state system. All these lead us to study and explore the history of that city-state, to have an understanding of its state order, economy, and socio-economic relations.

Keywords: Kanesh, Asia Minor, karum, “Cappadocian” sources, economy, trade, Hittite Old Kingdom, Kussara, dignitary, management system.

Introduction

The state of Kanesh was one of the city-states of Asia Minor. The main written sources of the history of Kanesh are the “Cappadocian”¹ trade tablets. They are also the first written local sources on the history of Asia Minor and adjacent territories. Most of them were discovered near the present-day Kültepe (Turkish lit. “Ash hill”, near the present-day Karahöyük settlement) and date back to the XX-XVIII centuries BC².

Due to the lack of written sources, it is difficult to form an idea about the initial (early Bronze Age) phase of the city’s history. However, the archaeological material allows us to claim that there was a settlement in the “Upper City”³ at that period (archeological layers 18 to 11)⁴. It is evident that the history of the state of

* This study has been carried out within the framework of the grant received from the Committee of Science, Republic of Armenia (grant N. 20TTSH-047).

The article was submitted on October 21, 2022. The article was reviewed on November 3, 2022.

¹ The “Cappadocian” written sources that have been deciphered and published, represent the history of Kanesh of about at least 1970-1710 BC, but most of them date back to 1895-1865 BC.

² Of the approximately 23,500 tablets found at karum, about 23,000 are from level II and only 500 are from level Ib. Only 40 tablets were found in the Kanesh citadel (“Upper City”). All the rest were found from the karum area. In “Cappadocian” sources Hittite proper names, as well as words borrowed from Hittite were mentioned for the first time. See [25: 69].

³ The city consisted of “Upper” and “Lower” parts. The royal palace, royal structures, temples, etc. were located in the “Upper city” or citadel. The karum was located in the “Lower city”.

⁴ According to archaeological data, the archaeological layers of Kanesh (18 archaeological layers) generally start from the Late Early Bronze Age and reach the Roman period. The period of the king-

Kanesh dates to as early as the second half of the III millennium BC. At least the archaeological material found at the site shows that the settlement existed before the Assyrian traders arrived there.

An inseparable part of the history of Kanesh is the trade karum established by Assyrians (Akk. *kārum*, colony), which was also the main international trade hub of the region. This trade was often interrupted or damaged as a result of wars between different city-states, which also fought to establish control over international trade routes and markets. Kanesh was not always successful in that struggle. The city was destroyed twice: in 1835 BC and in 1725 BC.

State System of the City-state of Kanesh

According to “Cappadocian” sources, the state of Kanesh was ruled by the king (referred to in “Cappadocian” sources as *ruba’um* - prince, king, direct translation from Akk. - great man) whose power over his subjects was quite immense [8: 117-118]. The king’s power was probably similar to that of the kings of the Hittite state, which the Hittites believed was god-given⁵. The king could also be the commander-in-chief, high priest and supreme judge. The Kanesh kings of different periods, e.g. Anitta, Zuzu also bore the title of great king [28: 74, 76].

Zipani is the first Kanesh king to be mentioned among the seventeen kings who, according to the source, were defeated by Naram Sin (2254-2218 BC) [22: 43].

The existing information about the Kanesh kings of a later phase has been restored after the discovery of “Cappadocian” sources. Those texts also contain information about the kings of Kanesh whose names are not mentioned, or whose names are mentioned only once, and it is very difficult to give any clear information about them. Moreover, it is virtually impossible to specify the dates of their rule⁶.

dom of Kanesh (XX-XVIII centuries BC) as evidenced by “Cappadocian” sources, is within the 8th to 7th archaeological layers (8-II, 7-Ib). According to Middle Chronology, level II of karum dates to ca 1970-1840 BC, and level Ib - ca 1840-1700 BC. [38; 22: 41].

⁵ IBOT 1.30 (CTH 821.1).

⁶ For example, the text AKT 6, 113 mentions an unnamed Kanesh ruler. The text Kt j/k 9; RIMA 0.33.4: 16 mentions a king going to the temple of the god of Anna of Kanesh, but his name is not mentioned. The text Kt n/k 1716b; Kt d/k 46 mentions another king who visited the temple of the god of Nipas of Kanesh. The text ICK 1, 178 mentions a certain king Labarsa [24: 20, n. 3; 28: 108]. The name Labarsa is interesting here: it is similar to the name of Labarna, a Hittite king of a later period. However, it is not clear where he came to power, in Kanesh or in another city. The name La-[ba]-arna-aš is also found in the text Kt 88/k 713.3. There he acts as a witness [10: 145]. Letter KTK 10 mentions that an alliance was formed against Hattusa between the towns of Šinaḫuttum, Amkuwa, Kapitra and a man named Kuku, who was probably the king of Kanesh [2, 294f., n. 1176; 3: 49 and n. 175]. We also have information about Warb/pa, mentioned in a text about divorce and in another text related to slave trade. Both texts are confirmed by a certain Warb/pa referred to as *rubā'im* and a certain *Ḫalkiašu* is mentioned as *rabi simmiltim* (head of the citadel) [28: 79-80, 107-110]. But again, it is not clear whether they operated in Kanesh or another city.

In the period of the Kanesh archaeological layer Ib the kings about whose reign some information can be given are also mentioned. Those kings [11: 123-132] are Ḫurmeli (ca 1790 BC)⁷, Inar (ca 1790-1775 BC), Warsama (son of Inar, ca 1775-1750 BC), Piṭḫana (who was also the king of Kussara⁸, ca 1750-1740 BC), Anitta (son of Piṭḫana, ca 1740-1725 BC) and Zuzu (ca 1725-1710 BC)⁹.

An important position in the Kanesh governance system was also occupied by the queen (Akk.: *rubātum*), as mentioned in a number of “Cappadocian” sources¹⁰. A text has been preserved in which the Queen of Kanesh wrote a letter to the rulers of the cities of Luḫuzatia, Ḫurama, Šalahšua as her subjects [18: 28-35]. Here we can see the commonalities between the reign of the queens of that period and the reign of Hittite tawananna (queen) of a later period. In both cases, the queens participated in state affairs, sometimes acting independently. We can also state that the role of women in general was greater in Kanesh than in Assur, and in Kanesh a ruling queen was mentioned as well: she negotiated on behalf of the state. Probably, after the king’s death, his wife, the queen, could rule the state alone or together with her heir. Later, these traditions were also partially transferred to the period of the Old Hittite Kingdom (ca 1650-1450 BC)¹¹.

A letter from an Assyrian merchant also mentions a certain Ḫabuala who was the “queen’s shepherd” (Akk.: *rēi’um ša rubātīm*), probably the overseer of the queen’s herd of cattle [28: 107].

Probably the queens of Kanesh, like the Hittite queens later, kept their high position in the court after the death of their husbands, the kings. And like the Hittite queens, they also participated in ritual, religious ceremonies and were the chief priestesses of the state.

No traces of royal burials have been found in the archaeological site of Kanesh, which may indicate that they have either not been discovered yet, or that

⁷ The name of king Ḫurmeli was Hittite. The name of this king meant “man from the city of Hur(ra)ma”, which shows that he was from another city and had probably seized power in Kanesh. See [11: 124; 12: 265; 21: 162].

⁸ Kussara was probably north-east or south-east of Kanesh, between Tegarama and Ḫurama. There was also a trade haven, a station (Akk. *wabartum*-station) of Assyrian traders in Kussara [13: 81; 2: 143-150; 6: 135; 16: 1391-1395].

⁹ [11: 128]. Zuzu was simultaneously the “great” king of the state of Alaḫzina. Probably in 1725 BC Zuzu seized power in Kanesh. The name Zuzu is also found in the texts from the period of the Hittite Old Kingdom, see Bilgin 2015: 195-196. That name was also mentioned during the period of the New Hittite Kingdom, see KUB 21.38 obv. 22'; [17: 281-290].

¹⁰ ATHE 62; ATHE 66; CCT 6,34a; ICK 1, 13a; Kt m/k 24; Kt m/k 35.

¹¹ There is also a tale about the Queen of Kanesh, the so-called “The Queen of Kanesh, Her Thirty Sons and Thirty Daughters” [29]. The text was written in the XVII century BC in Old Hittite script, but the tale was created earlier, before Anitta conquered a significant part of Asia Minor. Apart from Kanesh, other cities are also mentioned here: Zalpuwa, where the queen’s sons find shelter, Tamarmara, where they learn important information, Ḫattusa, which fights and defeats Zalpuwa. There are different interpretations for this story [33: 119-134; 34: 123-128].

they were probably buried in another place. However, it can be assumed that Piṭhana and Anitta who were from Kussara were buried either there or nearby.

Interestingly, in the public administration system of the kingdom of Kanesh there is no mention of structures such as *panku* (People's Assembly) and *tuliya* (Council of Elders) of the Hittite kingdom. It may mean that the governance of the state of Kanesh was carried out solely by the king and the court officials, without coordinating matters with the people or the representatives of the Council of Elders.

According to "Cappadocian" sources, there were other positions at the court of Kanesh as well, e.g. *rabi simmiltim* (literally, the name of the position is translated from Akkadian as the Chief of the Staircase, probably referring to the "staircase that led to the city or main gate"). That official was actually the head of the citadel, probably also the head of the court, and he was the second in rank in the states of Asia Minor. Usually, the king's brother or uncle held that position. Very often that position was held by the crown prince as well. The names of some of Kanesh's *rabi simmiltims* are known, particularly Turupanni, Ḫarpatiwa, Wanuššala, Šamnuman, Ḫalkiašu, Anitta, Peruwa, Ištar-ibri. Interestingly, in one of the texts of Kanesh (Kt.01/k294) the names of two *rabi simmiltims* are simultaneously recorded in relation to one case: one is the former *rabi simmiltim* of king Inar and the other is the newly appointed *rabi simmiltim* (Šamnuman) [3: 13, 36].

Other positions of the Kanesh court have also been mentioned, namely *rabi sikkatim* (probably a person who had commercial and military responsibilities), *rabi mahīrim* and *rabi ummanātim* (head of the market), *rabi šabim* (military leader), *rabi šarīqī* (chief of the slaves of the temple, at the same time involved in trade activities), *rabi huršātim* (his counterpart in the Hittite royal palace was the position of ^{LU}antuwašalli, the head of storehouses), *rabi abullātim* (chief of the city gates who guarded the entrances to the palace), *rabi bētim* (head of the palace), *rabi maššarātim* (commander of the garrison), *rabi haṭṭim* (chief macebearer), *rabi šukkallim* (grand vizier, probably had advisory duties), *rabi nāgirē* (chief of the heralds), *rabi lāsimē* (chief of the messengers) and *rabi targumannē* (chief of the translators, chief court interpreter) [28: 109, 112; 26: 171-172].

Three other high-ranking Kanesh officials organized and supervised the construction work: *rabi awīlē* (chief of the men), *rabi šābē/šābim* (chief of the workers), *rabi urdē* (chief of the slaves). *Rabi šābē* probably supervised the heads of various trades (*rabi nappāhē*, "chief of the metalworkers", *rabi kakkē* "chief of the arms", *rabi kittātim* "chief of the linens", *rabi ašlākē* "chief of washers").

Religious issues were under the control of the following officials: *rabi šarīqē* (chief of the oblates) and *rabi niqē* (chief of offerings) [26: 172].

As regards court cases, several professions were mentioned that were actively involved in these processes. They were *dayyānum* (judge), *rābišum* (attorney or solicitor) and *ṭupšarrum* (scribe) [26: 179].

The geographical location, as well as the lack of natural borders, made the Kanesh kingdom a political entity vulnerable from all sides, and its integrity and

security could only be maintained through an efficient army. We have no clear information about the army of the state of Kanesh. It must have consisted of infantry and chariots as the army of Old Hittite Kingdom in a later period.

Economy of Kanesh

The available information shows that the Kanesh court was quite actively involved in economic activities.

The economy of Kanesh city-state was mainly based on agriculture and cattle breeding. In addition, domestic and international trade and crafts were also important fields [9; 23]. The main items of international trade were tin and wool fabric [23].

The main grain crops grown in the fields around Kanesh were barley (Akk.: *še'um*) and wheat (Akk.: *aršātum*). These crops were referred to in the texts under the common name of *uṭṭutum*.

There was an irrigation system around the city, and those who used it paid money (Akk.: *gamrum*). The money was probably received by one of the court officials, *rabi šaqiātīm* (chief of the irrigated fields). Some of the lands were gardens, and horticulture was also one of the important fields of economy in Kanesh. This work was equally coordinated by the Kanesh court and it was under the supervision of *rabi kiriātīm* (chief of the gardens) and *rabi nuk(i)ribbē* (chief of the gardeners). This position is comparable to the Chief of Gardeners (Sumerian: GAL LÚ.MEŠNU.GIŠ.KIRI₆) of the Hittite court. Kanesh also had *rabi ūrqē* (chief of the vegetables) who controlled this field on behalf of the state.

Cattle breeding was another key field of economy. The “Cappadocian” sources also mention the official *rabi rē'im* (chief shepherd or head of herdsmen) [9: 149-154]. It is comparable to the official of the Hittite court GAL LÚSIPA and GAL LÚNA.GAD (chief of the shepherds)[5: 321-322].

The following officials, too, were associated with agriculture: *rabi še'ē* (chief of the barley), *rabi adrim* (chief of the threshing floor), *rabi sisē* (chief of the horses), *rabi perdim* (chief of the mules), *rabi kalbātīm* (chief of the dogs), *rabi alpātīm* (chief of the oxen), *rabi šamnim* (chief of the oil), *rabi eṣše* (chief of the wood), *rabi ṭābātīm* (chief of the salts) [26: 172].

The positions of *rabi karānim* / *rabi kirānim* (chief of the wine) and *rabi šāqē* (the chief cupbearer) known from the “Cappadocian” sources can be compared with the positions of GAL LÚGEŠTIN (chief of wine or chief of the wine stewards) and LÚGAL.SAGI(.A) (cupbearer, senior of wine waiters) of the Hittite Kingdom¹². That official also held an important position in the Hittite court. The name of his position can be roughly translated as chief of the cupbearers or chief of the wine.

¹² [5: 142-147, 156-158]. Interestingly, according to the text Kt j/k 625 2-3, Tudḫaliya was the chief of the cupbearers of Zuzu, the last king of Kanesh. At the same time, the name Tudḫaliya was mentioned in the text “*Hittite offering list for the Royal Ancestors*” (KUB 11 7 i 10-12) as one of the ancestors of the Hittite kings.

That official was mentioned as a military commander as well, who was also entrusted with conducting important military operations. For example, during the reign of the Hittite king Mursili II (1321-1295 BC), Nuwanza who held the position of the chief of the cupbearers was among the main military commanders of the Empire [14: 100]. It is difficult to state what duties this official had during the Kanesh period. We can simply guess that he was also the royal chief of the cupbearers and held a high position in the court. He was probably also involved in the procurement of grapes and wine production for the court.

In the “Cappadocian” texts we also record the production of wine in the region for the first time. The information about wine (Akk.: *karānum/kerānum*, Hittite: *wiyana-*, wine) in those texts mainly refers to the areas between the Euphrates and the Taurus mountains, e.g. the cities of Mamma, Tegarama [14], Ursu, Unibgum were mentioned as the main centers of wine production from where it was imported to Kanesh. The information preserved about “grape harvest” suggests that there was viticulture in the vicinity of Kanesh as well [2: 98-99, 210-211; 36: 153-154, 164-165, 220; 7: 41-42].

From the “Cappadocian” sources we also learn about three types of land around Kanesh. The first type was the land that used an irrigation system and had one owner. The second was the so-called ḪA.LA.NI-type land, which had less value because it had several owners. The third type of land was not connected to the irrigation system [9: 139-157; 7: 41-42].

Population of Kanesh

According to estimates, in the XVIII century BC 25,000-30,000 inhabitants lived in Kanesh and the city occupied an area of 170 to 230 hectares. It was one of the largest cities of the region during this period. Assyrians mostly lived in the “Lower city” and their number was 3,000-3,500¹³. They called the local inhabitants of Kanesh *nuā’um*. And the locals called Assyrians *tamkārum*. Assyrians also used the name *nisbe-*, which meant “the man from Kanesh”, thus distinguishing the people of Kanesh from other people of Asia Minor. As the “Cappadocian” sources show, various peoples lived in Kanesh: Hittites, Luwians, Assyrians, Hurrians, Amorites, among others [1: 100-107].

According to research, local people made up $\frac{3}{4}$ of the population during the period of the II karum level and lived in separate districts. In Kanesh, the locals mostly lived in the southeast and southwest quarters of the city [31: 321]. And Assyrians mostly inhabited the northwestern part of karum [30: 14].

It is interesting that many Early Bronze Age settlements in the surrounding areas of Kanesh were abandoned in the Middle Bronze Age, which is probably because the inhabitants of these settlements moved to the more developed and

¹³ [4: 66 and Fig. 1]. During that period the city of Assur occupied an area of about 55 hectares and had a population of about 7,000 - 10,000. See [27: 81].

populous Kanesh, the capital of the state. This also suggests that during that period the population of Kanesh grew not only naturally, but also artificially [19].

It is likely that the Nesite, i.e. the Hittite language, served as the lingua franca in both Kanesh and the surrounding areas. At the same time, it should be noted that the Akkadian language was used as a written medium, and it was mastered not only by the newcomer Assyrians and those who arrived from other parts of Mesopotamia, but also by the local people who were in close contact with Assyrian traders and who also wrote, read and communicated in that language. It is equally important to state that many locals were married to Assyrians and bilingual communication was common in their families [20: 232].

Interestingly, although the imported Mesopotamian cuneiform system was mainly used during that period, there is also evidence that the Hittite-Luwian hieroglyphic script was used at the same time. The end of the Assyrian trade also marked the end of the use of cuneiform in the region, which only resumed during the Hittite Old Kingdom [37].

Since the “Cappadocian” sources were mainly written by or for merchants, it should come as no surprise that a number of specializations directly related to trade are also mentioned there. Some examples include the following: *ummeānum* (investor), *tamkārum* (Assyrian) merchant, creditor, agent), *kaššarum* (harnesser, packer), *sāridum* (donkey driver) [26: 174].

Assyrians also had a self-governing body in Kanesh. In a certain sense they were autonomous in karum. The “great men” of karum also had judicial powers within the community. Assyrian merchants were mainly divided into three groups: “elite merchants” (Akk.: *šāqil dātīm*), who had “accounts” in the karum administration system, paid fee (Akk.: *dātum*) to the karum regime, and joined the ranks of seniors of karum. Then there were Assyrians living in karum (Akk.: *ašbūtum*), and the third group was actively involved in the caravan trade with Assyria (Akk.: *ālikū ša harrān ālim*) [3: 78].

The assembly of the Assyrians in Kanesh functioned like the assembly of the city of Assur and was subject to it as well. The assembly consisted of “small and big” people (Akk.: *šahher, rabi*). The assembly also had its *ṭupšarrum* (secretary) and *šiprū ša kārīm* (envoys/messengers of the *kārum*) [26: 173].

The Assyrians that settled in Kanesh preserved their religious traditions and ceremonies. They swore before the statue of God Assur, which had a cult structure in Kanesh.

Conclusions

Thus, we have come to the following conclusions:

- Probably already at the end of the third millennium, the areas around Kanesh were mainly inhabited by the Hittite-speaking population. Although Kussara and Nesa were separate states, the population mainly spoke Hittite (Nesite).

- The settlement of Kanesh existed from the Early Bronze Age. One proof of this is that the “Old Palace” (Layer 8) and the “Warsama Palace” (Layer 7) discov-

ered in the “Upper city” were built on top of structures that date back to the Early Bronze Age. They were probably similar structures as well [32: 82, 97].

- Considering that Nesa/Kanesh was mostly inhabited by Hittites, the history of the Hittite state can be traced back to at least the XX century BC and the phase from that period to the beginning of the Old Hittite Kingdom can be called the Early Kingdom, which lasted from the XX century BC to mid-XVII century.

- Hittite was later used as the written language during the Old Kingdom. However, no text written in Hittite was found in Kanesh, which in its turn suggests that the formation of the Hittite cuneiform language took place later, from the period of reign of Ḫattusili I until the reign of Telipinu [35: 103-104].

- Anitta was in fact the first of the Hittite kings to bear the title of great king (LUGAL.GAL). Of course, this was not equivalent to the title of the kings of the period of the New Hittite Kingdom (XIV-XIII centuries BC), because at that stage the Hittite kings were one of the most powerful rulers in the Near East.

- Unlike the Old Hittite Kingdom (before the time of King Telipinu), there probably existed the order of inheritance of the throne from father to son. Examples include Inar-Warsama and Piṭḫana-Anitta successions.

- Judging from the list of the court agencies of Kanesh, one may assume that the positions in the later Hittite state may have been borrowed from the Kanesh court.

- If Nesa-Kanesh was abandoned around 1700 BC, probably the local court, the royal family moved to Kussara and then from there to Ḫattusa.

- The state archive of the state of Kanesh has not been found to date. It can also be assumed that they managed to move it from the abandoned Kanesh to Kussara.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKT - (Ankara) Kültepe Tabletleri, Ankaraner Kültepe-Texte, Ankara (1990-2018.)
ATHE - B. Kienast, Die altassyrischen Texte des orientalischen Seminars der Universität Heidelberg und der Sammlung Erlenmeyer, Berlin, 1960.
CCT - Cuneiform Texts from Cappadocian Tablets in the British Museum (Londres).
CTH - Laroche E., Catalogue des textes hittites, Paris, 1971; Editions Klincksieck, 267 p.
IBoT- Istanbul Arkeoloji Müzelerinde Bulunan Boğazköy Tabletleri(nden Seçme Metinler) (Istanbul/Ankara).
ICK - ICK 1 - Hrozný, Bedrich. 1952. Inscriptions cunéiformes du Kultépé. Vol. 1. MAO 14. Prague: Státní Pedagogické Nakladatelství. ICK 2 - Matouš, Lubor. 1962. Inscriptions cunéiformes du Kultépé. Vol. 2. Prague: Státní Pedagogické Nakladatelství.
PIHANS - Publications de l'Institut historique et archéologique néerlandais de Stamboul (Leiden).
KEL - Kültepe Eponym Lists.
Kt - Kültepe Tabletleri.
KTK - N.B. Jankowskaja, Klinopisnye Teksty iz Kjul'Tepe v Sobranijach SSSR, Moscou, 1968.
KUB - Keilschrifturkunden aus Boğazköi (Berlin, 1921ff.).
REL - Revised Eponym List.
RIMA - Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia, Assyrian Periods (Toronto).

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**ՔԱՆԵՇԻ ԹԱԳԱՎՈՐՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՎԱՐՉԱՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆ ՀԱՄԱԿԱՐԳԸ ԵՎ
ՏՆՏԵՍՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ**

Ռոբերտ Ղազարյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ Քանեշ, Փոքր Ասիա, կարում, «կապադովկյան» աղբյուրներ, տնտեսություն, առևտուր, խեթական Հին թագավորություն, Կուսսարա, պաշտոնյա, կառավարման համակարգ:

Քանեշի պետությունը բրոնզեդարյան ժամանակաշրջանում Փոքր Ասիայում ձևավորված պետական կազմավորումներից մեկն էր: Այն կարևոր նշանակություն է ունեցել խեթական պետության (մ.թ.ա. XVII դ. կեսեր - XII դ. սկիզբ) կազմավորման և կայացման գործընթացում: Քաղաքը հանդիսացել է խեթական պետության մեզ հայտնի երկրորդ կենտրոնը Կուսսարայից հետո, և նրա տարածքը հենք է հանդիսացել խեթերի պետության հետագա ընդարձակման համար: Կարևոր է շեշտել, որ քաղաքը նաև աշուրցիների կողմից կազմակերպված միջազգային առևտրական ցանցի (ավելի քան քառասուն քաղաքներում) կենտրոնատեղին էր, մայրաքաղաքը: Քանեշի պետական կառուցվածքը, կառավարման համակարգը նույնպես իրենց ազդեցությունն են թողել խեթական պետական համակարգի վրա: Այս բոլորը մեզ թելադրում են ուսումնասիրել և հասկանալ այդ քաղաք-պետության պատմությունը, տալ նրա պետական կարգի, տնտեսության, սոցիալ-տնտեսական հարաբերությունների մասին պատկերը:

İŞUWA TOWARDS THE END OF THE XIII CENTURY BC (ON THE PROBLEM OF THE GROOVED WARE)*

Aram Kosyan

Abstract

At the end of the XIII century BC archaeological excavations carried out in various regions of Eastern Turkey have revealed a complete cultural break, thus marking the end of the Late Bronze Age (LBA) and the rise of the Early Iron Age (EIA). The main peculiarity for the new culture is the appearance of the so-called "grooved ware" which was unearthed during the excavations at numerous sites on the territory of İšuwa, a political unit well attested by Hittite cuneiform texts. This same ware is known also from several sites located in different parts of Eastern Highlands (eastern Lake Van basin, *Tillehöyük*, *Lidarhöyük*, Erzurum, Iğdır, etc.). To date the causes of this phenomenon are not clear. Ch. Burney and V. Sevin were the first to assume that at least in the case of the Upper Euphrates basin the transition from LBA to EIA was the result of migration from Transcaucasia. Later this assumption was cast doubt on by other archaeologists. U. Müller suggested that the source for the grooved ware should be looked for in İšuwa, and that later some population of this region moved to the south and south-east.

For the solution to this problem the author refers to the movement of the population of the Kura-Araxes culture of Transcaucasia and neighboring regions to the south-west and south which happened about 2000 years before the end of the LBA, during the termination of the Early Bronze Age I in Transcaucasia (end of the IV millennium BC). Most probably, the causes of both migrations could be the result of the so-called 5.2 and 3.2 kiloyear climatic events. Strikingly, the routes of the Kura-Araxes I migrants coincide with that of the grooved ware people. Thus, the suggestion of Ch. Burney and V. Sevin seem more plausible than the proposals put forward by later authors. Most probably in both cases we deal with significant migrations of Transcaucasian population groups.

Keywords: İšuwa, Hittite Empire, LBA-EIA transition, Altınova, grooved ware, Kura-Araxes culture.

During the disintegration of the Hittite Empire at the end of the XIII century BC on the eastern regions of its political and cultural influence archaeological data indicates fundamental changes. In the Elazığ region located to the east of the Euphrates, as well as in Malatya, to the west of the river, archaeological excavations show the end of the once strong Hittite cultural influence and the rise of a previously unknown, new culture. However scanty the Hittite cuneiform texts in regard to

* This study has been carried out within the framework of the grant received from the Committee of Science, Republic of Armenia (grant N. 20TTSH-005).

The article was submitted on October 15, 2022. The article was reviewed on November 3, 2022.

the political situation in this region towards the end of the second half of the XIII century BC are, they allow us to assume that the local tribal units were dominated by the Hittite Empire. With the end of the Hittite Empire and its written tradition, because of the lack of sources, the understanding of the causes of the abovementioned changes is greatly complicated. And about one century later, from the late XIII century until the mid-XII century BC, Assyrian texts (Tiglathpileser I and Ashshurbelkala) contain very limited information about the territory of the kingdom of Işuwa which occupied a part of the Upper Euphrates region¹.

According to the written sources and archaeological data, Işuwa was a heavily populated region at least from the Early Bronze Age (EBA), maybe even from the Chalcolithic period. In the article we shall not discuss the problem of the Late Bronze Age (LBA) population², but rather focus on the demographic changes which happened here towards the end of LBA and the beginning of EIA.

Archaeological data

For the study of the population of Işuwa, the number of settlements and their pattern are of utmost importance salvage archaeological excavations carried out in 1968-1970 which precedes the building of the Keban and Karakaya dams on Karasu and Muradsu³. These works have continued until now in the neighboring regions of both dams. In the course of excavations numerous sites were studied.

Further studies were carried in 2020 on the territory of Işuwa, particularly in the area which lies to the south and south-east of Elazığ (Uluova) within the frames of the “Elazığ Prehistoric Archaeological Survey” project [EPAS] aimed at the documentation of archaeological sites [29]. In the course of excavations, a total of 38 sites were investigated, among them 17 new ones. A significant number of sites show the existence of a multilayered occupation beginning from Neolithic up to Late Bronze Age (in some cases even from the Chalcolithic period). Some sites continue to function also in the succeeding periods (including the Middle Ages). If we add to these sites those which were studied before this project during the salvage excavations in 1968-1976 (now under the waters of Keban reservoir - *Korucutepe*, *Norşuntepe*, *Tepecik*, *Tülintepe*, *Değirmentepe* etc.)⁴, it becomes clear that this considerably small region was heavily populated during the Bronze Age.

¹ For the study of northern campaigns of these kings directed against Nairi and Uruatri see [32: 48-61; 14: 29-57, etc.].

² Hittite texts contain the names of approximately 20 settlements located in Işuwa, which may probably be the same as those excavated in Altınova and its neighborhood. For the list of these settlements see [21].

³ The results of archaeological excavations and surveys have been published in a considerable number of studies [15 (*Norşuntepe*) and further reports [36 (*Korucutepe*); 37; 10], and series of publication under the program of Keban Project Activities.

⁴ Middle East Technical University. Keban Project Publications. Ankara. For the chronology and brief description of sites in the Malatya and Elazığ provinces see [10: 389-396] (including those which have Late Chalcolithic and Late Uruk remains).

Thus, on the territory of Išuwa of the Hittite sources numerous settlements have been identified; a considerable number of these show clear traces of habitation since the Early Bronze Age (some even from Late Chalcolithic)⁵. In the LBA I a significant increase in population was recorded [7: 405, Table 9]⁶. And already in LBA II the number of new settlements founded by the Kura-Araxes newcomers reaches 46, where approximately 4500 people live. About 54% percent of these settlements were located on mounds [11: 66; 3: 99]. The pottery inventory of these new settlements is exclusively Transcaucasian Kura-Araxes; local production is absent [4: 123]⁷. Only in Altınova (Kharberd plain of Armenian sources) 25 settlements were identified. All these settlements are small ones; among them three have 2 hectares of habitable area, five are medium-sized, and the rest cover even less space [11: 69]. During this period the local population continues to live in their original settlements but side by side with newcomers. It is worth mentioning that the dwellings of locals and newcomers are located close to each other [4: 122]⁸. This could speak in favor of the assumption that in this period between the two different cultures there already existed some integrity.

Much more complicated is the situation during the Middle Bronze Age. According to T. Şerifoğlu, in Altınova and its neighborhood a significant increase in population is also visible, although its impact on the region is not so clear like in the EBA [31: 103]⁹.

Regarding the LBA-EIA transition, one should state the following. In the EIA a significant increase in the settlements is visible¹⁰. In numerous sites of Altınova and Malatya plain (*Norşuntepe*, *Korucutepe*, *Tepecik*, *Değirmen-tepe*, *Imikuşağı*, *Tülintepe*, *Arslantepe*, etc.) fundamental changes were fixed, which points on the presence of a new population. The new culture which appears in the course of this transition is characterized by the next features:¹¹

- 1) Significant decrease of the LBA sites and the number of population;
- 2) Traces of severe destructions in some sites (*Norşuntepe*, *Korucutepe* etc.);

⁵ For the list of sites and description of the Kura-Araxes material culture during the Bronze Age see [29: 181]. The Early Bronze Age I period is represented especially in those sites which are currently under the waters of reservoir and also after the studies in the frames of EPAS (*Tadım Höyük*, *Kil-litepe*, *Dedepınarı*, *Körküyü Höyük*, *Könk*, etc.).

⁶ The appearance of the characteristic Kura-Araxes black and red burnished ware marks the increase of the number of sites [4: 118].

⁷ See the satellite map of sites which contain the Kura-Araxes pottery [4: 114].

⁸ The study of the Early Bronze Age I Kura-Araxes pottery at *Tepecik* (now under the reservoir) comprises only 35 percent of total ceramics but in EBA II it reaches 60 percent not only here but in other sites of the region, and 90 percent in EBA III.

⁹ The author thinks that it is difficult to state mass influx of alien population into Išuwa during MBA, although one could not rule out the arrival of some Hittite, Luwian, and Hurrian ethnic groups.

¹⁰ Around 50 percent according to V. Sevin [33: 95]. See also [29: 182].

¹¹ For the description of new cultural traits see [33: 87-95; 39: 18-21; 1: 476ff., also in 19; 20: 160-162].

3) Increase in number of EIA settlements comparing with the previous period (about 50%);

4) Influx of new and primitive cultural traits, which speaks in favor of the existence of newcomers;

5) Distinctive features of the new culture - a) pottery mostly is made of low quality clay, without potter's wheel or slow wheel, limited repertory of wares [38: 155], b) primitive architecture (absence of planned building activities), the absence of administrative and cultic buildings (in *Norşuntepe*) [1: 476ff.]. Instead of "cities" of the Hittite period at *Norşuntepe* and *Korucutepe* we encounter small rural settlements [15: 105; 36: 56; 27:107-112]. And, on a final note, the transition shows cultural discontinuity.

For the study of the number of settlements and population estimates an important question arises: what the background of these changes described above was. One may wonder how the causes of this transition could be explained: whether it was a result of inner developments (for example, demographic blow), or we deal with impulses from outside (that is the influx of a significant portion of the alien population), remains unknown.

If we try to compare the impact of the Kura-Araxes population on the region under study (specific pottery, architecture, etc.) and the effect of the EBA-EIA transition on Işuwa, some similarities could be established.

The question is whether the EIA pottery could appear in Işuwa along with the people who made them. While the EBA migration into the region could not be doubted, as to the EIA, it still remains unsolved. The main peculiarity of the LBA-EIA transition rests on the appearance of large quantities of the so-called "grooved ware". Still Ch. Burney and V. Sevin pointed to the possibility that the source of this ware could be Transcaucasia [9; 33]. Let us mention that besides Işuwa, the grooved ware was found during the LBA-EIA transition and later, until the VIII century BC also in the Upper Tigris sites (*Uçtepe*, *Ziyarettepe*, etc.) [23: 129] and to the south (*Tillehöyük* [6], *Lidarhöyük* [27]), in the eastern basin of Lake Van (the cemetery near the village Karagündüz, Yoncatepe, the neighborhood of the Van citadel, *Evditepe*, *Alacahan*, *Dilkaya Höyük*, etc.) [34; 5: 195-200; 16; 13 (for the geography of the grooved ware and typological study of this ware unearthed from different sites)].

Taking into account the wide geography of this ware (besides the regions listed above it is fixed in Kars, Erzurum, the neighborhood of Ararat, Iğdır, many sites of Armenia), one may adhere to the proposal of the large-scaled migration (regardless of its duration - one-time mass population movement or gradual spread into different regions) which during the XII century BC probably should have covered extensive geographical areas.

After the studies by Ch. Burney and V. Sevin some archaeologists proposed to look for the original place of this ware exactly in Işuwa. According to U. Müller, the source of this ware should be looked for in the Upper Euphrates area (Işuwa) and its spread should be the outcome of the migration of some portion of its popu-

lation which had moved and settled down in the regions lying to the south-east [26: 142]. So, the proposal regarding the Mushku association of the grooved ware and its connection with the Transcaucasian location before migrations have been cast doubt on. G. D. Summers and some others find that the geography of the grooved ware does not coincide with the regions the Mushku tribes referred to by Assyrian sources used to inhabit [35: 246-247; 2: 398; 30: 119].

Under the light of available data, several remarks regarding the problem of the grooved ware could prove useful.

If we suppose that it is exactly from Išuwa that the outpour of population at the end of LBA took place, then two questions should be addressed:

1. What happened in Išuwa during the disintegration of the Hittite Empire which resulted in the migrations of its population and their resettlement in different parts of the Eastern Highlands. Taking into account the wide geography of the grooved ware and the possibility that the list of archaeological sites which contain this type of pottery could be significantly increased in the future, one could definitely speak of quite a large quantity of migrants.

Although the territory of Išuwa lies in the semi-arid climatic zone, the ratio of annual precipitation is quite high (500-600 mm). It is lower in the Malatya plain (around 400 mm), but to the north of Muradsu it reaches 1000 mm. [31: 103].

The plains of Malatya and Altınova stand out with good agricultural potential. For example, according to the memoirs of the British diplomat K. Brant who visited this part of the Ottoman Empire in the 1830s, in Altınova the wheat yields 1:16 [8: 207]. In this respect the plain of Malatya has more favorable conditions, since the climate is milder and the terrain is flat.

The territory of Išuwa and its neighborhood has rich deposits of natural resources, especially metals¹². Along with agriculture, the deposits of different metals (copper in Erganimaden¹³, iron in Divriği and Hasançelebi¹⁴, tin in the Malatya plain, Keban, Altınova and Başkil [31: 103]) created favorable conditions for the development of crafts.

Geographically Išuwa lies at the crossroads of three neighboring regions. Through its territory major routes that connect Central Anatolia and Cilicia with the Eastern Highlands and Mesopotamia run. Towards the south the road runs through Elazığ and, bypassing Erganimaden, continues until Mesopotamia. Another road proceeds to the east and through Mush reaches the northern shores of Lake Van and further to Transcaucasia. The third road from Elazığ runs to the north-east and through Erzincan plain also to Transcaucasia. Thus, Išuwa could be regarded as a contact zone [22: 69-70]. This region comprises a natural corridor through which different migrations took place. In all likelihood, some groups of migrants

¹² The map of Išuwa-Malatya see [7.II: Karte 4].

¹³ Copper mines of Erganimaden were the richest deposits of the Middle East along with those of Cyprus and Sinai.

¹⁴ The mines of Divriği and Hasançelebi which have not exhausted their resources yet.

may have settled down here. Probably, the existence of personal names representing different languages still in the Hittite texts could be regarded as a consequence of this special place of Išuwa [21]. The economic potential and constant political contacts with neighboring regions make the tribal units of Išuwa small but economically stable.

In the case of a significant outpour of local population at the beginning of the EIA one might expect to find the decrease of settlements, but the opposite situation is apparent. In the EIA we see a significant increase of settlements (about 50 percent, see above). Despite the fact that Išuwa was densely populated in the LBA, it could hardly be regarded as a starting point for such a large-scale outpour. Economic potential and abundant water resources definitely could not force the population to look for more favorable places of subsistence in other regions including Northern Mesopotamia and even Transcaucasia.

2. According to A. Erdem, the grooved ware unearthed in different locations is not homogeneous. Along with similarities, it also has several distinctive features (color and quality of clay, burnishing techniques) [13: 114]. Different features of this ware could be observed in various regions. This could testify in favor of the assumption that the makers of the grooved ware had arrived in their future habitats from a much wider geographical area than that of Išuwa. Otherwise the existence of such differences in this ware would be difficult to explain.

3. The next argument against the Išuwaeen starting point of this ware is the XIII century crisis which is fully attested in the Near East and Aegean basin and had a negative impact on contemporary states (Hittite Empire, Egypt, Assyria, etc.). In this context the developments to the east of the Euphrates might be fully explained. During the so-called 3.2 kiloyear event (the Late Bronze age collapse, late XIII-XI centuries BC) major droughts were attested in the Northern hemisphere which resulted in the collapse of Near Eastern and Mycenaean Late Bronze age civilizations¹⁵. One of the most distinctive features of this period was continuous deterioration of climatic situation, and as a consequence political instability, economic difficulties of states, the collapse of some (Hittite Empire, Mycenaean states, etc.) and decrease in political activity of others (Assyria, Egypt). The next peculiarity of the crisis could be seen in the migrations of large population groups (the "Sea-peoples", Aramaeans, Central Anatolians to the south, North Balkanic population into Asia Minor and others). Possibly, exactly in this context the spread of the grooved ware in the Eastern Highlands should be explained.

4. In regard to the proposed connection between the makers of the grooved ware and Mushku tribes referred to in the Middle Assyrian texts, it is necessary to mention the following. The texts of Tiglathpileser I tell that 50 years before his reign (in 1164 BC) some ethnic groups - Mushku, Kashku and Apishlu - had in-

¹⁵ For this period see [20 - with references on extant studies to that date]. See also most recent climatological studies where this period is thoroughly discussed in regard to different regions of Eastern Mediterranean [28; 17; 24; 18, etc.].

vaded and settled down in Alzi and later advanced into the south and reached Northern Mesopotamia. It should be remembered that "Nairi lands" figure still during Tukulti-Ninurta I (that is in the last quarter of the XIII century BC), against whom the Assyrian king had organized a campaign in the third year of his reign. Alzi itself was part of "Nairi" tribal union. If so, who were the Mushku and other ethnic groups? If the population of Nairi were the grooved ware people, they could not be identical with the Mushku. Not to mention Kashku who were the well-known population of north-eastern Asia Minor (Pontic zone) still from the mid-II millennium BC according to the Hittite texts, who had nothing to do with Išuwa. There is little chance to locate these tribes in Išuwa and Nairi slightly before the LBA system collapses.

Summary

Based upon the arguments referred to above, one should suggest the next preliminary proposal in regard to the spread of the grooved ware during the LBA-EIA transition.

Despite the fact that the territory of Išuwa is definitely the region where the grooved ware is represented abundantly, the proposal of the spread of the part of its population at the close of the LBA lacks more decisive arguments. At the same time, the movements of the Kura-Araxes population at the close of the EBA I are strikingly comparable with that during the LBA-EIA transition. In the EIA the grooved ware was unearthed exactly in the same regions where the EBA I ceramics and architecture were present around 2000 years ago. It seems that this is not accidental. The routes of the Kura-Araxes I migrants coincide with that of the grooved ware people. In both cases, taking into account the 5.2 and 3.2 kiloyear events, one may find the suggestion of Ch. Burney and V. Sevin more plausible than the proposals put forward by later authors. Most probably in both cases we deal with significant migrations of Transcaucasian population groups.

As to these migrations, it would be premature to speak about one-time large advancement. The changes in the environment might have a different impact on the lifestyle of population groups who live in this extensive region. This is especially true if one deals with non-homogeneous territories and the absence of statehood in the former Kura-Araxes cultural zone. Probably Transcaucasia and its western neighboring regions until modern Erzurum were organized as tribal unions whose population practiced agriculture in lowlands and transhumance in the nearby mountainous areas. The proposed outpour of population should have covered a considerable time span. Probably such a solution to the problem could explain different typological features of the grooved ware in different regions where it was found.

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**ԻՍՈՒՎԱՆ Մ.Թ.Ա. XIII ԴԱՐԻ ՎԵՐՋԵՐԻՆ
(ԱՎՈՍԱՎՈՐ ԽԵՑԵՂԵՆԻ ԽՆԴՐԻ ՇՈՒՐՋ)**

Արամ Քոսյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ Իսուվա, Խեթական տերություն, Ուշբրոնզեդար-վաղերկաթեդար անցում, Ալլընսովա, ակոսավոր խեցեղեն, Կուր-Արաքսյան մշակույթ:

Հնագիտական պեղումների շնորհիվ մ.թ.ա. XIII դարի վերջերին հստակ նկատվում է Հայկական լեռնաշխարհի արևմտյան շրջաններում Ուշբրոնզեդարյան մշակույթի կտրուկ ավարտ և նոր, պարզունակ մշակույթով բնորոշվող բնակչության ներկայություն: Այդ նոր մշակույթի վկայությունը այսպես կոչված

«ակոսավոր խեցեղենն է», որը մեծ քանակությամբ հայտնաբերվել է ինչպես Իսուվայում, այնպես էլ Լեռնաշխարհի մյուս շրջաններում: Նույն երևույթն առկա է նաև Իսուվայից հարավ՝ Հյուսիսային Միջագետքի մի շարք (*Թիլլեհյոյուք*, *Լիդարիյոյուք* և այլն), Վանա լճից արևելք ընկած հնավայրերում (*Քարագյունդյուզ*, *Էվդիթեփե*, *Ալաջահան* և այլն), ինչպես նաև Էրզրումի, Արարատ լեռան շրջակայքում և այլուր:

Անցումային փուլում Իսուվայի տարածքում պեղված մեծաքանակ հնավայրերում առկա է բնակավայրերի քանակական զգալի աճ, ինչը կարող է վկայել նոր բնակչության ներհոսքի մասին:

Իսուվայում և այլ շրջաններում վերոհիշյալ անցումային փուլում նոր մշակույթի կրողներին դեռևս Չ. Բըրնին և Վ. Սևինը առաջարկել էին դիտել որպես Այսրկովկասից եկած բնակչություն: Այդ տեսակետը ավելի ուշ կասկածի տակ առնվեց: Փոխարենն առաջարկվեց ակոսավոր խեցեղենի աղբյուրը տեսնել հենց Իսուվայում, որտեղից էլ սկսվել է դրանց տեղաշարժը այլ վայրեր:

Իսուվայում ակոսավոր խեցեղենի աղբյուրը և դրա ստեղծողների գալստյան պատճառը կարող է նոր լուծում ստանալ նշված իրադարձությունից շուրջ 2000 տարի առաջ Այսրկովկասից Կուր-Արաքսյան մշակույթի I փուլի ավարտին (մ.թ.ա. IV հազ. վերջ) դեպի Վերին Եփրատի ավազան և այլ վայրեր ընթացած բնակչության տեղաշարժի հետ Ուշբրոնզեդար-վաղերկաթեդար անցման համադրման միջոցով: Երկու դեպքում էլ առկա են հնավայրերի քանակական աճ և նոր մշակույթի ակնառու հետքեր: Երկրորդ դեպքում՝ ի տարբերություն առաջինի, նախորդող փուլի մշակույթն ուղղակի վերանում է:

Որպես վերոհիշյալ բնակչության տեղաշարժերի պատճառ կարելի է առաջարկել մ.թ.ա. IV հազ. վերջերին և Ուշբրոնզեդարի ավարտին Առաջավոր Ասիայի շրջակա միջավայրում տեղ գտած կլիմայական փոփոխությունները:

12 ANATHEMATISMS OF ST. CYRIL OF ALEXANDRIA AND THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE ARMENIAN CHURCH*

Arthur Matevosyan

Abstract

It is well known that the Christology of the Armenian Church is based on the Christological teaching of St. Cyril of Alexandria. Following St. Cyril, the Armenian Church confirms the invariability and perfection of divine and human natures in Christ. The hypostatic union of Christ does not lead to a change or amalgamation of natures. It admits the union of Christ with God the Father in deity and with us in humanity. Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, is a perfect God and a perfect man, begotten before the ages from the Father according to deity, and for our salvation from Mary the Virgin according to humanity. And therefore, there is one nature of God the Word incarnate, revered together with His flesh in one worship. This is what the Armenian Church has believed since the 5th century to date. This article will examine the connection of 12 anathematisms contained in the letter of St. Cyril of Alexandria to Nestorius with the Christological teaching of the Armenian Church.

Keywords: Book of letters, St. Cyril, Nestorius, Apollinarius, the Word, Christ, the Holy Virgin, Armenian Church, anathematism, heresy.

The problem of the relation between the divine and human natures in the incarnate Logos began to worry the Church in the 4th century, at the height of the struggle against Arianism. Of course, the Christological problematic had interested fathers of the Church even earlier; in particular it was relevant during the struggle with the Gnostics, who were convinced Docetists, who denied the reality of the human flesh of Christ, in connection with which St. Irenaeus of Lyon was forced to stress energetically the reality and authenticity of the human nature of the incarnate Son of God. In the 2nd century, however, this was not the case, and it remained unclear how the Savior's human flesh was related to his divine nature. The appearance of the heresy of Apollinarius of Laodicea was a powerful impetus to the further development of the Christological teaching of the Church. He was a supporter of Nicene orthodoxy and a staunch opponent of Origenism and pagan Neoplatonism. This was largely due to the fact that he was an adherent of the Antiochian theological school with its principles of literal exegesis of Holy Scripture, incompatible with the Neoplatonist Alexandrian symbolic exegesis of the Bible. Apollinarius, being a follower of the teaching of St. Athanasius of Alexandria on the consubstantiality of the Father and the Son, thought that this teaching inevitably led to the idea of two Sons of God, one of whom was a Son by nature, and one by adoption. A perfect God and a perfect man can never form a single being, and this, in turn, fun-

* The article was submitted on October 10, 2022. The article was reviewed on October 15, 2022.

damentally undermines the very idea of the Incarnation, which is the basis of Christian soteriology.

Apollinarius, as a typical Hellenist in his way of thinking, could not be satisfied with the opinion of St. Athanasius, according to which the unity of the divine nature of the Logos with the perfect human nature of the Father is not broken, despite the obvious logical contradiction, since in this case we are dealing with the mystery of faith. For Apollinarius, the comprehensibility of the dogmas was an axiom, and so he developed a conception in which, at first sight, both the laws of logic and the principles of Christian soteriology were harmonized. Apollinarius proposed to abandon the notion of the perfection of human nature in Christ. In his view, the Logos was not united in Christ with a full human person, but only with a partial and imperfect one. Christ's human nature had a physical body and animal soul, but it had no self-conscious rational principle, called in Greek *nous*, whose place was taken by the divine Logos [11: 433]. At first sight, Apollinarius' conception had a number of significant advantages. It allowed 1. avoiding the view that there were two Sons -one of God and the other of man; 2. regarding Jesus as an ordinary man on whom the Holy Spirit descended at his baptism at Jordan (the heresy of adoptionism); 3. teaching that the Logos became flesh in the literal sense of the word. Apollinarius felt sure that his conception did not contradict St. Scripture, since it says that "...the Word became flesh," and *nous*, in the context of the ancient philosophical tradition, is not included in the concept of flesh. Certainly, this view should be recognized as erroneous, since the term *sarx* used in the prologue of John's Gospel was nothing more than the Greek equivalent of the Hebrew term *basar*, which, unlike the Greek word, denoted not the purely physical nature of man, but the human person, in the inseparable unity of its material and spiritual aspects. The essence of Apollinarius' Christology was that the incarnation of the Logos is by no means synonymous with His becoming a man, and Christ's human nature is not identical with that of all other men. In view of this, Apollinarius denied the fullness of the human being in the Incarnate Word and maintained that the "mind" was not included in the union and its place was taken by the Word itself, united with the animal body. His concept was strictly in accord with the principles of ancient philosophical thought, but it contradicted Revelation and the Holy Tradition of the Church, according to which Christ was like men in everything except sin, and so his teaching was strongly rejected by the Church. Apollinarius was anathematized at the Second Ecumenical Council in Constantinople, but this did not mean that the theological problem he raised was irrelevant to the Church. On the contrary, it was the focus of Christian theologians for several centuries to come.

The Christological teaching of Apollinarius of Laodicea was most severely criticized by the representatives of the Antiochian theological school, of which he was a representative. Apollinarius was convinced of the unity of the nature of the incarnate Logos, but since he simultaneously insisted on the truth of both divinity and humanity in Christ; the Antiochians concluded from this that Christ had two natures - divine and human. This concept was developed by Diodorus of Tarsus

and Theodore of Mopsuestia. They were both unquestioning supporters of Nicene orthodoxy who did not doubt the incorporeal nature of the Logos, but at the same time they were deeply convinced that Christ had a human self-consciousness along with the divine identity of the Word, which made the Apollinarian teaching that Christ had no human nous entirely unacceptable to them. The Word, in their view, was united in Christ with a full human person, but this union was not substantive. God the Word dwelt in the man Jesus as his temple, and the two natures fully preserved their qualitative features without mixing or merging with each other. According to the Antiochians, there is no substantial hypostatic unity in Christ; the unity of the person of the Word and Jesus was purely moral, and only during His earthly life did it reach such a high level that it became possible to consider the person of Christ as worthy of religious veneration and worship. The Word, for the Antiochian teachers, did not become human; he only became incarnate, and these are two fundamentally different processes. Within the framework of Antiochian Christology, there is no question of any deification of the human nature of Christ, which is essential in orthodox Christianity, because if there is no essential interpenetration of the divine and human natures, then each of them remains itself, without undergoing any change [10: 9]. Their soteriology did not presuppose a radical transformation of human nature by overcoming the sinful corruption of human nature and the resulting corruptibility of human nature, but only the moral improvement of the human person and his gradual approach to God, just as Jesus did under the influence of the Word who dwelt in Him.

The representatives of the Alexandrian school of theology had a very different view of Christology. While the Antiochians based their Christology on the image of Christ as depicted in the Synoptic Gospels, i.e. with a maximum emphasis on his purely human features, the Alexandrians, and especially their distinguished representative St. Cyril of Alexandria, based their Christology mainly on the Gospel of John, which centers on the Word, who became flesh. This was not accidental, for St. Cyril was deeply convinced that only God could be the subject of the salvation process. No human being, even one with such impeccable holiness as Jesus of Nazareth, could break the power of sin and death. God the Word did not simply dwell in the man Jesus, as the Antiochians believed, but became him. Hence St. Cyril's conviction that between God and man in Christ there is not merely a moral unity or interpenetration, but an indissoluble unity, by virtue of which on the cross died not just the holy man in whom the Logos dwelt, but God the Word Himself. For this reason, Virgin Mary is also called the Mother of God, for he who was born to her was not merely a man, but God the Word. It was this latter assertion that was the immediate cause of the theological controversy that led to the convening of the Third Ecumenical Council at Ephesus, at which the Christological teaching of the Antiochian school was condemned. The immediate reason for the beginning of the dispute was the activity of the bishop of Constantinople Nestorius, who in his sermons refused to call Our Lady the Holy Virgin and supposed that she could be called only Mother of Christ. This led to strong opposition from St. Cyril of Alex-

andria, who had been involved in the controversy since early 429. He had earlier rejected the Christology of Nestorius, who refused to attribute to the Word of God the virgin birth and death on the Cross, and thus destroyed the ontological unity of the incarnate Word and with it the Church's doctrine of salvation. The teaching of Nestorius was in his eyes a manifest heresy.

In opposition to Nestorius, St. Cyril taught the use of the term Mother of God in his Easter letter of 429 and in a letter to the monks of Egypt. Nestorius sent his sermons to Pope Celestine, but received no reply as the latter wrote to St. Cyril for more information. For Pope Celestine St. Cyril was the heir to the traditions of St. Athanasius of Alexandria. The pope convened a council and sent a letter to Alexandria with attachments to Constantinople, Philippi, Jerusalem, and Antioch. St. Cyril should assume the authority of the Roman See and warn Nestorius that if he did not renounce within ten days of receiving this ultimatum he would be excommunicated from the Church. This was the decree St. Cyril requested.

St. Cyril was the head of a theological school that rivaled that of Antioch, where Nestorius had studied. Meanwhile, in Constantinople itself, a large number of people kept away from Nestorius, and Emperor Theodosius II was persuaded to convene an Ecumenical Council at Ephesus. The council declared Nestorius deposed and excommunicated. The emperor confirmed the decision of the council; St. Cyril was allowed to return to his diocese, and Nestorius resigned. Later he was exiled to the Great Oasis of Egypt.

The letter of St. Cyril to Nestorius containing his anathematisms was translated into Armenian and was included in the Book of Letters, a medieval Armenian epistolary collection of religious texts, containing documents formulating the faith of the Armenian Apostolic Church and informing about the relations of Armenia with its neighboring countries; for some periods and phenomena this is a unique historical source. The literary genre of epistles, which developed in ancient culture and was popular during the Christian era, has played an important role in making the Book of Epistles popular. The Armenian authors included in the Book of Letters were written in the course of dogmatic disputes to substantiate and strengthen the doctrinal basis of the Armenian Apostolic Church in its struggle for independence and unity. Most of them are directed against Nestorianism and Chalcedonian Orthodoxy. Some of the dogmatic letters are so voluminous that they become almost independent works. Most of them are concerned with the doctrine of the Holy Trinity in the AAC, with the interpretation of the Nicene Creed and especially with the defense of the dogma of the oneness of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. The time when it was compiled and the name of the compiler are unknown. Obviously, the first complete version of the collection was compiled not later than in the 7th century, because the 5th-7th century messages, in contrast to later letters, are classified in a strict chronological order. It is supposed that the Book of Letters began to be collected in the 7th century under Catholicos Komitas Akhtsetsi and that the 1st version of the collection was completed in the 8th century by Catholicos Hovhannes III Odznetsi which was later complemented by new documents. The Book of Letters

contains the works of Armenian, Greek, Syrian, Georgian and other authors. The material is presented in the volume in translations from the original languages into Armenian. Next, we will analyze 12 anathematisms from St. Cyril's letter to Nestorius.

1. "Whoever does not confess that Immanuel is the true God, and therefore the Holy Virgin is the Mother of God, because she bore in the flesh the Word, which is from God and became flesh let him be anathema" [4: 21]. The Alexandrians, and in particular their illustrious representative St. Cyril of Alexandria, based their Christology primarily on the Gospel of John, which is focused on the God-man, the Word, who became flesh. The Antiochians, on the other hand, based their Christology on the image of Christ as depicted in the Synoptic Gospels, that is, with the greatest emphasis on his purely human features. This was not a coincidence because St. Cyril felt sure that only God could be the subject of the process of salvation. No human being could defeat the forces of sin and death, not even one as perfect in holiness as Jesus of Nazareth. Unlike what the Antiochians thought, the Word actually became the man Jesus rather than just dwelt within him. Therefore, St. Cyril was convinced that God and man in Christ had an indissoluble connection that transcends moral unity [7: 184]. As a result, God the Word Himself died on the cross to atone human sins, not only the holy man in whom the Word dwelt. Due to the fact that the man Virgin Mary gave birth to was not a simple man, but rather the Word made flesh, she is referred to as the Mother of God. According to Alexandrian thought, the Word adopted the entirety of human nature, yet his divine nature remained untouched. Contrary to the Antiochians, the Alexandrians never compared the human nature of Christ to the temple where the Word dwelt, and for them the divine and human natures of Christ are inseparably united as a result of the incarnation. The renowned Christological formula of St. Cyril of Alexandria, "The One Nature of God the Incarnate Word," which sparked impetuous theological controversy after the Council of Chalcedon, was derived from this.

2. "Whoever does not confess that the Word, being of God the Father, is united to the flesh hypostatically, and that therefore Christ is one with his flesh, that is, one and the same is God and man together, let him be anathema" [4:22]. This thesis opposes Nestorianism, which separated Christ into the Son of God and the Son of Man and established a merely moral but not substantial union between the two [7: 132]. Since the Church holds that Christ is One, Nestorianism in any form is heresy. Although Nestorius was a member of the Antiochian school of theology, it would be incorrect to blame his heresy proceeding from this fact. Numerous outstanding Orthodox theologians, including St. John Chrysostom, came from this school. Diodorus of Tarsus and Theodore of Mopsuestia, two of the Antiochian school's biggest exponents, had no desire to be heretics. Their understanding of Revelation was essentially historical, free of the philosophical speculations that typified Alexandrian interpretation. The reason for this thesis was not so much their inability to think philosophically. They just were convinced that since religious truths are totally transcendent, they are outside the scope of human cognitive

abilities. They held that the whole of human nature incorporated by the Word played a key role in the history of our redemption, even though they did not disagree in the slightest with the Nicene orthodoxy, which upheld God the Word's incorporeal essence. They prioritized Jesus' human traits over his divinity in their interpretations of the New Testament, placing a greater emphasis on the former. Although they drew no heretical implications from this argument, they had to do so logically because they considered the relationship between humanity and deity in Christ as akin to the temple in which God dwells. According to Antiochian Christology, Virgin Mary could not be referred to as the Mother of God because the child she bore was just the temple of God and not God made flesh. The danger of Nestorianism, however, rested more in its misunderstandings of the nature of salvation delivered by Jesus Christ than in its inaccuracies regarding the role of Virgin Mary. In contrast to the indwelling Word, who only contributed to redemption, according to Nestorius and his teachers, salvation was completed by the human Jesus. This argument directly contradicted the teaching of St. Cyril of Alexandria and the entire apostolic tradition, which held that a simple man, even the most perfect one, is evidently incapable of salvation; only God could be the subject of it.

3. "Whoever in one Christ, after the union (of the natures), divides the persons, uniting them only by a union of dignity, that is, in will or in power, and not, better, by a union consisting in the union of the natures, let him be anathema" [4: 22]. According to Nestorius' teaching, the unity of the Person in the Lord Jesus Christ is achieved by the union of the two natures - divine and human. He deemed that without their respective persons, the natures are not possible. Both the Word and man contribute to this union of two natures, each from their own sides. The natures remain as they are, but the persons are united to create a "person of connection" that is neither the person of the Word nor the person of man, but rather a composite person made up of both [7: 157]. Mankind uses the person of Godhead, and Godhead uses the person of humanity. This internal harmony is not the result of the union of the Divine Person with the human person. They continue to exist in some way as persons subservient to the person of Christ, of whom they are integral parts. Scripture calls Him the Son, the Christ, the Lord, sometimes according to the Person of the Godhead and sometimes according to the Person of humanity. The person of the Word and the person of man are subordinate to the person of Christ, of whom they are essential components.

4. "Whoever of the sayings of the Gospels and the Apostles, whether used by the saints about Christ or by Himself about Himself, relates separately to two persons or hypostases, and applies some of them to man, whom he presents as distinct from the Word of God, and others, as God-appropriate, to the Word of God the Father alone, let him be anathema" [4: 22]. Nestorius deemed that although Christ appears to us in the Gospel as one Person, He is actually two persons - divine and human. He is only one Person in respect to the outside observer. Although Nestorius never asserted that Christ has two persons, his entire style of thinking demonstrates that he believed Christ to have a second hypostatic center that is distinct

from the Hypostasis of God the Word. As a result, it seemed as though the relationship between the Son of God and the Son of Mary was only moral, much like that which existed between God and the pious in the Old Testament. St. Cyril of Alexandria advanced the hypostatic, or physical unity, theory in opposition to Nestorius. In Christ, according to St. Cyril, divinity and humanity were hypostatically connected, just as a person's soul and body are. This unique sort of unity necessitates the mutual communication and penetration of natures within a single Hypostasis. Speaking of any specific individual person in Christ is improper in the eyes of St. Cyril. The Second Person of the Most Holy Trinity, the Son of God, is the sole "I" who exists in Christ. In the first person, Christ identifies as both God and man. The subject of all the activities and states of the God-man is the Second Person of the Most Holy Trinity, also known as God the Word. One single subject, identical to the Second Person of the Most Holy Trinity, exists in Christ. There is no special human subject in Him.

5. "Whoever dares to call Christ God-bearing man, and not, better, true God, as one Son (with the Father) in nature, since the Word became flesh and came near to us, having taken our flesh and blood (Hebrews 2:14), let him be anathema" [4: 22]. According to St. Cyril, the Word who was born of God merged with our nature by uniting without confusion what belonged to both natures [11: 408]. As a result, He is conceived of not only as a man who carries the Godhead but also as God Incarnate, who took on human form and was born of the Holy Virgin. We should always keep in mind that the Word became flesh rather than saying that the Word dwelt in the man who was born of a woman.

6. "Whoever dares to say that the Word of God the Father is God or the Lord of Christ, rather than confessing, rather, that He Himself is God and also man, since, according to the Scriptures (John 1:14), the Word became flesh, let him be anathema" [4: 22]. Only when the divinity of the Word is acknowledged in conjunction with the human nature of Jesus does all Christian teaching about the God-man make sense. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to view God as Triune rather than simply One, as Jews and Muslims do. Additionally, the divine Hypostases must be seen as having one essence and being of an equal degree of perfection, between which there can be no subordination of any type. The Son is the same God as the Father, and all of the qualities that define Deity are equally his. The only-begotten Son cannot in any way be viewed as a result of the Father's act of will, despite the fact that the Father is the cause of the Son's Being. It is an enduring and indescribable generation that unavoidably occurs in the divine Essence. At the First Ecumenical Council of Nicaea, which blended biblical monotheism and the New Testament revelation of the existence of three hypostases of God, the notion of consubstantiality was created in order to defend the divinity of Christ and hence the truth of His salvific mission. The introduction of this term into orthodox theology required some effort on the part of the council participants. This word was compromised by the heretic Paul of Samosata, who used it to refer to the lack of separation between the Father and the Son, which was utterly unacceptable for the

Church, in addition to missing from the New Testament. It should be acknowledged that the Arians also disapproved of Paul of Samosata's doctrine, but they did so from a different position than the orthodox. The essence and hypostasis in God were also identical for them, and as there is one essence in God, so there is also one hypostasis, namely, the hypostasis of God the Father. Hence the conclusion that the Son had a different essence from the Father, and was therefore a creature. In so doing, the Arians denied the doctrine of the Trinity, and in fact destroyed the dogmatic basis of Christianity. To counterbalance this pernicious heresy, the Church Fathers put forward the idea of the real distinction of the three Hypostases in God. The whole Christian doctrine of the God-man makes sense only if the divinity of the Word, united with the human nature of Jesus, is recognized [11: 219].

7. "Whoever says that Jesus as a man was an instrument of the actions of God the Word and is surrounded by the glory of the only begotten as existing apart from Him let him be anathema" [4: 22]. St. Cyril, in complete accordance with Apostolic Tradition, resolutely breaks with the tendency inherent in the Antiochian theological school to rationalize Christian dogma, which vividly manifested itself in the Nestorian heresy, and states a super-reasonable understanding of Christological dogma that can be perceived only by an act of faith but is not open to rationalist speculation. First of all, St. Cyril emphasizes the natural, even bodily, unity of divinity and humanity in Christ, which enabled the salvation and deification of all mankind, in addition to their moral connection in Christ [8: 55]. Paradoxically, by this, the divine and human natures remained separate and distinct, rather than merged.

8. "Whoever dares to say that the man who has been received by God must be worshipped together with God the Word, must glorify him together with him, and call him God together, as one in another, and not honor Immanuel with one worship and sing him one praise, since the Word became flesh, let him be anathema" [4: 22-23]. St. Cyril of Alexandria claims that the God-man is one and not two, and that his single self-consciousness is the self-consciousness of the Word. He bases this claim on the unity of Christ's Hypostasis. If there is only one person, it must be the Word, not man, for two reasons: first, the Word was before man and could not be abolished as Person, and second, the Word was a part of the God-man from His very nature. In doing so, the Word absorbed all that the human nature of Christ experienced into the oneness of his Hypostasis: the body, the animal soul, and the intelligent spirit of man became the Word's body, soul, and spirit.

9. "Whoever says that the only Lord Jesus Christ is glorified by the Spirit in the sense that He enjoyed a power as if alien to Him and from Him received power to overcome unclean spirits and perform divine signs in people, rather than considering His own Spirit, through whom He performed miracles, let him be anathema" [4: 23]". In this passage, St. Cyril denounces the heresy of adoptionism. Some Christians, such as Theodotus the Leatherman, attempted to interpret Christian monotheism from a Greek philosophical standpoint in the second century while denying that Jesus Christ is God. According to them, the piousness and personal holiness of

the man Jesus of Nazareth led to his adoption as the Son of God during his baptism in Jordan. Although this spirit is not viewed as God's own Hypostasis as in the later theology of the Trinity, God still bestowed him with its power.

10. "The divine Scripture says that Christ was the High Priest and the intercessor of our confession, that He offered Himself for us as a pleasing fragrance to God and the Father. Whoever therefore says that it was not God the Word Himself who was our High Priest and our intercessor, when He became flesh and man like us, but as if He were another and distinct from Him, descended from a woman; or whoever says that He offered Himself as an offering for Himself, not for us alone, since, knowing no sin, He had no need of an offering for Himself, let him be anathema" [4: 23]. Here again St. Cyril rejects the dualistic Christology of the Antiochian school, of which Nestorius was the spokesman.

11. "Whoever does not confess that the flesh of the Lord is life-giving and proper, belonging to the Word of God the Father Himself, but belongs as though to another person distinct from Him and united to Him in dignity, that is, has only divine (in itself) habitation, and does not confess, as we said, that His flesh is life-giving, since it has become proper to the Word who can life-giving everything, let him be anathema". One particular aspect of St. Cyril's Christology is the idea of natural, physical sanctification via the Son, in the Son, and in Him alone. St. Cyril definitely refers to the sanctification we obtain by partaking in the Eucharist when he talks about bodily sanctification [9: 237]. Even after ascending to Heaven in the flesh, Christ sanctifies us using His Eucharistic Body as a kind of tool. The only way God, who is holiness and life, is united with the flesh of Christ and gives it life is through this union. Because the Lord's physical body was sanctified by the force of the Word that was united with it, it is efficacious for us in the sacramental blessing, the Eucharist, and can therefore give its holiness to us as well.

12. "Whoever does not confess that God the Word was suffered in the flesh, crucified in the flesh, accepted death in the flesh, and finally became the firstborn from the dead, because He is life and life-giving as God, let him be anathema" [4: 24]. According to St. Cyril, the Incarnation was God's physical manifestation. Due to the name's connotation, he frequently refers to Christ as Emmanuel ("God is with us"). Christ is not only a divinity wearing a human body; rather, he is God Incarnate because God the Word is joined with our nature. Thus, the human essence that Christ received does not exist independently, but is in His divine Hypostasis, being most closely united in Him. His Christological teaching excludes any form of Docetism. This heresy, gnostic in its origin, was revived in the 6th-7th centuries, when some followers of the famous monophysite bishop Julian of Halicarnassus confused the principle of the one nature of the incarnate Word with the absence of His perfect human nature, which inevitably led to the denial of the fullness of His incarnation. For them, the Christological formula "one nature" actually meant that Christ had only one - divine - nature. Although, unlike the Gnostics, they never denied the incarnation of the Logos, they believed that His body was so closely intertwined with His divine nature that it was stripped of all the qualities

inherent in human nature. As a result, they came to the same conclusion as the Gnostics: Christ did not have a real human body. This heresy had numerous followers in Armenia. The most famous of the Armenian docetists was Sargis of Mairagom, the pupil of the famous vardapet John of Mairagom, who later banished his pupil who fell into heresy. Teodoros Krtenavor and Khosrovik the Translator wrote against Sargis of Mairagom and his supporters, but the decisive role in the ideological defeat of Docetism was played by one of the most prominent Armenian theologians, Catholicos St. John of Odzun, who is the author of the treatise "Against Docetists". According to him, the source of the Docetists' delusions was their misunderstanding of the principle of "the one nature of Christ". For him, as well as for the whole Armenian Apostolic Church, the indivisibility does not mean either identification of human and divine natures in Christ, or their mixing and mutual separation. The unity of God and man has here a wholly unspeakable and mystical character, it is identity in difference, and difference in identity [6: 128]. "For concerning this the eyes of the mind of all Christ-lovers are enlightened, that the nature of the flesh and of the Word are one not because of the identity of the natures, for both of them are neither human nor divine. Neither the flesh descended from heaven, according to the former nonsense of Eutyches, nor did God the Word arise from Mary, as it seemed to Photinus, but the uncreated Word descended from the most uncreated Father and put on the flesh received from the Virgin's womb" [12: 50].

Conclusion

The Armenian Church's conception of Christ is renowned for its coherence and persuasiveness. It regards Christ as the heavenly Word who took on a perfect human nature. The purpose of the Incarnation is to save the world. It was done by God in and by the incorporation of Him into actual human life. God the Son, by whom the world was created, was incarnate for the salvation of the world. The incarnate Son, Jesus Christ, is the Mediator between God and man. As related to the eternal God and to created man, He is the one and only Savior of the world. He is the second Adam, in whom the human race is recreated, the firstborn of a new humanity, who will remain forever as its Head. In being united with human nature, God the Son gave Himself as Mediator between God and man, becoming perfect God and perfect man. As God, He is an uninterrupted continuation of God the Son and, through Him, of the Holy Trinity; and as man, the same is an uninterrupted continuation of the whole human race, since in Him is individualized the whole human nature in its perfection. Inasmuch as He is individualized in His perfection, He represents each human being personally and the human race as a whole. Any attempts to rational explanation of this great mystery of faith are doomed to failure because after the incarnation, the divine and human natures in Christ formed an ineffable unity without mixing or merging. The mind is unable to comprehend the inseparable unity of ontological opposites, each of which still retains the fullness of its qualities. For the Son of God to be free from the effects of original sin, the

Word was incarnated from the Holy Virgin, whose nature had previously been purified by the Holy Spirit. The human essence of Jesus and the divine nature of the Word were inseparably merged at the moment of the Immaculate Conception, creating what St. Cyril of Alexandria called “the one nature of the incarnate God-Word” from the very beginning. That this Christological formula has nothing to do with the Eutychian heresy, which really acknowledges in Christ only one, divine nature and rejects that Christ is consubstantial to us in humanity, should be reiterated forcefully. Theological ideas in Armenia developed from the fourth century to the end of the 5th century, but they did not include the adoption of the theory of the division of the two natures of Christ, which was established in 451 at the Council of Chalcedon. In these formulations, the Armenians saw an expression of Nestorianism. The Armenian Church is not a Monophysite in the sense commonly given to the concept. Monotheism is often understood as the recognition of the only one divine nature of Christ with the near-complete disappearance of His human nature, which, according to Eutychius, had lost His divinity, “like a drop of honey in the ocean”. The Christological nature of the Armenian Church, according to the teaching of Saint Cyril of Alexandria, can be expressed in one sentence: after the Word became flesh, one can speak only of one nature. When St. Cyril spoke of the “one nature of God the Word incarnate”, he emphasized that the Word had not abandoned His nature or undergone any loss or diminution in His Hypostasis. The term “incarnation” refers to the taking of flesh by the Word from the Virgin, whereby from the two natures, that is, Deity and humanity, one Christ came forth from the Virgin. He is both God and man, consubstantial with God the Father in Deity and consubstantial with us in humanity.

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Ս. ԿՅՈՒՐԵՂ ԱԼԵՔՍԱՆԴՐԱՅՈՒ 12 ՆՁՈՎՔՆԵՐԸ ԵՎ ՀԱՅՈՑ ԵԿԵՂԵՑՈՒ ՔՐԻՍՏՈՍԱԲԱՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ

Արթուր Մաթևոսյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ Գիրք թղթոց, Ս Կյուրեղ, Նեստոր, Ապողինար, Բան, Քրիստոս, Սուրբ Կոյս, Հայոց Եկեղեցի, նզովք, հերձված:

Հայտնի է, որ Հայոց եկեղեցու քրիստոսաբանությունը հիմնված է Կյուրեղ Ալեքսանդրացու քրիստոսաբանական վարդապետության վրա: Կյուրեղին հետևելով՝ Հայ Եկեղեցին հաստատում է Քրիստոսում աստվածային և մարդկային բնությունների անփոփոխությունն ու կատարելությունը: Քրիստոսի անձի միությունը չի հանգեցնում բնությունների փոփոխության կամ միաձուլման: Այն ընդունում է Քրիստոսի միությունը Հայր Աստծո հետ աստվածության մեջ և մեզ հետ՝ մարդկության մեջ: Հիսուս Քրիստոսը՝ Աստծո միաձին Որդին, կատարյալ Աստված է և կատարյալ մարդ, որը ծնվել է դարերից առաջ՝ ըստ աստվածության, և մեր փրկության համար՝ ըստ մարդկության՝ Մարիամ Կոյսից: Եվ, հետևաբար, գոյություն ունի Աստծո մարմնացյալ Բանի մեկ բնություն: Այս հողվածում քննարկվում է Կյուրեղ Ալեքսանդրացու Նեստորին ուղղված նամակում պարունակվող 12 նզովքների կապը Հայոց եկեղեցու քրիստոսաբանական վարդապետության հետ:

Կյուրեղի նամակը Նեստորին, որը պարունակում էր իր նզովքները, թարգմանվել է հայերեն և ընդգրկվել «Գիրք թղթոցում»՝ կրոնական տեքստերի միջնադարյան հայկական ժողովածուում, որը պարունակում է փաստաթղթեր, որոնք ձևակերպում են Հայ առաքելական եկեղեցու հավատքը և տեղեկացնում Հայաստանի հարևան երկրների հետ հարաբերությունների մասին. որոշ ժամանակաշրջանների և երևույթների համար սա եզակի պատմական աղբյուր է: Թղթերի գրական ժանրը, որը զարգացել է անտիկ մշակույթում և տարածված է եղել քրիստոնեական դարաշրջանում, կարևոր դեր է խաղացել «Գիրք թղթոցի» հանրաճանաչության գործում: «Գիրք թղթոցում» ընդգրկված հայ հեղինակները գրվել են դոգմատիկ վեճերի ընթացքում՝ Հայ առաքելական եկեղեցու դավանաբանական դիրքորոշումը հիմնավորելու և ամրապնդելու համար: Դրանց մեծ մասն ուղղված է նեստորականության և քաղկեդոնականության դեմ: Որոշ դոգմատիկ թղթերն այնքան ծավալուն են, որ դառնում են գրեթե ինքնուրույն ստեղծագործություններ: Նրանցից շատերը նվիրված են ՀԱԵ-ում Սուրբ Երրորդության վարդապետությանը, Նիկիական դավանանքի մեկնաբանությանը և հատկապես Որդու մի բնության դավանանքի շտապանությանը: Անհայտ է այն կազմելու ժամանակը և կազմողի անունը: Ակնհայտ է, որ ժողովածուի առաջին ամբողջական տարբերակը կազմվել է ոչ ուշ, քան 7-րդ դարում, քանի որ 5-7-րդ դարերի հաղորդագրությունները՝ ի տարբերություն հետագա թղթերի, դասակարգված են խիստ ժամանակագրական հաջորդականությամբ: Ենթադրվում է, որ «Գիրք թղթոցը» սկսել է կազմվել 7-րդ դարում Կոմիտաս Աղցեցի կաթողիկոսի օրոք, իսկ ժողովածուի 1-ին տարբերակը լրացրել է 8-րդ դարում Հովհաննես Գ Օձնեցին կաթողիկոսը, որը հետագայում ևս լրացվել է. «Գիրք թղթոցում» գետեղված են հայ, հույն, ասորի, վրացի և այլ հեղինակների ստեղծագործություններ: Նյութը ներկայացված է բնօրինակ լեզուներից հայերեն թարգմանություններով:

XALA, ĞALLA, QĀLĀN: DISCUSSING MEDIEVAL TAX TERMS**Gor Margaryan***Abstract**

The purpose of the study is to explore the origin and meaning of the term խալ ալ - xala, to identify the peculiarities of its application in the Armenian historical milieu, and to define at least approximately the chronological boundaries when the tax was in use in medieval Armenia. *Xala* became known mostly from epigraphic records of Armenia, where the term is mentioned in the immunity donations, in the instructions and references to the exemption of churches from tax obligations and from taxes, including xala. The paper will address all well-known explanations of the term, along with a comparative analysis with the Georgian historical environment, with the fiscal system of medieval Georgia, and, on the other hand, based on the analysis of source studies and definition of the etymology of the term and the phenomenon, a new definition of the term and answers to the above questions related to xala will be proposed as a hypothesis.

Keywords: xala, ğalla, qālān, medieval, tax, Armenia, Chaliphate, Kartli, epigraphic records.

Initially, the term is known in the form xala (conjugated xal[a]ē) from epigraphic records of 1036 (Ani): «...արդ տուաք որմով եւ ծառովք պտղաբերովք ու անպտղովք եւ խոտագետնովք եւ գ. Աւր ջուր ազատ ի խալաւէ (...and gave the walls, and the woods fertile and barren, and three days of water free from xala)», 1267 (Talin) «...զիմ հայրենիք զԹալնայ զինոյ խալէն (...xala on wine from my hometown Talin)» 1273 (Mren), «...եւ պարոն Սահմադինս ազատեցի զսուրբ ուխտին Արջվառճոյ այգիքն Մրենո եւ Աւշակն ի խալայ եւ յերրորդ հարկէ (I, lord Sahmadin, have exempted (for the church) the gardens of Mren and Oshakan from xala and the third tax)», 1288-1289 (Mren) «...թողաք զեզեց զինոյ եւ խաղողի խալէն (and left (exempted from taxation) the xala for gardens and wine)», 1336 «որ ինձ բաժին էր հասել զխալինը դաւանին (that I obtained as xala (proceeds) from the qalan (from the tribute))» (Tanah at monastery) [1: 20, 111, 116, 130; 2: 48; 3: 80].

Among the studies of the economic life of medieval Armenia, two main trends have emerged to interpret the term. The first theory holds that the xala is a distorted form of the tax term qālān. Other researchers simply state that it is a tax on wine, vineyards, orchards, fields and water. Apparently, the interpretation of khala as a tax on grapes and vineyards was so strong that even the version of the origin of the

* The article was submitted on October 23, 2022. The article was reviewed on November 13, 2022.

term from the Armenian word խաղող - *xağoğ* (grapes) was considered [4: 183]. T. Avdalbegyan explained xala as a tax on wine, vineyards and gardens, and he considered that xala comes from a distorted form of the taxation term qālān (in Arm. xalan). This view is reiterated by some researchers of the economic life of medieval Armenia [5: 395; 6: 77-78]. S. Hakobyan confirms Avdalbegyan's version and identifies khal with qalan, and, also based on the epigraphic record of 1036, he considers khal to be a tax for water. However, the author distorts the term by reading qalan instead of xala in a 1036 donation epigraphic record of Catholicos Petros: "and fruitful and barren trees, and the fields and 3 days of water (released) from qalan" (ջուր ազատ ի խալանէ) instead of reading "and trees fruitful and barren, and fields and 3 days of water (released) from xala" (ջուր ազատ ի խալաւէ) [7: 84, 90].

Manandian offers a different interpretation of this term, and this version is further repeated in the studies by other researchers. Manandyan briefly mentions the xala, explaining it as a tax on vineyards, on wine and grapes. It is noted that in the Georgian environment the same tribute is known under the term kulukhi (კულუხი). According to Manandyan, xala was known in Armenia since the period of the Bagratids Kingdom, which is of course correct, as the first mention of xala occurred in the late Bagratids period, but we would like to further precise it by offering the following version: xala became known from the late Bagratids period, starting from the first half of the 11th century [8: 282].

Qālān as a tax term (as a form of service to the lord) has been known in Armenia and Georgia since the Mongol period (from the first half of the 13th century), as the Armenian chronicler Grigor Aknere'i mentions: «...իւրեանց հեծելովք գնացին ընդ նոսա ի խալան» (...and went with their cavalry to serve (xalan) them (the Mongols)) [9: 11]. Later, under the Mongol rule, the term qalan came to mean a tax from the cultivated land and the settled population, or a land grant and a synonym for kharaj, although, as I. Petrushevsky rightly observes, the character of the khalan remains unclear [10: 382]. In the Georgian historical milieu already in the later Middle Ages, qalan (ყალან) is mentioned as a synonym for begara. Kalan could mean tax in general, as can be seen, for example, from the decrees (yarliq) of the Khan of the Golden Horde Timur Qutluğ [11: 5]. According to L. Budagov, this term comes from the Altaic qālān with the general meaning of tribute, tax and duty [12: 21].

Our assumption is that the correct interpretation of the term is suggested by the Arabic word ġalla. Ġalla is translated from Arabic in a general sense as harvest, income from the harvest, proceeds, as a corn/grain/fruits [13: 262], and as a rent of the fields [14: 407]. The collection and taxation of the harvest, that is the gathering of ġalla, has further associated ġalla-harvest with tribute, and not surprisingly, ġalla is further found and acts as a synonym for kharaj. Accordingly, the term kharaj (land tax, tax), along with synonyms darība (tax in general) and rasm (tax, levies), is explained by the term ġalla [15: 210].

As a confirmation of our theory about the interpretation of xala as ġalla, the presence of the same tax in the Georgian medieval historical milieu is of great help. The study of the meaning of ġalla began as early as in the 19th century. For example, in his early works Marie Brosse writes about ġala as a tax not on crops, without elaboration [16: 48], but in his later works he already explains ġala as a tax on wheat, barley, cotton, among others [17: clxxi]. Ġala in the sense of a tax on the harvest is also explained by Kalantarov in his work, without any clarifications [18: 37]. Ġala was equally interpreted as a tithe from the harvest.

In late medieval Georgia ġala was known as a natural tax, one that was levied on wheat, barley, cotton, i.e. on the harvest. In Medieval Georgia ġala was a tax on grain [19: 24], which was levied at the rate of 1/10 of the harvest [20: 8]. Also note that in the territory of Armenia ġala is mentioned in one Georgian-language inscription as well [21: 56-64].

This is confirmed in the decree of King of Kartli Luarsab I (1527-1556) to the monastery of Sion “...მოვიდა და ისაჯა თქუჴნისა საყდრისა მპყრობელი, კაცი სათნო ღუთისა, ტფილელ მთავარეპისკოპოზი დომენტი, პირველ გაშვებულობისა დათარხნობისა სიგელნი მოგუართუნა და აწ ჩუენ კუალად განვაახლედ და შემოგწირეთ და მოგახსენეთ ღალა პურისა და ზამბისა...and a God-pleasing man, the abbot of your monastery, Archbishop Domenti of Tiflis, came and presented the immunity documents given earlier, and we renewed these decrees and gave the Sion monastery a gall from grain and from cotton” [22: 8].

The amount of collection, collection of ġala was not stable in Georgia and largely depended on the natural and climatic conditions of the region. For example, it is known that the gala was levied at the rate of one kodi per one-day plowed area of land.

Conclusions

- First and foremost, we do not deem it possible to identify xala (խալ ալ) with qalan (قَالَان, խալ աւն , ყალანი) as different forms of the same word or its distorted form. In addition, it is impossible to assert the similarity of the two versions because of the phonetic similarity only, and, most importantly, qalan, a tax obligation known from the Mongol period from the first half of the 13th century, could not be known in the 11th century.

- In the Armenian environment the term xala comes to be known from the early 11th century and continues to exist (be mentioned) in the fiscal system of Armenia until the end of the first half of the 14th century. Later mentions of xala are not known. The area of xala distribution is exclusively eastern Armenia.

- The etymology of the term and the phenomenon of xala should be sought from the Arab environment; xala should be identified with ġalla (غَلَّة); xala implied a tax on the harvest in general. That xala may have been a general term for a tax is evidenced by the fact that xala was also a tax on water, , and nd further in the

Armenian environment it meant in a narrow sense, a tax on the harvest from vineyards, from wine and gardens, from water. As for the question of the Arabic ġalla transforming ġalla into xala (from Ġ (ġ) into X (ħ)), there are vivid examples of borrowed proper names, such as Ġutlu-Shah and Xutlu-Arslan, Ġlitch-Arslan and Xlitch-Arslan, and so on.

- Through the study of the Georgian gala tax and based on the fact that gala did not have the same meaning and could mean both the grain tax (mostly) and the harvest tax (e.g. cotton harvest), we can state that the Armenian xala (խալ ալ) and Georgian ġala (ღალა) have the same origin deriving from the Arab environment and almost the same meaning in their application; ġala in Georgia in the narrow sense is a grain tax, whereas xala is a wine and vineyard tax.

[illegible]

Ի՛նչեք։ Թո՛ղիպանե՛ս չՀԱՅՈՑ ե՛ի Ի՛մե՛ծԱ՛-
 փԱ՛ն/ ԹԱԳԱ՛ՌՈՐՈՒԹԵԱ՛Ն չԶԱ՛Խ Ե՛ի ՏԻԵ՛-
 ԶԵՐԱԿԱ՛Լ ՍՄԲԱ՛Տ/Ա, ՈՐԴԻ՛Ո ԳԱԳԿԱ՛ չՀԱՅՈՑ
 Ե՛ի ՎԻՍՑ Ե՛ԱՉՀԱՅՆԵԱ՛ՀԻ. ԿԱՄ Ե՛ԿԵ/ Ի՛նչ
 ՏԵԱ՛ՌՆ ՊԵՏՐՈՍԻ՛ չՀԱՅՈՑ ԿԱԹ՛ՈՂԻԿՈՍԻ՛ ՏԱ՛Լ
 ԶԱՅԳԻ՛Ն ԱՇԽԿԻ՛ ՈՐ/ Ի՛ ՄԵՐ ԿՈՐԴ՛Ո ԱՐԿԱ՛Ծ
 Է՛Ր ԴՐԻՍՏՈՍԱՍԵՐ՛ ՄԱՐԶՊԱ՛ՆԻՆ ԱՊԼՂԱՐԻ՛-
 ՊԱ ՈՐԴԻ՛Ո ԳՐԻ/ԳՈՐՈ ՊԱՀ՛ԼԱՒԻՆՈ՛ ՎԱՍ՛Ն
 ԱՌԱՒԵ՛Լ ՍԻՐՈՅ՛Ն Ե՛ի ԵՐԱԽՏԵԱ՛ՅՆ ԶՈՐ/ Ե՛Ա-
 ՌԱԵԱ՛Լ Է՛Ր ԶՍՈՒՐԻ ԼՈՒՍԱՒՈՐԶԻ՛ ԱԹՈՒՍ։
 ԱՐԴ ՏՈՒԱ՛Բ ՈՐՄՈ՛Վ Ե՛ի/ Ե՛ԱՌՈ՛Վ։ Բ ՊՏՂԱ՛.
 ԲԵՐՈՎ։ Բ Ե՛ի ԱՆՊՏՂԱ՛Բ Ե՛ի ԽՈՏԱԳԵՏՆՈ՛Վ։
 Ե՛ի ։ Բ։ ԱՒ ԶՈՒՐ ԱԶԱ՛Տ Ե՛ի ԽԱ՛ԼԱ՛Լ Ե՛ի Ի ԳԵՂ՛-
 ԶԼ Ե՛ԱՄԵՆԱ՛ՅՆ չՀԱՍՈՒՅ/ Ե՛ի ԳՐԵՑԱ՛Բ ՄԵ՛-
 Ե՛ԱԻ չՀԱՍՏԱՏՈՒԹԵԱՒԻ ԶԿՏԱԿՍ ԶԱՅԱ՛/ ԻՍԿ
 ՆԱ ԸՆԵԱՅԵԱՅՈ՛ ԶՅԻՐ ՇԻՆԵԱ՛Լ ԵԿԵՂԵՑԻՍ Ի
 ՍՈՒՐԻ ԹՐԿԻԶՍ/ ԲԱԺԱԿԻ ՎԱՍ՛Ն ԹՐԿԱԿԱ՛Ն
 ԽՈՐՀՐԴՈՅ՛Ն ՅԻՇԱՏԱ՛Լ չՀՈԳՐՈ Ի՛ՐՈ։ ԱՐԴ
 ԵԹԵ ՈՒ ԶԱՊԱՐԱ՛ՆՍԴ ԶՈՐ ՇԻՆԵԱ՛Լ Ե՛ ԱՊԼՂ-
 ԱՐԻՊԱ՛ ԱՌ/ ՍՈՒՐԻ ԹՐԿԶԻՍ Ե՛ ԿԱՄ ԶՈՐ
 Ի՛նչ ՏՈՒԵԱ՛Լ Է՛ Ի ՊԵՏԱ ԵԿԵՂԵՑՈՅԻ՛ Ե՛/ ՈՐՈ՛-
 ՇԷ՛ ՈՒ Ե՛ի ԿԱՄ ԶԱՊԱՐԱ՛ՆՍԴ ԲՆԱԿԻ Ե՛

[illegible]

Epigraphic record from Ani dating to 1036, excerpt from the Divan of Epigraphic Records [2: 48].

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«ԽԱԼԱ, ՂԱԼԼԱ, ԽԱԼԱՆ» ՄԻՋՆԱԴԱՐՅԱՆ ՀԱՐԿԱՆՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ ՔՆՆՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՇՈՒՐՋ

Գոռ Մարգարյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ Խալա, ղալլա, խալան, միջնադարյան, հարկեր, Հայաստան, խալիֆայություն, Քարթլի, վիմագիր արձանագրություններ:

Հոդվածի շրջանակներում փորձ է կատարվում ստուգաբանել Հայաստանում զարգացած միջնադարում գանձվող խալա(յ) հարկատեսակի ծագումը, կիրառությունը և բացատրել գանձման մեխանիզմները: Սակավ հայտնի այս հարկատեսակը պատմությանը ծանոթ է վիմագիր արձանագրություններից և հետազոտողների կողմից տարբեր մեկնաբանությունների առիթ է տվել, նույնացվել է հնչողությամբ նման այլ հարկատեսակների հետ կամ ներկայացվել են դրա մոտավոր կիրառությունը և հարկման օբյեկտները: Արաբական տիրապետության շրջանից հայտնի և միջնադարյան Վրաստանում կիրառություն գտած ղալա հարկի զուգահեռ ներկայացմամբ ու ստուգաբանությամբ փորձ է կատար-

վում բացահայտել այս հարկի իրական բնույթը և տեսակը հայկական միջավայրում՝ քննելով նախկինում հայտնված տեսակետները և ստուգաբանությունների անհամապատասխանությունները և անճշտությունները: Հոդվածում որպես եզրակացություն առաջ է քաշվում այն թեզը, որ հայկական միջավայրում 11-14-րդ դարերում հայտնի դարձած խալան ծագում է արաբական ղալա ձևից, կիրառությամբ և նշանակությամբ մոտ է վրացական ղալա հարկանվանը, և կասկածելի ու թյուր է այն տեսակետը, երբ խալան նույնացվում է մոնղոլական շրջանից հայտնի կալան/խալան հարկանվան հետ:

A FRAGMENT OF AN UNKNOWN ARMENIAN HOMILETIC COLLECTION FROM THE GEORGIAN NATIONAL CENTRE OF MANUSCRIPTS*

Dali Chitunashvili

Abstract

In the Armenian manuscripts fund of the Georgian National Centre of Manuscripts there is preserved a Gospel, which paleographically dates back to the 15th century [10:238].

The Gospel was restored in the 60s of the 20th century, and the fragments of the authentic leather cover are preserved. In the course of the restoration, it appears that two sheets of parchment used as flyleaves have been removed. The parchment fragments are horizontally cut parts of a single sheet and attract attention from both paleographical and textual perspectives.

Before being cut, the size of the fragment was 320x210, but even this does not reflect the original size of the parchment sheet, since only one column survives in the fragment, that too incompletely, and the manuscript must have been written in at least two columns.

In the fragment preserved today, the size of the column is 115 mm, the distance between the columns is 20 mm, there are 22 lines in the column, the distance between the lines is 10 mm, the bottom margin is 110 mm, and the right margin is 82 mm.

Keywords: Armenian manuscripts; Armenian Homiletic Collection; Georgian National Centre of Manuscripts; Homiliarium of Mush; Gospel.

The text is written in angular, italic *Erkatagir*; the uncial graphemes are several times larger than plain graphemes and exceed the column; a punctus on the line is used as a sign of separation; In the deciphered text, there is only one word abbreviated - the God (Մ~Ծ). Palaeographically, the manuscript leaves two impressions: in the outline of the letters, it is close to the Lazarian Gospel [9:124], although the graphemes are inclined, which reminds us of manuscripts of the 10th century [9:132]. Most of the graphemes are written between two parallel lines; the vertical lines of *Kan* and *Par* exceed the lines, the vertical lines of *z*, *č*, *ž* and *v* are a little beyond the two parallel lines, and thus, the fragment may be dated back to the first half of the 10th century.

One part of the fragment with which it was glued to the cover is damaged and difficult to read; nevertheless, it was more or less possible to copy and identify the text.

In the fragment we have found the end of the Martyrdom of the XL Martyrs of Sebasteni and the John Chrysostom's homily about the story of the evangelical

* The article was submitted on October 25, 2022. The article was reviewed on November 11, 2022.

Publican and the Pharisees, which, according to the fragment, is read on the fourth week of Lent, therefore, the martyrdom of the XL of Sebasteni is meant on the third week of Lent. These two texts, the "Passions" and the homily of John Chrysostom, appear one after the other in the old Armenian homiletic collections - charintirs (ճարընտիր - "selected words", Georgian equivalent - *mravaltavi* "Polykephalion"), which allows us to assume that the fragment we are interested in is part of the homiletic collection.

As has already been mentioned, there are 22 lines in the preserved fragment, but from the end of the text on the recto and to the continuation on the verso, almost 14 lines of the edited text [7:513-514] of the Martyrdom of Sebasteni are missing. If the 22 lines of our manuscript fragment match the 14 lines of the edited text, it can be assumed that the text must be missing the same number of 22 lines before. There should have been 44/45 lines in total in the column. Thus, the size of the manuscript should have been quite impressive, 600x400 mm.

Armenian homiletic collections have a long and interesting history. The information about the compilation of one of the oldest manuscripts of this type is provided by Mkhitar of Ayrivank, according to which the homiletic collection was compiled in 696 by the Bishop Solomon of Mackenya [8:66] and finally, the collection was completed in 747. It is from this very manuscript that the famous Homiliarium of Mush [5:148] must have been copied in 1200-1202.

The Homiliarium of Mush was created in the Avagi monastery (*Yerzink* District). According to the colophon, it was copied by a certain Vardan, and the artist was Stephanos. The manuscript originally consisted of 600 pages and contained the writings of 40 authors. Due to its dimensions (550x710), the collection is considered to be the largest Armenian manuscript made on parchment. A brief description of the manuscript and its dating was provided by A. Matevosyan [5:137-162], and a full description was published in 1984 by Gerard Garitté [1:237-280].

In the Homiliarium of Mush, according to the description, the commemoration of the martyrdom of the forty Sebasteia was placed on the fourth Sunday of Lent, after the "Martyrdom" Basil of Caesarea's homily of the forty martyrs was read. On the fifth Sunday of Lent, John Chrysostom's homily "For the Publican and the Pharisees" was read [1:264]. The "Passion" of the XL Sebasteni is commemorated on the fourth Saturday, and between the "Passion" and the homily of John Chrysostom, the praises of Basil of Caesarea and Sisian of Sebasteia can be found in the Homiliarium preserved in Matenadaran copied in 1456 (MSS 993), which is considered as one of the most complete codices of the Homiliarium [6:1697].

The Armenian lectionary, copied in 1154, like the Homiliarium, mentions Martyrs of Sebasteni on the fifth Saturday, and on the fifth Sunday it gives readings about the Publican and the Pharisees (Luke 17:20-18:14) [3:615].

The Lection of the Publican and the Pharisees and the related homilies on the fifth week of Lent can also be found in many Georgian Polykephalions depicting the Jerusalem tradition.

The well-known "Parkhali Mravaltavi" (NCM A-95, 10th century) begins the cycle of Lent with readings related to the Forty Martyrs of Sebasteni; here, on March 9, the martyrdom of "The fifty saints who were tortured in Sebasteia" is given [2:34], followed by the praise of the Martyrs of Sebasteni by Basil of Caesarea. Among the Lections of Lent Sundays, on the fifth Sunday, we have the "Gospel of Luke on of the Publican and the Pharisees" and on the same day, instead of the homily of John Chrysostom, there is an original Georgian homily dedicated to the Sunday of of the Publican and the Pharisees by Ioane Bolneli [10:377-379].

Georgian manuscripts of the Jerusalem lectionary of the tenth century also commemorate the Martyrs of Sebasteia on the fourth Saturday of Lent [3:81-82].

Thus, by reading the Martyrdom of the Martyrs of Sebasteia and John Chrysostom's homilies in the third and fourth weeks of Lent, our fragment differs from the Homiliarium of Mush and other liturgical collections, although this is not a unique case. In two of the Armenian Homiliariums we have found in the manuscripts copied in the village of Neghkuk (Նեղկուկ) [4:340] in 1194 and in Kafa (Կաֆա) in 1307 (Par.arm.110, 116-118) [4:197], there is a commemoration of the Martyrs of Sebasteia on the third Sunday of Lent, and the reading of the Publican and the Pharisees is on the fourth Sunday of Lent.

The difference in the time of the readings is conditioned by the Homiliarium of Mush and similar manuscripts beginning to count the Sundays of Lent with Cheese Sunday - Առաջին կիրակեօրն Բուն Բարեկենդանի [6:1679] (the first Sunday of the Cheese), and the following Sunday is already numbered as a second one when the Homiletic collection (including our fragment) preserved in the National Library of Paris, and structurally similar Polykephalions do not include the Cheese Sunday in the calendar and start counting Sundays from the following week.

As for the Martyrdom of the XL of Sebasteni, the text preserved in the fragment shows differences compared to the one published in 1874 [4:181]; in some cases these differences are variant readings (e.g., *մաւր* տեսեալ զնա միայն մնացեալ *ի բաց եղեալ կանանցի բնութիւն* // *մայրն* տեսեալ զնա միայն մնացեալ *ի բաց դնէր կանանցի տկարութիւն*) but the edited text has not enabled us to reconstruct the erased places, even though the outlines of the graphemes are visible.

Below is presented the text copied from the fragment:

1	ՏԻՑԱԻԱՆԴԵՑԻՆԶՈԳԻՍՆԵԻԱ
2	[Ս]ԵԻՆՈԳԻՔ ՄԵՐԱՊԵՑԱՆՈՐՊԷՍ
3	Ճ[ՆՃ]ՂՈՒԿ ՅՈՐՈԳԱՅԹ[Է]ՈՐՍՈՂԱՅ
4	ԱՐԴԱԵԻՈՐՈԳԱՅԹՔ Ն[ՈՅԱՓ]ՇՐԷ
5	ՑԱՆՈՒՄԵՔԱՊԵՑԱՔ[ՈԳ]ՆՈՒ

6	ԹԻՒՆԷՄԵԶ ՅԱՆՈՒԱՆԷ ՏԵԱՌՆՈՐ Ա
7	ՐԱՐԶԵՐԿԻՆՍ ԵՒ ԶԵՐԿԻՐ ԵՒ ԱՍԱ
8	ՅԵԱԼ ԶԱՄԷՆՆ ՄԻԱԲԱՆ ՀԱՏՈՑ
9	ԻՆ ԶՈԳԻՆՍ
10	ՔԱՅՑ ՊԱՏԱՆԻՆ ՄԵՂԻՏԱՆ ՈՐ ՄԸ
11	ԽԻԹԱՐԷՐ Ի ՄԱԻՐԷՆ ԴԵՐԵԻՍ ՅՈ
12	ԳԻ ՈՋ ԷՐ . ԵՒ ՀՐԱՄԱՅԵՑԻՆ ԲՌՆԱ
13	ԻՆՈՐՔՆ ԱԾԵԼ ԱՅՂՈՑ ԲԵՐԵԱԼ ՅԵԶՐ
14	ԳԵՏՈՅՆ ԹՈՂԵԱԼ ԱՆԴԵՆՆ ԶՊԱ
15	ՏԱՆԻՆ ԿԱՐԾԵԻՆ ԹԵ ԱՊՐԵՍՅԻ ԵՒ
16	ՄԱԻՐՆ ՏԵՍԵԱԼ ԶՆԱ ՄԻԱՅՆ ՄՆԱ
17	ՅԵԱԼ Ի ԲԱՅ ԵՂԵԱԼ ԶԿԱՆԱՆՅԻ
18	ԲՆՈՒԹԻՒՆԱՌԵԱԼԱՌՆՄԻՏՍ ԵՒ
19	ՈՅԺ. ԵԲԱՐԶՁՈՐԴԻԻՐՅՈՒՍ ԵՒ
20	ԱՌԱՔԻՆԱԲԱՐ ԵՐԹԱՅՐ ԶԿՆԻՍ ԱՅ
21	ՂՈՅՆ ԻՍԿ ՊԱՏԱՆԻՆ ՄԻՆԶԴԵՌ
22	Ի ՎԵՐԱՅ ՈՒՍՈՑ ՄԱԻՐՆ ԵՐ ԵՀԱՆ

1	ՀԱԱՅՂ ՓԱՅՂԵԻՆ [նշխարք սրբոց ի]
2	ՆԵՐՔՈՅ ԶՈՒՐՅՆ ԻԲՐԵԻ ԼՈՒՍԱԻ
3	ՈՐՔ Հ[.....]ՈՒՐԵՔՄՆԱՅԵԱԼ
4	[... ..]
5	[... ..]
6	[... ..]
7	Ք[... ..]
8	ԵՒ [... ..]Ք ՆՈՅՆՊԷՍ
9	ԷՔ[... ..]ԿՈՒԹԻՒՆ ՓԱՅՂԵՆ
10	[....]ԼՈՒՍԻՆ ՅԱՇԽԱՐՀԻՆ
11	[... ..]
12	[ՐԱՅ]ԵԱԼՔ ՓԱՌԱԻՈՐԵՑԱՆ
13	Ի ՓՐԿՈՒԹԻՒՆ
14	[... ..]ՀԱՅՐ
15	[... ..]
16	[... ..]
17	ՅԱԻՏԵԱՆՍ ԱՄԷՆ
18	ԶՈՐՈՐԴ ԿԻՒՐԻԱԿԷ

ԸՆԹԵՐՅՈՒԱԾ	
19	<i>ՅՈՎՀԱՆՈՒՈՍԿԵԲԵՐԱՆԻԿՈՍՏԱՆՏՆՈՒՊԱԻՂԻՍԵՂ</i>
20	<i>ԻՍԿՈՂՈՄԻՅԱԻՆՏԱՐԱՆԻՄԵՎՆՈՒԹԵՆԷ</i>
21	ԷԻ ԵԻ ԵՐՐՈՐԴԵԻՍՃԱՆԱՊԱՐՀԱՊԱ
22	ՇԽԱՐՈՒԹԵԱՆԶԻԻԲԱԶՄՈՒԹԵ

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
ԱՆՀԱՅՏ ՀԱՅԿԱԿԱԿԱՆ ՃԱՌԸՆՏԻՐ ԺՈՂՈՎԱԾՈՒԻ ՀԱՏՎԱԾ ՎՐԱՍՏԱՆԻ ՁԵՌԱԳՐԵՐԻ ԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ԿԵՆՏՐՈՆԻՑ

Դալի Ճիթունաշվիլի

Քանալի բառեր՝ Հայկական ձեռագրեր, հայերեն ճառընտիրի ժողովածու, Վրաստանի ազգային ձեռագրերի կենտրոն, «Մշո ճառընտիր», Ավետարան:

Վրաստանի ձեռագրերի ազգային կենտրոնի հայերեն ձեռագրերի ժողովածուում պահպանված է մի Ավետարան, որը թվագրվում է 15-րդ դարով: Ավետարանը վերականգնվել է 20-րդ դարի 60-ականներին, պահպանվել են բնական կաշվե հատվածներ: Վերականգնման ընթացքում պարզվել է, որ մագաղաթի երկու թիթեղները, որոնք օգտագործվել են որպես վերջաթղթեր, հանվել են: Մագաղաթի հատվածները մեկ հորիզոնական թիթեղի հատվածներն են, որոնք ուշադրություն են գրավում և՛ հնագիտական, և՛ տեքստային տեսանկյունից: Նախքան կտրելը չափսը եղել է 320x210 մմ, բայց նույնիսկ սա չի արտացոլում մագաղաթաթերթի սկզբնական չափը, քանի որ հատվածում պահպանվել է միայն մեկ սյունակ, այն էլ թերի, իսկ ձեռագիրը պետք է գրված լինի առնվազն երկու սյունակով: Պահպանված հատվածում սյունակի չափը 115 մմ է, սյունակների միջև հեռավորությունը՝ 20 մմ, սյունակում կա 22 տող, տողերի միջև հեռավորությունը՝ 10 մմ, ստորին լուսանցքը՝ 110 մմ, իսկ աջ լուսանցքը 82 մմ է:

A FRAGMENT OF AN UNKNOWN ARMENIAN HOMILETIC COLLECTION FROM THE
GEORGIAN NATIONAL CENTRE OF MANUSCRIPTS





TRAVELING HISTORY OF THE ARMENIAN FOUR GOSPELS DATED TO 1686 (NCM RAR 82)*

Khatuna Gaprindashvili

Abstract

The colophons of the old manuscripts, in general, convey important information about various persons, noble families, churches, monasteries, historical facts or contemporary political situations. In addition, the colophons often allow us to trace the history of creation, composition, purpose, preservation and sometimes to follow the journey of the manuscripts. One of such books is the Old Printed Armenian Four Gospels (RAR 82) preserved in the Rare Books Room at K. Kekelidze Georgian National Centre of Manuscripts.

Keywords: colophons; manuscripts; Armenian; The Four Gospels; K. Kekelidze Georgian National Centre of Manuscripts

This book has interesting colophons. One of the printed colophons is attached at the end of the book and it provides us information about the place and date of this book's publication. The date is given in both systems of chronology: general chronology that begins from the Nativity, and Armenian chronology that begins from 551/2. In this colophon we can read followings:

"The printing of this magnificent Holy Gospel, ascribed from the best and selected copy, was completed in 1686, and in 1135 by the Armenian era (1135+551=1686), on May 14, in Venice..."¹

In addition to the printed colophon, the book contains later colophons, according to which Four Gospels has a special history. Three years after its publication, the book was found on the territory of Armenia, in the city of Goris (a city in Syunik Province in the south of Armenia). The benefactor of this manuscript is Khanum, and the binder is Movses the priest, who binded the printed Holy Gospel in the embossed leather cover of the old manuscript, colored ornamental cloth is used as the cover sheets:

"Glory to the Holy Trinity, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit now and always and forever and ever, amen!

And this Holy Gospel was benefited by the benefactor woman Khanum as a reward for her hard work, to commemorate her and her parents: father - Astuatsatur, mother - Siritught, and her deceased and well-serving husband Mkrtich, and

* The article was submitted on October 11, 2022. The article was reviewed on November 8, 2022.

¹ «Աւարտեցաւ տպագրութիւն վայելչատիպ սրբոյ Աւետարանիս, ի լաւ և յընտիր օրինակէ, յամի մարդեղութեան տեառն ոռձգ (1686) և ի թուաբերութեան հայոց ոռձ լէ (1135+551=1686), ի ժող մայսի ամսոյն ի Վենետիկ քաղաքի...»:

her sons: Melkum, Gaspar, Edel, and daughter-in-law and grandchildren, who are here. At first commemorate the eldest son Melkum and his wife, the deceased Marriam and his sons: Khachatur, Minas, Martiros, his middle son Gaspar, his wife Margarita and son Petros, the youngest son Edel, his wife Hripsime and son Hovhannes, shall the mention of them be blessed.

And commemorate God-fearing Khanum, who bought this Holy Gospel for commemoration herself and the above-mentioned persons and donated it to Saint Stephen's Church. Whoever is a priest, he will use it (this book *Kh. G.*) with care and whoever is impudent and insulting, may he be judged by them and by God.

Commemorate again the current priests of this village, Ter Mkrtich and two Gregorian priests, may the Lord keep them healthy and have mercy!

And commemorate me, the binder of this Holy Gospel, the sinner Movses, the priest from Goris, together with my parents, those who commemorate us, will be commemorated by the Lord, on Wednesday, April 3, 1689, blessed be Christ forever and ever, amen. Our father, who art...²

The Four Gospels consists of 432 pages; it is incomplete, the text is missing quite a large number of pages (49-56; 137-304). The book is also interesting in terms of its artistic design. The title pages of gravures of the Four Gospels are decorated with colorful paints.

It seems that the book was actively used in liturgical practice, which is confirmed by the colophons preserved on the margins. These colophons are references to the readings of various feasts (քժկութեան, այլակերպութեան տեր մեր Յի-

² «Փառք ամենասուրբ երրորդութեան հօր և որդւոյ և հոգւոյն սրբոյ այժմ եւ անգրաւ յաւիտեանս յաւիտենիւ, Ամէն:

Արդ ստացաւ կենսատու սուրբ աւետարանս բարեւեր կինն Խանում ի հալալ արդեանց իւրոց յիշատակ իւրն՝ և զծնօղաց իւրոց. հօրն՝ Աստուածատրին և մօրն՝ Սիրիթթոյն և առն իւրոյ՝ բարեպաշտ Մկրտչի հանգուցելոյ և ծաղկեալ որդւոց իւրոց Մմէլքումին, Գասբարին և Էդէլին և հարսներուն և թոռանցն, որք են այսոքիկ. նախ յիշեցէք զաւագ որդին իւր զՄէլքումն և զամուսինն իւր՝ զհանգուցեալ Մարիամն. և զորդիքն իւրն՝ զԽաչատուրն, զՄինասն և զՄարտիրոսն եւ զմիջակ որդին իւր՝ զԳասբարն. և ամուսինն իւր զՄարգարիտն՝ և զորդին զՊետրոսն: Եւ զկր[տ]սեր որդին՝ Էդիլն և ամուսին իւր՝ զՀռիփսիմէն և զորդին զՅովհաննէսն, որոց յիշատակ սոցին արքիմութեամբ եղիցի:

Այլ և յիշեցէք զաստուածատր Խանումն, որ էառ զսուրբ աւետարանս յիշատակ իւր՝ և վերոյ գրելոցն և ետ պատարեցոց սուրբ Ստեփաննոս եկեղեցոյն և ով որ քախանայ լիցի, նա վայելեցէ զգուշութեամբ և ով որ լրբաբար կամ ծաղանօք դատապարտի ի սմանէ և Աստուծոյ:

Դարձեալ յիշեցէք այժմու քախանայք գեղիս գտեր Մկրտիչ սրբասնեալ քախանայն և երկու տեր գրիգորեանքն աստուածանփորձ կենօք պահեսցէ և բարով վայել տացէ:

Այլ և յիշեցէք զկազմող սուրբ աւետարանիս զՍօսէս զառաձեալ երեսս գորիսեցի հանդերձ ծնողօք մերովք, զյիշողդք յիշեալ լիջիք զտեառնէ Աստուծոյ մերմէ թվին ռճ լը (1138+551=1689), ապրիլի ամսոյ գ, աւուր չորեքշաբաթի, ի փառս Քրիստոսի օրհնելոյն յաւիտեանս Ամէն: Հայր մեր որ յեր...»:

սուս Քրիստոս, Ծաղկազարդի, տաճարի կիրակեից կարդայ, մասնութեան, խաչելութեան, տաճարի կիրակի պաշտաման, իղաբերից, յարութեան, ծնընդեան, հայրապետաց տօնի կարդայ, եկեղեցոյ տօնի կարդայ and others).

Besides the book being printed early which underlines its importance, the latter further increases by having two fragments of the parchment used as cover sheets. These parchments should have been included in the book at the time of the restoration of the Four Gospels by Movses the priest. Both fragments are parts of the same manuscript; moreover, it is part of a parchment sheet cut in two.

The technical data of the parchments are as follows: size - 260x165 mm; it is written in two columns. Margins: right 40 mm, left 40 mm, bottom 32 mm, top 20 mm; the width of the column is 70 mm, the space between columns is 17 mm, the lines are 15; the space between lines is 10 mm; the height of the graphemes is 7 mm. Text is written in brown ink with *Erkatagir* script. A marginal mark made in colored ink remains on the left margin.

The fragments contain Isaiah 32: 17-20 and 33: 1-2 verses (see the attached text) [1: 1033-1034]³. We do not know what book could have been cut up and used as the protective sheets, but if we reconstruct the original size of the parchment, the result will be as follows: the size of the original parchment manuscript should be approximately 325x220 mm.

text is written in quite large letters. With this type of writing, it is hard to imagine that it was a complete Bible. We believe it must have been some collection containing biblical readings. It is noteworthy that the manuscript was decorated with colored margins; red ink is also used in the text.

The fragments of the parchment manuscript can be dated back to the 11th century using palaeographical features. The intonation stresses frequently used in the fragment do not enable us to date them to an earlier period. Although according to Armenian paleographers, use of such stress is already confirmed in the manuscripts of the 9th-10th centuries, they are found with special frequency in the manuscripts of the later period.

The history of this book does not end with Movses Gorisetsi. In 1727, Four Gospels was found in a certain Petros' possession, who calls himself the last benefactor:

"The last benefactor of this Four Gospels is Petros, his son Hovhannes, Paghi, Eliaz, Isaiah, 1727"⁴.

³ Աստուածաշունչ, Մատեան հին և նոր կտակարանների, արևելահայերէն նոր թարգմանութիւն, Ս. Էջմիածին, 1994 [Bible, Old and New Testaments, St. Echmiadzin, 1994], 1033-1034:

⁴ «Վերջին ըստացող սուրբ աւետարանս Պետրոսն որդին իւր Ովանեսին, Պաղին, Էլիազին, Եսային, ռճ՝հգ:» (1176+551=1727):

The adventure of this gospel does not end there either. In 1742, it appeared in the hands of Hovhannes, a priest of one of the rural churches in historical Albania, as the last colophon of the book:

"By the will of God the Pantokrator, I, Nerses of Seysulan, the son of Sahak have bought this Four Gospels as the reward of my righteous merit for commemoration myself and my parents: father - Sahak, mother - Kozal, my brothers - Sargis and Hovhannes, my wife - Khanum and all my relatives, I gave it to Hovhannes, the Orutians, who is the priest of this Seysulan village. And you, who will take this Holy Gospel into your hands and read it, I beg you to commemorate in your holy prayers the unworthy and humble above-mentioned Nerses together with his parents, and you also be commemorated before the Holy Judgment of Christ, amen! In 1191 by the Armenian era (1191+551=1742), August 15, the Dormition of the Mother of God, during the reign of the Holy Catholicos Nerses over the house of the Albanians, and Shahin-Shah Tahmaz, the great king of the Persians, who is currently fighting against the cursed Leks."⁵

Who are the historical figures named in the colophon? Nerses should be Aluank Catholicos Nerses V (1705; 1726-1763), who was under the jurisdiction of Armenian Apostolic Church and whose activity period coincides with the date of creation of the colophon, and Shah-Tahmāsb is the current ruler of Iran, Nader-Shah (Tahmāsp Quli Khan, 1736-1747). It is well possible that the Lazks mentioned in the colophon are the same as Leks, Lezgins. As we know from history, Nader-Shah invaded the North Caucasus in 1741-1743 [3: 495]⁶. Thus, the data of our colophon exactly coincides with the period of this campaign in the North Caucasus.

The journey of the book does not end in Albania. It is not known how, but Four Gospels was found in Svaneti (Georgia), in Kachkachishvili's family⁷ [2:

⁵ «Կաման ամենակալին Աստուծոյ, արդ եւ Ներսէս Մէլսուլանցի, որդի Սահակին վերստին ստացայ զսուրբ Աւետարանս ի արդար վաստակոց իմոց յիշատակ ինձ և ծնողաց իմոց, իորն իմոյ՝ Սահակին և մօրն իմոյ՝ Կօզալին և եղբարցս՝ Սարգիսին և Ովանէսին, ամուսնոյն իմոյ՝ Խանումին և ամենայն արեան մերձաւորաց իմոց եւ ետու զաւի ձեռն օղուտադանց տէր Ովանէսին. որ է քահանայ այսմ Մէլսուլան գեղիս, հանդիպողք և ընթերցողք սուրբ աւետարանիս խնդրեմ և ժտեմ յիշել ի մաքրափայլ աղօթս ձեր զիս զնուաստ և զանարժան վերոյ գրեալ Ներսէսս հանդերձ ծնողօրն իմովք և դուք յիշողքդ յիշեալ լիջիք առաջի ահեղ ատենին Քրիստոսի, ամէն, ի թուականութեան հայոց ազգի ոճ դա (1191+551=1742) և օգոստոս ամսոյ ժե, փոխման սուրբ Աստուածածնին, ի հայրապետութեանս տանս Աղուանից տեառն Ներսիսի սրբազան կաթողիկոսի և ինքնակալ թագաւորութեան պարսից մեծի արքային Թահմազ Շահնշահին, որ այժմ պատերազմեր ի վերայ անիծեալ լազկին...»

⁶ Գ. Կատիճաճե, *Իրանի օսկոյր III-XVIII ԵԵ., ԺԺԺԺԺԺ, 2009* [D. Katsitadze, *The History of Iran, III-XVIII cc., Tbilisi, 2009*], 495.

⁷ Another Armenian Four Gospels (NCM Arm 110) preserved at the National Centre of Manuscripts is related to the Kachkachishvili surname. The manuscript was copied in 1773 in Georgia. Georgian inscription is presented on the cover of this manuscript: "Comemorate Miqela Kachkachishvili and

110]. In 2007, Georgian National Centre of Manuscripts purchased the book from them.

So, this is the brief history of the Four Gospels according to its colophons.

The Old Printed Armenian Four Gospels (RAR 82) is preserved in the Rare Books Room at K. Kekelidze Georgian National Centre of Manuscripts. Two fragments of the parchment are used as flyleaves which contain the 11th century text of the Bible. The colophons attached to the old printed book tell us the story about the journey of this Holy Gospel throughout the South Caucasus and the historical situations that took place during that period.

Fragments of Isaiah's Prophecy:

Is. 32:17-18	Is. 32:19-20
ԵՒ ԿԱԼ	ԱՅՂ ԿԱՐԿՈՒՏ
[ՅԻԱՐԴԱ]ՐՈՒ	ԵԹԵՒՋԱՆԻՑԷ,
[ԹԻՒՆ]ՋՀԱՆԳ	Ո՛ՉԻՉԵՐԿԵՐԱՅ
[ԳԻՍՏ]ԵՒ ՅՈՒ	ԵԿԵՍՅԷ: ԵՒ ԵՂ
[ՍԱՅԵ]ԱԼՔՆԵՂ	ԻՅԻՆՈՐԲՆԱԿԵ
[ԻՅԻՆ]ՍԻՆՉԵԻ	ԱԼԻՑԵՆՅԱՆ
[ՅԱԻԻ]ՏԵԱՆ:	ՏԱՌԻՆ, ՅԱՆ
[ԵԻԲ]ՆԱԿԵԱՅ	ՀՈԳՍԻԲՐԵԻՋԱ
[ԷԺՈ]ՂՈՎՈՒՐԻ	ՅՆՈՍԻԿՈՐՔԿԵ
[ԻՍԻԲ]ԱՂԱՔԻՆ	ՅՅԵՆԻԴԱՇՏ
[ԽԱՂԱ]ՂՈՒԹԵ	Ի. ԵՐԱՆԻՈՐ
[ԱՆ]ԵԻԲՆԱԿ	ՍԵՐՄԱՆԻՑԵՆ
[ԵՍՅԷ]ՅՈՒՍՈՎ	ԸՆԴԱՄԵՆԱՅ
[ԵԻՀԱ]ՆԳԻՑԵՆ	ՆՋՐՈՎՈՒՐԵՋ
[ՍԵՇ]ՈՒԹԵԱՄԲ	ՆԵՇԿՈՒԹԵՆ:

his deceased parents, forever and ever, in 1793, on January 1th”. [„ქ. მოიხსენე უფალო კაჰკაჰაანო მიჟელა და მიცვალებულნი მშობელნი მისნი სასუფეველსა შინა ქ-კს უჰა იანვარსა ა (481+1312=1793).“]

Is. 33:1	Is. 33:1-2
ՎԱ՛ՅԱՅՆՈՑԻ	ԶՅԵՑԻՎԵ[ՐԱՅ]
ԿՈՐԹՇՈՒԱՌ	ՁՈՐՁՈՑ
ԱՅՈՒՑԱՆԻՅԵ	ԱՅՆՊԷՍ[ՄԱ]
ՆԶԶԵԶ: ԲԱ	ՏՆԵՍՑԻՆ[Ի ՊԱՐ]
ՅՅԶԶԵԶՈՉՈՔ	ՐՏՈՒԹԻԻ[Ն]
ԿԱՐԷԹՇՈՒԱՌ	ՏՐ ՈՂՈՐՄԵ[ԱՅ]
ԱՅՈՒՑԱՆԵԼ:	ՄԵԶԶԻԻ[ՔԵԶ]
ԵՒՈՐԱՐՀԱՄԱՐ	ՅՈՒՍԱՅԱ[ՔԵՂ]
ՀԷՆ ՈՉԶԶԵ	ԵԻԶԱԻԱԿ[ԱՆՀ]
ԶԱՐՀԱՄՐՀԷ	ԱԻԱՏԻՑ[ՆԻԿՈՐ]
ԶԻՄԱՏՆԵԱՑ	ՈՒՍ: [ԱԻՂ]
ԻՆԻՊԱՐՏՈՒ	ՄԵՐՓՐԿ[ՈՒԹԻԻՆ]
ԹԻԻՆՈՐԶԶԵԶ	ԻՔԷՆԷԻ[ԺԱՄ]
Ն ԱՐՀԱՄԱՐՀ	ԱՆԱԿԻՆ[ՆԵՂՈՒ]
ԵՆ, ԵԻԻՐԲԵԻ	ԹԵԱՆ:

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**ՀԱՅԿԱԿԱՆ 1868 Թ. ՔԱՌԱՎԵՏԱՐԱՆԻ ՃԱՄՓՈՐԴՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ
ՊԱՏՄՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՄԵՋ**

Խաթունա Գափրինդաշվիլի


Բանալի բառեր՝ հիշատակարան, հայկական ձեռագրեր, Քառավետարան, Կ. Կեկելիձեի անվան վրացական ձեռագրերի ազգային կենտրոն:

Հին ձեռագրերի հիշատակարանները, ընդհանուր առմամբ, կարևոր տեղեկություններ են հաղորդում պատմական տարբեր անձանց, ազնվական ընտանիքների, եկեղեցիների, վանքերի, պատմական փաստերի կամ ժամանակակից քաղաքական իրավիճակների մասին: Բացի այդ, հիշատակարանները հաճախ թույլ են տալիս հետևել պատմության ստեղծման, հորինվածքին, նպատակին, պահպանմանը և երբեմն հետևել ձեռագրերի ճանապարհին: Այդպիսի գրքերից է Կ. Կեկելիձեի վրացական ձեռագրերի ազգային կենտրոնի Հազվագյուտ գրքերի պահոցում պահվող տպագիր հայերեն քառավետարանը (RAR 82):









ILIA CHAVCHAVADZE AND THE EMERGENCE OF GEORGIAN NATIONAL DISCOURSE*

Beniamin Mailyan

Abstract

The purpose of this article is to explore the history of the emergence of the discourse of Georgian nationalism and the idea of the Georgian nation. The author offers an alternative view of the reasons for the emergence of Georgian nationalism and identifies the main topics of the Georgian national narrative.

Ilia Chavchavadze, a poet, a writer, a publicist and a public figure, is considered the spiritual father of the nation in Georgia. He is one of the key figures in the Georgian historical pantheon because he outlined the main ethnic markers of Georgian identity. He and his circle, the group of intellectuals known as Tergdaleulebi, mark the beginning of the history of Georgian nationalism. This makes him an indisputable authority for all those who call themselves Georgian patriots.

Keywords: Georgia, Ilia Chavchavadze, Mtkvardaleulebi, Tergdaleulebi, Pirveli Dasi, feudalism, nationalism, traditionalism, colonialism, capitalism.

Nationalism became one of the backgrounds of modernisation. Kartvelian nationalism has been one of the key factors driving change in Georgia. It continues to play a relevant role in various spheres of life of Georgian society - political, cultural and scientific. Problems of the genesis and intellectual history of Georgian nationalism occupy a separate place in Caucasian studies today. The study of the origins of Georgian nationalism, as well as its ideological roots, remains among the priority and urgent scientific tasks.

In the 1860s, the magazines *Tsiskari* (The Dawn) and *Sakartvelos Moambe* (The Herald of Georgia) were engaged in heated ideological debates on Georgian language and literature, and essentially on social and political issues. In the course of that discussion, the Kartvelian intellectual establishment was divided into conditionally competing groups. The conservatives, who came to be known as the "fathers"/*mamebi*, merged into one of them. Their social sentiments, however, were not set out as a coherent political theory. A political expert from Tbilisi writes that the older "generation did not leave any systematised ideological heritage and in this regard, we cannot compare Prince Grigol Orbeliani or any of the "fathers" with Joseph de Mestre and Chateaubriand" [18]. The emergence of the Georgian national discourse was fuelled by the class interests of the feudal lords, who had entered the epoch of modernity and were in a deep economic decline. It is this circum-

* The article was submitted on August 29, 2022. The article was reviewed on October 10, 2022.

stance that the conservative *Mtkvardaleulebi* (those who drank water of the Mtkvari/Kura River) movement had chosen as the cornerstone for the attempted consolidation of the noble elements. They acted as public "adherents of medieval Georgia with its pomp and pageantry" [29: 53]. The "fathers" dreamed of restoring ancient virtues of Georgian society, when allegedly simple morals reigned: a kind monarch ensured the prosperity of his subjects, and the church catered for high moral values. "The last offspring of medieval feudalism, - writes a witness to the events, - gives direction, tone to all affairs of national life" [10: 16]. Thus, the quite liberal idea of the Westernisation of Georgia, in the views of the nobility's educated community, was, alas, intricately intertwined with the pathological glorification of their country's feudal past.

From the *Mtkvardaleulebi* generation, born of the aristocratic fronda and forged by the anti-Russian conspiracy of 1832, an outwardly "Westernised" intelligentsia, gradually but inexorably took over the initiative. From this emerged the modernisers, nicknamed "sons"/*shvilebi*. They initiated a new tendency which was joined by Georgian youth educated in Russia and which was called *Tergdaleulebi* (those who drank water of the Terek River). They returned to their native land with a dream of the national revival of Georgia. An unquestionable authority for those who lived with this hope was Prince Ilia Chavchavadze (1837-1907). A broadly educated intellectual, he tried to creatively rethink the concepts of Western thinkers (Ernest Renan and others) for the benefit of his country. From the German philosophers (J. G. Fichte and others), for example, he took over the experience of the Romantic tradition. For him, their theories were just a form, which he filled with his own content. His formula "Georgian heart and European clothes" [40: 26] became the cornerstone, the core of the *Tergdaleulebi* viewpoint on the Westernisation of Georgia. Thus, Chavchavadze called for borrowing only external forms from the West, as the westernisation of the country was not possible without the weakening of paternalist structures.

Poet Akaki Tsereteli, educator Jakob Gogebashvili and, later, writers Prince Kazbegi and Vazha-Pshavela (Luka Razikashvili) stood closest to him in their outlook. Chavchavadze, along with his ideological supporters, formed a movement *Pirveli Dasi*/First group which gave a new and powerful impetus to Georgian patriotism. They defended the code of Georgian identity - *Kartveloba* - in every possible way in the face of threats of Russification.

If the *Mtkvardaleulebi* were bitterly longing for the distant past only, the *Tergdaleulebi* generation tried more to compose literature about the real problems of their time [35: 218]. At the same time, the *Pirveli Dasi* literati were united in their anticipation of the catastrophe that bourgeois civilisation seemed to be bringing to their homeland. They promoted an ideal of "heroic realism" that was hostile to mercantile consciousness. They dreamed of overthrowing the vulgar, squalid, bourgeois culture of the merchants and reviving a stern community of brave, valiant warriors.

The quintessence of the *Tergdaleulebi* doctrine is perhaps contained in the corporatist theory of the "Common Action Ground", i.e. the commonality of ethnic interests of all social groups of the Georgian people [29: 12]. They stood firmly on the point of defending common national values: Georgian identity, language and culture. The *Mtkvardaleulebi* were in full solidarity with them on this issue.

A peculiarity of the Kartvelian revival was that the main carrier of ideas of restoration of ethnic statehood was the local aristocracy. This was due to the weakness of the Georgian bourgeoisie and the historically established vanguard role of the nobility. Georgian aristocracy belonged only to the hereditary nobility - the "nobility of the sword", which, as experience has shown, mentally boycotted the environment of merchants living according to the laws of "power of money" and not "power of the land". It should be recalled that the heroic "high" romanticism in the work of Ilia Chavchavadze, which extolled the love of an exploit, was the antithesis of merchant "low" mercantilism. "Where there is profit, - he spoke of merchants with undisguised disdain, - there is the merchant's homeland" [24: 152]. There was no phenomenon in Georgia similar to the English "gentry" or the French "nobility of the mantle", who were recruited from the "third estate" at the beginning of the new age and well adapted to bourgeois relations. Even after the abolition of serfdom, the Georgians continued to live in the system of coordinates of feudal society, with its hierarchy of vertical relations. Indeed, as a contemporary of the *Tergdaleulebi* reports, "the Georgian people are distinguished by the medieval type of their social structure" [10: 11]. A powerful national bourgeoisie had not developed in Georgia, which was usually the product of anti-feudal revolutions.

Expert Gia Nodia writes that the 1832 conspiracy, which was an episode of aristocratic nationalism, was not further developed. In the 1860s Ilia Chavchavadze had to create Georgian nationalism on a new basis [7: 21]. His social programme was based on the desire to preserve Georgia as an agrarian community [37: 133]. He considered the complete abolition of estates and nobility land ownership premature [24: 106]. This eventually led him into the conservative camp. He was characterised by agrarian romanticism - a desire to remove the sphere of land relations from the influence of market mechanisms.

Ilia Chavchavadze argued that colonialism and capitalism had destroyed the social idyll that had existed in feudal Georgia. He and his followers tried to prove that prior to the Russian domination serfdom was paternalistic care of a peasantry and not slavery. "Such an opinion, - writes the researcher of the issue, - was a gross distortion of history. One must assume that Georgian writers of the nobility were ashamed to admit the existence of the vile system on which their own well-being was based. <...> Therefore, these gentile writers idealised old Georgia and even denied the existence of serfdom in it" [14: 13, 97].

Furthermore, Chavchavadze called for the reconciliation of the estates within his ethnos and cherished the illusory dream of a union of "sword and ploughshare" [24: 149; 33: 37]. This was in fact very similar to the corporatist theory. In this way, the leader of the *Pirveli Dasi* wanted to avoid an acute social struggle in his

country. However, the emancipation of peasants without land, while retaining feudal duties based on land dependence, laid the groundwork for an irreconcilable conflict between them and the landlords.

The *Tergdaleulebi*, however, made an invaluable contribution to the consolidation of the ethno-cultural identity of the Kartvelians. Moreover, they initiated the process of ethno-political construction of the Georgian nation [15: 20]. Their concept of nationalism emanated from the ideas of the German Romantics and was based on the primordialist model. The process, however, developed at the expense of the internal assimilation of the autochthonous peoples - Mingrelians and Svans, as well as some traditional Georgian population groups (Armenians, Ossetians, Jews, Greeks, Kistebis and others) who had assimilated the Kartvelian language. In addition, there was an urgent need to make Georgian Muslims, who then had a very different identity from their Christian compatriots, part of a single nation.

Among the Kartvelians, a strong regional (or sub-ethnic) identity has long contributed to their ethnographic isolation. They lacked a collective identity. For example, the Gurians "did not have a concept of a single Georgian nation. Georgia for them was Kartli and Georgians were Kartlians, sometimes Kakhetians" [9: 7]. In short, ethnicity did not matter to them when people of feudal formations simply did not ask to which ethnos they belonged. In addition, the pre-modern era was generally characterised by the predominance of religious identity over ethnic identity.

The process of consolidation of the Georgian ethno-confessional community into a full-fledged nation was hindered in every way by the discriminatory regime of religious policy introduced by official St. Petersburg. The problem was deprivation of autocephaly of the Georgian Orthodox Church and the destruction of its monopoly of education, which of course was a heavy blow to the ethnic identity of Georgians. For this reason, the Kartvelian clergy temporarily lost the ability to form and retransmit the cultural code of their people. The consequence of this was a decline in the importance of Orthodoxy as an identity marker.

As a reminder, Muslim Georgians were a distinct community. Their identity had a distinctive character, which limited their communication in the Kartvelian environment. These barriers gradually began to break down due to the secularization of culture of the feudal elite, which led to the formation of national intelligentsia. In this context, it seems no coincidence that the sequence of parts of the famous triad formulated by Chavchavadze - "Fatherland, Language, Faith" - the main markers of contemporary Georgian self-awareness became consistent.

"By putting "Language" ahead of "Faith", - writes expert Gia Nodia, - Chavchavadze secularised Georgian nationalism by likening it to linguistic nationalism, opening it up to Georgian Muslims and representatives of other confessions, but he also reserved the possibility of appealing to medieval tradition" [7: 22]. This nationalism acted as a mechanism for constructing the internal solidarity of the young Kartvelian intelligentsia.

For the Kartvelian traditionalists, who placed the main emphasis on the idea of a common language (*Ena*) and homeland (*Mamuli*), it was not the Orthodox faith but the native language - Kartuli - that determined nationality. This enabled the establishment of an ethno-cultural channel of communication with their Islamised compatriots. Moreover, Chavchavadze raised love for his native country to the level of faith (*Sartsmunoeba*), thus actually establishing a new civic cult [2: 112]. Although the *Tergdaleulebi* advocated the creation of a secular nation, they continued to regard Orthodoxy as one of the important factors of intra-ethnic solidarity. In addition, Christianity symbolised Georgia's glorious past. After all, the struggle for their faith at the same time was always the struggle for their language among the Kartvelians. It has also not been forgotten and integrated by the efforts of the *Tergdaleulebi* into Kartvelian national narrative [34: 90]. It should be emphasised that Chavchavadze paid particular attention to Christian beliefs. He based his views on the Martyrological paradigm. He called Orthodoxy his true faith and zealously defended its positions. Christianity, writes Chavchavadze, "was a sign of belonging to the Georgian people. <...> By Christian faith we preserved our land, our language, our identity, our national face" [5: 53].

Moreover, Chavchavadze saw the new form as an embodiment of traditional Georgian values. He placed particular emphasis on the deeds of the ancestors, similar to the Russian *pochvenniks*, who emphasised a return to native roots. "Neither the commonality of language, - he reasoned, - nor that of faith and family kinship does create as strong a sense of belonging together, as the unity of history" [44: 56].

In this sense, the aphorism that "nations are made by historians" is true. Without the continuity built by them, linking dozens of generations into a single whole, neither national memory nor national identity would have been possible. Of course, a special role was given here to the processes of creating a canonical historical narrative. As the eminent British historian put it, "the past is what creates the nation" [27: 332]. In his works Chavchavadze turned to the historical past of his homeland, reviving its most heroic pages in order to awaken a sense of patriotic pride in his fellow countrymen. However, the only living tradition that he inherited from his ancestors was firmly tied to feudal culture.

Chavchavadze said that "there are Kartlians, Kakhetians, Gurians, Mingrels, but <...> there is no Georgian as a representative of a single nation" [15: 88]. Thus, in order to achieve decolonization, it was clearly necessary to forge a fully-fledged Georgian political nation from the Kartvelian feudal ethnos. This project formulated by the leader of the *Pirveli Dasi*, however, initially had an important flaw. In his construction the Kartvelians remained a medieval "ethnos", for he did not intend to transform them into a fully-fledged bourgeois "demos", a mobile community of the Western type. Of course, this then raises the question of how the nobility and the plebs would integrate with one another. Without bourgeois Westernisation, this would obviously be impossible. In addition, writes a researcher, "Chavchavadze clearly defined ethno-cultural boundaries of Georgian identity and the Kartvelian

ethnos. It was only possible to be Georgian by birth" [42: 62]. Thus, he called for solidarity among his fellow tribesmen on the basis of his primordialist sentiments, as he remained a conservative romantic in the depths of his worldview.

The epistolary tradition in the modern era formed a new core of Kartvelian identity. Here "literary activity has gone hand in hand with the political movement, and the chief writers are also the leaders of Georgian Nationalism" [38: 68]. They, however, possessed a traditionalist worldview built on mythologemes, where they portrayed Georgia's feudal past in a very rosy light. An eyewitness reports that Georgian "literature quite vividly expresses the national feeling, mainly in the form of idealisation of the past, longing for the lost, lamentation of the miserable reality, etc" [26: 484]. Literature played a special role in those conditions, writes the Russian researcher, when Georgian authors could not yet cultivate nationalism in political life [11: 15]. The noble intelligentsia (Prince Grigol Orbeliani and others) called for a return to old customs, a revival of medieval chivalric traditions and the glorification in a romantic spirit of concepts and values such as "fatherland", "class" and "native land". As a result, they dreamed of reconstructing the contemporary social reality according to the model of an ideal past imagined by them.

Historical memory, thanks to the efforts of noble intellectuals, acted as a powerful consolidating factor. "Almost everything, - writes a publicist living in Tbilisi, - that Georgians consider fine is intrinsically linked to the era of feudal monarchy" [17]. A well-known expert has quite correctly identified that a characteristic feature of Georgian political thought has been the "medieval interpretation" of the entire political trend in Georgia's new history [19: 158]. It undoubtedly has at its core the feudal paradigm, passed on by the baton to subsequent generations of Georgian intellectuals by their noble predecessors. It was in these circles that a very specific, local "feudal nationalism" [10: 48, 49, 56] began to be assiduously cultivated, as defined by an eyewitness of the era.

"It should be taken into account, - reports the Tbilisi-based publicist, - that Georgian nationalism, despite its rich history, is poorly researched - there are few programmatic documents. Their place is usually taken by a mishmash of scathing quotations and archaic preconceptions. Georgian leaders drew their ideas about the phenomenon of the nation from Western sources, which predictably led to a toss-up between ethnic and civic nationalism" [16]. Indeed, in the legacy of the *Tergdaleulebi* there is extensive publicism rich in pathetic rhetoric, but we do not see any comprehensively developed socio-political concepts of their own. In the opinion of their contemporaries, "the views of the Georgian nationalists remain extremely vague" [21: 54].

Nationalism, according to the Swiss author, is an unavoidable effect accompanying any modernisation [1: 15]. It is important to remember that in Europe it grew out of the anti-feudal revolutions, the rejection of class society and hereditary aristocracy by the bourgeoisie [13: 196]. By contrast, Georgian nationalism emerged in an aristocratic environment on the basis of rejection of capitalism and liberalism. It is noteworthy that the genesis of nationalism in Georgia was aimed at social re-

venge of the nobility and was not connected with the emancipation of the plebeian majority. It was a purely "noble nationalism", the instigator of which was Ilia Chavchavadze [36]. After all, he "served the nobility with his talent and knowledge" [14: 98]. Another Georgian author, however, attributes him to preaching integral nationalism [41: 45]. According to a local political scientist, it is ethnic in nature, based on language and religion [39: 80]. Thus, the triad "Fatherland, Language, Faith" has become a formula for Georgian nationalism, and the figure of Ilia Chavchavadze himself has become its embodiment [40: 30]. He publicly justified the legitimacy of the autocephaly of the Kartvelian clergy, abolished by the Russian authorities. In recognition of these merits, the Georgian Orthodox Church canonised him under the name Saint Ilia the Righteous [5: 54]. His ideas are now interpreted within the framework of religious nationalism, and the existing secular cult is gradually being enriched with details inherent in the cult of traditional Orthodox saints.

Chavchavadze never clearly articulated or publicly raised the issue of the need to restore his Georgian statehood. It was only in 1906 that he spoke cautiously in the press in favour of Georgian self-government [31: 263]. At the same time, institutional nationalism in Europe was hardening before his eyes when dependent ethnic groups were given significant opportunities for their consolidation. The tensions over the status of languages undoubtedly played a role as a catalyst for political mobilization. The mother tongue and its position became a significant social resource. The theorists of nationalism attached no less importance to the issue of ethno-cultural solidarity than to the struggle for other ideological resources. Therefore, "Ilia Chavchavadze's nationalism, - according to the Georgian author, - was a cultural nationalism. It did not emphasise political goals" [30: 38]. His ideas nevertheless played a powerful detonator role in the growth of the Kartvelian liberation movement.

Ilia Chavchavadze, who attempted to formulate a definition of Georgians as a nation, helped the Kartvelian community to realise the costs of colonial dependence in his writings. He formulated his political credo in the short story *The Letters of the Traveler* (1861), with the refrain being "before we belonged to ourselves" [44], which was in fact a call for the restoration of the country's sovereignty. However, opposition to foreign domination in the view of the leader of the *Pirveli Dasi* was to unfold not as a political but as a cultural confrontation.

Spiritual followers of Chavchavadze long hesitated to put forward the slogan of secession of Georgia from the Romanov Empire. In the beginning they were extremely timid in their political ambitions. The *Tergdaleulebi* had to look back at the official authorities, fear of persecution, use of Aesopian language and so on. They waited for an opportune moment, but until then their agenda was limited to the task of preserving their ethno-cultural identity and their native language. However, a modern expert, while mentioning the importance of these figures in the history of their people, writes with certainty that "Ilia Chavchavadze led the national liberation movement in Georgia from the 60s of the XIX century, which gradually, but

consistently led Georgians to the path of struggle for the restoration of statehood and national independence" [23: 229]. It should be recalled that Chavchavadze is declared in Georgia as a kind of "founding father of the nation" [6: 85]. After all, he made a significant contribution to the formation of a new Georgian identity by putting forward the idea of the consolidation of the Kartvelians into a nation. He was also the first to formulate the basic concepts of Kartvelian nationalism.

It should be recalled that at one time there was no tangible liberal current in the Georgian political palette. Its development was hindered by the visible absence of a bourgeois class and the traditional forms of life of the bulk of the population.

An expert from Tbilisi writes: "he can be called the father of Georgian liberalism just as much as the father of Georgian nationalism" [18]. It is difficult for us to agree with the assertion that Chavchavadze was allegedly a liberal. All the more so as his concept of national revival was by no means linked to the doctrine of liberalism, the core of which is the preaching of freedom of commodity-money relations. After all, it is well known that the leader of the *Pirveli dasi* was sharply critical and negative of capitalism [33: 37]. The evidence is perhaps his categorical rejection of the market conversion of feudal property and its redistribution by free sale.

In addition, writes the Georgian author, "in I. Chavchavadze's writings, we find a denunciatory critique of capitalist society" [24: 38]. Moreover, in the pages of his newspaper *Iveria*, Chavchavadze gave prominence to those commentators who tried to prove that not only did capitalism not exist in Georgia, but that it never would [25: 17]. The leader of the *Pirveli Dasi* himself, demonstrating his attitude towards merchants, referred to them as "weasels" and the capital belonging to them as "evil money" [4: 362]. The idea of reconciling the interests of the nobility with those of the bourgeoisie was strongly opposed by him. He realised that these interests were incompatible and that the victory of the bourgeoisie would ultimately lead to the loss of all the hereditary privileges of the nobility.

As the Kartvelian aristocrats found themselves squeezed between the Russian bureaucracy and Armenian compradors, the nobility of the *Tergdaleulebi* feverishly sought ways to overcome this fatal tendency for their class. An American expert writes: "after the early period of radicalism, I. Chavchavadze became a conservative liberal by the 1880s" [33: 37]. It is not difficult to see that we are facing a counter-versus two paradigms: Enlightenment liberalism on the one hand, and romantic conservatism on the other. Moreover, he is looking for answers to the challenges of time in tradition. "We only need, - writes the leader of the *Pirveli Dasi*, - to turn to the former customs and they will tell us the right path" [8: 63]. It would be more accurate to state that the national revival was now conceived not as a simple return to old values, but as their radical renewal. His "dynamic conservatism" implied continuity from the past, not a return to it. "From our ancestors, we inherited the three sacred treasures: Fatherland, Language, and Faith. If we do not even take good care of them, what kind of men are we, what will we be able to say to our heirs?" [43: 27; 12: 24]. It is clear that Chavchavadze appears in this passage as

a traditionalist, who saw in the new form the embodiment of familiar Georgian values.

Thus, the leader of the *Pirveli Dasi* and his comrades-in-arms move to the position of feudal traditionalism. Their works "are saturated with idealisation of old morals" [14: 93]. They were building a sentimental abstraction, the aim of which was not to imagine a future life, but to call for the resurrection of the romanticised past. The social essence of the sum of their views is the consistent and talented response of the nobility to the prospects of bourgeois development. "Before the enemy raided <...> ruined us, stole, - Chavchavadze complained irritably, - now Armenian merchants ruin us even more. Before we met the enemy <...> and sometimes even defeated them. But how will you defeat a merchant?" [45]. In his eyes, it was a value conflict between the commercial mentality of the merchants and the heroic culture of the aristocratic knights.

The welfare of the Georgian aristocracy was traditionally linked to the land, which for many of them was their only source of income. The nobility, who did not understand or did not want to realise the true causes of their decline, instead craved a simple and powerful explanation for the sudden collapse of their traditional way of life. This was soon found by replicating the myth of the insidious shenanigans of the Armenian bourgeoisie. An eyewitness recalled: "the main inspirers of the anti-Armenian and sometimes Armenophobic campaign were prominent representatives of Georgian literature, such as Prince I. Chavchavadze, Prince Ak. Tsereteli and others. This campaign was purely of noble origin" [26: 519]. From the point of view of aristocrats, their ruin was the work of cunning foreigners who allegedly abused Georgian hospitality and used it for selfish ends. This thesis was thoroughly polished and laid out in the famous programmatic pamphlet "Armenian Scientists and Scream Stones" [28]. In this work, saturated with bright and catchy phrases, Ilia Chavchavadze did not rely on verified facts, but rather on his natural eloquence, thus compensating for the total lack of intelligible arguments [3].

The ideas defining the consciousness of the second generation of Georgian intellectuals were, among other things, products of Western origin. They sought ideological constructs suitable for themselves in the European intellectual environment. In his rejection of capitalism, Chavchavadze predictably resorted to arguments of agrarian romanticism. "History, - he writes, - has only the people who stand firmly on [their] land and plough on it" [24: 150]. As a result, the leader of the *Pirveli Dasi* intuitively felt a connection to the traditionalist theory of "blood and soil" before it was formulated by German philosopher Oswald Spengler. The essence of this doctrine was the relationship between "blood", ethnicity, and "soil", the homeland that gives one's people sustenance.

Ilia Chavchavadze tried to combine the conservative views of his nobility with the demands of modernity, as he realised that an unconditional return to the former feudal orders of the Middle Ages in the conditions of modern civilisation was impossible. As a result, he became a link between the old feudal aristocracy and the young nobility, representing both elite groups. In other words, Chavchavadze was

looking for and had found (by the 1880s) an acceptable *modus vivendi* between the nostalgia of the conservatives ("fathers") and the reformism of the traditionalists ("sons"). The core of this idea was the formula he proposed: "A new Georgia should only be born out of the old" [40: 25]. In contrasting the heroic past with the dreary present, he chose traditionalism as synonymous with anti-capitalism. This problem became part of the ideological baggage of the Georgian so-called *pochvenniks*, who gave it a nationalist character.

A number of his works are written in the genre of classical romanticism, idealising the past and condemning modernity. He writes: "The Georgian name, Georgian customs and order has been desecrated! In the old days everything was our way" [45]. This call to old times is nothing less than his protest against foreign rule. In addition, it was the "nostalgic nationalism" of the Georgian nobility, of which Ilia Chavchavadze was the main speaker [37: 132]. Thus, the sentiments of the local traditionalists were broadly cited by conservative romantics.

Although the leader of the *Pirveli Dasi* sought to give the Georgian tradition a more modern character, he was an organic part of the local nobility. Social conservatism, feudal particularism and pronounced xenophobia dominated there. Chavchavadze, reports the Georgian author, "failed to avoid idealising the past. He has tried to connect his new ideas with ancient Georgia, with its "golden age". He praises the past and directly speaks of the need to restore "the old times"" [24: 143]. Chavchavadze, however, realised that in the drastically changed circumstances a full return to the previous paradigm of conservatism had become impossible. Expert G. Nodia correctly noted that in the new paradigm constructed by Chavchavadze "there was a reconstruction of the medieval past on the basis of the Georgian national project of the new time" [7: 22]. This trend reflected his transit towards mature national-conservatism.

The European author concluded that Ilia Chavchavadze was committed to "reformist conservative politics" [32: 303]. His views, in our opinion, resemble in many ways the Georgian analogue of the ideas of the Russian *Slavophiles*, with their eternal search for a "third way". Indeed, he "believed in the uniqueness of Georgia's development and considered it completely different from the development of European countries" [24: 131]. As a consequence, he entered into sharp ideological disputes with the adherents of Westernisation, liberals and radical democrats, and then with the *Narodniks*, the worst enemies of the nobility's landed estates [22: 231]. In his vision, it was of course necessary to take into account the previous historical inertia when modernising his native country and to avoid a capitalist transformation in Georgia.

The speeches of Chavchavadze and his comrades-in-arms resonated widely and prompted many sympathisers of the *Tergdaleulebi* plans to engage in political activities. Yet Chavchavadze was an implacable opponent of the bourgeois order. He did not, however, slip into the marginal position of a retrograde. He believed that the main efforts should be focused on the cultural revival of the Georgian people. To a large extent his distinctive position in the liberation movement was due to

his outstanding personal qualities and talent as a great writer. The combination of pessimism towards the surrounding world with a belief in its better future, criticism in the spirit of modern age traditionalism and recognition of the right to individual freedom, create the worldview phenomenon of Chavchavadze. Thus, the leader of the *Pirveli Dasi* was the first to chart a vector pointing the way for Kartveli traditionalists and to formulate their unspoken manifesto, a response of Georgian *pochvenniks*/traditionalists to the challenges of colonialism and capitalism.

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ԻԼՅԱ ՃԱՎՃԱՎԱԶԵՆ ԵՎ ՎՐԱՑԱԿԱՆ ԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ԽՈՍՈՒՅԹԻ ԿԱՅԱՑՈՒՄԸ

Բենիամին Մաիլյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ Վրաստան, Իլյա Ճավճավաձե, մտկվարդալեուլերի, թերգդալեուլերի, Պիրվելի դասի, ավատատիրություն, ազգայնականություն, ավանդապաշտություն, գաղութատիրություն, կապիտալիզմ:

Հոդվածի նպատակն է ուսումնասիրել վրաց ազգայնականության խոսույթի առաջացման պատմությունը և վրաց ազգի գաղափարը: Հեղինակն այլընտրանքային տեսակետ է առաջարկում վրացական ազգայնականության առաջացման պատճառների վերաբերյալ և մատնանշում է վրացական ազգային պատումի հիմնական թեմաները:

Իլյա Ճավճավաձեն՝ բանաստեղծ, գրող, հրապարակախոս և հասարակական գործիչ, Վրաստանում համարվում է ազգի հոգևոր հայրը: Նա վրացական պատմական պանթոնի առանցքային դեմքերից է: Նրանից և նրա շրջապատից՝ մտավորականների մի խմբից, որը հայտնի է որպես «թերգդալեուլերի», սկսվում է վրացական ազգայնականության պատմությունը: Սա դարձնում է նրան անվիճելի հեղինակություն բոլոր նրանց համար, ովքեր իրենց անվանում են Վրաստանի հայրենասերներ:

NEWLY DISCOVERED DOCUMENTS ABOUT GRIGOR ZOHRAP'S ACTIVITY*

Miqayel Martirosyan

Abstract

After the publication of the monograph “The chronicle of the life and activities of Grigor Zohrap” by Prof. Albert Sharuryan it would seem that all episodes of Zohrap’s life had been revealed. Yet the study of Russian-German diplomatic clash in regard to the Armenian reforms in 1913 shows that G. Zohrap was actively involved not only in that process but he also functioned as the main negotiator from the Armenian side, a fact which remained unnoticed by historians and philologists. While the Armenian national delegation headed by Poghos Nubar was the official body representing the Armenian problem to great powers in Europe, in Constantinople the official negotiating body was the Commission of Safety of Armenian Patriarchy. G. Zohrap was one of the five members of the Harassing commission which supported the Safety commission who in the course of negotiations became the main actor. His participation in the negotiations was hidden by Russian diplomacy and by the Armenian circles and G. Zohrap himself. He was a member of the Ottoman parliament and it would be quite dangerous since the Young Turks could accuse him of treachery.

The documents presented in the article deal with the meetings of G. Zohrap with the first translator of the Russian embassy A.N. Mandelstam on August 20, 21, and 24, September 1-2, 1913 and the second translator of the German embassy Schönberg on August 30. These documents are kept in the archive of the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin. In the documents Zohrap’s name is missing but the comparison of documents of Great powers and memories of contemporaries comes to prove that it was he who negotiated on behalf of the patriarchy. After the end of the meetings G. Zohrap came to the Safety commission and talked about the course and results of the negotiations. His reports were recorded and sent to Gevorg V Surenyan, the Catholicos of All Armenians.

The study of these documents shows that G. Zohrap had a considerable contribution in the achievement of a compromised Russian-German agreement in regard to the Armenian reforms.

Keywords: Grigor Zohrap, Poghos Nubar Pasha, Arshak Chopanyan, Patriarch Zaven Ter Yeghian, A. Mandelshtam, ambassador M.N. Girs, compromise agreement, Armenian national delegation, Nubar Miqayelyan.

When in 1996 professor Albert Sharuryan's scientific work "The chronicle of the life and activities of Grigor Zohrap" was published, it seemed that everything was said about Zohrap, and all episodes of his life were discovered. The opinion was the result of the esteemed professor's diligent and bulky work where the

* The article was submitted on March 17, 2022. The article was reviewed on June 27, 2022.

novel's Armenian trout's literary and public-political activity was shown. Yet in the late 19th century and in the early 20th century, Grigor Zohrap was one of the powerful personalities whose whole life chronicle would demand efforts of several generations of philologists and historians. From July to January 1913-1914 the research about the Armenian reforms negotiation process brought us to the conclusion that Grigor Zohrap was the main negotiator from the Armenian side with German and Russian embassies in Constantinople. Concerning Armenian reforms, he had informal meetings and private conversations with Young Turk's high-ranking officials only in the case of the initiative coming from the latter. In contrast to the June-July negotiations period, when the problem of Armenian reforms in Constantinople's Austro-Hungarian embassy invited a countries conference hit the dead end, and in which the Armenian side did not take part, the August-September period ended by reaching a Russian-German compromise agreement, which was a serious progress in Armenian reforms problem. From the end of July, the representatives of the patriarchate, and, most of all, Grigor Zohrap, as one of the Security committee's foreign affairs officers of the patriarchate [12: 189], were actively involved in that process. If in Europe Armenian national delegation was led by Poghos Nubar Pasha, in Constantinople the right to hold Armenian negotiations was the security commission of the Armenian Patriarchate. Although G. Zohrap was not a member of the Security Commission, gradually he became one of the Russian-German compromise agreement architects around Armenian reforms. For such a responsible role several factors had a role, among them the inborn talent and ability to negotiate, the high popularity and status of a member of the Ottoman Parliament, also realistic approaches to solving the problem and being an acceptable and appreciable person from Constantinople's Russian and German embassies. Here we see how the members of the Armenian circle of Peterburg Nikoghayos Adonc and Sirakan Tigranyan, who arrived in Constantinople in 1912 December, describe Zohrap. "Grigor Zohrap is a lawyer by profession, writer, public dealer, and a member of the Turkish parliament, elected by the population, an honorable person, who draws the attention of not only Armenian population. The noble man with a great and bright mind, who has obedient, flexible and eloquent language, speaks with great enthusiasm, almost with teenage vigor" [2: 382-383].

Grigor Zohrap's was not part of the general enthusiasm and possessor of unrealistic illusions of Constantinople's patriarchy. In his diary, he confessed. "At first I didn't agree with our project and never had any hope of achieving it. From that time, I objected to guessing the difficulties of claims. After this, our patriotic requirements played their role"[2: 382-383].

In the process of negotiation, Grigor Zohrap's being non-partisan¹ played a role and in general, he estimated the ability to harmonize the protection of Armeni-

¹ It is known that before the 1912 parliamentary elections, he kept friendly relationships with famous members of Dashnaktsutyun, especially with Vardges Serenkulyan, alongside whom he passed away in 1915.

an interests. Here is how he has shown the Armenian-Russian relationship vision based on the principle of mutual benefit. "In Armenian question by the right of neighbors and by the state of interests, our main prop is Russia. Russia needs to ensure its effectiveness in bordering Turkish regions. He also must settle there, as an important area for the advancement to the southern open sea. In that way his main relatives, more reliable allies were Armenians, and it is indisputable, especially when before everything and regardless of everything both sides had the same interests" [4: 318].

In the frames of Armenian reforms, Grigor Zohrap asked Chopanyan to burn their letters in front of his relative who was living in Paris, and Chopanyan did so faithfully. Here is the proof that Zohrap classified his activity too. In 1913 he published two scientific works. "The situation of Sebastia province from the economic and ethnographic point of view and fettle of Armenians" and "Armenian question under the light of documents", out of which the first was published in the French press, unsigned, and the second was a separate book under the pseudonym of Marsel Lear. Even, the head of the Armenian national delegation Poghos Nubar pasha was unaware that the author of that work was Grigor Zohrap for a long time.

Even the frames of Constantinople's patriarchate and the members of the Security committee, who knew about the role of Grigor Zohrap in establishing the September 10 Russian-German compromise option, did not discover the details of the negotiation after Zohrap's death in their diary. The secretary of the Security committee Vahan Papazyan (Koms) in his diaries highlights Zohrap among Armenian national dealers and writes. "From all this, the most unconditional, enthusiastic, and dedicated power is G. Zohrap. He was respected and had great authority in international political-diplomatic frames. All doors were opening in front of him" [5: 197]. Patriarch Zaven Ter Yeghian recalls Grigro Zohrap's wasted efforts with gratitude "for success in Armenian reforms problem" with a central emphasis. "Almost every day Zohrap was connecting Andre Mandelshtam, who was the thirist translator and legal advisor of the Russian embassy in Constantinople" [6: 55].

It is remarkable that Grigor Zohrap's role was kept secret by Russian diplomats in Russian-German negotiations. Special translator A. Mandelshtam later published many works, which did not show Zohrap's efforts and services in any way. Almost the same attitude was showed towards Zohrap in "Сборник дипломатических документов. Реформы в Армении" (Collection of Diplomatic Documents. Reforms in Armenia) collection published in 1915. On August 3(16) 1913 Constantinople's Russian ambassador M.N. Girs sent to Peterburg Number 733 a secret telegram, in which he mentioned that on the same day famous Armenian dealer Grigor Zohrap visited him, who presented himself as a German embassy's official representative Lepsius, then he also showed the content of negotiations and a bunch of recommendations with the minister of foreign affairs Talaat [14: 98]. In the published version of this secret telegram, Zohrap's name is missing [8: 265-266]. We are sure that keeping Zohrap's name secret in the publication of Russian official documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not done with the

purpose of attributing Russian role in the September 10 Russian-German establishment of a compromise option; they simply wanted to keep the Ottoman parliament Armenian representative, who was still alive, safe from alleged charges of treason by the Turkish.

Fortunately, Zohrap's special role in the negotiation process was testified not only by Russian ambassador M.N. Girs but also by the Embassy of Italy. Here we see B. Mochenigo's telegram to his country's Minister of Foreign Affairs M. San. Juliano which was sent on September 14/27/1913. "Yesterday I had quite a long conversation with lawyer and member of parliament Zohrap, whom we can consider an Armenian leader. He told me that all Armenian people were deeply disappointed that Italy with Germany adopted an oppositional position to the legitimate demands of Armenians last spring. He expressed hope that now our approaches have changed positively and made it clear that if it is like it, then Armenian powerful forces will do everything so that Italy can economically enter Minor Asia" [7: 69]. The most important evidence which proves that the person who negotiated with Constantinople's German embassy's second translator Shyonberg on August 30 (September 12) was G. Zohrap is the letter number 279 which was sent to Foreign Affairs from the embassy on September 8 (21). The letter called "Written Statement of Armenian Requirements" by G. Zohrap to the embassy summarizes the results of Zohrap-Shyonberg negotiations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reports.

"Regarding the conversation with the most influential leader Zohrap among native Armenians and second translator Shyonberg, I had the honor to report to Your Excellency in a different way. After this Zohrap himself formulated the main points of his essay in writing ..." [13: 119].

Unfortunately, Zohrap's archive, with more than 900 atypical handwritten pages was confiscated by Turkish police on the day of his arrest May 20, 1915. As for his diaries, they refer to the December-January 1913-1914, i.e. the end of the negotiation process. We think, that the access to Turkish archives will shed light on the activity of this truly glorious person.

Below for the attention of the reader are presented documents referring to the Zohrap-Mandelstam and Zohrap-Shyonberg negotiations towards the end of August 1913 and the beginning of September, extracted from the valuable collections which are kept in Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin Manuscript. The collection of these documents mainly refers to the negotiations between representatives of Constantinople's Armenian patriarchate and foreign embassies in 1912-1913, concerned with Armenian reforms. Representatives of the patriarchate held negotiations with persons authorized by them. There were meetings also with the Ittihat party and high-ranking people by the initiative of the Turkish side. After that meeting representatives from the Armenian side reported the process and results to the patriarchate. Those reports were recorded and sent to the Catholicos of All Armenians Gevorg the Fifth Surenyan. These reports, which presented negotiations in detail in a question-answer form, constitute the content of the manuscript.

Representative of the Mother See of the Holy Etchmiadzin manuscript Nubar Miqayelyan brought together one part and published it in the magazine "Etchmiadzin" in B-E numbers in 1965. Unfortunately, in unknown conditions for us, the thick volume which was made by hardworking N. Miqayelyan was not published completely. The following documents are completely taken from number 228 document made by Nubar Miqayelyan and now saved in the Mother See of Holy Etchmiadzin Manuscript.

The negotiations with the foreign embassy were done secretly, so the people who made reports and records tried to hide the name of the Armenian negotiator, with the aim to protect him from further retaliation by Young Turks. So instead of his name the word *delegate* was written. And now without the documents retrieved from the archives of other countries by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and without combining memories of figures of that time, one may find it next to impossible to find out who the Armenian representative was in reality. By the way, with this method from 1990 we were able to prove in "Le vilayet de Sivas au point de vue Economique et Ethnographique et la Situation des Armeniens" scientific work, which almost includes Volume C of Acts written by him.

So, in the documents below, published for the first time, Constantinople's Armenian patriarchate's delegate is Grigor Zohrap [9: 196-242].

20/2 Մեպատմբերի Երկուշաբթի

Մեր պատմիրակին տեղեկագիրը.

Այս առտու գերմանական դեսպանատան հայ պաշտոնյաներեն մեկը եկավ զիս ըսելու թե գերմանական դեսպանատան թարգմանը Պրն. Շեռնբերգ կփափագի հայոց մեկ ներկայացուցիչին հետ խոսակցիլ: Ըսի թե պատրաստ եմ տեսնելու Թերապեա Թոգաղյանի մեջ [Թոգաղյան արձարանը գտնվում էր Կ. Պոլսի Թաբապիա թաղամասում, Բոսֆորի ելրոպական ափին – Մ.Մ.]: Ժամադրությունը պիտի որոշե Պարոն Շեռնբերգը:

Եղած այս հրավերի մասին գացի ռուսական դեսպանին խորհուրդը առնելու: Ա. Թարգմանը /ռուս/ [Կ. Պոլսի ռուսական դեսպանության առաջին թարգմանն Անդրեյ Մանդելշտամն է – Մ.Մ.] ընդունեց զիս և երկու ժամի չափ տեսակցեցանք:

Բացատրություն խնդրեցի Տրուպեցկոյի [Գ. Ն. Տրուպեցկոյ, 1912-1914 թթ. Ռուսական կայսրության արտգործնախարարության Մերձավոր Արևելքի բաժնի վարիչ, իշխան – Մ.Մ.] վերջին տեսակցության մեջ անոր այն հայտնության մասին թե այս վայրկյանիս դահլիճներու մեջ բանակցություններ կկատարվին:

Թարգմանի տված տեղեկություններուն նայելով՝ հայոց մասին այս վարկյանիս դահլիճներու մեջ խոսակցություն չկար: Բայց Պարոն Դր Գիրսը կուզեր, որ հայկական ծրագիրը հոս դեսպաններու կողմե շուտով քննվի: Դեսպանը շատ կարևորություն կուտա անոր:

Թարգմանը ըսած էր թե Սամսոն-Սվազը փոխանցված էր գերմանացիներուն, իսկ Խարբերդ-Տիգրանակերտը՝ Ֆրանսիացիներուն: Հետաքրքրվեցաւ անոր terminus-ի մասին:

Պատասխանեց թե երկաթուղիներու խնդիրը դեռ չէր վերջացած և Հայաստանի գիծերուն Անադոլոյի գերմանական գիծին կցելու մասին դեռ ոչինչ չէ որոշված: Թերևս այս գիծերը Սև ծով պիտի հանգին: Թարգմանը այն համոզումը չունի թե երկաթուղիներու շինությունը շատ կապ չունենա հայկական բարենորոգմանց հետ և թե Ֆրանս-գերմանական շահերուն իրավախոհություն երկաթուղիներու խնդրին մեջ և հայոց հարցին լուծումը - տարբեր բաներ են:

Իմ դիտողությունս թե՛ թուրքիո հաջողությունը էդիրնէի խնդրոյն մեջ զանոնք բոլորովին անձնապատասխան և համատ պիտի դարձնէ մեր հարցին մեջն ալ, և այն դիտողությանս թե թուրքերն համոզված են թե Ռուսիա առաջ չպիտի երթա և թե ամեն պարագայի մեջ զինվորական ուժերուն Հայաստանի մեջ ավելցվիլն անշուշտ քաղաքականություն բռնելու նշաններ էին: Թարգմանը պատասխանեց թե Ռուսիա ուղղակի շահ չունենա էդիրնէի խնդրոյն մեջ. բայց շահ ունի հայկական հարցին լուծման մեջ, թե երբ ատենը գա և Ռուսիան ստիպվի, կրնա վերջապես առաջ շարժվիլ:

Ավելցուց նաև թե եթե հայկական խնդիրը պետությանց ումանց և թուրքիո հակառակությանց հետևանքով խափանվի և եթե հայերը լռությամբ ընդունեն այս վիճակը աշխարհը պիտի ըսէ թե հայերը բան մը չէին պահանջեր, և թե ռուսներ հայերու անունով և շինծու կրողորքէին և ռեֆորմ կպահանջէին:

Պատասխանեցի թե բարենորոգմանց հայերու կողմէ ուզված ըլլալը, բոլոր պետությանց պաշտոնապես հաղորդված էր: Բացի Եվրոպայի պատվիրակութենէն, դեռ շատ ամիսներ առաջ, նաև Հայոց Պատրիարքարանի կողմէ և թե հարյուրներով de marche-ներ կան, ուստի հայկական հարցին Ռուսիո մեկ ցանկությունը համարվիլը հիմ չունի և անհնար է:

Ես համառոտ ամփոփումը տվի Թալաթ, Խալիլ և Ֆեհմի բեյերու հետ շաբաթ օր մեր ունեցած բոլորովին անհատական խոսակցությանը, հաղորդեցի իրենց նաև որ հիշյալները առաջարկած են երկրորդ տեսակցություն մը ևս ունենալ հառաջիկա ուրբաթ օրը: Ամփոփեցի թուրքիո ընդդիմության կետերը: Ըսի որ մենք ընդհանուր կերպով միայն խոսած ենք, իսկ երկրորդ խոսակցության մասին դեռ որոշում մը տված չենք [Ներքին գործերի նախարար Թալաթ, Պետխորհրդի նախագահ Խալիլ և իթթիհատ կուսակցության քարտուղար Ֆեհմի բեյերի հետ հանդիպումը տեղի է ունեցել 1913 թ. օգոստոսի 17-ին, Ձոհրապի տանը: Անպաշտոն այս հանդիպմանը հայերից մասնակցել են նաև Հարություն Շահիրիկյանը և Վարդգես Մերենկույանը – Մ.Մ.]:

Ա. Թարգմանն ալ Դոկտ. Շեռնբերգի հետ իր ունեցած տեսակցությունը պատմեց: Շեռնբերգը այցելած էր իրեն ետ առնելու համար կատարված բոլոր գիշումները /որ գերմանացիները ըրած էին թե Դոկտ. Լէփսիուսի բերնով և թե անկէ վերջ, Դոկտ. Շեռնբերգի կողմէ Պրն. Մանդելշթամի ըրած/:

Շեռնբերգը հայտարարած է թե ինքը արդեն անձնապես խոսած էր Պրն. Մանդելշթամին վերջին անգամ, և Դր Վանգենհայմը որուն զեկուցած էր ինքը, համաձայն չէր եղած որնէ զհջումի: Ռուս թարգմանը անակնկալի եկած այս տգեղ *volte-face*-ին առջև, խիստ կերպով խոսած է և իբրև վերջին խոսք ըսած է անոր թե ռուսերը իրենց ծրագրեն ոչ մեկ զհջում պիտի ընեն բացի մեկ կետէն, այն է ի հարկին երկու *secteur* ընդունիլ հյուսիսէն հարավ բաժնվելով, բայց անհողողող պիտի մնա մյուս բոլոր կետերուն մասին, զոր գերմաններն ալ գրեթե ընդունած էին: Շեռնբերգը անոր հետ կրկին տեսնվելու պետքը ցուցուցած է և հրավիրած է անոր: Ռուս Ա. Թարգմանը թէն խոստացած է, բայց վերջէն Պրն. Դր Գիրսի հրամանով ետ կեցած է այդ այցելութենէն: Դր Գիրսի վրա խիստ գեշ ազդած է գերմանացիներու այս *volte-face*-ը և ըսած է թե ինքը այս մասին պիտի տեսակցի Պրն. Դր Վանգենհայմի հետ: Այս տեսակցությունը տեղի պիտի ունենա երկու-երեք օրվան մեջ:

Գերմանացիներու այս *volte-face*-ը ես /մեր պատվիրակը/ բացատրեցի այսպես: Թուրքերը շարքա օր խոսակցեցան մեզի հետ, ուրքաք օրն ալ պիտի գան, հավանաբար մեզի հետ իրենց համաձայնությունը հաջողեցնելու համար անոնք դիմած են Վանգենհայմին որ զմեզ չքաջալերեն զհջումներ ընելով, որովհետև այդ պարագային հայերը չպիտի ուզէին թուրքերու հետ բանակցիլ և խնդրած ըլլան որ դեսպանը հաշտեցնէ զմեզ, որպէսզի իրենց դիմենք:

Պարոն Մանդելշթամը շատ հավանական գտաւ իմ այս ենթադրությունը:

Ուրքաք օրը թուրքաց հետ ի՞նչ ձևով խոսելու հարմար ըլլալու մասին թարգմանին կարծիքը հարցուցի. արդոք նախ ռուս ծրագրին դեմ թուրքաց դիտավորությունը հայտնել, մեր պահանջները իրենց պարզել և թե այս երկրորդականներէն սկսիլ թե էականները մեջտեղ դնել սկիզբէն իսկ: Թարգմանը թելադրեց նախ մեր պահանջներուն էական կետերը դնել անոնց առջև և անդրդվելի մնալ:

Ուզեցի հասկնալ իր կարծիքը մեր կողմէ դեսպաններու ընելիք նոր դիմումներու նպատակահարմարության մասին: Բնքը օգտակար գտնելով հանդերձ, դեսպանին կամքը առնելու պետքը տեսաւ: Ըսի իրեն թե Շեռնբերգի հետ հայոց մեկ ներկայացուցիչ կրնա տեսակցիլ երբ այս մասին նույնպէս դեսպանին կամքը առնվի: Խոստացաւ այս մասին հաղորդել:

Ամբողջ խոսակցության ընթացքին մեջ այն տպավորությունը ունեցա որ գերմանական նոր խաղը ռուսաց զայրությոյնը պատճառելով հանդերձ, բավական շփոթեցուցած է այնքան որ այս մասին հեռագրով Պետերբուրգ հաղորդած են հրահանգ խնդրելով: Պզտիկ տկարություն մը, անվճռականություն մը նշմարեցի, բայց մերթ ալ գործը առաջ վարելու որոշում մը:

Այս պայմաններու մեջ ես ալ սրտաբեկ, պատշաճ չտեսա այլևս Տրապիզոնի մասին խոսք ընելու, քանի որ հիմեն կիսախտվեր մեր պահանջները:

Նույն օրը գացի տեսնելու Պրն. Վայսը /"Ֆրանկֆուրտեր ցայտունգ"ի թղթակիցը և խիստ ազդեցիկ գերմանական դեսպանատան մեջ/: Դեսպանին այս ընթացքին դեմ գանգատեցա, հազիվ, ըսի, գերմանացիները հայերու վստահություն

ներշնչելու վրա էին: Հայ-գերմանական բարեկամությունը դեռ տկար բույս մըն էր և ահա ամենածանր հարված մը կընդունվի:

Պրն. Վայսը իր հայասիրական զգացումները կրկին հայտնելով ինձի, դատապարտեց դեսպանին այս *volte-face*-ը: Ըսավ թե նա խաբված և քիչ մըն ալ հմայված էր թուրքերե: Մասնավորապես կվստահի ներկա *grand-vezir*-ին, բայց Բեռլինի մեջ քաղաքականությունը նույն է հայոց հանդեպ և թե այս չնչին դժվարությունը շուտով պիտի վերնա: Խորհուրդ տվավ որ Շեռնբերգեն վերջ տեսնվիմ Պրն. Դը Վանգենհայմի հետ և խոսիմ: /Այս բանը ըսավ նաև Պրն. Մանդելշթայմը/: Կրկնեց իր խորհուրդը որ տված էր անգամ մը և որուն ինքը շատ նշանակություն կուտա, այն է, որ Բեռլինի մեջ գերմանական կայսրուհուն աղերսագիր մը տրվի հայկական դատը պաշտպանելու մասին: Կայսրուհուն ազդեցությունը մեծ է և ինքն ալ հայասեր է և թուրքերն ալ չի սիրեր: Պրն. Վայսը ըսավ նաև որ դեսպանատան մեջ ինքն ևս պիտի աշխատի և իր լրագրի մեջ հոդված մը պիտի գրե:

21 / 3 Մեպտեմբեր 1913թ.

Մանդելշտամը անձամբ բերավ դեսպանատունեն սպասված հրահանգները երկու առաջարկներու մասին: Կրկնեցի /պատվիրակը/ մեր հրահանգը, ըսի որ եթե գերմանիայի այս հետադարձ շարժման վրա պնդեն իր երկու բարեկամները, ինչ պիտի ըլլա մեր վիճակը դեսպաններուն ժողովին մեջ: Կվախնամ ըսի, որ Անգլիան թույլ գտնվելով, ինչպես որ դուք ալ նկատեցիք, իսկ Ֆրանսիան շուտով խաղաղ վիճակ մը ստեղծելու փափագով յուր դրամազույսները փոխադրությամբ և երկաթուղային ձեռնարկները շահագործելու հոգատարությամբ ավելի թույլ գտնվի և Ռուսիան մինակ մնա:

Թարգմանը լուծ է: Պատվիրակը այցելուցած է որ ասկե քանի մը շաբաթ վերջ մեր վիճակը ավելի տկար պիտի ըլլա, որովհետև թուրք կառավարությունը պիտի գորանա փոխառությամբ և զինվորական ուժերը հավաքելով հայկական վիճակներու մեջ:

Թարգմանը ըսավ թե գիտե որ Ջեմալ բեյ վեցերորդ գորաբանակը Էրզրում փոխադրելու վրա, ասկե ավելի բան մը չըսավ նորեն:

Պատվիրակը ըսավ, որ Ռուսիան մինակ մնացած կարելի է որ մեր դատը չկարենա հետապնդել այլևս, և թե նոր շրջան մը սկսվելու ըլլար ով գիտե քանի տարվան համար, մեր առջի վիճակի մեջ պիտի ձգվեինք տաճկաց կառավարության ենթարկված, որ այս անգամ կատարած ջանքերեն ալ ավելի սաստկացած պիտի ըլլային:

Ասոր միայն պատասխանեց որ դեսպանը մեզի խոսք տված էր թե ջարդեր թույլ չպիտի տա: Ըսի որ ջարդերը տարբեր բաներ են, իսկ ամենօրյա քայքայում և հալածանքն ալ տարբեր: Դարձյալ պատասխան չառի: Ըսի որ պարտավոր եմ դեսպանին այս բոլորը խոսիլ և անոր կարծիքը իմանալ, իրաց նոր կացության մասին, հարմար դատեց: Գերման դեսպանին հետ Դը Գիրսի տեսակցութենեն վերջը, Թարգմանը պիտի երթար Դը Գիրսը տեսնելու:

Այսօրվան տպավորություննս Ռուսիո տկարության մասին երեկվան զգացածս ավելի ևս կհաստատեն: Թարգմանը կարծես ինձ կսպասեր: Խորհուրդ խնդրեց որ վեց դեսպաններու քով ըլլայիք դիմումը փութով կատարվի: Իր բաղձանքը այն է որ թուրքաց հետ խոսակցության միջոցին, դեսպաններու գրված թղթի մոտ, իբրև ամփոփում, թուղթով մը հայտնվեր մեր հիմնական պահանջները: Ըսի որ ատիկա կրնար խզում մը առաջ բերել և թե այդ կետերը իբրև մեր պահանջները ներկայացնելով մեկտեղ բերանացի կերպով, գրավոր տալու մասին պիտի մտածինք:

Ինք կարծեր թե իր առաջարկը խզում մը չի ենթադրեր.- ըսի որ շատ մտահոգ ենք, պիտի խորհինք:

Կարդացի իրեն դեսպաններու գրվելիք նոր *note confidentielle*-ը, որ հավանեց և շատ հարմար տեսավ մանավանդ վերջին պարբերությունը ավելցնելով թե «հայերը քիչ մը ավելի տոկունություն և կորով պիտի ցույց տան այժմ»:

ՏԵՍԱԿՑՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ ՊՐՆ. ՄԱՆԴԵԼՇԱՍԻ ՀԵՏ

24/6 սեպտեմբեր / շաբաթ [Պետք է լինի ուրբաթ – Մ.Մ./ 1913 թ.

- Թարգմանը հարցուց Տեղապահ Սրբազանին քաղած տպավորությունները ըրած այցելություններեն:

- Ֆրանսիան և Անգլիան թույլ են գտնվեր: Գերմանիան առանց որոշ *concrete* բաներ ըսելու տարտամ բարյացակամություն հայտնեւ է: Իտալիայեն կարծես քիչ մը հետաքրքրություն և մտոնկություն տեսնվեր է դեպի մեզ:

- Իտալիայեն կսապսենք այդ: Եթե Տեղապահը Ավստրիո դեսպանին հետ ալ խոսած ըլլար հոն ալ դեպի լավ փոփոխություն մը պիտի տեսներ: Ռուսիան աշխատեցավ այս երկուքին քով: Ադէկ կըլլար որ Ֆրանսիային հասկցնէիք որ եթե հայկական խնդիրը երեսի վրա ձգե անախորժություններ կրնան պատահիլ և Ֆրանսիան որ միմիայն փոխառությունը ընելու աճապարանքը ունի իր դրամագլուխն բոլորովին ապահով պայմաններու մեջ փոխ տված չպիտի ըլլա: Հետո երկաթուղիներու շինությունն ալ կրնա ետ մնալ: Անոնք հասկցուցեք Ֆրանսիային: Նույնպէս փաշան քիչ մը կորով թող ցուցնէ թե Ֆրանսիայի և թե Անգլիո: Նույնպէս Գերմանիո հանդէպ, մանավանդ, սա վերջին *volte-face*-ին համար:

- Գերմանիո ընթացքի մասին գրեցինք արդեն փաշային: Հարցուցի թե արդոյք հայ հեղափոխական մարմիններու կողմէ խիստ քաղաքավար թուղթ մը տրվիլն դեսպաններուն օգուտ մը չէ՞ր ունենար արդոյք և մեր *notice*-ի վերջին մասը չէ՞ր ուժովցնէր: Ի՞նչ էր դեսպանին կարծիքը այս մասին:

- Գաղափարը շատ լավ է : Կխոսիմ ձեզ կիմացնեմ:

- Դեսպանը Դը Վանգենհայմի հետ խոսեցա՞վ արդոյք:

- Ոչ, ուզեց որ սա վերջին *notice*-ն ալ ներկայացված ըլլա: Շեռնբերգի հետ ըլլայիք խոսակցությունն ալ իմանա: Ինքը երեքաբթի պիտի տեսնվի: Վաղը Պետերբուրգ պիտի հեռագրենք պետությանը ամեն մեկին ըրած տպավորությունը ձեր ներկայացուած վերջին *notice*-ի վերաբերմամբ:

- Հարցուցի թե ի՞նչի կվերագրեր Շեռներեզի ժամադրության չգալը, թյուրիմացությունն, թե մեր վերջին notice-ի դեմ դժգոհության ցույց մը:

- Վերջին ենթադրությունը ավելի ճիշտ է, բայց պետք է լուսաբանել և դեսպանին հետ խոսիլ: Լավ կըլլար որ դուք ալ ուղղակի Վանգենհայսը տեսնեք:

- Հարցուցի թե ի՞նչ ընթացք բռնենք թյուրքաց հետ. խզե՞նք թե ոչ:

- Ժամանակ վաստակեցեք: Կհուսամ որ այս շաբաթվան վերջերը պետությունները հայկական հարցով զբաղվիլ պիտի սկսին, և ադեկ քայլ մը պիտի առնենք:

- Հաջողության շանսերը ի՞նչ են: Ի՞նչ պիտի ըլլա եթե Ռուսիա մինակը մնա: Տաճկաց վրա գործվելիք ճնշում մը որն կրնա ըլլալ, ահավասիկ Ֆրանսիան և Անգլիան բոլորովին թույլ են:

- Բավական chance-ներ կան որ բան մը պիտի ընենք: Կրկնեմ որ շաբթվան վերջը խնդիրը բավական պիտի լուսաբանվի. եթե ուրիշ խնդիրներու մեջ հաջողեցինք, միայն չպիտի ըլլա այս խնդրույն մեջ: Ռուսիա, Բուլղարիա և Ավստրիոյ միացան կաշխատի որ, թերևս ալ Գերմանիո ճնշումի մասին վերջին կմտածենք:

- Ես ձեզի ըսի որ բանակ մը պետք կար պատրաստ պահել Կովկասի մեջ:

- Մենք ի հարկին անանկ ծեծ մը կուտանք, որ թուրքերը երբեք չմոռանան: 4.000.000 զորք ունինք:

- Այո, բայց Պրն. Վանգենհայսի խոսքերն ալ մտքե մի հանեք:

- Ամեն բան ժամանակի մը համար է: Էդիրների խնդրին մեջ չպնդեցինք, վասնզի Էդիրների մեջ թուրքերեն դժգոհ և բողոքող ժողովուրդ մը չկար: Հայաստանի մեջ ասոր հակառակն է, Հայ ժողովուրդը չեմ կարծեր որ լուռ մնա եթե հայկական բարենորոգումները ետ մնան որևէ պատճառով: Լուռ կեցալ թարգմանը և ինձի հարցուց

- Ի՞նչ կըսեք, այդ պարագային հայերը լուռ կմնա՞ն թե կապստամբին:

- Պատասխանեցի, եթե թուրքերը գեշ վարվին հետերնին՝ կապստամբին: Կվախնամ, որ թուրքերը առանց մեր փափագածները տալու պիտի զգուշանան անհանդուրժելի վիճակ մը ստեղծել և նույնիսկ երկրորդական կարգի գոհացումներ պիտի տան մեզի:

- Եթե մեր քրդերը գձեզ անհանգիստ ընեն...

- Թուրքերը քրդերուն զլուխը պիտի ձգմեն, ոչ թե մեզի բարիք մը ընելու համար, այլ անվստահելի դարձած e' le ment մը խորտակելու համար: Ուստի ասկեց ալ հույս չկա որ ապստամբելու պատճառ տրվի: Մանավանդ որ թուրքերը քիչ ատենեն մեծ ուժ պիտի հավաքեն Հայաստանի մեջ թե հայոց, թե քրդաց և թե ռուսաց դեմ: Հայեր այն ատեն միայն պիտի ապստամբին եթե հաջողության լուրջ հույսեր և հենակետեր ունենան, արկածախնդրություն չպիտի ընեն:

Եթե Ռուսիա օգնե իրենց, հայերը կրնան շարժիլ, բայց պրն. Տրուբեցքոյը պարզ անձնապաշտության համար անգամ, զենք տալու տրամադիր չէ թվեր, ըսելով, որ զենքը ինքնին կրակ կառնե:

- Պրն. Տրուբեցքոյը ըսած է այդ խոսքը դիվանագիտական ճամբով, դատին լուծվելուն հույս դնելով: Ես կխոսիմ ձախողության պարագային:

- Ես ալ կ'ապատահանեմ թէ առանց հաստատ օգնության Թուրքիոյ հայերը չեն ապստամբիր: Մյուս կողմէ իմ կարծիքս այն է, որ թուրքերը պիտի դիմադրեն մինչև վերջը, ուստի Ռուսիա հիմակուց աստոր դեմ ինչ ընելին որոշելու է, և եթէ անպատեհություն չկա մեզի իմացնելու է:

- Ես կ'կարծեմ թէ գերմանները վերջ ի վերջոյ իրենց առջի զիջումներուն պիտի գան: Պիտի գանոնք հարմարցնել թերևս ալ լմնցնելու համար վիլայէթները պահել պետք ըլլա, բայց *inspecteur*-ները մեծ պետությանց հավանությամբ ընտրվիլը և վալիներն ալ անվանել և պաշտոնանկ ընելու արտոնելը անհրաժեշտ է /*Լեփսիուսի առաջարկը*/ [1913 թ. օգոստոսի սկզբին Կ. Պոլսում Յոհաննէս Լեփսիուսը գերմանական դեսպանատան անունից կիսապաշտոնական գրավոր առաջարկներ էր փոխանցել հայոց պատրիարքարանին: Կ. Պոլսից Լեփսիուսի մեկնելուց հետո գերմանական դեսպանությունը հրաժարվել էր իր առաջարկներից – Մ.Ս.]: Թարգմանը հարցուց թէ Հայաստանի երկու շրջանի բաժանելու *Etude*-ը լմնցա՞վ, թէ ոչ: Եվ հետաքրքիր եղավ արդյունքին:

Ըսի, որ դեռ չլմնցավ:

Թարգմանը հայտնեց որ բովանդակ Ռուսիան հայկական դատին համակիր է և միաբան, որոշելով ուրեմն որ

1. Թուրքաց հետ բանակցությունը / անհատական հանգամանքով/ չխզենք:
2. Հեղափոխական կուսակցությանց կողմէ դեսպանատանց գիր մը տրվելու մասին դեսպանին կարծիքը պիտի առնվի:
3. Դեսպանը պիտի տեսնեմ, Վանգենհայմի հետ խոսակցելէն հետո:

Վերջէն թարգմանը ուզեց – եթէ կարելի է մեր միջոցով ճշգրիտ պայմանները գիտնալ թուրքաց և արաբաց մեջ գոյացած համաձայնության:

Այսօրվան տպավորությունս քաջալերիչ է. Ռուսիա՝ Ֆրանսիայի և Անգլիոյ լքումին տեղ Իտալիան և Ավստրիան և քիչ մըն ալ Գերմանիան դեպի իրեն քաշելու ճամբան բռնած կ'ըլլի:

ԽՈՍՍԱԿՑՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ ՊՐՆ.ՇԵՆՈՒԲԵՐԳԻ ՀԵՏ

Ուրբաթ 30 Օգոս./ 12 Մեպտ. 1913 թ./

Պրն. Շենոբերգը Գերմանիոյ դեսպանատան մեր մասին ունեցած բարյացակամ տրամադրությունները կրկնելով, ըսավ որ անիկա գործնական բան մը՝ սկզբնավորություն մը կրադա բարենորոգմանց խնդրույն մեջ, ուստի կզգուշանա այն ամեն բաներէն որոնք *irreductible opposition*-ի մը տեղի կուտան թուրքաց կողմէն, այսպէս շարժելով հայոց օգտին կաշխատին, հայոց, զոր կնկատեմ աշխատասեր և աջակից տարր որուն վրա *compter*-ի կրնա ընել: Կուզեմ ցրել այն կարծիքը հայոց որ դեսպանատունը կդիմադրէ բարենորոգմանց, ընդհակառակը նա անոր հաջողելուն կբաղձա:

Պատվիրակ - Այս տեսակցության մեջ ես ավելի կարևորություն կընծայեմ հայոց և գերմանացոց միացման քան թէ հայ-թուրքաց վեճին: Այսօր իրավ որ հայերը շատ զարմացած տեսնելով գերմանական դեսպանատանն տաճկաց տե-

սակետին համար միայն աշխատող, տաճիկները քաջալերող և հայերը վհատեցնող:

Շեռներգը բողոքեց ասոր դեմ:

Եվ չէք կրնար ուրանալ սակայն տաճկաց 1 հուլիս շրջաբերականը հիմք ընելով պատվիրակներու համաժողովին մեջ, նույնիսկ պահ մը ավելորդ դատեցիք հայկական բարենորոգումներով զբաղիլ: Եվ ասիկա շատ մոտեն գիտեմ: Գիտեմ նաև որ գերմանական դեսպանատունն իր խորհուրդներովն էր, որ *inspecteur ge'ne'ral*- ներու հատուկ օրինագիծը, հապճեպով միայն ռուսական *projet*-ն ջուրը ձգելու համար շինված, հրատարակվեցավ այնքան հապճեպով, որ զայն պատրաստող կառավարությունը միջոց և ժամանակ չունեցավ զայն հաշտեցնելու օրենքին հետ և կամ բանավոր և լուրջ հանգամանք մը տալու համար անոր: Այսպես ըլլալը նույնիսկ Թալաաթ բեյը ինձի խոստովանեցավ, կտեսնեք, որ վավերական տեղեկությանց վրա կ'իսխիմ:

Շեռներգը - Քանի որ պատվիրակներու հանձնաժողովին թուղթերը կարդացեր էք...

Պատվիրակ - Ո՛հ, չեմ կարդացեր, բայց կրցած եմ քիչ մը տեղեկություններ առնել [Իրականում Ձոհրապը քաջատեղյակ էր դեսպանությունների պատվիրակների Ենի-քյոյի համաժողովի արձանագրություններից: Այդ մասին ռուսաց դեսպան Մ. Ն. Գիրսը գաղտնիորեն հոգացել էր – Մ.Մ.]:

Շեռներգը - Շատ լավ, այն ստեն տեսած ըլլալու էք որ Գերմանիան, Ավստրիան, վերջին նիստին բավական լուրջ բարենորոգումներ առաջարկած են, դուք անհնարին բաներ պահանջելով և համառելով /մեկ վիլայեթի կազմություն, տերությանց հավանությունը *inspecteur ge'ne'ral*-ի անվանումին և այլն/ բարենորոգմանց *irre'alisable* ըլլալուն պատճառ կըլլար: Վասնզի թուրքերը - և շատ խորին կերպով համոզված ենք ասոր - մինչև վերջ պիտի ընդդիմանան ասոնց. ի՞նչի պիտի հանգի ասոր վերջը, ոչնչի: Բռնի՞ ուժ գործածել, ասիկա ոչ մի պետություն կուզե, այդ միջոցով միայն ձեռք բերվելիք բաներ չեն, ըսել է. ա՛յն է նախամեծարը քեզ, բայց անմիջապես գործադրելի, թե շատ բայց անհնարին:

Պատվիրակ - Հայերը գործնական մտքի տեր մարդիկ են, տեսեք անոնք *autonomie* անգամ չեն պահանջեր: Մինչդեռ արաբները պահանջած են զայն, բայց միանգամայն չեն կրնար հրաժարիլ այնպիսի պայմաններե դուրս բարենորոգմանց իրական / և ոչ թե ձևի համար և խաբեբա կերպով / գործադրման համար անհրաժեշտ կնկատեն: Օրինակի համար սա վայրկյանիս ձեր ըսած խոսքին պատասխանելով հիմակուց ըսեմ ձեզի որ առանց պետությանց հավանության օտարականք մը Հայաստանի մեջ բարենորոգմանց գլուխ նշանակվիլը հայերը չեն ընդունիր, և անօգուտ է եթե այս էական պայմանը չընդունի այս գործով զբաղիլ: Լավագույն է, որ հայերը իրենց ճակատագրին թողունք և դեպքերը իբրև բանավոր լուծումը:

Շեռներգը - Պնդեց, որ թուրքերը երբեք պետությանց հավանություն պայմանը չեն ընդունելու: *Coe rcitive* միջոցներ գործածել հարկ պիտի ըլլա, *Omega* *mandat* թե՛ նավային ցույց:

Եթե Գերմանիան հաճի իսկ պետությունները չպիտի հոժարին: Հետո կրկնեց իր փաստերը ըսելով *controle*-ի տակ պիտի ըլլա *inspecteur*-ը, և այս ալ հավանություն չափ գորավոր է:

Պատվիրակ - Բացատրեցի իրեն, որ այն ձևով որ այս *controle*-ը հաստատել կուզեն, անհկա բոլորովին *inefficace* է, ուստի ավելի ևս անհրաժեշտ է, որ Բարենորոգումները գործադրեք, նորեն անվանումը պետությանը հավանությամբ ըլլա:

Շեռնբերգ - Համառեցավ մինչև վերջ իր տեսակետին վրա և ըսավ, որ թուրքերը իրեն *amour-propre*-ին համար ալ չեն կրնար այս պայմանը ընդունել և թե թուրքաց հետ ապրելու կոչված, պետք էինք ավելի հաշտարար ոգի մը ցույց տալ:

Պատվիրակ - Բացատրեցի հայոց քաղաքական ուղղությունը, օսմանյան պետության մեջ ապրելու փափագը դեռ բոլորովին թողած չըլլալով կճանչնայինք աստոր մեր վրա դրված պարտականությունները, բայց *assentiment des Puissances*-ը անանկ էական է, որ անոր վրա *concession* անհնար է: Հարցուցի թե մի՞թե Գերմանիո շահը չի պահանջեր տևական վիճակի հաստատումը Հայաստանի մեջ, արդ եթե օտար պաշտոնյան Բ. Դոնեն կախում ունենա ոչինչ պիտի կրնա ընել: Իր ամսականը պիտի անկե ստանա և տաճկաց հաճելի լինելուն պիտի նայի: Մենք, ըսի, տաճկաց վիրավորել չենք ուզեր, ընդհակառակն կուզենք, որ անոնք ալ գիտնան թե իրենց շահը և մերինը նույնն է: Բայց անոնց *mentalite*-ն անուղղելի է: Անոնց խոսած Բարենորոգումներն ալ հինգած, փոտած բաներ են: Ամեն անգամ, որ ընկճված ազգ մը Բարենորոգում մը պահանջեր է, անոնք հիմնական *reformes*-ը ուզած են, ընդհանուր Բարենորոգում, Եվրոպացի պաշտոնյաներու աջակցություն, ասոր վրա ավելի խոսիլ չարժեր: Կմոռնան սակայն, որ վիճակը շատ ծանր է: Եթե հայերը տեսնեն, որ այս անգամ ալ Բարենորոգմանը հարցը ջուրը ինկած է ապստամբութենե գատ բանի մը վրա չպիտի մտածեն: Եվ ինչ-որ բախտ կտնօրինե այն կըլլա:

Շեռնբերգ - Կարծեք, որ ապստամբությունը կհաջողի:

Պատվիրակ - Ով ըսավ, որ ապստամբությունները կհաջողին, այսինքն հաջող կհանդիսանան եւ ոչ մեկ տեղ մասնավորապես Թուրքիո մեջ: Ապստամբները կընկճվին զինու գորությամբ, բայց ապստամբիչ երկիրը կանջատվի: Այս անգամ ալ անանկ պիտի ըլլա, Հայաստանը Ռուսիո պիտի անցնի և խնդիրը պիտի վերջանա:

Շեռնբերգ - Չեմ կարծեր, որ Հայաստանը Ռուսիո կրնա կցվիլ եթե Եվրոպան չուզե:

Պատվիրակ - Ձեզի կապահովցնեմ, որ այդպես պիտի ըլլա: Եվրոպան պիտի պարտավորվի ուզելու և իրողությունները նկատողության առնելու: Ըսի որ հայ ազգին հոգեբանությունը ծանր գինովության աստիճանի մը հասած էր և մեր ձեռքը չէր, հուսախաբության պարագային, մեր ուզածին պես վարել զայն: Ըսի որ քրդերը շատ պատրաստ էին շարժումի մը, բայց մենք անոնց հետ գործակցիլ չենք ուզեր և թե հույսերնիս Եվրոպային կտրած չենք:

Այս ձևով խոսեցանք երկար: Միշտ նա /պնդեց/ թե թուրքերը *assentiment des puissances* երբեք չպիտի ընդունեն: Բնձի թվեցավ թե գերման դեսպանը մոտ օրերըս խոսակցություն մը ունեցեր էր *Grand Vé'zir*-ին /որ իրոք շատ *enté'té*-արարած մըն է/ հետ, և խորապես համոզված է Թուրքիոյ դիմադրությանը: Ես ըսի որ պետք էր ընտրել կամ հրաժարվիլ Բարենորոգմանց խնդրեն, կամ այս պայմանը ընդունիլ: Ըսի որ գրեթե շատ մոտ բան մը 1880-ի հավաքական ծանուցագրին մեջ կար արդեն և թե *formule*-ը կրնային մեղմ ընել, որ Թուրքիոյ անձնասիրությունը չվիրավորվի:

Խոսակցությունը պահ մը գրեթե ընդհատվելու մոտ վիճակ մը ստանալէ վերջ վերսկսավ:

Պատվիրակ - Մեր քաղաքական ուղղությունը հետևյալն է, նախ հաշտ ըլլալ Օսմանյան կայսրության հետ, ուր պիտի ապրինք, երկրորդ՝ ռուս պետության հետ, որ սահմանակից է, և ուր այնքան հայեր կ'ընակին և հանգիստ կ'յանք կ'վարեն, երրորդ՝ Գերմանիոյ Բարեկամությանն հետույ Կիլիկիոյ և Միջին Ասիոյ մեջ: Մենք համոզված ենք որքան գերմանական *pe'ne'tration*-ը Անադոլոյէն դեպի ներս տարածվի, Անադոլոյի մեջ ալ, այնքան հայոց ապահովությունը կ'ուժովնա: Ահա այս երեք կետերուն վրա մեր քաղաքականությունը կ'իմնվի:

Շեռնքերգ - Բոլորովին համամիտ եմ ձեզի, բայց ձեր համառելը ռուսական *projet*-ին վրա, Օսմանյան կառավարության դեմ հաշտարար ոգիի ապացույց չէ:

Պատվիրակ - Կրկնեմ, որ *assentiment des puissances*-ի պէս էական պայմանէ հրաժարվելով, հայկական Բարենորոգումներէն հրաժարված կ'ըլլաք և դուք սա կ'ցանկաք:

Շեռնքերգ - *Controle*-ը լեզվի, հողային հարցի *repré'sentation e'gale*, պաշտոնի մասնակցություն, վիլայեթներու ժողովներու *compe'tence*-ի ընդարձակումը, ի նչ-պէս, ասոնք արհամարհելի կ'համարեք:

Պատվիրակ - Ասոնց արժեքը գիտեմ, բայց էական հայ տարրին իսլամ տարրէն ճգնվիլն է: Յորչափ իսլամ *fonctionnaire* և դատարաններու գլուխը եվրոպական *mentalite'* մը ուղղիչը չ'ըլլա և հայերը չ'պաշտպանվին, բան մը եղած չ'ըլլար: Կրկնեմ որ զիջում չ'ենք կրնար ընել այս մասին: Բայց ցույց տալու համար թե մենք ալ Գերմանիոյ պէս Բարենորոգմանը սկզբնավորությունն տեսնելու կ'բաղձանք և զոհողության ալ պատրաստ ենք, կրնանք մյուս կետերու մասին խորհրդակցիլ: Այս կետը սակայն իմ անձնական կարծիքն է, միայն վերջին կամքը մեր Պատրիարքարանինն է: Հետո դիտել տվի որ Պրն. Լեփսիոսը ընդունած էր *assentiment*-ի պայմանը, ընդունած էր շատ մը ուրիշ բաներ և թե ցավալի էր, որ դեսպանատունն ետ էր առնէր այս ամենը:

Շեռնքերգը զարմանք հայտնեց:

Գրված թուղթ մըն ալ կա, ըսի տեսնել ուզեց:

Պատվիրակ - Ըսի որ եթե *volte-face*-ը հայ ազգը իմանար շատ պիտի հուզվի: Ըսի որ գաղտնի պահեցինք այս ամենը: Մենք փոքրամասնություն մըն ենք որ Գերմանիոյ և հայոց մերձեցման կաշխատինք: Արդ եթե այս իմացվեր, մեծ հարված մը պիտի ըլլար մեր գործին: Ես կուզեի որ ոչ միայն Գերմանիոյ ընդդիմու-

թյունը չըլլար, այլ անոր աջակցության պարտեհինք մեր հաջողությունը, գոնե մասամբ: Ըսավ որ թերևս այսպես պիտի ըլլա: Ըսի որ Գերմանիան և Ռուսիան պիտի լավ համաձայնին և ոչ թե վիճին եթե կուզվի դրական բան մը ըլել:

Շեռնբերգը համամիտ ըլլալը հայտնեց: Հետո ավելցուց թե հիմ կրնդունվի տաճկաց առաջարկություններն զանազան փոփոխություններով: Խստիվ մերժեցի սա բանաձևը: Ըսի որ սա կետն ալ անգիջանելի կնկատեմ, թե հայկական հատուկ բարենորոգում մը չի կրնար ընդհանուր բարենորոգմանց մեջ լուծել և անհետացնել: Այսպես անհրաժեշտ և անգիջանելի նկատեցի հավասարությունն *representation*-ի և պաշտոնի մեջ: Ըսավ որ այս վերջին կետը իրենք կրնդունին, առաջին երկու կետերը նոթագրեց: Կրկնեցի, իսկ վիլայեթներու և վալիներու մասին ես միմիայն իմ անձնական կարծիքն հայտնած եմ, իսկ ամեն պարագայի մեջ ատիկա եթե մեր ազգեն ալ ընդունվեր միմիայն գործին վերջնական պաշտոնապես անգիջանելի կետերն ասոնք են, զորս հայտնած ենք Պատրիարքարանի վերջին գրության մեջ:

Հետո ըսի միշտ թեությամբ թե եթե երբեք Պատրիարքարանն ալ ընդուներ վիլայեթներու պահպանումը, ատիկա միայն վերջին ժամուն պիտի հայտներ, գործին վերջ մը տալու համար և ոչ թե բանակցությանց էական:

Եթե պատրիարքարանը այս զիջումը ըներ այն ատեն պետք էր ընդհանուր քննիչին պաշտոնը տրվեր վալիի հրաժարցնելու և անոր տեղն անվանելու իրավունքը տալ և առհասարակ զծել անոր *attribution*-ները որոշ կերպով: Համամիտ թվեցավ, խոստացավ այս ամենը դեսպանին հաղորդել: Վերջին պահուն խոսակցությունը քաղցրացավ և մտերմությամբ բաժանվեցանք և զիս կրկին տեսնելու փափաքը հայտնեց:

ԱՄՓՈՓՈՒՄ

Մեր խոսակցությունը Ա. մասին մեջ խիստ էր և հեռու իրարմե, վերջին մասերուն մեջ ավելի մեղմ և մոտիկանալու տրամադրության մեջ:

1. Պատրիարքարանի վերջին թուղթին մեջ նշանակված հինգ կետերը կմնան պաշտոնապես անփոփոխ [Երբ գերմանական դեսպանությունը կատարեց *volte-face* (դիմափոխություն), այսինքն՝ հրաժարվեց Լեփսիուսի միջոցով կատարված առաջարկներից, Կ. Պոլսի հայոց պատրիարքարանը, իրեն խաբված զգալով, օգոստոսի 29-ին տերությունների դեսպանատներին էր հանձնել բարենորոգումների հինգ անխախտ պայմանների մասին հուշագիր – Մ.Մ.]:

2. Վալիներու և վիլայեթներու պահպանումին կամ մեկ վիլայեթի և մեկ ընդհանուր վալի անվանելու խնդիրը, իմ անձնական կարծիքովս, կրնա նորեն քնվիլ, բայց Պատրիարքարանի դիտավորությունները չեմ գիտեր այս մասին:

3. Ամեն պարագայի մեջ բարենորոգումները ի գործ դնելու համար առնվելիք օտարական բարձր պաշտոնյան, ինչ ալ ըլլա իր անունը պետք է պետությանց հավանությամբ անվանվի այս պայմանը, որ շատ քաղցր ձևով մը կրնա օգտակար ըլլալ, անհրաժեշտ է մեզի, զիջում չի կրնար ըլլար ասոր վրա:

4. Այս պարագային /այսինքն երկու *inspecteur general*-ի ընտրության Պատրիարքարանը հավանի/ պետք է ընդլայնել անոր իրավասությունները վալին պաշտոնե հանելու հետ և նոր վալի նշանակելու իրավունքը տալ և ուրիշ կետերու մեջ ալ իր իրավասությունն ընդարձակելով ճշտել:

5. Հավասարությունը՝ *représentation*-ի և *fonctions publiques*-ի համար քրիստոնյա և ոչ քրիստոնյա տարերու մեջ, անհրաժեշտ պայման է, այս մասին որևէ զիջում չի կրնար ըլլալ: Ըսով որ այս մասին գերմանական դեսպանատունը դիտողություն չունի:

6. Պատրիարքարանը եթե երբեք իմ անձնական կարծիքովս ենթադրված զիջողությունն ընդունի, այնուհետև միայն անիկա կրնա հայտնել երբ որ տեսնե թե ամեն ինչ ընդունված է բացի այս կետեն:

7. Հայկական բարենորոգումները տաճկական ընդհանուր բարենորոգումի հարցին հետ չի կրնար շփոթվիլ կամ անոր մեջ լուծվիլ: Հայկական բարենորոգումները միջազգային հանգամանք մը ունին ուրկէ չենք կրնար հրաժարվիլ: Այս կետն ալ զիջողություն չընդունիր:

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Իրեն հաղորդեր է Շեռնբերգ տեսակցության արդյունքը:

Դժգոհություն հայտնեց զիջումներ լինելու տրամադրության մասին, զիջումները Ռուսիա պիտի վերապահել:

Պրն. Վանգենհայմը իրավունք պիտի ունենա ըսելու թե ռուսաց Դեսպանատունը ավելի անհաշտ է քան հայերը:

Պատվիրակ - Իրապես զիջողություն չկար, որովհետև ամեն մեկու դեմ փոխարինություններ առնելու պայմաններ դրված էր: Նախ անձնական հանգամանքով այդ տրամադրությունը ցուցուած է բացորոշապես շեշտելով Պատրիարքարանի վճիռը:

Թարգման - Բեռլինի մեջ այս պատճառով ճիշտ Շեռնբերգի ըսածին պես, ամեն զիջողություններ ետ դառնալու տրամադրություն կա և թե նույնիսկ առաջարկություն կա, որպեսզի թարգմանը նորեն միանալով, թուրքաց առաջարկություններն ալ քննեն, և թե հավանական է, որ Վանգենհայմին ռուսաց դեսպանը վաղը այս մտքով խոսք բանա:

Պատվիրակ - Ըստ կարելույն խիստ լեզու գործածած եմ, որպեսզի չենթադրե թե հայերը թուրքաց առաջարկները կրնան ընդունիլ, այս մասին կատարելապես համոզված մեկնեցավ:

Բացատրեցի թե զիջողություն ըսածներու դեմ ի՞նչ փոփոխություններ կուզեինք.

Ա. Առհասարակ որևէ զիջում ընելու համար պայման դրեր էի մյուս բոլոր պայմաններու վերջնականապես ընդունվիլը:

Բ. Վալիներու և վիլայեթներու պահպանման դեմ, պայման դրեր էի ընդհանուր քննիչի վալիներ հրաժարեցնելէ զատ նաև իրավունք մը անվանելու: *Assentiment*-ի ձևական փոփոխության մը ենթարկելու դեմ, պայման դրեր էի էու-

թյան պահպանումը: Ուրեմն զիջողություն մը ըրածի պէս էր, բայց իրապէս ոչինչ չէի զիջած:

Իմ տպավորությունս այն էր, որ թարգմանը առհասարակ Ռուսիո մինակ ձգված ըլլալը կհասկացներ ինձի, առաջարկելով շատ տկար և աննշան միջոցներ: Օրինակ խորհուրդ կուտար, որ Բտալիո *charge d'Affaires*-ը և Ավստրիո առաջին թարգմանը տեսնեինք: Դիտել տվի, որ այս երկու պետությանց ընդհանուր քաղաքականությունը, այս երկու անձնավորություններու հետ խոսելով չի կրնար փոխվիլ:

Համաձայն ըլլալով, ըսավ, որ կրնա սակայն օգուտ մը բերել:

Նույնպէս անհամբեր կսպասեր, որ դեսպանները իրենց դիմումները կատարեն:

Գոհությամբ պատմեց ինձի Վանա դեպքի մանրամասնությունները / Մելքոնի սպանության մասին և այլն/: Մանավանդ հայերու զինված ըլլալը:

Պատվիրակ - Հայաստանի մյուս մասերու մեջ այնպէս չէր, մանավանդ մյուս հայաբնակ վայրերը: Երկաթուղայիններու մասին Ռուսիո և Թուրքիո մէջ բանակցությունները սկսելը հաստատեց: Բայց ըսավ, որ հին խնդրին շարունակությունն է, նոր խնդիր մը չէ: Ամեն պարագայի մէջ, հայկական խնդրին վնասելու հանգամանք չունեն:

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Ռուսական դեսպանը Վանգենհայմին հետ տեսնվել է պայմանով, որ մարդու մը չհաղորդվի: Անձնապէս ինձ լուր կղրկե թէ դժգոհ չէ այսօրվան ունեցած խոսակցությունէն: Ընդհանուր գիծերուն վրա խոսած են: Մասնավոր կետերը երկրորդ խոսակցության նյութ ըլլալու են: Անիկա այս շաբթվան մէջ պիտի կատարվի:

Այս միջոցին ռուս դեսպանը պիտի տեսակցի նաև մյուս դեսպաններու հետ, այնպէս, որ կրնա ըսվիլ թէ դեսպաններու մէջ նախնական խոսակցությունը սկսած է և թէ 4-5 օրէն բավական որոշ բաներ պիտի հասկացվին: Դեսպանը կկրկնէ մեզի որևէ զիջում չընել մանավանդ *assentiment* բառին վրա պնդել: Պրն. Մանդելշտամը իր կողմէն կխորհի թէ վալիներ ու վիլայեթներ պահել, այդ վիլայեթներու ընդհանուր ժողովներ պահել չի նշանակեր անպատճառ: Եվ թէ երկու *secteur* ի մէջ երկու ընդհանուր ժողովով բավականաւ պետք էր:

Պատվիրակ - Երբ որ վիլայեթներու և վալիներու ներկա ձևերը պահվին, դժվար պիտի ըլլա ժողովներու ջնջումը առաջարկել, որովհետև թուրքաց տեսակետն է ցույց տալ իրենց մարդոց թէ Հայաստանի մէջ ոչինչ չի փոխվեր, բացի ընդհանուր քննիչի մը անվանումը:

Թարգմանը իր տեսակետին վրա պնդեց: Ըսավ թէ այլևս Ավստրիո և Բտալիո դեսպաններուն դիմելու հարկ չկա, որովհետև դեսպանն ինքը պիտի խոսէր: Բայց հեղափոխական մարմիններուն դիմումին պետք ըլլալը շեշտեց, արդէն ըսավ - այս մասին Պետերբուրգ հեռագրած և համաձայնությունը ստացած ենք:

Պատվիրակ - Ֆրանսայի զմէս վերջնականապէս լքած ըլլալու մասին, Նուպար փաշային տեղեկություն մը ուզելը անհրաժեշտություն է:

Թարգմանը պատասխանեց որ պետք է ճշտել: Իրոք այս պահուս Ֆրանսան մինակ ձգած է Ռուսիան ձեր խնդրի մեջ, բայց ըսել է, որ եթե Ռուսիան վերջնական պահանջ դնե և հայտնե, որ ասիկա իր դաշնակցության պարտականության մասը կկազմե, Ֆրանսան չպիտի շարժի: Իրենք հույս ունեին, որ Ֆրանսան Ռուսիո հետ պիտի քալե, վասնզի պիտի խորհի, որ եթե մերժե, Ռուսիան շատ մը խնդիրներու մեջ պիտի լքե անոր, ինչպես Սուրիո մեջ: Նուպար փաշան պետք է ուժով դիմում կատարե Փարիզի մեջ հասկցնելով, որ հայերը հանդարտ պիտի չմնան և Ֆրանսացվոց փոխատվությունը պիտի վտանգվի ինչպես նաև արգելքներու պիտի հանդիպի երկաթուղիներու շինությունը: Հայասեր և այլև ուրիշ ընդդիմադիր ֆրանսիացիներ ալ պետք է ձեռքի տակ շարժման մեջ դնել: Նման բան մըն ալ Անգլիո մեջ ընել անհրաժեշտ է: Խորհուրդ տվավ որ փաշան Միլլուքովը տեսնա, տեսնա նաև ուրիշ կուսակցության վերաբերող ռուս քաղաքական անձնավորություններ որոնք բոլորն ալ ընդգրկած են հայկական հարցը, որպեսզի ռուս կառավարությունը մղեն ավելի ուժգին արմատական գործունեության մը:

Խոսեցա իրեն թե ինչ պիտի ընե Ռուսիան եթե բոլորովին մինակ մնա:

Պատասխանեց, որ այդ պարագայի համար դեռ որոշում մը տրված չկա: Ավելցուց, որ մինակ մնալը անպատճառ հայկական հարցը լքանել ըսել չէ: Վասնզի Ռուսիան մինակ ալ կարող է գայն առաջ մղել: Հարցուցի իրեն թե Կովկասի մեջ զորացրվում կատարելու մասին հրատարակություն մը կար: Պատասխանեց, որ, ո՛չ, զորացրվում մը կատարված չէ, և իրենք հոն բավական մեծ ուժ ունին: Հարցուցի թե ի՞նչ պիտի ըլլա եթե Ռուսիան մինակ մնալով չուզեր առանձին առաջ տանել հայկական հարցը: Ըսի, որ հայերը այս մտատանջության մեջ են և թե այդ պարագային հայերուն երկու ճամբա կմնար հետևելիք:

Ա. Անհաշտ կենալ մինչև վերջը թուրքաց հետ: Այս ճամբան խիստ վտանգավոր էր, ըստ որում թուրքերը մեզի իբր կասկածելի տարր նկատելով հայահալած նոր քաղաքականություն մը պիտի սկսեին: Ասկե հայ տարրը շատ պիտի վնասվեր, իսկ եթե հուսահատական քայլերու դիմեինք - որովհետև պատրաստ չենք - ձախողեինք պիտի անպատրաստ ըլլալով:

Բ. Թուրքաց հետ որևէ ձևով համաձայնություն կնքել, նույնիսկ անկարելիին առջև խոնարհելով և զոհելով մեր էական պահանջները, այդ կերպով նախ հալածանքե պիտի ազատեինք և թուրքաց հետ բարեկամ մնալով, Հայաստանի մեջ ինքզինքնիս գորացնելու ատեն պիտի ունենայինք, ապագային պատրաստվելու համար: Երկրորդ այս ճամբան իմ կարծիքովս բանավոր ըլլալով հանդերձ, Ռուսիո խորհուրդին կդիմեինք:

Թարգման - Եթե գործը այդ վիճակին գա, հարկավ Ռուսիան պետք եղած խորհուրդը պիտի տա հայերուն, բայց այսօր հոդ հասած չենք դեռ:

Պատվիրակ - Ամեն օր որ կանցնի հայոց տկարացման կծառայե, քանի որ թուրքերը Բալկանյան դժվարություններեն ազատված, ֆինանսական օպերասիոնը (operation) հաջողեցնելով, պիտի գորանան և ոչ մեկ զիջումի պիտի հոժարին:

Թարգման - Հայկական խնդրույն ինչ հանգամանք առնելը սա մեկ քանի օր-վան մեջ պիտի ճշտվի, ուստի պիտի սպասել քանի որ ժամանակի մեծ կորուստ մը չպիտի ունենանք [9: 196-242]:

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ՆՈՐԱՀԱՅՏ ՎԱՎԵՐԱԳՐԵՐ ԳՐԻԳՈՐ ԶՈՀՐԱՊԻ ԳՈՐԾՈՒՆԵՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԻՑ

Միքայել Մարտիրոսյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ Գրիգոր Զոհրապ, Ապահովության հանձնաժողով, պատրիարք Զավեն Տեր Եղիայան, Վահան Փափազյան, Արշակ Զոպանյան, Պողոս Նուբար փաշա, Հայ ազգային պատվիրակություն, դեսպան Մ. Ն. Գիրս, Ա. Ն. Մանդելտամ, դեսպան Հ. Վանգենիայմ, Շյոնբերգ, փոխգլխումային համաձայնություն, Մայր Աթոռ Ս. Էջմիածնի ձեռագրատուն, Նուբար Միքայելյան:

Պրոֆեսոր Ալբերտ Շարուրյանի «Գրիգոր Զոհրապի կյանքի և գործունեության տարեգրություն» աշխատության հրատարակումից հետո թվաց, թե այլևս Գ. Զոհրապի կյանքի բոլոր դրվագները բացահայտված են: Սակայն հայկական բարենորոգումների շուրջ 1913 թ. ծավալված ռուս-գերմանական դիվանագիտական մրցապայքարի ուսումնասիրությունը մեզ հանգեցրեց այն համոզմանը, որ Գ. Զոհրապը ոչ միայն ակտիվորեն ներգրավված է եղել այդ գործընթացում, այլև կատարել է հայկական կողմից գլխավոր բանակցողի գործառույթը, ինչը վրիպել է պատմաբանների և բանասերների ուշադրությունից: Եթե Եվրոպայում Հայկական հարցը տերություններին ներկայացնող պաշտոնական մարմինը Պողոս Նուբար փաշայի գլխավորած Հայ ազգային պատվիրակությունն էր, ապա Կ. Պոլսի օտարերկրյա դեսպանությունների հետ հայկական բարենորոգումների շուրջ բանակցություններ վարող պաշտոնական մարմինը պատրիարքարանի Ապահովության հանձնաժողովն էր: Գ. Զոհրապը եղել է Ապահովության հանձնաժողովին սատարող Հարստահարական հանձնաժողովի հինգ ան-

դամներից մեկը և աստիճանաբար դարձել է Կ. Պոլսի դեսպանությունների հետ բանակցություններ վարող գլխավոր անձը: Բանակցային գործընթացին նրա մասնակցությունը գաղտնիացվել է ինչպես ռուսական դիվանագիտության, այնպես էլ հայկական շրջանակների և հենց Գ. Զոհրապի կողմից: Նա օսմանյան խորհրդարանի պատգամավոր էր, և գաղտնիացումը նպատակ ուներ նրան զերծ պահել դավաճանության երիտթուրքական ենթադրվելիք մեղադրանքներից:

Ընթերցողի ուշադրությանը ներկայացվող վավերագրերը վերաբերում են 1913 թ. օգոստոսի 20-ին, 21-ին, 24-ին, սեպտեմբերի 1-ին և 2-ին ռուսական դեսպանատան առաջին թարգման Ա. Ն. Մանդելշտամի և օգոստոսի 30-ին գերմանական դեսպանատան երկրորդ թարգման Շյոնբերգի հետ Գ. Զոհրապի հանդիպումներին: Այդ վավերագրերը պահվում են Մայր Աթոռ Սուրբ Էջմիածնի ձեռագրատանը: Վավերագրերից բացակայում է Գ. Զոհրապի անունը, սակայն տեղությունների արտգործնախարարությունների փաստաթղթերի և ժամանակակիցների հուշերի համադրումն ապացուցում է, որ պատրիարքարանի կողմից բանակցություններ վարող անձը եղել է Գ. Զոհրապը: Հանդիպումների ավարտից հետո Գ. Զոհրապը եկել է Ապահովության հանձնաժողով և պատմել է բանակցությունների ընթացքի և արդյունքների մասին: Նրա հաշվետվությունները արձանագրվել են և ուղարկվել Ամենայն հայոց կաթողիկոս Գևորգ Հինգերորդ Սուրենյանին: Առաջին անգամ հրատարակվող այս վավերագրերի ուրսումնասիրությունը վկայում է, որ Գ. Զոհրապը ծանրակշիռ ներդրում է ունեցել հայկական բարենորոգումների շուրջ ռուս-գերմանական փոխզիջումային համաձայնություն կայացնելու գործում: Այդ բանակցություններում նա ցուցաբերել է փոխշահավետության հիման վրա հաշտարար համաձայնություն կայացնելու դիվանագիտական հմտություններ:

THE 1953 COUP IN IRAN AND THE ROLE OF GREAT BRITAIN IN IT*

Hayk Soghomonyan

Abstract

The article discusses the causes of the 1953 military coup in Iran and the role of Great Britain in it. In 1951 Prime Minister Mossadegh roused Britain's ire when he nationalized the oil industry. Mossadegh argued that Iran should begin profiting from its vast oil reserves which had been exclusively controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The company later became known as British Petroleum (BP). After considering military action, Britain opted for a coup. President Harry Truman rejected the idea, but when Dwight Eisenhower took over the White House, he ordered the CIA to embark on one of its first covert operations against a foreign government. In 1953, Iranian armed forces, with the help of the CIA and British intelligence, orchestrated a coup that toppled the democratically elected government of Iran.

Keywords: Mohammad Mossadegh, Fazlollah Zahedi, nationalization of oil, coup, AIOC, BP, Iran, Great Britain, MI6, CIA.

Introduction

The nationalization of the oil industry in Iran did not yield the result the Iranian people expected and the Prime Minister of Iran M. Mosaddegh promised them. In fact, it was due to these promises that Mosaddegh gained great fame and reputation. Referring to the great reputation of Mossadegh, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran, notices: "Enthusiastic about the promises of Mosadegh, different classes of people gradually gathered around him, among them university students, merchants or workers" [2:182]. Mossadegh promised that the time of abundance was approaching and all the expenses of the state would be covered by the oil revenues, which is the legal right of Iran and according to which, 300,000 pounds per day should be levied from the oil company, as a result of which the income of every Iranian should increase [2:182].

However, as it turned out, as a result of the nationalization of oil "the income of every Iranian" mentioned by Dr. Mossadegh, did not increase; moreover, it decreased. As a result of the oil crisis the greater damage was caused to the state budget. The reduction in imports reduced state customs duties, and there were also difficulties in tax collection. New tax increase on tobacco and tobacco products caused a wave of dissatisfaction among the society [4].

* The article was submitted on May 7, 2022. The article was reviewed on May 23, 2022.

The nationalization of oil in Iran was also a major blow to the economy of Great Britain. The loss of oil revenues coming from Iran sharply reduced London's financial opportunities, by which the latter paid for the import of vital goods the level of which remained disproportionately high compared to exports. Great Britain was unable to export enough goods to buy the currency they needed in order to pay for imports, as well as to return the huge loans which they had taken to finance military operations during the war [23:16]. At the same time, the reason for the financial shortfall of Great Britain was that it did not want to reduce costs in order to maintain its great empire [23:16]. Even though it faced a huge loss of revenue as a result of the nationalization of oil, the country's main concern still remained the growing crisis of the currency, which haunted the British economy throughout the post-war period. After the end of the World War, Great Britain made a very slow transition from a military industry to a peaceful economy. At the end of the war, 55% of the gross domestic product of the UK came from the military output [10:33].

British government preparations for the coup

The British government was concerned about the nationalization of Iranian oil also because the latter could have a domino effect in the region and other oil-producing countries in the region could follow their example.

Seeing that it was impossible to find edges of reconciliation with the government of Mossadegh, the British government soon began to actively take steps to oust Mossadegh from power. The minister of Foreign Affairs Herbert Morrison addressed this issue to British Iranologists, one of whom was Ann Katharine Lambton, a lecturer at the London School of Oriental Studies and at the School of African Studies and the press attache of the British Embassy in Tehran during World War II who was also considered one of the leading orientalist in Britain. She offered not to compromise with Mossadegh anymore, but to use "effective means of propaganda" to mobilize the public opinion in Iran against him [18:114]. Lambton also offered to refuse the US offers to compromise, since in her opinion "Americans have no experience or idea of understanding or perceiving Iran" [12:300]. Soon, the activities of the operative intelligence network of the British embassy expanded. On the advice of Lambton, another skilled Iranologist Robert Zehner, a professor at Oxford University, returned to Tehran to join the staff of embassy in intensifying anti-Mosaddegh propaganda; it was also planned to organize and expand the internal opposition through local agents, such as the Rashidian brothers (Assadollah, Seifollah and Ghodrattollah). Professor Zehner was actively in contact with a number of anti-Mossadegh elements, including Ernest Perron who was the personal secretary of the Shah in Switzerland. Zehner's activities were supplemented by the other staff members of the embassy and particularly by the staff of MI 6, including Charles Montague (Monty) Woodhouse and Norman Darbyshire who played a decisive role in the campaign against Mossadegh. They started to cooperate with local agents, among which, in addition to the Rashidians, civil

servants were included, such as Soleiman Behbudi known as the “head of the Shah’s palace” [29:23].

The British firmly supported General Fazlollah Zahedi because of his connections with many key officers in the army. Zahedi, actually, was arrested by the British in 1943 for his pro-German stance, but the British considered this as an advantage, since due to that Zahedi could not easily be considered pro-British [19:168]. Soon, the British intelligence established contacts with disgruntled officers of the army, key officers of the gendarmerie, the air force officers, royal security and even with the Iranian secret police [28:188]. The role of the world television and radio company “BBC” in the British fight against Mossadegh should be singled out as well. As early as June 1951, when the government of Mosaddegh was preparing to take oil industry under his control and when Great Britain was re-deploying military forces in the Persian Gulf, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain provided funding for an additional half-hour broadcast and, at the request of the British Embassy in Tehran, another 15 minutes were added [27:515-535]. In his book, Norman Kemp also discusses the key role that the “BBC” has played in providing information to Iranians. “The authorities of Iran suspended the activities of the company’s daily newspaper and every evening the factory workers gather around the radio to listen to the foreign programs of the “BBC” to get up-to-date information”” [17:208].

In October 1952, the government of Iran closed the British Embassy in Tehran, claiming that certain intrigues were taking place there, thus removing the camouflage of Britain from its secret activities. In November, the representatives of MI 6 and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs met with the staff of CIA and offered a joint action plan to overthrow the Iranian government [26:77]. In late June, the United States finally approved the coup, and Britain, meanwhile, submitted to the CIA the “complete plan” of pre-scheduled action [24:1].

US position on British proposals

Yet at the same time, a question arises as to why the USA agreed to join the coup planned by Great Britain. The US government initially welcomed the initial stage of the formation of the nationalization movement of the oil industry. This is explained by the fact that US President H. Truman was convinced that the sponsorship of the nationalist movement would contribute to the struggle against communism in third countries and it was nationalism that could be a barrier to the penetration of communism. According to Truman and those around him, Mossadegh was the very incarnation of Iranian nationalism. Such controversies between the British and American policies towards the Iranian government were a concern for London. In 1952, the Minister of the Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden expressed an opinion that US Secretary of State D. Acheson and the State Department, seeking to end the threat of communism in Iran, wanted to help Mossadegh for already a long time to the detriment of the interests and rights of the MES and the United Kingdom [11:39]. Anthony Eden mentions in his memoirs: “I did not

accept the argument that the only alternative to Mossadegh was the communist authority. I thought that if Mossadegh was overthrown, he could be replaced by a more sensible administration, with which it would be possible to sign a satisfactory contract. I knew that Iran had flexibility, which, at first glance, did not seem obvious. Iranians have always been able to start over" [9:201].

In the beginning of 1953, the rapprochement of the American and British policies took place in Iran (one of the reasons for that rapprochement was that they sensed the danger of the Soviet Union becoming more active in Iran). According to William Taylor Fine, American politicians had a misconception that Mossadegh was gradually leaning towards the Soviet Union, expanding his political base at the expense of joining the Tudeh party [11:39]. However, this conclusion was definitely wrong and the role of the Tudeh, in the given period, was extremely overestimated. In his work, Professor Yervand Abrahamyan quotes the message of the British Ambassador, where it is mentioned: "Tudeh party should not be taken as a serious threat" [32:221]. Dean Acheson, who held the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs under the Truman administration, later also stated that the threat of the Tudeh party had never been taken seriously [7:680-681].

After D. Eisenhower came to power, the US attitude towards Iran changed dramatically. According to the Iranian author Abbas Manouchehri, the change in the course of US policy had two reasons: political and economic. From an economic point of view, the actions taken by Mossadegh in Iran endangered the interests of American oil companies; in addition, the "Cold" War and the war going on in Korea forced the USA to retain its traditional allies, particularly Great Britain, in Europe [37:165].

In his book "The Art of Intelligence", Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA of the period, alludes to the role of the CIA in Iran. "The supporters of the Shah received assistance from outside", he wrote, not mentioning that it directly came from the CIA. This action aimed to protect the interests of the US capital in the international oil companies. It is interesting to note that the operation also affected the personal commercial interests of the director of CIA, since the latter's law firm "Sullivan and Cromwell" handled the affairs of the Anglo-Iranian oil company [3:4].

According to Christopher Woodhouse, who was in charge of preparing a coup in Iran and who was an MI 6 officer, with the help of British money, it was already possible to secure the cooperation with the high-ranking army and police officers, deputies, senators, mullahs, merchants, newspaper editors, as well as with the mob leaders [30:118]. Interestingly, two years after the coup, the same Woodhouse, the then-leader of MI 6, became the director of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, one of the leading "independent" research institutes of Great Britain [30:138]. Shapoor Reporter, another Iranian agent of the British, was awarded the title of knight and later became an intermediary in the sale of British weapons to Iran, in particular, between the manufacturers of the "Chieftain" tanks, "Rapier" missile and Iran [31:140-142].

One of the reasons why the CIA attributed the organization and implementation of the coup to itself was that this relatively newly formed structure (1947) was criticized from the very beginning within the USA and was in obvious competition with other intelligence services, which is why the latter needed to fully attribute the implementation of such an action to itself, thus demonstrating its effectiveness and enhancing the reputation of the newly created structure [5:14].

Domestic political tensions within Iran

However, the question arises as to whether Mossadegh was ousted from power as a result of the planned coup, or Mossadegh was doomed to failure from the very beginning because of the unstable internal political situation in Iran. To address this and other similar questions, one should understand the situation that had developed in the domestic political life of Iran and observe the ranges of the oppositionists, growing day by day, who opposed Mossadegh because of his policies. In the early days of the nationalization of oil, after a year the popularity of Mossadegh started to fade away, and the wave of dissatisfaction was everywhere, from the palace to common citizens. In that short period of time, Mossadegh managed to gain many opponents in various spheres of governance.

After taking over the duties of Prime Minister, the organization “Fedayeen of Islam” demanded Mossadegh and his ministers to adopt the Sharia laws. Refusing to comply with these demands, in June 1951, Mossadegh ordered to arrest Navvab Safavi, the leader of their group. The relations between Ayatollah Abolghasem Kashani, who was a proponent of the nationalization of the oil industry, and the organization “Fedayeen of Islam” began to strain as well, due to latter’s support for Mossadegh, but in the middle of 1952, the group re-established its connection with Kashani, who had begun to oppose Mossadegh. “Fedayeen of Islam” actively co-operates with the internal opponents of Mossadegh, particularly with Mozzafar Baghai who left the National Front and later became the most zealot opponent of Mossadegh, encouraging Fadayeen to use violence against him [36]. During the last six months of Mossadegh being a Prime Minister, “Fadayeen’s” hostile attitude towards the Mossadegh government brought the hope to the Secret services of the US and Great Britain that the group would also help to overthrow Mossadegh [8:143].

Since the very beginning of assuming the post of Prime Minister Dr. Mossadegh managed to spoil his relations not only in the external sphere of Iran but also in the internal one. It is interesting to mention the position of Jamal Emami, one of the deputies in Mejlis and also a member of the oil commission, was obviously ironic about the activities of Mossadegh. “The governance of the country has been reduced to the lowest point. There are only rallies here and there. Student rallies, pupil rallies, seventy-years-olds rallies and even rallies of six-year-olds. I am pretty disgusted with these vile street rallies. It would be better if our Prime Minister finally decides whether he is a politician or leader of the uneducated mass. I could never ever imagine that a seventy-year-old man would be transformed into a

demagogue. A person who blockades the Mejlis with the help of the crowd is really dangerous for the society” [33]. Interestingly, it was Jamal Emami who nominated Mossadegh for the post of Prime Minister in the Mejlis [33].

Mossadegh gained a large number of enemies among the army officers as well. The reason for this was that he reduced the military budget by 15%, transferred 15,000 people from the army to the gendarmerie and set up a commission to study the issues connected with corruption, procurement, and also with career promotion. Mossadegh also removed a total of 136 officers from the army, including 15 generals, as well as began to call for an end to US military missions [28:187]. The army officers were outraged because of the budget cuts and other actions that undermined their positions [28:187]. The disappointment with Mossadegh’s policy was already openly expressed on the National Front and a vivid example of this was that in August 1952, the bill on the extension of martial law in the Chamber of Deputies (Parliament) faced the resistance of the deputies of the National Front. The bill was proposed by Ahmad Vosough, the Deputy Minister of National Defense, and his response to the clear, obvious complaints was the following: “I should mention that this bill was introduced by Dr. Mossadegh, the Minister of National Defense”. When the deputy minister added that the whole aim of it was the establishment of security and order, Yousef Mosher, one of the deputies of the National Front, said that it was an obvious lie [25]. The day before, the Senate refused to pass a bill on the third reading, which intended to provide Mossadegh with a six-month emergency mandate [25].

Consequently, without any hesitation, Mossadegh aimed to undermine the position of Shah. In October 1952, the Mejlis decided to dissolve the Senate, half of the members of which were appointed by the Shah, according to the Constitution [6:385]. Mossadegh accused those in the palace of meddling in politics and of encroaching on the Constitution and blamed the Shah’s mother, his sister Ashraf and younger brother. He stated that as a result of the active intervention of the inner circle of the Shah the government postponed the elections in 1952, leaving 57 of the 136 deputy’s seats vacant [6: 388].

At the end of February 1953, the Shah threatened to leave the country. According to Elwell Sutton, this act, which in the West would be considered as the acceptance of defeat by the Shah, was accepted as a dramatic prelude to the beginning of the Shah’s protection and aid movement in Iran. Any similar step such as taking refuge in a sacred place is not considered a manifestation of cowardice in Iran, but a deep act of political-spiritual significance and has a strong psychological impact on Iranians. Mossadegh immediately sensed the danger coming from that and this time he was able to thwart the intention of the Shah [6: 387].

In July 1953, Kashani lost his presidency in parliament, and in mid-July, 56 members of the National Front resigned, declaring that the opposition had created conditions in Parliament under which it was impossible to carry out normal parliamentary activity. Whether it was a maneuver or not is not entirely clear, but whatever it was, it enabled Mossadegh to announce on the radio that he intended to hold

a referendum on the dissolution of the Mejlis because of its inaction. According to Yervand Abrahamyan, Mossadegh forced his deputies to resign from the National Front [32: 217]. The referendum was held from August 3 to 10, with 99% of its participants voting in favor of dissolving the Mejlis [6: 389].

According to the Shah, the idea of dissolving the Mejlis was that generally the majority of the elected deputies were against Mossadegh, that is why the latter held a referendum [34: 56].

General Hossein Fardoust, who once held the position of Deputy Director of SAVAK, as well as the position of the head of the “Imperial Inspection”, referring to the events of August 1953 in his memoirs, notes:

“The plan for the coup on Mordad 25 was as the following: three military formations, each of which with the strength of one reinforced regiment combat effectiveness, were previously deployed in three military units. The two officers in charge of the security of Nasiri, immediately after Mossadegh rejected the order of Shah (Mossadegh immediately ordered to arrest Nasiri), were to inform the commanders of the three military formations via radio (which was carried out). One of the military formations was to surround the house of Mossadegh and arrest him, the other to seize the radio station, and the third one to be ready to carry out the further orders of the coup leaders. The commander-in-chief of the coup was Zahedi and the commanders of the three military formations were to receive orders from him by telephone. Immediately after receiving the news of the arrest of Nasiri, Zahedi ordered to execute the plan of coup, but surprisingly, none of the military formations moved from their locations. The Minister of Defense, General Riahi, was being informed of the incident and the military units loyal to Mossadegh disarmed and arrested the three military units of the coup, without a clash” [35: 176-177].

Becoming informed of the failure of the coup, the Shah, along with the queen, left first for Baghdad and then for Rome. According to the Shah, the decision to leave the country was conditioned by the fact that being well acquainted with the political plans of Mossadegh, as well as with his greed for power, he decided to leave the country to avoid possible bloodshed and leave the Iranians free to choose their future path [34: 58].

Implementation of the coup

According to the same H. Fardoust, the failure of coup attempt on Mordad 25 was conditioned, first of all, by the large number of people aware of the coup, consisting of Nasiri, Zahedi, three commanders of the military formations, two officers of the headquarters security guard of Zahedi, other certain high-ranking officers of the coup military formations, and secondly, due to the fact that Zahedi, the ring-leader of the coup, was not present in person, and the Shah was absent from Tehran, whose presence would have a huge impact on the action [35: 178].

The day after the coup attempt, it was announced that the government forces had managed to stop the coup and all of the organizers had been arrested. On August 17 mobs threw down from their pedestals the statues of Kings of the Pahlavi

line. General Zahedi was the object of an intense search. A total of sixteen civilians and fifteen officers were arrested, including two major generals and six colonels [21]. Foreign Minister Hossein Fatemi indicated that the Government was considering the formation of a Regency Council to carry out the royal functions, but at a press conference, he said there was no thought of establishing a republic in Iran and that, regarding a Regency Council, "the Government is studying developments" [21]. At the same time General Zahedi, who kept in touch with foreign correspondents from hiding places, issued a declaration addressed to officers of the armed forces telling them the time was approaching for them to make sacrifices, "even of your lives, to maintain the independence and the monarchy of Iran and preserve the principles of the holy religion of Islam" [21].

After the failure of Mordad 25, Mossadegh ordered 27 gallows set up in Sepah Square of Tehran in order for his opponents, some of whom were his former supporters, to be hanged [34: 59]. However, on the 28th Mordad (August 19), a crowd of *Zurkhanehs*, a crowd of other sections of the ordinary population, took to the streets, probably with the support of Ayatollah Behbehani and probably Kashani. According to some eyewitnesses, soon the group of five hundred was augmented by police and troops until it totaled almost three thousand. It was then divided into groups of several hundred each [22]. 32 Sherman tanks moved towards the center of Tehran and besieged important strategic objects and after a three-hour clash with three tanks in front of Mossadegh's house, Zahedi was declared a legitimate candidate for prime minister [32: 223]. According to the "New York Times", more than 300 persons were killed during the fight [20].

After the failure of the coup on Mordad 25, the CIA and MI 6 attributed the victory of the coup on Mordad 28 to themselves, and a large number of researchers are of the same opinion, mainly citing the book by Kermit Roosevelt. However, a detailed study of modern archives clearly contradicts the facts contained in that book. First of all, the report of Roosevelt on the overthrow of the government of Mossadegh is quite interesting inasmuch as which Eisenhower mentions in his diary that it was more like a ten-cent cheap novel [13].

A document is striking in the archives of the US State Department, in which, after the failure of the coup, the CIA headquarters reported to their station in Tehran on August 18: "The State Department has announced that since the operation was tested and failed, we should not take any further action against Mossadegh, which may complicate the relationship with him in the future and in the absence of strong arguments from you and Henderson, the operation against Mossadegh must be stopped" [14].

In the evening of August 18, a break appeared to take place between the Tudeh and Mossadegh regime. Apparently Tudeh partisans began demonstrating on streets without having obtained usual appropriations from Mossadegh and engaged in acts of violence. Mossadegh ordered streets cleared and demonstrations ceased. For the first time in several months serious fighting took place between security forces and Tudeh. In the morning of August 19, the supporters of the Shah

arranged a pro-Shah demonstration. This demonstration began in a small way in a bazaar area but the initial small flame found an amazingly large amount of combustible material and soon there was a roaring blaze which during the course of the day swept through the entire city. Security forces sent to put down the demonstration refused to resort to violence against crowds, some joining demonstrators and others remaining passive. As crowds increased in volume in various parts of the city, they destroyed the offices of those newspapers which during recent days had been most scurrilous in their attacks on the Shah. From the city center a huge crowd commandeered vehicles of all kinds and rushed northward, engulfing Tehran Radio station. Members of the Embassy had a good opportunity to observe the character of these crowds at this time. They seemed to come from all classes of people including workers, clerks, shopkeepers, students, and others [15: 694].

Thus, it becomes clear that the activities of external forces during the coup were limited to Mordad 25 (August 16). The question is how it turned out that two days after the failure of the pre-planned coup such a large crowd of people from all walks of life, from soldiers to ordinary citizens, took to the streets and ousted Mossaddegh from power.

It can be stated that after the failure of the first attempt of coup, everyone knew what kind of revenge awaited them, be it a soldier or a cleric, as well as seeing the gallows already being prepared in the square the next day, they were forced to act in a more organized way, and go to the very end, in this case having nothing to lose, which ultimately led to success.

The role of the clergy in the success of the coup should also be taken into account. The state religion of Iran, the Shia branch of Islam, always had profound roots in the Iranian population and the vast majority of Iranians were firmly connected with religion. That is why the clergy has also always been highly regarded by the Iranian population and the latter managed to unite and guide broad circles of the people with their ideology. Some documents shed light on the involvement of high-ranking Iranian clergies in the coup. In the secret message dating to April, in the archive documents of the US State Department, it is noted that Ayatollah Kashani, Boroujerdi and Behbehani agreed to support the Shah against Mossaddegh, if necessary [16].

After the overthrow of the Mossaddegh's administration, Mossaddegh was arrested and the Shah returned to Iran with great pomp on August 22 [34: 59], [1: 140].

Conclusion

Thus, juxtaposing the general facts, one can assume that the reason for the fall of the Mossaddegh government was not so much the factor of oil, but the policy he adopted from the very beginning, both in the external and internal spheres. The real reason for the fall of his government was that he tried his best to exclude the Shah and the army from the politics, but the army, playing a major role virtually everywhere, as well as in Iran, remained a strong supporter of the monarchy and opposed

giving way to a government elected by the people. Among the mistakes of Mossadegh were the reduction of the army, withholding of salaries, dissolution of the parliament, etc. One of his mistakes was also the confrontation with the clergy. All this led to his downfall. Without questioning the preparations for the coup, one should state that the initiative and the main work of its preparation were carried out mainly by the British MI6, and not by the CIA. However, the coup planned by the two countries, which took place on the 25th of Mordad, failed, and the events of the 28th of Mordad (August 19), which led to the overthrow of Mossadegh, were undoubtedly due to the efforts of the Iranian people, Iranian army and clergy, as many people in the abovementioned circles were dissatisfied with the government of Mossadegh. After all, if the events of the month of Mordad would not have taken place, it could be stated that the government of Mossadegh was doomed to failure from the beginning, since after gaining real power, it seemed to be cut off from reality and the demagogue methods among the common people and the ear-pleasing promises made during the speeches would not solve the numerous economic problems that arose, which is why almost everyone was disappointed with him, even the representatives of his National Front. The Anglo-American coup would never succeed had Mossadegh not squandered the vote of confidence given to him by such a large circle of the society. The dissolution of the Senate, the acquisition of enemies among the army officers, the reduction of the military budget, the dissolution of the Mejlis, and obviously, many of the other factors mentioned above led to the overthrow of M. Mossadegh.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AIOC - Anglo-Iranian Oil Company

MI6 - Military Intelligence, Section 6

CIA - Central Intelligence Agency

BP - British Petroleum

**ԻՐԱՆՈՒՄ 1953 Թ. ՀԵՂԱՇՐՋՈՒՄԸ ԵՎ ՄԵԾ ԲՐԻՏԱՆԻԱՅԻ
ԴԵՐԱԿԱՏԱՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ ՆՐԱՆՈՒՄ**

Հայկ Սողոմոնյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ Մոհամմադ Մոսադեդ, Ֆազլուլլահ Ջահեդի, նավթի ազգայնացում, հեղաշրջում, ԱԻՆԸ, ԲՓ, Իրան, Մեծ Բրիտանիա, ՄԻ 6, ԿՀՎ:

Հոդվածում քննության են առնված 1953 թվականին Իրանում տեղի ունեցած ռազմական հեղաշրջման պատճառները, ինչպես նաև Մեծ Բրիտանիայի ունեցած դերն ու մասնակցությունն այդ իրադարձությանը: Իրանի վարչապետ Մոհամմադ Մոսադեդը 1951 թվականին ստորագրեց Իրանի նավթային արդյունաբերության ազգայնացման մասին օրենքը: Իրանում նավթային պաշարների շահագործման մենաշնորհը մինչ այդ պատկանում էր Անգլո-իրանական նավթային ընկերությանը (հետագայում վերանվանվեց Բրիթիշ Փեթրոլիում): Ազգայնացումից անմիջապես հետո վարչապետ Մոսադեդը վտարեց բրիտանացի մասնագետներին և խորհրդականներին, իսկ 1952 թվականին ընդհանրապես խզեց դիվանագիտական հարաբերությունները Լոնդոնի հետ: Նավթի ազգայնացումը առավել սրեց Արևմուտքի հետ Իրանի հարաբերությունները, ինչպես նաև Իրանի ներքաղաքական վիճակը: 1953 թվականի ամռանը իրանական բանակի սպայակազմի կողմից իրականացված ռազմական հեղաշրջման արդյունքում, որում անմասն չէին նաև ԱՄՆ և Մեծ Բրիտանիայի գաղտնի ծառայությունները, մեծ հոչակ վայելող վարչապետ Մոսադեդի կառավարությունը տապալվեց, իսկ վերջինս ձերբակալվեց:

THE ECONOMIC TRIANGULATION BEIJING-YEREVAN-NEW DELHI: COOPERATION OR COMPETITION?*

Orazio Maria Gnerre

Abstract

Since it is no longer part of the Soviet Union, Armenia has found itself in the position of being able to choose its partners independently. This was largely determined by proximity relations, by historical ones with Russia, and by the places where the emigration of Armenia's own people took place. Beyond that, it is placed in conditions of choice between cooperation with some actors rather than others. In this sense, Armenia has started dialogue and trade relations with two Asian giants, China and India. The article proposes to recap the relations between these countries, paying attention to the factors that could allow a triangular cooperation rather than a competition.

Keywords: Beijing, New Delhi, Yerevan, India, China, Armenia, cooperation, competition, export, trade, political relations.

1. Armenia in the global sea: between diplomatic relations and business

The Armenian Republic is relatively young. It was born as a Soviet federal republic within the USSR in 1936, although in the recent and contemporary history of the Armenian people there was another state formation, between 1918 and 1920. In any case, despite the formal autonomy, it was rather difficult to have an independent foreign policy and diplomacy within the Soviet Union. As Yuri Arutyunyan rightly points out, in fact, the political and identitarian “loyalty” of the Soviet Armenians was directed both to the capital Yerevan and thus their own national history, and to Moscow [1]. Yet, in the latter case, it was difficult to distinguish between Soviet politics in a political-idealistic sense and Russian national identity [4], two elements that often overlapped, even in involuntary psychological terms.

With the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet political entity, Armenia found itself overnight sailing in the sea of international relations and the global market. As in any similar case, this at the same time offers opportunities and creates dangers of an economic nature or safety-related ones. It became necessary, from one moment to the next, to establish one's role in the region, to discriminate between potential allies and competitors, to weave a web of relations between peoples and nations that led Armenia to have negotiations, right from the beginning of this process, also with the States United, with whom they established public relations in 1991.

* The article was submitted on October 11, 2022. The article was reviewed on October 22, 2022.

Obviously, no state in the world lives in conditions of absolute autonomy, since its decisions in political terms are determined by the reactions of the other actors and by the scenario in which it is inserted. In this sense, it is evident that Armenia could only maintain a certain type of relations with the former Russian motherland, as well as preserve certain political-diplomatic lines developed in the times of the Soviet Union [17: 1].

One of the most immediate effects of the collapse of the USSR and the opening of Armenia to the world was, among others, the reopening to Armenian emigration. This had already been advocated by the USSR, which saw socialist Armenia as the hub of Armenian identity in the world¹. This phenomenon, however, assumed even greater significance with the conclusion of the bipolar conflict [17: 2].

Reunification with the world of emigration has been a key vehicle for Armenian diplomacy; it has built a channel of dialogue between communities around the world, the Motherland and Governments. One of the most excellent cases, apart from the Russian one highlighted by Arutyunyan [1], is undoubtedly that of the USA.

Despite this type of dialogue that has been formed on the cultural proximity engendered by mutual knowledge between peoples born of emigration and coexistence, there are many other reasons for the development of bilateral relations between Armenia and other countries, which do not necessarily include this element. Indeed, if on the one hand we have seen two elements that almost seem to “determine” Armenian foreign policy, namely international “friendships” and political relations established in Soviet times, and the necessary relationship with the host States of his emigration, there are also other elements of a perhaps more “volatile” nature (in the sense that they do not have a long ancestry in contemporary history) that characterize its choices and options.

The above-mentioned levels are undoubtedly that of security and economic relations, but in this paper, we would like to focus in particular on the second aspect. The economy of Armenia is the economy of a country, as we have anticipated, that is quite young. The Armenian economy has been undergoing constant modernization since the end of the Soviet era (during which, however, there was a

¹ “After World War II Soviet authorities tried to consolidate Soviet Armenia as the homeland for all Armenians in the world. Hence, the Soviet government started a campaign to facilitate the repatriation of people of Armenian origin - dispersed around the world due to the 1915 genocide and the collapse of the Russian Empire. To foster the process, Soviet authorities issued a decree which allowed repatriated Armenians to build private housing in the territory of Soviet Armenia - with 50 per cent of the cost being paid by Soviet authorities. By the 1946 decree, persons of Armenian nationality that returned from abroad into Soviet Armenia were declared Soviet citizens as soon as they had arrived in the Soviet Union. Turkey forbade the repatriation of 30,000 Armenians from Turkey. Nevertheless, during 1946-1947 around 60,000-80,000 Armenians were able to repatriate into Soviet Armenia from Lebanon, Syria, Greece, Egypt, France, Bulgaria, Romania and Iran. Another wave of returns occurred in the mid 1960s.” See [17:4].

rapid industrialization of the territory). According to the World Bank, it is important for Armenia to prevent any kind of political uncertainty and geopolitical risk in order to continue developing its economy and the entire country [28]. To this end as well, Armenia is building its network of international relations.

In this sense, Armenia has begun to navigate in the sea of international relations and the global economy, in an increasingly interconnected world in which the factor of geographical proximity has become less incumbent [11] (but not non-existent, considering the factor of the geopolitical risks as referred to by the World Bank [28]).

This type of position, a very specific one, has made it develop relations with two countries, entailing commercial exchanges. These two countries are both Asian demographic giants, with particular economic competitiveness - China and India. What unites them is also belonging to the BRICS (which, according to the acronym, also includes Brazil, Russia and South Africa), a club of countries with rampant economies and with common international projects.

2. Armenia and India

As for relations between Armenia and India, we should reiterate that there has been no large Armenian immigration in India. Relationships have developed over time, but they come from very far away, and have roots in the common elements of the history of the two peoples [13]. It seems that Armenia and India have had a history of relations favored by the existence of the Macedonian Empire, which, having collapsed, also split the two peoples; however, it should be remembered that some Armenian communities went to live in Indian territory as early as the Middle Ages, but at the end of the British rule over the country, many members of these groups preferred to move to Australia [5: 2].

Even in the Armenian territories, in ancient times there were Hindu villages, a fact proven by both the chronicles and the ethnographic findings. Conversely, the ancient presence of Armenians is also attested in the Indian subcontinent [19: 64-87]. Already at the time the relations between the two peoples assumed decisive nuances of an economic nature.

It therefore appears also that economic relations between the Indian and Armenian people have existed for a very long time. According to Mkrtchyan, the first Armenians who went to live in India already enjoyed an excellent reputation with the political and social institutions of that country. This would be due, again according to Mkrtchyan, to the connection these peoples had had for commercial and mercantile reasons determined by the very particular geographical position of Armenia as a gateway and connection between the western and eastern world of the Eurasian continent. Mkrtchyan notes that already in Armenian historian Agathangelos's work, *History of Armenia*, it is written that the kings of Armenia adorned their crowns with precious stones of Indian origin, and that they had Indian styles of decoration used for their royal palaces. Mkrtchyan equally points out that fourth-

century historian Pavstos Buzand and sixth-century historian Movses Kaghan-katvatsi also spoke of these relationships in their works [19: 64,71].

As in the case of the United States, relations between India and the Armenian state began with the end of the Cold War and the opening of Armenian foreign policy. As noted, “a new quality of cooperation between [Indian and Armenian people emerged] in the end of the 20th century, as a result of the establishment of official ties between the newly independent Republic of Armenia and India on August 31, 1992”.

These relations, which were clearly expressed on the cultural level as well as on the diplomatic level, however, have had important developments in the economic field [5: 2]. According to data from the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, trade between the two countries increased after the Soviet Union fell, and this can be seen in figures from \$ 16.5 million in 2005 to \$ 71.72 million in 2011 [9; 5: 2]. Again, according to the same Ministry, India's exports to Armenia were quantifiable, at 19.1 million dollars in 2016, while imports were 1.8 million [10].

And in the period which followed immediately this was the picture:

“India's exports to Armenia were USD 19.8 million in 2017 and imports in the same period were USD 2.8 million. Indian exports to Armenia consist of bovine meat, agricultural products, electrical equipment, cut and polished diamonds, optical equipment, plastics, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, garments, chemical goods and cars, while Armenia's exports include nonferrous metals and raw-rubber. Indian Group “Kalpataru Power Transmission Limited,” Gandhinagar (Gujarat) won a World Bank financed contract (approximately US\$ 22 million) in November 2012 for designing, supplying and installation of high voltage transmission towers in Armenia. The project has since been completed [2: 3-4].”

The Indian and Armenian populations often travel from one country to the other to invest, as documented. Small-scale migrant/ investor cooperation indicated that bigger non-topological Trans-Asian cooperation might be established. Overcoming the element of geographical proximity in economic relations is a factor which, as we have already noted, assumes great importance today and will probably increase again in the future, especially due to the intensification of technological development in the area of communications and travel. This factor, of course, not only affects economic relations with India, but could greatly increase a trade that already exists, and one which some define below as its real potential [3].

The two countries are therefore taking steps forward in the intensification of exchanges [18], as for example a series of agreements that have been signed for economic and technological cooperation, especially in the agricultural field as well as in the pharmaceutical one. The two countries have also promoted the opening of a special air corridor for commercial purposes [3]. In addition to this, together with the Russian Federation and Iran India has launched an infrastructural and commer-

² Armen Martirosyan, Foreword, in [15].

cial project called “North-South Corridor”, and among the observers of which are Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Syria, Ukraine, Belarus, Turkey, Kyrgyzstan, Oman, Bulgaria, as well as Armenia [27]. This project which includes ports, roads and maritime and land corridors is reminiscent in many ways of the Chinese one of the “Belt and Road” which also touches upon Armenia and which we will discuss later.

Due to the complex geopolitical situation in which Armenia is immersed, India has signed an agreement with Armenia for the sale of different types of armaments, given the direction that the Indian economy is taking on the export of defense systems [24].

3. Armenia and China

On the other hand, there is a slightly more intense recent history between China and Armenia as regards the reception of the immigration flow. In fact, many of Armenians moved to China, also with the intention to migrate from there to Australia [21], as in the case of the communities in India [5: 2].

In this case as well cultural relations between the two peoples have existed for a long time. As put by an Armenian government source,

“Armenians were first mentioned in China during the 2nd century as merchants exporting silk and other goods. Small Armenian communities were established after the first Mongol invasion (at the beginning of the 13th century) when a part of the thousands of captive Armenians was settled in the northern regions of China. Later they settled in coastal cities, especially in Canton (present-day Guangzhou), where they built a church in 1307.

The first Armenian communities were formed over time. There were 30 families living in Canton in the middle of the 17th century [21].”

It must be said that the volume of business between China and Armenia is much more impressive than that with India. The importance of the Chinese economic presence in Armenia is such that it has made the Far Eastern country the country’s second economic partner, after Russia:

“According to the Armenian statistical service, the trade turnover between Armenia and the PRC in 2018 amounted to \$771.1 million with an annual growth of 29.3%, of which 107.2 million fell to Armenia’s exports with an annual decline of 9.5% import share of 663.9 million with an annual growth of 39%. Moreover, according to the data of the same statistical service, in 2018, China’s share in the total volume of Armenia’s foreign trade was 8.9%. Now, China is the second trade and economic partner of Armenia after Russia [8].”

And then:

“Statistics provided by China’s General Administration of Customs shows that the volume of trade between the two economies totaled US \$994 million in 2020, of which US \$222 million was Armenia’s export to China and US \$772 was its import from that country [26].”

This type of trade is of vital importance to the Armenian economy and is increasing in intensity, proceeding according to the Chinese investment philosophy and the good bilateral relations between the two national entities³.

Here, too, we have the example of a country that began direct diplomatic relations with the ex-Soviet country as early as in 1992, and that has since signed several bilateral agreements with it in the commercial field [8]. Finally, Armenia and China also move jointly in the domain of security, but this is happening on a very different level from the simple arms trade that has been taking place this year with India.

This type of relationship can be explained more easily with the visit of the Armenian Defense Minister Sargsyan to China, where he met the Chinese Defense Minister Chang Wanquan, agreeing on an estimated \$ 1.5 million military assistance from the Far Eastern country to Armenia. In this diplomatic visit, the Armenian Defense Minister also met the leadership of one of the most important corporations of the Chinese military industry, the Poly Group, and in that juncture the parties expressed their willingness to cooperate and have a dialogue in the near future [8].

In addition to this, however, there remains another point to discuss, which is of capital importance when it comes to economic relations between the two countries, namely the Chinese project of the Belt and Road Initiative [25] with which China proposes the construction of a commercial and (above all) infrastructural network that extends especially over the Eurasian continental mass. Within this project, of course, Armenia is also included, which among other phenomena assumes the role of guaranteeing alternative routes to the project [8]; the latter depends on the will of many different countries. As Mher Sahakyan rightly writes, the Belt and Road would first of all lead to the growth of the Armenian economy, as an effect of economic traffic and the opening of connections for primarily commercial purposes, but also and above all the establishment requires good neighborly relations with Iran, Turkey and Azerbaijan [26]. In addition, the implementation of the Belt and Road itself should create the necessary conditions for implementing regional security in the best possible way [29].

Although already very advantageous, economic exchanges between Armenia and China can only increase in a context of renewed regional security and trust among the actors cooperating in the great Belt and Road project.

³ "Russian and EU markets are saturated, and Armenia needs to explore new markets for exporting its products. In this context, fostering economic relations with China may play a crucial role in boosting the Armenian economy. The development of Armenia-China economic relations is entirely in line with the win-win international cooperation philosophy, put forward by the Chinese President and General - Secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee Xi Jinping. As an ancient Chinese saying goes, "Those who only seek comfort for themselves will ultimately be rejected, and those who sacrifice their own interests for the success of others will be supported". It is also in line with China's "dual circulation" strategy elaborated in 2020 and the new 14th Five - Year Plan for 2021 - 2025." in [23].

4. China and India in Yerevan: Conclusions

To understand, therefore, how Armenia, once again charged with the responsibility of an autonomous foreign policy, can find itself “trapped” between various choices having to make the most convenient ones in a world where the boundaries of alliances and partnerships are mobile and mutually influential, we should think about the relations - also and above all economic - that it seeks to develop with India and China.

India and China are notoriously considered competitors from different points of view, not least the economic one. Being certainly particular competitors, given that they cooperate within the BRICS club we have already written about, even in the last period, they have experienced diplomatic ups and downs. Often this type of competition is promoted by an interested third party, as in the case of the United States which, at this historical moment, would prefer Indian economic growth to the detriment of the People's Republic of China⁴.

In this regard, therefore, it should first be understood whether these two economic realities, China and India, could compete in Armenia, and, if so, to what extent. One of the problems that could arise, should these projects be carried out quickly, is that of the North-South Corridor “against” the Belt and Road.

“Geopolitically and geo-economically, the INSTC [i.e. the International North-South Transport Corridor] is also being seen as New Delhi’s counterweight strategy to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China is India’s competitor in the region. The corridor is going to leave a deep impact on India’s engagement with Eurasia, as India-the fifth-largest economy in the world-looks forward to fostering deeper and stronger ties in the region. INSTC also serves another one of India’s geopolitical interests as it bypasses archrival Pakistan and strengthens its co-operation with Russia and other members of the project.

Iran plays an important role as a transit hub in this project. To connect Eurasia to the Indian Ocean, India agreed to invest up to \$635 million to develop the Iranian deep-sea port of Chabahar on the Gulf of Oman which is only 300 kilometers from Gwadar, the major Pakistani trade hub port heavily invested in by China [27].”

Nonetheless, the international scenario is in motion, and despite some apparent constants in contemporary history, there are significant changes at the level of diplomacy. Despite the economic competition, the two countries are increasingly beginning to be conceived as true symbionts, even at the level of the large corporate apparatuses; the specializations of the two countries are done respectively [12]. Beyond that, the business between the two countries (which hit \$ 125 billion in 2021 [14]) is of considerable magnitude. This depends on their worldview and how these two countries see the future of international relations and the global distribution of power [16: 154]. The international crises of the last period have seen,

⁴ A summary of this thought is in [20]. “The US views India as a natural competitor of China which is not interested in growing Chinese influence in the region” [22].

in 2022, a political rapprochement between the two Asian countries [14; 7]. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Indian Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar met in Indonesia on 7th July 2022, reiterating the importance of rapprochement in the face of the current political scenario and common interests in terms of international politics, based on multilateralism and democratic participation in common development [14].

Furthermore, economic cooperation would appear to be in the interests of both actors. One of the predictions made by an analyst regarding the possible medium-term cooperation between China and India is as follows: “the many business synergies between these two neighboring nations come to the fore. The combination of China’s manufacturing might and India’s software and service prowess provides across-the-board value-chain capabilities. The United States remains heavily reliant on both nations, whose market sizes dwarf that of America, giving Chinese and Indian companies colossal economies of scale and leading to large bilateral trade deficits for the United States with both nations. These dynamics ultimately result in world-leading Chinese and Indian universities, companies, and research institutes [20]”.

The future of the Armenian country fits into this scenario, given its position within the economic projects of these two giants. It is important to understand how projects such as the North-South Corridor and the Belt and Road Initiative will interact in the next period, bearing in mind that this will greatly depend on the international scenario that will be formed, as well as on the subsequent relations between China and India. The Armenian variable will then be of a political-decisional nature, as well as entrepreneurial, and this is seen in relation to its choices to confirm the adhesion to the great Asian integration projects, or to prefer one over the other. However - and we reiterate this - it will strongly depend on the capacity for dialogue and cooperation that the countries in question will be able to put in place.

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**ՊԵԿԻՆ-ԵՐԵՎԱՆ-ՆՅՈՒ ԴԵԼԻ ՏՆՏԵՍԱԿԱՆ ԵՌԱՆԿՅՈՒՆԸ.
ՀԱՄԱԳՈՐԾԱԿՑՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ ԹԵ՝ ՄՐՑԱԿՑՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ**

Օրացիո Մարիա Գնեռե

Բանալի բառեր՝ Պեկին, Նյու Դելի, Երևան, Հնդկաստան, Չինաստան, Հայաստան, համագործակցություն, մրցակցություն, արտահանում, առևտուր, քաղաքական հարաբերություններ:

1991 թ.-ից հետո Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունը սկսեց ինքնուրույն վարել իր արտաքին քաղաքականությունը և ընտրել իր արտաքին գործընկերներին: Արտաքին քաղաքականության մեջ Հայաստանի Հանրապետությունը ի սկզբանե ուշադրությունը սևեռեց Ռուսաստանի Դաշնության և այն երկրների վրա, որտեղ գոյություն ունեին հայկական համայնքներ: Բացի այդ, Հայաստանի համար առաջնահերթություններից մեկն էր համագործակցել Ասիայի երկու տերությունների՝ Չինաստանի և Հնդկաստանի հետ: Արտաքին քաղաքականության ձևավորման հարցում էական նշանակություն ունի նաև Չինաստանի և Հնդկաստանի կողմից առաջ մղվող տնտեսական ծրագրերում Հայաստանի ընդգրկման հարցը: Հոդվածում ուսումնասիրության առարկա է դարձել Հայաստանի հարաբերությունները այդ երկրների հետ՝ հաշվի առնելով նաև այն հակասությունները, որ առկա են Չինաստանի և Հնդկաստանի միջև: Հոդվածում փորձ է արվում վերլուծել տնտեսական, քաղաքական փոխառնչությունների հիմնահարցերը, որոնք ունեն նաև տարածաշրջամային նշանակություն:

UNDERSTANDING OMAN'S POLICY TOWARD REGIONAL CONFLICTS*

Mushegh Ghahriyan

Abstract

The study of Oman's foreign policy attracts scholars because of its unique features. It undoubtedly differs from the foreign policies of other countries in the region. This paper focuses on Oman's policy in three cases of regional conflicts: the Syrian war, the war in Yemen, and the crisis in Qatar in the context of regional changes and Saudi-Iranian rivalry. Oman pragmatically manoeuvres to mitigate threats emerging from the crises and wars in the countries of the Middle East.

Keywords: Oman, foreign policy, Syrian war, Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia.

Introduction

In the Middle East where states make enormous efforts to protect their sovereignty, security, and stability the smaller and weaker ones find themselves in the most vulnerable position. Both domestic and external factors cause substantial or even insurmountable problems for those countries. Those countries use a wide range of instruments and strategies to protect their security and sovereignty. However, there is no guarantee that those efforts will be fruitful as bigger and stronger neighbors are ready to intervene.

Even though Arab nations constitute the majority of the Middle East and North Africa, they do not have a proportionate amount of power or influence there. Particularly since the 2010s, only Saudi Arabia with its allies, the UAE and Egypt, has been a dominant regional power, along with three non-Arab countries: Iran, Turkey, and Israel. Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya, the traditional leaders of the Arab world, have all suffered from substantial political setbacks, and several are now struggling to retain their integrity. Instead, Iran and Turkey have stepped in to fill the void left by the decline of the Arab states. The Arab monarchies have managed to survive, whereas the republican regimes were the first to collapse under the pressure of the revolutionary processes. Due to the accumulated wealth and energy resources, the Arab states of the Gulf region had already begun to assume a more prominent role in regional affairs in the early years of the 21st century [17:232]. Wealth and survival predetermined who would become the leading force in the Arab world [50: 420].

* The article was submitted on May 5, 2022. The article was reviewed on August 17, 2022.

According to Yossef, the Arab Spring and further developments have led to the redistribution of power in the Middle East towards the Gulf region. It has weakened the status quo alignment and empowered the revisionist camp. The Gulf issues dictate the future struggle in the Middle East between two versions of Islamism [68: 76].

The post-Arab spring order is characterised as a situation where all are against all forming fluid coalitions. Some regional powers, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, seek to form their blocs, while other actors struggle to preserve their autonomy [55]. Compared to the pre-2011 order, Sunni - Shia dynamics have broadened involving more actors in the region [38:146]. While in recent two decades Iran largely benefited from geopolitical shifts in the Middle East and extended its influence, the other heavyweight of the region has been less successful [30:7].

Iran and Saudi Arabia, two hegemons in the Gulf region, are archrivals, while other smaller countries have become embroiled in this rivalry. Saudi Arabia is the leading force in the GCC. It claims leadership in the Arab world. It asserts dominance in the Arab world. Saudi Arabia views Iran as its principal foe and views its allies and proxies as security threats. Saudi Arabia's support of various countries and factions is not strongly based on ideology. Iran supports the Shia populations and factions in the Arab countries like Hezbollah, Houthis, Alawis, among others.

According to Kamrava, Saudi Arabia and Israel sit at the top of the pyramid of the hierarchy in the MENA region seeking to preserve the regional status quo, as well as two challengers, Iran and Turkey. In the second row of the pyramid, the middle powers are situated some of whom are closely aligned and allied with the status quo powers (Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, and the UAE), while others (Algeria, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, and Tunisia) try to conduct more independent policies. In Kamrava's view, the countries in the second group are more pragmatic, and less based on ideological and identity factors in their foreign policies [29:13]. However, in recent years, Saudi Arabia's foreign policy, especially under Muhammad bin Salman, has changed toward a more proactive stance and pursues to form its broader alliance and new status quo which confronts the efforts of Turkey and Iran.

Oman is a country with a population of roughly 4.5 million and is situated along strategic trade routes, between Iran and Saudi Arabia. On one hand, Oman is a member of the Gulf Cooperation Council with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, and Bahrain; on the other hand, it maintains friendly relations with Iran.

Oman is well known for its distinctive foreign policy, which seeks to counter-balance the risks resulting from the Middle East's inherent instability. In order to maintain a balance between the regional powers and provide extremely beneficial services to both regional countries and other powers engaged in regional affairs, it has assumed the role of mediator and friend to all.

This paper examines Omani foreign policy in the context of the Syrian War, the Qatar Crisis, and the Yemen War in an attempt to understand how the nation has positioned itself. For the study, I have selected the cases of conflicts in three Arab countries where Saudi Arabia and Iran are antagonists. Iran firmly backs Ba-

shar Assad's government in Syria, including militarily. Saudi Arabia has provided financial aid to the Syrian opposition. In the case of the crisis in Qatar, Iran backed the regime of Qatar while Saudi Arabia led the boycott campaign. Iran provides military backing to the rebel Houthis in Yemen, while the Saudi-led alliance has been actively engaged in hostilities.

The foreign policy of Oman: what we know so far

Numerous studies have been devoted to comprehending Oman's foreign policy and evaluating its advantages and disadvantages. The Sultanate's foreign policy is examined and explained using a variety of theories and methods. Discussing the problem in the framework of the neutrality strategy is one of the typical approaches. Oman is occasionally referred to as the Switzerland of the Middle East or Arabia for its efforts to keep neutrality [42]. Neutrality comes in a variety of forms, including non-alignment, temporary, *de jure*, and *de facto* neutrality [54]. Under Sultan Qaboos, Oman chose to voluntarily become a neutral state and refrain from taking part in conflicts. It is worth mentioning as well that Oman's foreign policy uniqueness is associated with Qaboos's name.

According to Sultanate's foreign policy vision, it is aimed at building strong relations with all neighbours based on mutual respect and non-interference. Oman perceives the members of the GCC, Yemen, Iran, India, and Pakistan as neighbouring countries. Oman understands that neighbours may enter into conflict with each other and takes an obligation to maintain cordial relations with the sides and help to overcome the disputes, because the conflicts between the neighbours may jeopardize its own security. Oman defies exclusions, and boycotts, and insists that dialogue is key in addressing any issues. In its foreign policy, Oman takes a pragmatic stance that emphasizes geostrategic realities rather than flimsy ideological beliefs. The pragmatism of Oman is based on the conviction that long-term interests will outlast temporary difficulties [48].

Mediation is Omani foreign policy's key tool. Oman has been a successful mediator in a number of negotiations and incidents over the years, including the negotiations over the Iran nuclear deal signed in 2015, mediation or facilitation efforts between the Arab countries, and between Iran and the Western countries. Oman has effectively mediated a number of situations, building a reputation that other powers highly praise. Despite Saudi Arabia and the UAE occasionally pressuring Muscat to abandon its neutral posture, Oman is strong enough to resist. [33]. The policy of neutrality, on the other hand, can be effective as long as the GCC states and other players profit from Muscat's "friends to all and enemies to none" stance [44].

One of the concepts applied to explain the Sultanate's foreign policy is omnibalancing. According to David, leaders seeking to resist internal and external threats to their rule practice omnibalancing [20: 236]. When discussing Oman's unique strategy of balancing internal and external threats, O'Reilly suggested the

term *Omanibalancing*. In its efforts to mitigate threats, Oman befriends traditional Arab enemies, Israel and Iran [45: 70].

Other scholars address the issue in the scope of hedging – a strategy when options are created in relations with other countries in order not to become over-dependent on one party. Hedging is perceived as something between balancing and bandwagoning and pursues the goal of mitigating the risks emanating from the latter two. The basic motivation for “hedging” is to reduce the risks and uncertainties associated with balancing or bandwagoning [35: 637]. According to Kuik’s definition, hedging is “a behavior in which a country seeks to offset risks by pursuing multiple policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteracting effects under the situation of high-uncertainties and high-stakes” [36: 163]. Oman develops political, security, and economic relations with the US, the GCC states, and Iran and hedges against overreliance on any of these countries by diversifying its alliances. In Binhuwaidin’s view, hedging explains Oman’s political response to the increasing power of Iran [12: 10]. Oman hedges against Iran and the KSA, as the Gulf sub-complex of the Middle East region remains bipolar. Oman’s friendly relations with the US and UK, and political, economic, and military cooperation with them contribute to the country’s improved security and increased opportunities as well.

Colombo tags Oman as a “swing” country for its foreign policy. “Swing” states are flexible, trying to balance conflicting interests and countries pragmatically [18: 60]. Kliman and Fontaine note that the mixed political orientation of “swing” countries gives them greater advantages than just size, population, or economic output [34].

Numerous publications claim that Oman's foreign policy is based on the vision of Sultan Qaboos, the country's challenging past during the civil war, the desire to avoid it, the need to strike a balance between the strong regional powers, and the unique features of the Ibadi branch of Islam practiced in Oman.

Worral says that flexibility, pragmatism, and cultural roots serve as a considerable legacy for the foreign policy of Muscat, and according to him, the status of ‘Interlocutor State’ suits Oman best [65: 50]. Kechichian observes that Oman developed a role for itself under Qaboos by pursuing a pragmatic policy, forging allies, and adhering to regional obligations 31: 25].

Although Oman’s strategy has been successful for decades, some researchers are skeptical of its prospect, given several factors, including the death of the long-time Sultan Qaboos, who held a high authority, and the decline in hydrocarbon revenues, which has made the country even more exposed to economic and political challenges. Neither neutrality, nor mediation are not ends in themselves. In general, Oman's foreign policy is pragmatic and flexible. In its foreign policy, Oman operates in an extremely balanced and calculated manner, trying not to interfere in regional disputes as much as possible. Such an approach allows not only ensuring security but also gaining prestige in international relations.

Case 1 - the War in Syria

In the early days of March 2011, the demonstrations in Syria quickly evolved into a bloody war between government forces and foreign-backed opposition forces. As of 2012, a full-scale war had already been unleashed. Almost all the Arab countries supported the opposition, advocated for the exclusion of the Syrian government from the Arab League, and isolated it. Some of those Arab countries supported anti-government forces militarily, financially, and politically. Among those Arab states, Oman's stance was milder compared to the others, although, in November 2011, Muscat voted to suspend Syria from the Arab League [53].

While Saudi Arabia and Qatar were at the forefront of Arab countries leading the anti-Assad camp, Oman, as it happened in many other cases, refused to follow its partners in the GCC, as well as this, it did not close its embassy, did not denounce Assad's rule, did not cut its ties with Damascus and did not support the opposition. Oman only downgraded its mission, and in 2020 was the first state of the Gulf region to send its ambassador back to Damascus [39].

In the early months of the conflict, Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi called for a peaceful solution mediated by the League of Arab states, "the aim of the Arab League is to get Syria out of this crisis through an Arab plan and mechanism" [1]. In October 2012, Alawi addressed both the Syrian government and the Syrian National Council urging them to stop killing and displacing Syrian civilians and stressed that Oman's role in Syria's conflict would only lie in providing humanitarian assistance [14].

Oman's previous foreign minister, bin Alawi, visited Damascus in 2015 at the height of the military conflict, and the second visit took place in 2019. The initial visit took place shortly after Russia launched its military operation to support its ally, Assad [21]. According to Syria's official SANA news agency, the minister discussed with Assad ways to "resolve the crisis in Syria" [4]. During the second visit of the Omani minister, the parties discussed bilateral relations and regional security [59].

Those visits were not unilateral. In 2015, Oman received Syria's foreign minister Walid al Muallem, a rare foreign visit of a Syrian official, apart from Russia and Iran [2]. Muallem paid another visit to Muscat in 2018. During this visit, he inaugurated the headquarters of Syria's new embassy in Muscat [25].

In March 2021, the visit by Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal al-Mekdad to Muscat renewed hopes for Syria's readmission to the Arab League [57]. In July 2021, Omani foreign minister Sayyid Badr Albusaidi told the *Asharq Al-Awsat* newspaper that his country supported Syria's return to the Arab League [49]. Egypt, the initiator of Syria's return to the Arab League, launched its campaign from Oman hoping to convince the Gulf states to re-admit Syria to the Arab League [40].

In May 2021, Oman's Sultan Haitham bin Tarik was the first Gulf leader to congratulate Syrian President Bashar al-Assad on his re-election as president of Syria [43]. Oman and Syria regularly negotiate on the level of foreign ministers and discuss the promotion of joint interests and cooperation. Oman describes the

relations between the two countries as fraternal [47]. At the beginning of the conflict, Oman froze communication with Syria waiting for an appropriate moment to revive the relations. That happened when Oman successfully participated in reaching the nuclear deal between the 5+1 group (UN Security Council permanent members plus Germany) and Iran in 2015 and after the start of Russian intervention in the war that changed the balance in Syria.

The approach of Oman was later followed by other GCC countries, the UAE and Bahrain. Particularly, the UAE dramatically changed its approach to the Syrian authorities. It was the first Gulf country to invite Bashar Al-Assad to visit Abu Dhabi in 2022. The Emirati authorities would prefer to engage with the current government of Syria rather than various radical factions, which are assisted by Qatar, and Turkey with whom the UAE's relations had been rather tense. The rift in the Gulf region and controversies between the regional actors play in hand with the Syrian government. In this context, Oman could play an important role in the rapprochement between Syria and the GCC countries. Given the colossal finances necessary for the restoration of the war-torn country, the GCC countries are the only real source of possible investments.

Oman believes that restoring stability in Syria requires maintaining a productive relationship with Damascus. The country has promised to participate in the reconstruction of Syria when peace is restored in the country [15].

Thus, Oman has yet to play its role in the Syrian case. Its patience in Syria seems to be justified, and Oman's gamble has won [37]. Oman could position itself as a facilitator between Syria and the West. In addition, Oman may become an important diplomatic actor in the process of reintegrating Damascus into the Arab world and the international community [15].

Case 2 - the War in Yemen

Yemen, which is situated in the southwest of the Arabian Peninsula, has long been renowned for its strategic location between Asia and Africa, the Arabian Sea, and the Red Sea. Rarely has the nation experienced times of peace, and it is not a coincidence that Yemen's fragile stability vanished during the early months of the Middle Eastern revolutions. The country was completely wrecked and divided between warring parties after ten years of civil war and external interference, which were also accompanied by the most horrific forms of humanitarian catastrophe. Yemen is a neighboring country of Oman, unlike Syria and Qatar, and the conflict there poses a number of challenges and contains multiple dangers. Moreover, that factor explains the interest and active involvement of Muscat in peace brokering.

In 2011, protests broke out in Yemen, forcing President Ali Abdullah Saleh to quit. followed by a transition of power with the support of Gulf states. Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi became the interim president. In the new phase of instability in the country, Al Qaeda launched military operations and occupied part of the country. In 2014, the group Ansar Allah, widely known as Houthis, an Iranian-backed movement, captured the capital city, Sanaa, demanding to share power. The ad-

vance of the Houthis in 2015, and the support of Iran prompted the Saudi-led coalition to launch a military operation.

In March 2015, the Saudi coalition launched airstrikes aimed at pushing back the Houthis and restoring Hadi's government. The Saudi coalition received intelligence support from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France [11]. In August 2015, ground forces entered Aden, and drove the Houthis out, but were unable to force them to withdraw from Sanaa. The Houthis reached an agreement with former President Saleh on the rule of the territories under their control, but in 2017 Saleh changed the camp. The Houthis killed Saleh and defeated his army. In 2018, Saleh's supporters and Saudi forces attacked Hodeida port on the Red Sea coast. After several months of fighting, the parties reached a ceasefire agreement. As of early 2022, the war is still going on, the Houthis have recently started to attack targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and Saudi forces have intensified airstrikes on their positions [6].

The coalition led by Saudi Arabia included the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, Egypt, Sudan, and Morocco. The only country of the Gulf Cooperation Council that did not participate in the coalition was Oman. Muscat, faithful to its foreign policy tactics, tried to provide a platform for dialogue between the conflicting parties. Fear and a search for new opportunities are the main drivers of Oman's foreign policy in Yemen, Tveit argues. Oman fears that conflict in Yemen may penetrate into the country, but on the other hand sees possibilities to transform challenges into opportunities by projecting its own influence in Yemen [62]. In April 2015, former Omani Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi explained the position of the country. "Oman is not part of that campaign for simple reasons – Oman is a country of peace. We cannot work on peace efforts at the same time we would be part of a military campaign. Those two things do not meet" [13].

In the conflict in Yemen Oman is an essential mediator. It has hosted meetings and negotiations between the warring parties, and the external actors as well.

On 24 April 2015, Oman unveiled a seven-point peace plan for Yemen, which called for a Houthi withdrawal from all Yemeni cities, the restoration of Hadi's government, early elections involving the conversion of the Houthis into a political party, and Yemen's accession to the GCC [60]. Saudi Arabia rejected Oman's proposals [9]. In May 2015, Oman hosted peace talks between the US diplomats and Houthi representatives [16]. In 2016, the country organised a meeting between former US Secretary of State John Kerry and the Houthi delegation headed by Mohammad Abdul Salam where a ceasefire was agreed upon [61]. Muscat also organised low-level meetings between the Saudi-led Arab coalition and the Houthis, and hosted a series of meetings between international and Western officials and the Houthi delegation [56].

Oman believes it has a special diplomatic role to play in helping the warring factions move toward peace. In 2019, bin Alawi bin Abdullah, stated: "We always facilitate any attempt for parties to talk to each other ... or bring parties from Yemen to meet in Oman" [7]. In March 2021, after Saudi Arabia offered the Houthis a

cease-fire, the Omanis encouraged them to accept the proposal [5]. The Sultanate of Oman has revealed that it is working jointly with Saudi Arabia to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Yemeni crisis [56].

Generally, Oman acts cautiously and patiently in Yemen to preserve its position as a neutral arbiter. Nevertheless, it was blamed for allowing the Houthis to use its territory and enhance the smuggling of weapons to Yemen. In its turn, Oman is suspicious of the UAE's involvement and intention in the south of Yemen, where Abu Dhabi backs the Southern Transitional Council [9:6].

Oman applied its diplomatic abilities in the Yemeni crisis as well, using the reputation it accrued during the negotiation of the Iran nuclear deal in 2015. In addition to declining to join the coalition led by Saudi Arabia, Oman expressed its opposition to it by denouncing the military action and characterizing it as a sectarian effort to attack Iran. Oman urged the international community to strengthen the diplomatic approach and emphasized that it was the right of the Yemeni people, not outside parties, to resolve the situation conflict. Oman urged the GCC members to refrain from meddling in Yemeni affairs.

Case 3 - Qatar Diplomatic Crisis

Qatar, a tiny peninsula state in the Gulf with ambitious goals and projects, has occasionally been irritating other Arab nations for its excessive independence in foreign policy as Doha's own agenda and initiatives may conflict with those of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. It unavoidably entailed the severance of ties between those countries. Qatar's support of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt led to a diplomatic crisis in 2014: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain recalled their ambassadors from Doha. The trio accused Qatar of not following the November 2013 commitment not to sponsor someone posing a danger to GCC states' security and stability [41]. After Qatar demonstrated a readiness to accede to the demands of its neighbors, the ambassadors were reinstated in November 2014. This minor crisis served as a precursor to the larger one, which began in 2017.

In the summer of 2017, four Arab states - Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt - announced the severance of their relations with Qatar, accusing it of supporting terrorism. In addition to it, these countries-imposed land, water, and air blockades on Qatar. These countries presented 13 demands to Doha, including the weakening of ties with Iran, the closure of the Turkish military base in the country, the cessation of interference in the affairs of other countries, among others [3]. Two other regional powers, Turkey and Iran, expressed support for Qatar in the conflict [51]. Doha refused to comply with the demands [10]. Its financial capabilities allowed it to mitigate the economic consequences of the blockade, and reorient its trade to other countries. Diplomatic relations between the four countries and Qatar were restored in early 2022 [52].

In both cases, Oman and Kuwait did not unite their efforts with the Saudi-led camp and even benefited economically from the crisis. Kuwait, which played a primary role in managing and resolving the 2014 dispute, again offered its services

to bring the sides around the negotiating table [64]. The ending of the crisis and restoration of the unity of the GCC was in line with its national security strategy [24:80]. Oman's involvement in mediation was marginal, entrusting Kuwait to take on that role [27]. Nevertheless, Kuwait's primacy in the process did not mean that Oman distanced itself: it made efforts to mediate in the frames of the Gulf Cooperation Council [66].

In January 2021, when the parties announced the resolution of the dispute, the UN Secretary-General expressed his gratitude to the late Emir of Kuwait and late Sultan of Oman, "who worked tirelessly towards resolving the Gulf rift" [63].

Initially, Doha hoped that Muscat would mediate the dispute, and Oman first agreed. However, realizing that it cannot play the role of principal mediator, Oman returned to its typical strategy of quiet diplomacy [8]. Kuwaiti and Oman's position was not a surprise at all considering certain factors. Oman does not consider that it shares the same threats with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, first, with regard to Iran. Kuwait and Oman see the best service for their interests by balancing relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran [16].

Muscat aided Doha to circumvent the blockade and benefited financially from strengthened business ties between the two countries [46]. Throughout the crisis, Oman remained politically neutral but economically strengthened its cooperation with Qatar. Oman opened its sea access and airports for Qatari companies and expressed opposition to attempts to exclude Qatar from the regional cooperation framework [67: 655].

In January 2018, Qatar signed a memorandum of understanding with Oman on the development of bilateral investment and trade. The agreement covered a wide range of cooperation sectors including the production and export of food products from the sultanate to Qatar [19]. Construction materials, consumer goods, and food products from Oman replaced those of Saudi Arabia. Additionally, Oman served as a transshipment point for Qatari ships that were forbidden from entering the airspace and waterways of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates [27].

A few days after the rift began, Qatar started transporting goods via Oman to bypass the Gulf countries that had blocked the sea routes to Doha. Typically, cargo for Qatar is loaded onto smaller boats and sent to Doha after stopping at the massive deep-water Jebel Ali port in Dubai or the capital of the UAE, Abu Dhabi. [28] Qatar has launched two new shipping lines between Hamad Port and Sohar and Salalah ports in Oman [26].

The Sultanate deepened its economic ties with Qatar, where the mutual trade between the two countries reached \$702 million, a 2000% rise during the first three months of the crisis, between June and September 2017. Moreover, Oman's non-oil exports to Qatar increased by 144% during the first nine months of the year 2017. Furthermore, by December 2017, the Sultanate of Oman had become the foremost destination for Qatari non-oil exports, receiving about 35% of Qatari's total exports [67]. Apart from it, Oman received \$1billion in direct financial support from Qatar to support its economy worsened by COVID-19 and lower oil prices [32]. Oman

and Qatar also signed agreements on military cooperation, taxation, tourism, ports, labour and investment [58].

Oman does not share the worries of Saudi Arabia and the UAE over security matters and does not believe that Doha has broken the GCC agreement. Oman declined to play a significant mediating role. Instead, Muscat did not hesitate to benefit of the crisis. In this instance, collaboration between Qatar and Oman was advantageous to both parties since Muscat helped Doha overcome the blockade and Doha gave Muscat more funds and more trade prospects. The Omani position in this issue was more pro-Qatari than neutral. Nevertheless, Muscat has contribution in bridging its GCC allies and partners. Instead, Muscat did not hesitate to benefit of the crisis. In this instance, collaboration between Qatar and Oman was advantageous to both parties since Muscat helped Doha overcome the blockade and Doha gave Muscat more funds and more trade prospects. The Omani position in this issue was more pro-Qatari than neutral. Nevertheless, Muscat has had its contribution in bridging its GCC allies and partners. Instead, Muscat did not hesitate to benefit from the crisis. In this instance, the collaboration between Qatar and Oman was advantageous to both parties since Muscat helped Doha surpass the blockade and Doha provided Muscat with more funds and more trade prospects. The Omani position in this issue was more pro-Qatari than neutral. Nevertheless, Muscat has had its contribution in bridging its GCC allies and partners.

Conclusion

This article discusses Oman's stance on three cases of regional conflicts that ensued as a result of well-known developments in the region. In this turbulent time, the stronger regional powers compete with one another in an effort to improve their positions, while the weaker ones strive to preserve their sovereignty.

In the scholarly literature, it is generally agreed that Oman's foreign policy is more pragmatic and less dogmatic. The country manoeuvres between regional hegemony, Saudi Arabia and Iran, to ensure the best possible outcome for itself. In this struggle, Oman's most valuable card is neutrality, and the key tool for neutrality is mediation. Oman's mediation is acknowledged and valued by other regional states as well as the United States due to its numerous successful cases. In addition, it is crucial to remember that the Omani mediation is founded on its soft abilities rather than its physical force.

Oman's security layers, including its GCC membership, balancing between Iran and Saudi Arabia, its use of mediation as a tool for foreign policy, the security support the US provides, and the increase in military spending are insufficient to totally ensure its security and stability and eliminate risks. Oman has a small population; the state depends heavily on the trade of hydrocarbons and is therefore subject to the volatile prices on the global market, and hence social issues can also destabilize the country's internal order. Unlike the UAE and Qatar, the Omani government, with its limited resources, is unable to fund expensive, ambitious foreign policy efforts as a method of keeping challenges away from its frontiers.

The following chart shows the positions Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Oman toward the conflicts discussed in this article.

	Saudi Arabia	Iran	Oman
The Syrian war	Assistance to the opposition, isolation of Bashar Assad, advocacy for the change of the regime	Support to Assad's regime, including military	Refusal of joining the demand of Assad's government overthrow, recognition of its legitimacy
The war in Yemen	Direct military confrontation against the Houthis backed by Iran	Direct military support to the Houthis	Mediation efforts, condemnation of the military operation by Saudi led coalition
Qatari crisis	Boycott, isolation and blockade	Political and logistic assistance to Qatar	Assisting Qatar to overcome isolation, strengthening of trade relations

In each of the three examples shown in the table, Oman's attitude is more in opposition to Saudi Arabia's and more in line with Iran's. In all the three situations, Oman's position tends to favour maintaining the status quo rather than encouraging the developments taking place in those states. Geographically, Syria is far away from Oman, and it is not a significant trading partner. Thus, Oman was practically equally far away from the opposing sides in the Syrian war. Yemen is not only a neighboring nation, but it is also the scene of Saudi Arabia's military conflict with an Iranian-backed group. For Oman, it has resulted in more difficulties. To maintain relations with all parties engaged in war in Yemen, Muscat has made it explicit that it was distancing itself from the military campaign. Despite not being Oman's neighbor, Qatar is a significant partner and GCC member. The diplomatic rift created two camps, one of which was isolating and applying pressure, while the other was assisting in relieving the pressure. Oman has chosen the second option.

Oman's decisions can be explained by the caution that any significant change carries risks to its security and stability. The potential challenges might easily undermine internal stability or foster an unfavorable environment for the nation. Nevertheless, I do not insist that Oman is in the pro-Iranian camp. Oman has carefully adhered to its foreign policy stance, refusing to isolate or boycott nations and at least maintaining formal connections with all of them.

In any conflict, the opposing sides eventually sit around the negotiation table. Oman should uphold its reputation as a reliable mediator and gain the trust of both parties. It might be necessary to not only maintain strict neutrality, but also to take specific steps, such as assisting Qatar in breaking the blockade or the Houthis in certain circumstances.

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ՕՄԱՆԻ ԲԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ ՏԱՐԱԾԱՇՐՋԱՆԱՅԻՆ ՀԱԿԱՄԱՐՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ ՆԿԱՏՄԱՄԲ

Մուշեղ Ղահրիյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ Օման, արտաքին քաղաքականություն, Սիրիական պատերազմ, Եմեն, Կատար, Սաուդյան Արաբիա

Օմանի արտաքին քաղաքականության ուսումնասիրությունը հետաքրքրում է ակադեմիական շրջանակներին նախևառաջ այդ քաղաքականության առանձնահատկությունների շնորհիվ: Այն աներկբայորեն տարբերվում է Պարսից ծոցի տարածաշրջանի այլ երկրների արտաքին քաղաքականություններից: Այս հոդվածն անդրադառնում է Օմանի արտաքին քաղաքականությանը տարածաշրջանային երեք հակամարտությունների համատեքստում՝ Սիրիական պատերազմ, Եմենի պատերազմ և Կատարի շուրջ դիվանագիտական ճգնաժամ և դիտարկում դրանք տարածաշրջանային երկու տերությունների՝ Սաուդյան Արաբիայի և Իրանի դիմակայության համատեքստում: Օմանի յուրահատուկ արտաքին քաղաքականությունը կապվում է երկրի նախկին միապետ սուլթան Կաբուսի անվան հետ: Հաշվի առնելով երկրի ոչ վաղ անցյալի իրադարձությունները, տարածաշրջանին բնորոշ կոնֆլիկտայնությունը և մի շարք այլ հանգամանքներ՝ Օմանը մշտապես փորձել է չեզոքություն պահպանել տարբեր իրադրություններում, ինչպես նաև իր միջնորդական ջանքերն առաջարկել զանազան հակամարտող կողմերի: Այս առումով, Օմանը կարողացել է հաջողություններ գրանցել և դրա շնորհիվ հեղինակություն ձեռք բերել, որը գնահատվում է նաև այլ երկրների կողմից:

Հոգվածում քննարկվող հակամարտություններում Օմանի կայացրած որոշումները կարելի է բացատրել այն բանով, որ տարածաշրջանային անկանխատեսելի փոփոխությունները ռիսկեր են պարունակում երկրի անվտանգության և կայունության համար: Օմանը հետևում է իր իսկ որդեգրած արտաքին քաղաքական սկզբունքներին՝ մերժելով մեկուսացման և բոյկոտի քաղաքականությունը և պահպանելով կապերը բոլոր կողմերի հետ: Միևնույն ժամանակ, այդ քաղաքականությունը չի նախատեսում բացարձակ չեզոքություն: Ընդհանուր առմամբ, Օմանը ձգտում է հավասարակշռված, հաշվարկված և պրատմատիկ մոտեցումներ ցուցաբերել տարատեսակ մարտահրավերների բախվելիս:

ON THE LEXICAL EVIDENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF "LEADER" IN MIDDLE PERSIAN AND ARABIC LANGUAGES*

Artyom Tonoyan, Artem Davydov

Abstract

In New Persian (hereafter NP) there are more than two dozen Arabic borrowings, attested in different dictionaries and partly still using today for the concept of "leader" [8], while most of the words for the same concept in Middle Persian (hereafter MP) are of Iranian origin. The present article introduces and examines the lexemes attested in Middle Persian and Arabic with the meaning "leader, leader, commander". The choice of the Middle Persian language is due to the task of showing the features of the public perception of the concept "leader" and its expressions at the linguistic extent in Sassanid Iran, still free from strong Arab influence. On the other hand, the choice of Arabic is due to the fact that it shows the enormous influence that the Arab world had already in the post-Sassanid period on the Iranians' perception of the concept of "leader", and, consequently, the Arabic language itself, in the level of linguistic thought, in the face of Arabic borrowings to denote the concept of "leader" in NP. The Arabic loanwords in NP, used for the concept of "leader", are presented in the authors' previous paper [8], because of which the present examination is limited in the presentation of the denotants of the concept of "leader" only in Sasanian Middle Persian and Arabic.

The lexical material of Middle Persian is extracted from the well-known dictionaries of D. N. MacKenzie [18], H. S. Nyberg [21], and D. Durkin-Meisterernst [10], and Arabic from the dictionaries of X. Baranov [3] and E. W. Lane [17]. In addition, Arabic loans in NP are written out from the dictionaries of 'Amīd [1], Mo'in [19], Dehrodā [9], Steingass [24], Rubinčik [22] etc.

Four lexemes of Iranian origin, i.e. parwānag, pēšar, pēšōbāy and sālār, attested in Middle Persian with the meaning of "leader" were subjected to etymological examination. Simultaneously, 26 Arabic words in the same meaning, the majority of which were also borrowed in Persian, are presented.

Keywords: Sasanid Iran, Middle Persian, post-Sasanian Iran, Arabic, leader, parwānag, pēšar, pēšōbāy, sālār, etymology, etymon, semantic development, Arabic loans

The denotants of the concept of "leader" in Middle Persian

There are approximately thirty lexeme for the concept of *leader* in Modern Persian, among which, in addition to the original Iranian words, there are at least two dozen loanwords from Arabic and Turkish [8], while, the words in Middle

* The article was submitted on October 26, 2022. The article was reviewed on November 1, 2022. This work was supported by the RA Science Committee and Russian Foundation for Basic Research (RF) in the frames of the joint research project SCS 20RF-189 and RFBR 20-59-05006 accordingly.

Persian for the same concept are incomparably less (*parwānag*, *pēšār*, *pēšōbāy* and *sālār*), but only of Iranian origin without any exception. There are still 4 words for the concept of *leader* in the Middle Persian texts of the Sasanid period¹, which are:

Parwānag ‘leader, guide’ [18: 65] which in Classical Persian is referred to as *parvāna(k)* with the same meaning [9, s.v. “parvānak”], which passed from Persian into Arabic as *furānaq*, literally meaning ‘leader, guide, avanguard’ [23:71]. The phonetical form of Middle Persian word is identical with a zoonym *parvānak* ‘caracal’ [28, s.v. “parvānak”]² or its variant *farāna(k)* known in the Modern Persian also as *sīāhgūš*³ with the meaning of ‘caracal’⁴, ‘desert lynx’ or ‘Persian lynx’⁵. The interpretation given by Xalaf Tabrīzī [28, s.v. “sīāhgūš”], Ānand Rāj [2, s.v. ‘sīāhgūš’] and other lexicographers of this appellation is the following: ‘*In Persian parvānak also means sīāhgūš. The sīāhgūš is renowned as šāter-e sīr [the herald/forerunner of the lion] because it goes ahead of the lion and cries in order to warn the other animals of the lion’s coming*’ [14: 245-248]. Hūšang A’lam, considering a bayt by Kāqānī Šervānī⁶, calls this interpretation of Ānand Rāj wrong [14: 245-248]

It is interesting that according to Zakarīyā Qazvīnī (13th century), the Iranians were able to catch caracal, especially when it was young, to use it later in hunting, because it hunted cranes and crows by springing 5 to 6 feet into the air after them, when they rise from the ground [14: 246]

It could be possible that the semantic development of the word, when the name of the animal, maybe as a result of transposition or adjectival nominalization (cf. e.g. Tat. *mārna* “woman” (< Pers. *mādīn* “a female in general”, *narna* “man” (< Pers. *nar* “male, masculine”) has acquired the meaning of *leader*, is connected with its hunting function, due to the fact that it has always been ahead of the hunting group. Anyhow, the weak point for this interpretation is that *parwānag* by meaning ‘caracal’ is never mentioned in Middle Persian⁷, instead it appears in

¹ MP *xwadāy* “lord” (18, 95), *bay* “god, lord” (18, 17), *dahibed* “ruler, lord of land” (18, 23) and *šāh* “king” (< Old Persian *xšāyaθiya-*) and *pātaxšāh* “king” (< Old Iranian **pati-xšāyaθiya-* [12]) have not been discussed in the present paper. The etymological connection of last one with Armenian *bdeašx* (about main function of the Armenian *bdeašxes* see A. Hakobyan A. [10/1]) has been seriously put into doubt by G. Kapantsian [14/1].

² Written in India by Xalaf Tabrīzī in 1651. In this article, we used the 1997 version republished in Tehran.

³ In Persian, *sīāhgūš*, lit. ‘black-eared,’ so called because the back of its long, tufted, black-tipped ears is distinctively black.

⁴ The name *caracal* itself comes-ultimately-from Turkish *qara-qūlāq/kara-kūlāk*, lit. ‘black-ear(ed),’ as a calque of the Persian name [14:245].

⁵ The caracal, which ranges from Africa to central and southwestern Asia, occurs widely in Persia: It has been reported from Xūzistān, Fārs, Kermān, the Kavīr region, Balučiṣtān, Xorasan, Šāhrud, and Tehran area [14].

⁶ Sire, thou art a lion and I am thy *parvāna*; the *parvāna* is better off under the lion’s protection [14].

⁷ MP *parvānak* “butterfly”, mentioned by Horn, is a homonym, derived from Old Iranian **par-* “to fly” (11, 675-676).

Middle Persian texts only with the meaning of *leader*. As a zoonym, it begins to appear in Classical Persian texts, which may lead one to think that the original meaning of the word was *leader* and in the case of zoonym it is the secondary semantical development. The word *parwānag* (*prw'nq*) with the only meaning *leader* is attested also in Parthian and Turfan MP and is borrowed from Iranian languages to Arabic and Aramaic [11: 674-675]. Therefore, Nyberg's [21: 152] etymology seems to be correct, according to which the first component of this lexeme could be **parw*, meaning 'in front of, before' (cf. Prth. *prw'n* [parwān] 'in front of, before, forward' [10: 280]).

In Middle Persian there is only one word derived from the root *parwānag*, i.e. *parwānagīh*, which means 'leadership' [18: 65]).

Pēšār and *pēšōbāy*

In the Middle Persian texts *pēšār* means 'leader, guide' [18: 68], the first component of which is Middle Persian *pēš* 'before, ahead, in front of'. The lexeme is derived from Old Persian *paišiya* 'before, ahead' [5: 136]. The second component -*ār* is a common agentive suffix in Middle Persian, which, being attached to the past stem of verbs, forms agent nouns e.g. *dādār* 'creator', *frēštār* 'deceiver', *guftār* 'speaker', *hammōxtār* 'learner', *kastār* 'destroyer', *madār* 'comer' etc. But, given that there is no example of amalgamation of *ār* to nouns or adjectives in Middle Persian, another solution must be sought here: *pēšār* might have descended from **pēšyār*, with the -*y*- has been reduced due to the existing of another word in the same phonetic form (a homonym) in Middle Persian - *pēšyār* (< Av. *pairi-fraharəz* 'to ejaculate sperm' [21: 161]), which means 'urine' [18: 68]. The second component *yār* (< MP *ayār* 'friend') is also found in other compound words, such as *šahryār* 'lord, ruler' [18: 79], *dastyār* 'helper' [18: 25] etc.

The same lexeme, i.e. *pēš* 'before, in front of' is attested also in other compound word *pēšōbāy* [*pyš(')wp'd*] 'leader, vanguard'⁸ [18:68], the second component of which can be related with *pā(y)*⁹, meaning 'foot' [11: 778]. According to Horn the vowel *ō* in the middle of word is an anaptyxis between two components and does not have an etymological value [12: 34].

From the point of view of origin and semantic changes this word can be compared with the Old French *paonier* 'foot-soldier' (> *pionner* in Modern French and English) and the Arabic *qādem* 'vanguard, forehand' (cf. *qadam* 'step'). Moreover, a new phonetical development of the latter is used in the sense of *leader* also in Modern Persian [19, s.v. 'pīšvā'].

Pēšōbāy has been changed to *pēšvā* in Classical Persian and means 'leader, ruler' [28, s.v. 'pēšvā']. *Pīšvā* with the same meaning has usage in Modern Persian [22, s.v. 'pīšvā'].

⁸ Cf. also MP *pēšōbāyīh* 'leadership' [18, 68].

⁹ In the initial position, the shift of MP *b-* to *p-* in NP is a common phenomenon, cf. MP *bizešk* and NP *pezešk* (18, 18), MP *bōzišn* and NP *pōziš* (11, 743-744).

The issue of the using of this word in Middle Persian texts is of high interest. The title *pēšōbāy-i dēn* ‘leader of Religion’ is mentioned in them, attested in the Abbasid period as *hudēnān pēšōbay*¹⁰ or *wehdēnān pēšōbāy*, ‘leader of the faithful [Zoroastrians]’ or lit. ‘leader of those of the Good Religion’¹¹. Mahnaz Moazami by affirming the thesis of M. Boyce [4: 147-149], finds that *hudēnān pēšōbay* is an epithet, possibly in correspondence to the Muslim title *amir al-mo'menin*, ‘commander of the faithful’ [20: 361].

Sālār ‘leader, master’ through the regular shift of consonant compound **-rd-* to sonant *-l-* is derived from Old Iranian **sara-dāra-* [13: 72], the first component of which, i.e. **sara-* means ‘head’ and second component, i.e. **dāra-* is an agent noun consisting of the present stem of the possessive verb *dar* (*dāraya-*) ‘have, hold’ (cf. Old Persian *dar* ‘hold, dwell’ [15: 189]) by the suffix *-ā*. In contrast to the word *pēšōbāy*, which has more of the meaning of only religious leader, the Middle Persian *sālār* and Parthian *sardar* [10: 305] both have the meaning of ‘chief, head’ of any professional group¹². Anyway, the examination of the semantic fields of *sālār* and other compound words derived from it in Middle, Classical and Modern Persian, e.g. *sālār* ‘commander, commandant, ruler’ [9, s.v. ‘sālār’], *gundsālār* ‘colonel, senior military officer rank used in Sasanid army’ [27: 85-86], *sepāhsālār* ‘military commander, commander-in-chief’ [9, s.v. ‘sepāhsālār’] makes it plausible that this lexeme, in time, gradually acquired the meaning of only a military commander.

Middle Persian *sālārīh* ‘leadership’ is originates from *sālār* with adding suffix *-īh*, which forms abstract nouns in Middle Persian.

The denotants of the concept of “leader” in Arabic

In this section are briefly presented the basic denotants of the concept of “leader” in Arabic language. This is strictly a compilation section which exists for comparative purposes and does not pretend to be complete. It does not include words of Altaic and Iranian origin borrowed into Arabic. It also does not include idiomatic expressions which are very numerous. The denotants will be looked upon root by root in the Latin alphabet order. The main sources used while compiling the list are Baranov’s [3] and Lane’s [17] dictionaries.

?mm: *ʔimām* ‘imam, worship leader at the mosque’ ‘a person, or learned man, whose example is followed, or who is imitated’ [17, s.v. “ʔmm”], ‘any exemplar,

¹⁰ According to Ph. Kreyenbroeck, the title *hudēnān pēšōbay* arose as a result of strong administrative changes in Zoroastrian Church of post-Sasanid Iran period, replacing the title of Sasanian high priest *mōbedān mōbed* [16:160].

¹¹ *Ādurfarrōbay ī Farroxzādān* (early 9th century) and *Ādurbād ī Ēmēdān* (early 10th century), who assembled portions of the Middle Persian *Dēnkard* ‘Acts of the Religion’, both were known by the title *hūdēnān pēšōbāy* [6].

¹² Cf. *artēštārān sālār* ‘chief of the warriors’ as a high-ranking title in Sasanian army [25: 662], *mur-wišān sālār* ‘head of soothsayers’ [7, 43], *axtarmārān sālār* ‘head of astronomers’ [26: 123-124], *dēn sarðar* ‘highpriest’ [10: 305].

or object of imitation to a people, or company of men such as a head, chief, or leader, or some other person' [17, s.v.]. The term also may be referred to Muhammad himself: *ʔimām-(al-ʔumma)*. Cf. *ʔamma* 'to pursuit, to come'.

ʔmr: *ʔamīr*, adj., 'ruler, commander, monarch, aristocrat', cf. *ʔamara* 'to command'. Is referred to a military, but not necessarily military, leader. Later, the term has become a formal title and is usually translated into in English as 'prince' (cf. NP *amīr* 'commander, ruler, prince' [1, s.v. "amīr"]).

ʔhl: *ʔāhil*, form I active participle, 'chief, master, lord' (cf. NP *ahl* 'lord, master', 'worthy of' [24, s.v. "ahl"]).

ʔlm: *ʔallāma* 'expert, connoisseur'; N.B.: the noun has *tā marbūṭa* (*ʔallāmatun*) but is of male gender; cf. *ʔalima* 'to know' (cf. NP *ʔālī/i)m* 'learned, intelligent, wise, theoretic' [24, s.v. "ʔālim"]).

ʔmd: *ʔamīd*, adj., 'chieftain, commander', cf. *ʔamada* 'to support, to hold'.

bṭrq/bṭrk: 1. *baṭraq/baṭrak* 'patriarch' (from Greek *πατριάρχης*), 'a leader of the Christians or the chief of the Magians' [17, s.v.]. 2. *biṭrīq* 'patriarch' from Latin *patricius* (cf. *pater* 'father') [17, s.v. "bṭrq"], historically a leader of an army.

hdy: *hādin* (or, without *tanwīn*, *hādi*), form I active participle, 'guide, leader, conductor, director', cf. *hadā* 'to lead'.

ḥkm: *ḥakīm*, adj., 'sage, wise man', cf. *ḥakama* 'to rule' and *ḥakuma* 'to be wise' (cf. NP *ḥāki/(e)m* 'commander, ruler, governor' [1, s.v. "ḥāki/(e)m"]).

kbš: *akbuš/akbāš* 'the chief, or lord, of a people, or company of men' [17, s.v. "kbš"].

mlk: *mālik* 'king, lord', cf. *malaka* 'to rule, to manage' (cf. NP *māli/(e)k* 'possessor, occupier, lord, master, proprietor, ruler, king' [24, s.v. "mālik"]).

nqb: *naqīb*, adj., 'big man, supervisor, chieftain, tribe leader', cf. *naqaba* 'to dig, to undermine, to sap' (cf. NP *naqīb* 'chief, leader, an intelligent person' [24, s.v. "naqīb"]).

qdm: *mutaqaddim*, form V active participle, 'leader', cf. *qadam* 'foot' (cf. NP *qādi/(e)m* 'a comer, a man's head, the fore-part of a camel's saddle, a camel's front teat' [24, s.v. "qādim"]).

qṭb: *quṭb* 'leader, magnate, pole, pivot' (cf. NP *qu/(o)ṭb* 'an axis, a pivot, a prince, lord, chief, a general, commander' [24, s.v. "quṭb"]).

qwd: *qāʔid*, form I active participle, 'leader, chief', cf. *qāda* 'to lead, to guide, to steer'.

rʔs: *raʔīs*, adj., 'leader, chief, master, commander', cf. *raʔs* 'head' (cf. NP *raʔīs* 'head, superior, boss, chairman, chief' [1, s.v. "raʔīs"]).

ršd: *muršid*, form IV active participle, 'teacher, mentor, superior, spiritual guide', cf. *ʔaršada* 'to show the right way' (cf. NP *muršid/moršed* 'teacher, mentor, superior, spiritual guide' [1, s.v. "muršid"]).

syd: *sayyid* 'master, head'; *sāʔid*, form I active participle, 'master, head'; cf. *sāda* 'to be in charge, to rule'.

slt: *sultān* ‘sultan, lord’, cf. *sultā* ‘power’ (cf. also NP *sultān* ‘ruler, monarch, sovereign, a potentate, sway, emperor, king, absolute power, authority’ [24, s.v. “sultān”])

şdr: *mutaşaddir*, form V active participle, ‘leader’, cf. *şadr* ‘chest’ (cf. NP *şadr* ‘chief, a high official’ [24, s.v. “şadr”]).

şyx: *şayx* ‘elder, cheikh’, cf. *şāxa* ‘to get old’ (cf. NP *şeyx* ‘tribal chief, chieftain, big boss, leader’ [1; 22, s.v. “şeyx”]).

şrf: *şarīf*, adj., ‘noble; descendant of the prophet Muhammad’, cf. *şarufa* ‘to be noble’.

xdm: *maxdūm*, form I passive participle, ‘lord, governor, leader’, cf. *xadama* ‘to serve’ (cf. NP *maxdūm* ‘lord, governor, leader, a person whom serve’ [1, s.v. *maxdūm*]).

xl: *xalīfa* ‘khalif, lord’, adj., N.B.: the noun has *tā marbūṭa* (*xalīfatun*) but is of male gender; cf. *xalaḥa* ‘to follow’ (cf. NP *xalīf*).

wly: *wālin* (or, without tanwīn, *wāli*), form I active participle, ‘ruler’; historically, an administrative term throughout Arabic and Muslim world (cf. NP *valī* ‘guardian, supervisor, ruler, friend’ [22, s.v. ‘valī’]).

zfm: *zaḥīm* morphologically, an adjective; ‘responsible, leader, master, guide’, morphologically, and adjective, cf. *zaḥama* ‘to be responsible of’.

Summary

In summary, it should be noted that the Middle Persian lexical items of Iranian origin to denote the concept of "leader", mostly, show a clear semantic (etymon) and etymological connection with the words meaning "forward", "front" and "head", while in Arabic and New Persian forms borrowed from Arabic there is a pure semantic connection, in the main, with the words and concepts of "knowledge", "wisdom" and "command".

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ՄԻՋԻՆ ՊԱՐՍԿԵՐԵՆՈՒՄ ԵՎ ԱՐԱՔԵՐԵՆՈՒՄ «ԱՌԱՋՆՈՐԴ» ՀԱՍԿԱՑՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԲԱՌԱՅԻՆ ՎԿԱՅՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ ՇՈՒՐՋ

Արդյուն Տոնոյան, Արդյուն Դավիդով

Բանալի բառեր՝ Բանալի բառեր՝ Սասանյան Իրան, միջին պարսկերեն, հետ-սասանյան Իրան, արաբերեն, առաջնորդ, *parwānag*, *pēšar*, *pēšōbāy*, *sālār*, ստուգաբանություն, բնիմաստ, իմաստային զարգացում, արաբական փոխառություններ:

Ի տարբերություն նոր պարսկերենի, որտեղ «առաջնորդ» հասկացության համար վկայված, մասամբ այժմ էլ գործածական բառերի մեջ մեծ թիվ են կազմում արաբական փոխառությունները, միջին պարսկերենում նույն հասկացու-

թյան համար վկայված բոլոր բառերն իրանական ծագման են: Հոդվածում ներկայացվել և քննվել են այն բառերը, որոնք միջին պարսկերենում և արաբերենում վկայված են «առաջնորդ, ղեկավար, հրամանատար» նշանակությամբ: Միջին պարսկերենի ընտրությունը պայմանավորված է առաջադրանքով՝ ցույց տալու մինչիսլամական և դեռևս արաբական ուժեղ ազդեցությունից զերծ Սասանյան Իրանում «առաջնորդ» հասկացության հանրային ընկալման առանձնահատկությունները և լեզվային մակարդակում դրա արտահայտությունները: Մյուս կողմից դասական արաբերենի ընտրությունը պայմանավորված է ցույց տալու համար այն հսկայական ազդեցությունը, որ արդեն հետսասանյան շրջանում ունեցել է արաբական աշխարհը իրանցիների՝ «առաջնորդ» հասկացության ընկալման վրա, և հետևաբար, նաև ինքնին արաբերենը՝ լեզվամտածողության մակարդակում՝ ի դեմս «առաջնորդ» հասկացության համար նոր պարսկերենում հայտնված արաբական փոխառությունների: Նոր պարսկերենում «առաջնորդ» հասկացության համար կիրառական արաբական փոխառությունները ներկայացված են հեղինակների՝ սրան նախորդած հոդվածում, որի պատճառով այս նյութը սահմանափակվել է «առաջնորդ» հասկացության նշանակյալները Սասանյան միջին և դասական արաբերենում ներկայացմամբ:

Միջին պարսկերենի բառային նյութը քաղված է Դ. Մաքքենզիի [18], Հ. Ս. Նյուբերգի [21] և Դ. Դուրկին-Մայսթերենսթի [10], իսկ արաբերենինը՝ Բարանովի [3] և Է. Լեյնի [17] բառարաններից: Արաբերեն բառերի հետ համեմատության մեջ դրված պարսկական փոխառությունները քաղված են Դեհխոդայի [9], Ամիրի [1], Մոհինի [19], Շթայնգասսի [24] և Ռուբինչիկի [22] բառարաններից:

Հոդվածում քննության է ենթարկվել միջին պարսկերենում «առաջնորդ» իմաստով վկայված 4 բառ (parwānag, pēšar, pēšōbāy և sālār), որոնք բոլորը բնիկ իրանական ծագում ունեն: Միաժամանակ, «առաջնորդ» հասկացության համար ներկայացվել է արաբական 26 բառ՝ քաղված բառարաններից, որոնց մեծամասնությունը փոխառվել է նաև պարսկերենում, ուստի արաբերեն բառերին զուգահեռ ներկայացված են նաև դրանց՝ պարսկերենում փոխառոյալ ձևերը:

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“THE CAUCASUS AT THE CROSSROADS OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE
(FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT)”**

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Keywords: International Conference, Caucasus, Caucasian studies, Armenia, Georgia, Institute of the Oriental Studies of NAS RA, Institute of History and Ethnology of Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University.

The International Conference "The Caucasus at the Crossroads of International Trade and Cultural Exchange (from ancient times to the present)" was held at the National Academy of Sciences of RA on September 5-6, 2022. It was organized by the Institute of Oriental Studies of NAS RA and the Institute of History and Ethnology of Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University. The conference was attended by about forty researchers from research centers and universities in Armenia, Georgia, Russia, Japan, the United States of America, Iran, and Poland. At the beginning of the conference welcoming speeches were delivered by Academician-Secretary of the Division of Armenian Studies and Social Sciences of NAS RA Academician Yuri Suvaryan, Director of the Institute of the Oriental Studies of NAS RA Robert Ghazaryan, and Director of the Institute of History and Ethnology of Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University Giorgi Tcheishvili. In his opening remarks, academician Yuri Suvaryan noted, "the Caucasus is an important crossroad where the interests of many nations and states have been intersecting. I hope this conference will be a key step for the continued development of Caucasian studies. Under current geopolitical conditions new challenges and difficulties are emerging, and this conference should also have a practical purpose, to work out a strategy which will help to face the modern scientific and also geopolitical challenges coming up for the Caucasian peoples.

Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of NAS RA Robert Ghazaryan mentioned that strengthening Armenian-Georgian scientific ties is important for the Institute. "The Caucasus region and the Armenian Highland are ancient centers of civilization. The civilization values and historical events formed here have influenced the processes of the entire region. Furthermore, important developments also took place in the region, and the Caucasus became a real crossroads of civilizations for indigenous and neighboring peoples", said Robert Ghazaryan.

"We are honored to be here. This is an important partnership and a priority for our institute. I am hopeful that the conference will be a great success and will inspire us to organize similar conferences in the future or initiate joint publications," said the director of Ivane Javakhishvili Institute of History and

Ethnology Georgi Tcheishvili. He read the welcoming remarks by Jaba Samushia, the general director of the Shota Rustaveli National Science Foundation of Georgia as well. "This conference demonstrates the scientific dialogue that exists between Armenia and Georgia and is a connection of our two countries' bilateral scientific relations. I suppose that such a scientific conference will also take place in Georgia where we will proceed with our work."

The conference consisted of six sessions. The plenary session discussed interesting topics such as the correlation between the political geography and political concepts in the 12th century Georgian kingdom (Giorgi Tcheishvili, Tbilisi State University's Institute of History and Ethnology, Georgia), the reconstruction of the numismatic history of the Georgian kingdom throughout the 12th century (Alexander Akopyan, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences), the Armenian Commercial Networks under the Safavid Empire (Tomoko Morikawa, Tokyo University), the hierarchical system of the Armenian Church after the Seljuk campaigns (Azat Bozoyan, Institute of Oriental Studies of NAS RA), some issues on the life of Saint Hripsime and her Companions according to Georgian Narrative Sources (Mariam Chkhartishvili, Tbilisi State University), and the Armenian Martyrologies and social and economic relations between Christians-Muslims in Late Medieval Lake Van (Ani Shahinian, Oxford University).

During the next five sessions of the conference, participants discussed topics concerning Armenian merchants in the local administration of the Caucasian region incorporated in the Safavid state of Iran, Armenian Commercial Networks under the Safavid Empire, the interpretation of some largely unexplored taxes and duties in the economic history of Armenia in the high middle ages, the foreign policy of the Ottoman Empire in The Caucasus, the cultural activities of the King Vakhtang VI in terms of the political situation in the Caucasus in the first quarter of the 17th century, Azerbaijan's policy of exporting the Artsakh/Karabakh issue to the Arab Islamic world, as well as the peculiarities of Azerbaijan's propaganda in MENA region, the current Sunni-Shia interactions in Georgia, and other highly interesting scientific issues. The international conference was an important step for deepening Armenian-Georgian scientific ties, as well as symbolizing the importance of Caucasian studies. The conference was widely covered by the local press¹.

The proceedings of the conference are published², and in the future it is planned to publish articles by the participants of the conference in the publication of conference articles.

The conference was financially supported by the Science Committee of the Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sports of the Republic of Armenia.

¹ <https://www.lragir.am/2022/09/05/736767/>; <https://www.aravot.am/2022/09/05/1289051/>;
<https://ankakh.com/hy/article/106022>

² Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference "The Caucasus On The Crossroads Of International Trade And Cultural Exchanges", Yerevan, publishing "Copy print", 2022, ISSN 2953-7851, 96 pages. <https://arar.sci.am/dlibra/publication/353011>

**«ԿՈՎԿԱՍԱՐ ՄԻՋԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ԱՌԵՎՏՐԻ ԵՎ ՄՇԱԿՈՒԹԱՅԻՆ
ՓՈԽԱՌՆՉՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐԻ ԽԱՉՄԵՐՈՒԿՆԵՐՈՒՄ՝ ՀՆԱԳՈՒՅՆ
ԺԱՄԱՆԱԿՆԵՐԻՑ ՄԻՆՉԵՎ ՆՈՐԱԳՈՒՅՆ ՇՐՋԱՆ»
ՄԻՋԱԶԳԱՅԻՆ ԳԻՏԱԺՈՂՈՎ**

Մոնիկա Միրզոյան

Բանալի բառեր՝ Միջազգային գիտաժողով, Կովկաս, կովկասագիտություն, Հայաստան, Վրաստան, ՀՀ ԳԱԱ Արևելագիտության ինստիտուտ, Իվանե Զավախիշվիլի անվան Թբիլիսիի պետական համալսարանի պատմության և հնագիտության ինստիտուտ:

2022 թ. սեպտեմբերի 5-6 ՀՀ Գիտությունների ազգային ակադեմիայում մեկնարկեց «Կովկասը միջազգային առևտրի և մշակութային փոխառնչությունների խաչմերուկներում՝ հնագույն ժամանակներից մինչև նորագույն շրջան» թեմայով միջազգային գիտաժողովը:

Գիտաժողովի բացմանը ողջունի խոսքով հանդես եկան ՀՀ ԳԱԱ Հայագիտության և հասարակական գիտությունների բաժանմունքի ակադեմիկոս-քարտուղար Յուրի Սուվարյանը, ՀՀ ԳԱԱ Արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի տնօրեն Ռոբերտ Ղազարյանը, Իվանե Զավախիշվիլի անվան Թբիլիսիի պետական համալսարանի պատմության և հնագիտության ինստիտուտի տնօրեն Գիորգի Ճեիշվիլին: Ողջունելով գիտաժողովի մասնակիցներին՝ ՀՀ ԳԱԱ ՀՀԳԲ ակադեմիկոս-քարտուղար, ակադեմիկոս Յուրի Սուվարյանն ասաց, - «Կովկասը խաչմերուկ է, որտեղ խաչվել և խաչվում են բազմաթիվ երկրների շահեր: Լիաժույս եմ, որ այս գիտաժողովն էական ներդրում կունենա կովկասագիտության զարգացման գործում: Ներկայիս աշխարհաքաղաքական իրավիճակում առաջանում են նոր բարդություններ, և գիտաժողովը պետք է ունենա նաև գործնական նպատակ՝ մշակելու այնպիսի ռազմավարություն, որը հնարավորություն կստեղծի համատեղ դիմակայելու առկա կամ սպասվող աշխարհաքաղաքական մարտահրավերներին»: ՀՀ ԳԱԱ Արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի տնօրեն Ռոբերտ Ղազարյանը նշեց, որ ինստիտուտի համար էական նշանակություն ունի հայ-վրացական գիտական կապերի ամրապնդումը:

Իվանե Զավախիշվիլի անվան Թբիլիսիի պետական համալսարանի պատմության և հնագիտության ինստիտուտի տնօրեն Գիորգի Ճեիշվիլին իր ե-

լույթում նշեց, որ սա կարևոր համագործակցություն և առաջնահերթություն է երկու ինստիտուտների համար, և որ նա լիահույս է, որ գիտաժողովը կոգեշնչի հետագայում ևս նման գիտական միջոցառումներ կազմակերպելու և համատեղ տպագրություններ նախաձեռնելու համար:

Միջազգային գիտաժողովին մասնակցում էին չորս տասնյակից ավելի հետազոտողներ Հայաստանի, Վրաստանի, Ճապոնիայի, Ռուսաստանի Դաշնության, Ամերիկայի Միացյալ Նահանգների, Լեհաստանի, Իրանի գիտական կենտրոններից:

Բացման և ողջույնի խոսքերին հաջորդած գիտաժողովի լիագումար նիստում քննարկվեցին հետաքրքիր թեմաներ՝ XII դարի վրացական թագավորության քաղաքական աշխարհագրության և քաղաքական հայեցակարգերի հարաբերակցության, վրացական դրամագիտության պատմության XII դարի վերջի պատմափուլի վերականգման, Սեֆյան Իրանում հայկական առևտրային ցանցերի և սելջուկյան արշավանքներին հաջորդած շրջանում Հայոց եկեղեցու նվիրապետական համակարգի վերաբերյալ:

Հետագա հինգ նիստերի ընթացքում քննարկվեցին արդիական և ուշագրավ կովկասագիտական այնպիսի թեմաներ, ինչպիսիք են XVII դարի առաջին քառորդում Վախթանգ VI թագավորի մշակութային գործունեությունը՝ Կովկասում տիրող քաղաքական իրադարձությունների պայմաններում, Ադրբեջանի քաղաքականությունը Արցախի (Ղարաբաղի) հարցը արաբական և իսլամական աշխարհում բարձրաձայնելու, Մերձավոր Արևելքում ադրբեջանական քարոզչության առանձնահատկությունների վերաբերյալ, Վրաստանում սունիական և շիայական փոխազդեցությունները և շարք այլ հետաքրքիր թեմաներ:

Միջազգային գիտաժողովը կազմակերպվել էր ՀՀ ԳԱԱ Արևելագիտության ինստիտուտի ջանքերով և Իվանե Զավախիշվիլիի անվան Թբիլիսիի պետական համալսարանի պատմության և հնագիտության ինստիտուտի հետ համատեղ նախաձեռնությամբ:

Գիտաժողովը կազմակերպվել էր ՀՀ կրթության, գիտության, մշակույթի և սպորտի նախարարության Գիտության կոմիտեի ֆինանսական աջակցությամբ:

ԳՐԱԽՈՍՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐ

BOOK REVIEWS

**ARAM KOSYAN, "THE HITTITE KINGDOM (POLITICAL HISTORY)",
YEREVAN, 2022, COPY-PRINT PUBLISHING, MAPS, NOTES,
BIBLIOGRAPHY, INDEX. 252 P., DOI: 10.54503/978-9939-9012-5-1**

Hasmik Hmayakyan

Aram Kosyan's "The Hittite Kingdom (Political History)" presents the military and political history of the Hittite Empire from the moment of its beginning (18th-17th centuries BC) until its disintegration in the late 13th century BC. The four chapters of this work presents a detailed study of the Hittite kings' rule and activities, various aspects of military and political history of that powerful state according to the chronology and historical periodization accepted in science, based on the study and analysis of the preserved written sources, materials given by enormous bibliography of the field. Such a comprehensive study covering the history of the Hittite kingdom, incorporating the latest achievements of historical science regarding the history of ancient Anatolia, was carried out and published in the Armenian language for the first time.

The Hittite state which came into existence in the 18-17th centuries BC in Asia Minor, was powerful enough to incorporate the entire peninsula of Asia Minor within a single political unit, overcoming numerous challenges of foreign, internal political and intra-dynastic character, which are explored in the given work. During the 500 years of its military and political history, the Hittites developed diverse relations with their immediate and distant neighbors, such as polities located in different parts of Asia Minor, Babylonia, Egypt, Mittani, Assyria: these aspects are also thoroughly analyzed and presented in this study, revealing the important role of the Hittite state in the Near Eastern politica-cultural space, at the same time being its inalienable part.

This work is valuable also in respect of exploration of a number of important and problematic issues related to Armenian studies. The Hittite civilization's importance is significant for the study of the political units that existed in the 2nd millennium BC in the western regions of the Armenian Highlands, a region neighboring Asia Minor. Since the 1920s, a number of researchers have put forward, among other concepts, the "Hayasa hypothesis" of ethogenesis of the Armenian people that circulates to this day and relates to Hayasa, a political unit located in the neighborhood of the Hittite kingdom: it was considered a possible cradle of ethno-genesis of the Armenians. It should be noted that such political units as Hayaša, Azzi, Išūwa were the carriers of the influence of Hittite civilization. In general, as the author mentions: "The Hittite cuneiform texts of the XV-XIII centuries BC are

the only written sources of the western Armenian Highlands history, which indeed are invaluable primary sources in this regard”.

The researcher's merit is enormous in regard of a novice study, corrections and own interpretations of those sources. Particularly the sub-chapters "Tudhaliáš and Hayaša", "Muršiliš and Hayaša", "Sister Kingdoms of Tarhuntašša and Išūwa" are of particular interest, which describe these relationships on the basis of the Hittite sources. The study contains the author's important concepts, new interpretations and valuable conclusions regarding the above issues.

The work is also significant in a sense of using by the author the data of all recent special literature, a coverage of a wide range of Hittite-related issues as well as a list of personal names, toponyms, subjects, and maps enclosed at the end of the book.

The work of the distinguished scholar is a noteworthy contribution to the field of Hittite studies in general, besides that it may serve as a remarkable impetus for the development of Hittite studies in Armenia.

ԳՐԱԽՈՍՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ ԱՐԱՄ ՔՈՍՅԱՆԻ
«ԽԵԹԱԿԱՆ ԹԱԳԱՎՈՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ (ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆ ՊԱՏՄՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ)»
ԵՐԵՎԱՆ, «ՔՈՓԻ ՊՐԻՆՏ» ՀՐԱՏԱՐԱԿՉՈՒԹՅՈՒՆ, 2022 Թ., 252 ԷՋ,
DOI: 10.54503/978-9939-9012-5-1, ՄԵՆԱԳՐՈՒԹՅԱՆ ՎԵՐԱԲԵՐՅԱԼ

Հասմիկ Հմայակյան

Պատմական գիտությունների դոկտոր, պրոֆեսոր Արամ Քոսյանի «Խեթական թագավորություն (քաղաքական պատմություն)» աշխատության մեջ ներկայացված է Խեթական պետության ռազմաքաղաքական պատմությունը՝ իր սկզբնավորման պահից (Ք. ա. XVIII-XVII դդ.) մինչև վերջինիս տրոհումը մ.թ.ա. XIII դարի վերջերում: Աշխատության չորս գլուխներում հանգամանալից կերպով, ըստ Խեթական տեղության պատմության փուլաբաժանման առումով գիտության մեջ ընդունված ժամանակագրության ու Խեթական արքաների գահակալման և վարած գործունեության, ներկայացված է այդ հզոր տեղության բազմաբովանդակ ռազմաքաղաքական պատմությունը՝ պահպանված գրավոր աղբյուրների, մասնագիտական լայնածավալ գրականության տվյալների ուսումնասիրության և վերլուծության հիման վրա: Խեթական տեղության պատմության վերաբերյալ հայերեն լեզվով նման համապարփակ, տվյալ բնագավառին

վերաբերող գիտական նորագույն տվյալների համալրում կատարված ծավալուն ուսումնասիրություն իրականացվում է առաջին անգամ:

Փոքր Ասիայում Ք.ա. XVIII-XVII դարերում ձևավորված խեթական տերությունը կարողացել է մեկ քաղաքական միավորի մեջ ներառել ողջ Փոքր Ասիա թերակղզին՝ հաղթահարելով բազմաթիվ արտաքին քաղաքական և ներքաղաքական, ինչես նաև ներդինաստիական խնդիրներ, որոնք լայնորեն լուսաբանված են աշխատության մեջ: Այն իր գոյության և ռազմաքաղաքական պատմության շուրջ 500 տարիների ընթացքում բազմաբնույթ և բազմակի առնչություններ է ունեցել մի շարք պետությունների հետ, ինչպիսիք են Բաբելոնը, Եգիպտոսը, Միտտանին, Ասորեստանը, և այս հարցերը ևս համակողմանիորեն վերլուծվել և ներկայացվել են սույն ուսումնասիրության մեջ՝ բացահայտելով խեթական տերության ունեցած կարևորագույն դերը Առաջավորասիական քաղաքակրթության շրջանակներում, որի անբաժանելի մասն էր կազմում վերջինս:

Աշխատությունը արժեքավոր է նաև հայագիտությանը վերաբերող մի շարք կարևոր և խնդրահարույց հարցերի ուսումնասիրության տեսանկյունից: Խեթական քաղաքակրթությունը կարևորագույն նշանակություն ունի Փոքր Ասիայի հարևան Հայկական լեռնաշխարհի արևմտյան շրջաններում Ք.ա. II հազարամյակում գոյություն ունեցած քաղաքական միավորների պատմության ուսումնասիրման համար: Գիտության մեջ դեռևս անցյալ դարի 20-ականներից մի շարք ուսումնասիրողների կողմից առաջ է քաշվել և առ այսօր, ի թիվս այլ վարկածների, շարունակում է շրջանառվել հայոց ազգածագման «Հայասական» վարկածը, որը կապված է խեթական տերության հարևանությամբ գտնված Հայասա քաղաքական միավորի հետ. այն համարվել է հայոց ազգածագման հնարավոր բնօրրաններից մեկը: Հարկ է նշել, որ Հայասա, Ազգի, Իսուվա քաղաքական միավորները իրենց վրա կրել են խեթական քաղաքակրթության զգալի ազդեցությունը: Այս առումով հարկ է առանձնացնել հեղինակի կարևոր այն միտքը, որ. «Մ.թ.ա. XV-XIII դարերի խեթական սեպագիր տեքստերը հանդիսանում են Հայկական Լեռնաշխարհի արևմուտքի պատմության միակ գրավոր աղբյուրները, որոնք անգնահատելի սկզբնաղբյուրներ են»:

Մեծ է գիտնականի վաստակը նաև այդ սկզբնաղբյուրների նորովի ուսումնասիրության, ճշգրտումների ու սեփական մեկնաբանությունների առումով: Առանձնապես հետաքրքրական են «Թուդխալիյասը և Հայասան», «Մուրսիլիսը և Հայասան», «Թարխունտասսայի և Իսուվայի քույր թագավորությունները» ենթագլուխները, որոնցում վերոնշյալ աղբյուրների հիման վրա ներկայացված

են այդ առնչությունները: Ուսումնասիրության մեջ տեղ են գտել հեղինակի կարևոր մոտեցումները, նորովի լուսաբանումներն ու արժեքավոր եզրահանգումները վերոնշյալ հարցերի վերաբերյալ:

Աշխատությունը կարևորվում է նաև հրապարակի վրա եղած բազմալեզու մասնագիտական նորագույն գրականության կիրառմամբ, խեթագիտության բնագավառի ուսումնասիրությունների լայն ցանկի, ինչպես նաև գրքի վերջում առկա անձնանունների, տեղանունների ու անվանացանկերի, քարտեզների առկայությամբ:

Վաստակաշատ գիտնականի այս աշխատությունը կարևոր ներդրում է խեթագիտության բնագավառում ընդհանրապես, և նշանակալի խթան կարող է հանդիսանալ Հայաստանում խեթագիտության զարգացման առումով:

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**ՀԱՅԵՐԵՆ ԵՎ ՌՈՒՍԵՐԵՆ ԱՅԲՈՒԲԵՆՆԵՐԻ ԼԱՏԻՆԱՏԱՌ
ԳՐԱԴԱՐՁՈՒՄՆԵՐ
THE LATIN TRANSLITERATION OF THE ARMENIAN AND RUSSIAN
ALPHABETS**

Հայերեն	Armenian Translit- eration	Русский	Russian Translit- eration
Ա ա	A	А а	A
Բ բ	B	Б б	B
Գ գ	G	В в	V
Դ դ	D	Г г	G
Ե ե	E	Д д	D
Զ զ	Z	Е е	E
Է է	Ē	Ё ё	Yo
Ը ը	ə	Ж ж	Ž
Թ թ	t'	З з	Z
Ժ ժ	Ž	И и	I
Ի ի	I	Й й	Y
Լ լ	L	К к	K
Խ խ	Kh	Л л	L
Օ օ	c'	М м	M
Կ կ	K	Н н	N
Հ հ	H	О о	O
Ձ ձ	Dz	П п	P
Ղ ղ	Ġ	Р р	R
Ճ ճ	č'	С с	S
Մ մ	M	Т т	T
ԅ է	Y	У у	U
Ն ն	N	Ф ф	F
Շ շ	Š	Х х	Kh
Ո ո	Vo	Ц ц	Ts
Չ չ	Č	Ч ч	Č
Պ պ	P	Ш ш	Š
Ջ յ	J	Щ щ	Šč
Ռ ռ	r'	Ъ	“
Ս ս	S	Ы	Y
Վ վ	V	Ь	‘
Տ տ	T	Э э	Ē
Ր ր	R	Ю ю	Yu
Յ զ	Ts	Я я	Ya
Ու ու	U		
Փ փ	p'		
Ք ք	k'		
Լի	Ev		
Օ օ	O		
Ֆ ֆ	F		

ԲԱՆՔԵՐ ԱՐԵՎԵԼԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԻՆՍՏԻՏՈՒՏԻ
(պարբերականը մինչև 2021 թ. կոչվում էր «ՄԵՐՁԱՎՈՐ ԵՎ ՄԻՋԻՆ
ԱՐԵՎԵԼՔԻ ԵՐԿՐՆԵՐ ԵՎ ԺՈՂՈՎՈՒՐԴՆԵՐ») ՄԱՏԵՆԱՇԱՐ

BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF ORIENTAL STUDIES
(Until 2021 the periodical was named “The Countries and Peoples of the Near and
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BULLETIN
OF THE INSTITUTE OF
ORIENTAL STUDIES

VOLUME II, ISSUE 2

ԲԱՆԲԵՐ
ԱՐԵՎԵԼԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅԱՆ ԻՆՍՏԻՏՈՒՏԻ

ՀԱՏՈՐ II, ՀԱՄԱՐ 2

Տպագրված է «ԲՈՓԻ ՊՐԻՆՏ» տպագրատանը:

Չափսը՝ 70x100 ^{1/16}: Տպ. մամուլը՝ 11.125:
Տպաքանակը՝ 50: