

THE ISRAELI FACTOR IN IRAN-AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS (2005-2013)*

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Abstract

The article deals with Israel's factor which influences Iran-Azerbaijan relations. The article highlights the following issues when assessing the impact of the Israeli factor on Iran-Azerbaijan relations:

- *Represent Israel's foreign policy priorities on Azerbaijan,*
- *Assess the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Azerbaijan-Israel cooperation and analyze Iran's policy within this context,*
- *Analyze Azerbaijan's motives for strengthening cooperation with Israel.*

The nuclear program, Iran's missile systems, the Shia factor, the Iranian-speaking peoples of Azerbaijan (Tats, Talish), the activities of Azerbaijani Shia opposition figures, the 760-kilometer border between Azerbaijan and Iran – these are the main factors underlying Israel's policy towards Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijan first of all justified the establishment of relations with Israel with the expectation of receiving military-political assistance from Israel in the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

During the presidency of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013), when one of the scenarios for suspending Iran's nuclear program was considered a military attack, the territory of Azerbaijan was considered a platform for attacking Iran. While Baku has made every effort to exclude the Iranian factor in Azerbaijan-Israel military cooperation, the Iranian military-political management has always been skeptical of Baku's assurances, claiming that Israeli drones could easily be used for reconnaissance against Iran.

- *During Hassan Rouhani's presidency, as compared with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency, positive developments took place in the relations between Azerbaijan and Iran, and bilateral economic cooperation strengthened. In order to weaken Israel's influence in Azerbaijan, Iran replaced its policy of harsh response to Azerbaijan with*

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economic cooperation. Iran was more concerned about the growing influence of Israel in various spheres in Azerbaijan than the use of a possible Israeli threat against Iran from the territory of Azerbaijan, which has always been raised in the past.

- *Azerbaijan tried to bring counterargument against Israel-Azerbaijan relations with Armenia-Iran relations.*
- *In order to weaken Iran's religious influence, Azerbaijan, on the one hand, repressed the country's Shiite opposition figures, and on the other hand, Baku managed to obtain military-political support from Israel by exploiting the Iranian-Shiite "threat".*
- *According to Iranian experts, the strategic relations between Azerbaijan and Israel have been established in the South Caucasus, in particular due to Iran's wrong policy towards Azerbaijan.*
- *Currently, if in the Middle East, Iran more or less manages to control the threats appearing from the proxy war with Israel, than on its immediate border Iran is trying to avoid a direct confrontation with Israel. During the Second Artsakh War, the transfer of Israeli UVC of the territory of Iran, and in this regard, Iran's cautious statements are evidence of that.*

Keywords: Iran, Azerbaijan, Israel, Middle East, Azeri, Shia, military.

In the studies published over the last decade by the leading Iranian “Think tank” on Azerbaijan and Israel relations, assessment to Azerbaijan-Israel relations has been given within the frames of factors influencing Iran-Israel and Iran-Azerbaijan relations. The choice of chronological boundaries of the study is conditioned by the circumstance that during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013) the relations between Iran and Azerbaijan were severely strained. The Israeli factor had a significant impact in this matter.

The article highlights the following issues when assessing the impact of the Israeli factor on Iran-Azerbaijan relations:

- Represent Israel foreign policy priorities on Azerbaijan,
- Assess the position of the Islamic Republic of Iran on Azerbaijan-Israel cooperation and analyze Iran's policy within this context,
- Analyze Azerbaijan's motives for strengthening cooperation with Israel.

According to the ideology of Ben-Gurion's doctrine¹, non-Arab Muslim countries have a significant role to play in Israel's foreign policy. Strengthening of Israel's relations with Azerbaijan shall be first and foremost to be viewed from that point of view. One of the reasons for the strain in the relations between Iran and Azerbaijan is not basically Azerbaijan-Israel relations, but the fact that Azerbaijan, in view of discrepancies in the relations between Teheran and Baku², directly or indirectly contributes to the implementation of Israel's policy regarding Iran. According to Iran, Israel-Azerbaijan relations are directed against Iran. The main goal is to weaken Iran's religious and cultural influence on Azerbaijan³.

The nuclear program, Iran's missile systems, the Shia factor, the Iranian-speaking peoples of Azerbaijan (*Tats, Talish*), the activities of Azerbaijani Shia opposition figures, the 760-kilometer border⁴ between Azerbaijan and Iran - these are the main factors underlying Israel's policy towards Azerbaijan⁵.

For Israel, the presence on the Iranian border is especially important in view of the fact that the Iranian-sponsored groups in the Middle East are in fact present on the Israeli border⁶.

If Iran justifies its presence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon in terms of forming an "Axis of Resistance" with the participation of the groups "Hezbollah" and "Hashd al Shaabi" operating in those countries then Israel views the actions of these groups as a threat focused against its national interests. According to Israel, Iran's goal is to build a "continental corridor" connecting Iran to the Mediterranean Sea under the name of "Resistance Front"⁷.

¹ **Zielinska** 2020: 236.

² **Israyelyan** 2016: 199-204.

³ Hebs-e azaye hezb-e islam dar Azarbaijan jozv-e prujehaye Israel ast. Available at: <https://bit.ly/2QnglCB>, accessed April 22, 2021.

⁴ **Saidel** 2014, Available at <https://mida.org.il/2014/09/02/hurt-iran-without-airstrikes/>, accessed April 27, 2021.

⁵ **Rezazadeh** 2014: 15.

⁶ **Harel** 2017, Available at: <https://bit.ly/3sFlzbj>, accessed April 22, 2021.

⁷ **Adesnik** 2019: 13.

One of the issues on Israel's agenda in Azerbaijan was the implementation of economic and cultural programs in the southern Iranian-speaking regions of Azerbaijan⁸. Israel pursued the following two goals:

1. to approach the Iranian border under pretence of investing in agriculture.
2. to establish contacts with the Iranian-speaking population of Azerbaijan in order to influence possible separatist actions in Iran.

It is mentioned in the report released in January 2016 of Azerbaijani opposition periodical "Yeni Musavat" that the Israeli Military Intelligence Organization was indirectly involved⁹ in the protest campaigns which took place at the Eastern Azerbaijan state of Iran in 2006¹⁰. In this context, Brenda Shaffer, a senior Jewish expert of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), runs active operations related with the issues of ethnic groups of Iran. For some period of time he held the position of Advisor to the Director of the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and co-authored a two-volume book on "Separatist movements in Atrpatakan" with the Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Iran Javanshir Akhundov (2009-2016). In April 2021, a monograph entitled "Iran Is More Than Persia" by Shaffer was published¹¹.

Another important factor in Israel's focus is the influence of Azerbaijan's Shia opposition figures on the country's domestic and foreign policy¹². There is a belief in Iranian public and political circles that Azerbaijan's anti-Shia policy, as well as the participation of Baku in separatist demonstrations in Iran, is

⁸ Suspicious travels of the Israeli ambassador to different cities of Azerbaijan", available at: <https://bit.ly/3w2pcd5>, accessed Jun 08, 2021

⁹ Israel's Foreign Policy Priorities on Iran, available at: <https://bit.ly/3x1mJQl>, accessed Jun 28, 2021

¹⁰ Iran newspaper has been suspended, available at: https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/story/2006/05/060523_mf_cartoon, accessed Jun15, 2021

¹¹ **Shaffer** 2021: 14-17.

¹² Kaffash: "Pishnhad-e hokm-e sangin az suye dadsetani-e Baku baraye Elham Aliev ra mahkum mi konim", Available at: <http://fa.arannews.com/News/67970/>, accessed April 22, 2021 (in Persian).

encouraged by Israel¹³. The reason is that some of the Shia opposition figures in Azerbaijan received religious education in Iran and they are fundamentally against the strengthening of Israeli-Azerbaijani relations¹⁴.

The Azerbaijani authorities, accusing the country's Shia opposition figures of espionage in favour of Iran¹⁵, restricted their activities¹⁶, most of whom are currently imprisoned. Iran, in its turn, accuses the Azerbaijani authorities of bringing baseless accusations against Shiite figures¹⁷.

Jewish lobbyists with economic interests in Baku¹⁸ provide significant support to Azerbaijan on international platforms. According to Iran, in order to exert pressure on Azerbaijan, international human rights advocacy organizations pursue a dual policy on the human rights structures in Azerbaijan. Raising the issue of Azeri political prisoners, their reports do not refer to the criminal cases brought against Azeri Shiite opposition figures accused of collaborating with Iran¹⁹.

Iran considers the dual policy of Azerbaijan towards the Muslim countries, and in this context the influence of Israel on the foreign policy of Azerbaijan reflects the fact that Azerbaijan officially avoids mentioning the "Quds Day", and does not give a clear assessment of the policy of Israel towards Palestine. This happens in the case where Teheran believes that the reputation of Iran's supreme leader in the Islamic world, his concern towards the violation of rights of Muslims in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as consideration of the

¹³ “Bazdasht-e jasusan hamzaman ba monagheshesheye Gharabag”, Available at: <http://www.anaj.ir/?p=8823>, accessed April 22, 2021. (Persian).

¹⁴ **Kazemi, Heshmati** 2017, “12 rahbord-e zed-e Irani-e Israel dar Azarbaijan”, Available at: <https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/802200/>, accessed Jun 29, 2021 (in Persian)

¹⁵ **Nalbandi** 2021: “Sarkub-e Khomeinichiha tamami nadarad”, Available at: <https://bit.ly/3mM2mCl>, accessed May 4, 2021 (in Persian).

¹⁶ **Cornell** 2011: 279-280.

¹⁷ **Movsum Samedov** 2016, Available at: <https://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/196743/>, accessed April 22, 2021 (in Russian).

¹⁸ “Brenda Shaffer mamur-e Israel baraye tajzিয়ে Iran kist?” 2020, Available at: <https://bit.ly/39zyNyE>, accessed May 4, 2021 (in Persian) .

¹⁹ **Adeli** 2012, “Zendanian-e siasi-e eslamgara hamchenan da زندان”, Available at: <https://bit.ly/2PUoaPW>, accessed May 5, 2021 (in Persian).

Karabakh issue on the same level with the Palestinian issue had an important role in terms of drawing attention of Islamic world to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

In response to Iran's concerns over the strategic cooperation between Israel and Shiite Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan points to the close relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Armenia²⁰.

In general, Israel has always been concerned about the fact that after rising to power of Shiite forces in Azerbaijan, its presence in the region will be endangered.

The most important factor influencing the relations between Iran and Azerbaijan is the military cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan. The formation of Iran's position on this issue is influenced by the security environment on Iran and the ongoing growth in Iran-Azerbaijan relations. As relations between Baku and Teheran improve, the Israeli factor shifts from a security threat to a matter of political manipulation.

In response to Iran's accusations, Azerbaijan has provided Teheran with various justifications for establishing strategic relations with Israel²¹. Depending on the level of Iran-Azerbaijan relations, Tehran has objected to or acknowledged them.

Azerbaijan first of all justified the establishment of relations with Israel with the expectation of receiving military-political assistance from Israel in the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict²². Deep military cooperation established between Israel and Azerbaijan after Ilham Aliiev came to power²³.

During the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, when one of the scenarios for suspending Iran's nuclear program was considered a military attack, the territory of Azerbaijan was considered a platform for attacking

²⁰ "Iran and Armenia against Azerbaijan and Israel" 2017, Available at: <https://haqqin.az/news/91385>, accessed April 22, 2021. (in Russian).

²¹ **Asadi** 2012: 8.

²² **Omid** 2016: 143.

²³ **Kamran** 2011: 73.

Iran²⁴. Taking into account the tensions in Iran-Azerbaijan relations during that period and the 33 day war in 2006 between Israel and “Hezbollah”, Baku and Tel Aviv viewed Iran as a common threat. Israel has deployed reconnaissance devices in the southern regions of Azerbaijan near Iran, and ballistic missiles and UAV catching radar systems were installed in “Sitalchay”, located 50 km from Baku²⁵. In this context, Israel's attention to the southern regions of Azerbaijan is particularly noteworthy²⁶.

Iran was convinced that the active cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel, especially in that period, was connected with Iran's nuclear program. According to the military cooperation agreement with the cost of \$1.6 billion signed between Azerbaijan and Israel in 2012, Azerbaijan acquired various types of unmanned aerial vehicles, anti-ship missile systems, various naval weapons (Gabriel-5 anti-ship missile systems, Barak-8 anti-aircraft missile systems, EL/M-2080 Green Pine Radioorientation systems, Shaldag Mk.5 patrol boats, Saar-62 patrol boats, Saar-72 rocket boats, Hermes-900 unmanned aerial vehicles, etc.)²⁷. In response to a note of protest from the Iranian Foreign Ministry against the transaction, Azerbaijani Ambassador to Iran Javanshir Akhundov assured that "The weapons acquired from Israel are not designed for Iran, but will be used in the war against Karabakh"²⁸. During his visit to Iran in March 2012, Azerbaijani Defense Minister Safar Abiev assured the Iranian side that Azerbaijan would not take any "hostile" step against Iran²⁹.

It is noteworthy that shortly after S. Abiev's visit to Teheran, Israeli Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman announced at the end of his visit to Baku

²⁴ **Frenkel** 2012, «Israel's new ties to Azerbaijan worry neighboring Iran», Available at: <https://www.miamiherald.com/latest-news/article1939973.html> accessed Jul 12, 2021.

²⁵ **Rezazadeh** 2014: 17.

²⁶ **Panahi** 2015: 61.

²⁷ **Asadi** 2012: 13.

²⁸ **Robinson** 2012: “Iran va Azerbaijan: Hamsayegan-e negaran” 2012, Available at: https://www.bbc.com/persian/iran/2012/06/120609_i23_lp_neighbours_iran_azarbayjan_fr, accessed April 22, 2021 (in Persian)

²⁹ “Azerbaijan: ejaze hamle be Iran az harim-e khod nemidahim” 2012, Available at: <https://p.dw.com/p/14JnO>, accessed April 22, 2021 (in Persian)

that the issue of Iran was also discussed at the meeting with the President of Azerbaijan. In addition, “Foreign Policy” bulletin reported that Israel had received permission to use Azerbaijani airports to attack Iran³⁰.

While Baku has made every effort to exclude the Iranian factor in Azerbaijan-Israel military cooperation, the Iranian military-political management has always been skeptical of Baku's assurances, claiming that Israeli drones could easily be used for reconnaissance against Iran³¹. The Minister of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics of Iran Hossein Dehghan also mentioned that he had personally communicated with Ilham Aliev about the Israeli drone that crossed the territory of Iran from Azerbaijan.

"We warned the Azerbaijani side and expressed our concern, but the President of Azerbaijan did not accept it easily," underlined the head of defense authority of Iran³².

One of the reasons for the strained relations between Iran and Azerbaijan regarding Israel is related to the attacks on Iranian nuclear specialists in Azerbaijan. The development of the nuclear program was one of the foreign policy priorities of Islamic Republic of Iran during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. The nuclear program was considered a means of ensuring the independent functioning of Iran's political, economic and security systems. That is why the attacks against Iranian nuclear scientists in Azerbaijan was quite sensitive issue for Iran and had a negative impact on Iran-Azerbaijan relations.

During interrogation, Jamali Fashi, who carried out the assassination of Iranian scientist Masoud Ali Mohammadi, confessed that he had visited Baku for several times and met with Israel's intelligence agency - Mossad representatives³³.

³⁰ **Perry** 2012, “Israel's Secret Staging Ground”, Available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/28/israels-secret-staging-ground/>, accessed April 22, 2021.

³¹ **Barry** 2016: 64.

³² **Kazemi, Heshmati** 2017: 12 rahbord-e zed-e Irani-e Israel dar Azarbaijan”, Available at: <https://www.mashreghnews.ir/news/802200/>, accessed April 22, 2021 (in Persian)

³³ “Amel-e teror-e Ali Mohammadi be dar mojazat avikhte shod” 2012, Available at: <https://www.isna.ir/news/91022615326/>, accessed April 22, 2021 (in Persian)

Over the years, the perceptions of Iranian public and political circles on Azerbaijan-Israel relations have changed. If in the early 2010's Iran considered the increasingly strengthening military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel as a threat to its interests, and high-level public concerns were heard about it in Teheran, then after 2013 as a result of positive changes in Azerbaijan-Iran relations Iran's approaches to Israel-Azerbaijan cooperation changed.

Conclusion

- During Hassan Rouhani's presidency, as compared with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's governing period, positive developments took place in the relations between Azerbaijan and Iran, and bilateral economic cooperation strengthened. In addition to the military cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel, Iran has become increasingly concerned about the growing influence of Israel in various spheres in Azerbaijan. Iran is particularly concerned about the fact that Israel has managed to influence the decisions of the Azerbaijani leadership on Iran. In order to weaken Israel's influence in Azerbaijan, Iran replaced its policy of harsh response to Azerbaijan with economic cooperation. Iran was more concerned about the growing influence of Israel in various spheres in Azerbaijan than the use of a possible Israeli threat against Iran from the territory of Azerbaijan, which has always been raised in the past.

- Azerbaijan tried to bring counter-argument against Israel-Azerbaijan relations with Armenia-Iran relations.

- In order to weaken Iran's religious influence, Azerbaijan, on the one hand, repressed the country's Shiite opposition leaders, and on the other hand, Baku managed to obtain military-political support from Israel by exploiting the Iranian-Shiite "threat".

- Studies show that a significant part of armament supplies from Israel to Azerbaijan took place in 2009-2013, at a time when tensions between Iran and Azerbaijan were at their peak.

- Azerbaijan put into turnover the thesis on "Comprehensive assistance to Armenia by Iran" through its agents of influence for the purpose of diverting the attention of the Iranian military-political leadership from the

Azerbaijan-Israel strategic cooperation, as well as to influence Iranian public opinion.

- According to Iranian experts, the strategic relations between Azerbaijan and Israel have been established in the South Caucasus, in particular due to Iran's wrong policy towards Azerbaijan. A discourse on Israel is currently underway in a narrow circle of experts in Iran³⁴. For example, Faezeh Rafsanjani, the daughter of Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989-1997) (a prominent public figure who was imprisoned in 2012 for her political activities), believes that Iran should take into account the fact that, regardless of Iran's attitude towards Israel, Israel is recognized as an independent country by UN. Israel not only exists as a state, but also has very good relations with many of Iran's neighboring countries, with which, by the way, Teheran also has good relations.

- Currently, if in the Middle East Iran more or less manages to control the threats appearing from the proxy war with Israel, then on its immediate border Iran is trying to avoid a direct confrontation with Israel. During the Second Artsakh War, the transfer of Israeli UVC to the territory of Iran, and in this regard, Iran's cautious statements are evidence of that.

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³⁴ **Arman Meli newspaper, 2020,** Oct 6: № 839, 6.

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**ԻՍՐԱՅԵԼԻ ԳՈՐԾՈՆԸ ԻՐԱՆ-ԱԴՐԲԵՋԱՆ
ՀԱՐԱԲԵՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՆԵՐՈՒՄ (2005-2013 ԹԹ.)**

Արմեն Իսրայելյան

Քանալի բառեր՝ *Իրան, Ադրբեջան, Իսրայել, Մերձավոր Արևելք, շիա, ռազմական:*

Ադրբեջանի և Իսրայելի հարաբերությունների վերաբերյալ Իրանի առաջատար հետազոտական կենտրոնների կողմից վերջին տասնամյակի ընթացքում հրապարակված հետազոտություններում Ադրբեջան-Իսրայել հարաբերություններին գնահատական է տրվում Իրան-Իսրայել և Իրան-Ադրբեջան հարաբերությունների վրա ազդող գործոնների համատեքստում:

Ուսումնասիրության ժամանակագրական սահմանների ընտրությունը պայմանավորված է այն հանգամանքով, որ Իրանի և Ադրբեջանի հարաբերություններում լարվածությունը գագաթնակետին է հասնում Մահմուդ Ահմադինեժադի նախագահության շրջանում: Ի թիվս մի շարք խնդիրների՝ երկկողմ հարաբերություններում լարվածության առաջացման հարցում նշանակալի ազդեցություն է ունեցել Իսրայելի գործոնը:

Հոդվածում Իրան-Ադրբեջան հարաբերությունների վրա Իսրայելի գործոնի ունեցած ազդեցությունը գնահատելիս առանձնացվել են հետևյալ խնդիրները՝

1. ներկայացնել Ադրբեջանի հարցում Իսրայելի արտաքին քաղաքական առաջնահերթությունները,
2. գնահատել Ադրբեջան-Իսրայել համագործակցության վերաբերյալ Իրանի Իսլամական Հանրապետության դիրքորոշումը և այդ համատեքստում՝ վերլուծել Իրանի քաղաքականությունը,
3. վերլուծել Իսրայելի հետ համագործակցությունը խորացնելու Ադրբեջանի շարժառիթները:

Միջուկային ծրագիրը, Իրանի հրթիռային համակարգերը, շիզմի գործոնը, Ադրբեջանի իրանախոս բնակչությունը, Ադրբեջանի ընդդիմադիր շիայական գործիչների գործունեությունը, Ադրբեջանի և Իրանի 760

կիրմետրանոց սահմանը՝ դրանք այն հիմնական գործոններն են, որոնք ընկած են Ադրբեջանի նկատմամբ Իսրայելի քաղաքականության հիմքում:

Ադրբեջանն Իսրայելի հետ հարաբերությունների հաստատումն առաջին հերթին հիմնավորել է Լեռնային Ղարաբաղի հակամարտության լուծման գործում Իսրայելից ռազմաքաղաքական աջակցություն ստանալու ակնկալիքով:

Թեև Բաքուն փորձել է ժխտել Ադրբեջան-Իսրայել ռազմական համագործակցության մեջ Իրանի գործոնի առկայությունը, Իրանի ռազմաքաղաքական ղեկավարությունը մշտապես կասկածանքով է վերաբերել Բաքվի հավաստիացումներին:

Հասան Ռոհանիի նախագահության շրջանում, ի տարբերություն Մահմուդ Ահմադինեժադի կառավարման շրջանի՝ Ադրբեջանի և Իրանի հարաբերություններում տեղի են ունեցել դրական զարգացումներ, խորացել է երկկողմ տնտեսական համագործակցությունը: Բացի Ադրբեջանի և Իսրայելի ռազմական համագործակցությունից՝ Իրանին սկսել է ավելի շատ մտահոգել Ադրբեջանում տարբեր ոլորտներում Իսրայելի ազդեցության մեծացման փաստը: Իրանին հատկապես մտահոգել է այն հանգամանքը, որ Իսրայելին հաջողվել է ազդել Իրանի վերաբերյալ Ադրբեջանի ղեկավարության որոշումների կայացման վրա: Ադրբեջանում Իսրայելի ազդեցությունը թուլացնելու նպատակով Իրանն Ադրբեջանի նկատմամբ կոշտ հակազդեցության քաղաքականությունը փոխարինել է տնտեսական համագործակցությամբ:

Իրանի կրոնական ազդեցությունը թուլացնելու նպատակով Ադրբեջանը մի կողմից երկրի ընդդիմադիր շիա գործիչների նկատմամբ բռնաճնշումներ է իրականացրել, իսկ մյուս կողմից Բաքվին հաջողվել է իրանական-շիայական «սպառնալիքը» շահարկելով Իսրայելից ռազմաքաղաքական աջակցություն ստանալ:

Ուսումնասիրությունները փաստում են, որ Իսրայելից Ադրբեջան սպառազինության մատակարարումների նշանակալի մասն իրականացվել է 2009-2013 թթ., ճիշտ այն ժամանակահատվածում, երբ Իրան-Ադրբեջան հարաբերություններում լարվածությունը հասել էր գագաթնակետին:

Ադրբեջանն Իրանում իր գործակալների միջոցով Իրանի ռազմա-քաղաքական ղեկավարության ուշադրությունն Ադրբեջան-Իսրայել ռազմավարական համագործակցությունից շեղելու, ինչպես նաև Իրանի հասարակական կարծիքի վրա ազդելու նպատակով շրջանառության մեջ է դրել «Իրանի կողմից Հայաստանին ցուցաբերող համակողմանի աջակցության» մասին թեզը:

Իրանի փորձագիտական շրջանակների գնահատմամբ՝ Ադրբեջանի և Իսրայելի միջև ռազմավարական բնույթի հարաբերությունները հաստատվել են Հարավային Կովկասում, մասնավորապես Ադրբեջանի նկատմամբ Իրանի վարած սխալ քաղաքականության պատճառով: Իրանում ներկայումս փորձագիտական նեղ շրջանակներում Իսրայելի թեմայի շուրջ դիսկուրս է ընթանում: Օրինակ, ԻԻՀ նախագահ Հաշեմի Ռաֆսանջանիի (1989-1997 թթ.) դստեր՝ Ֆաեզե Ռաֆսանջանիի (*հայտնի հասարակական գործիչ է, քաղաքական գործունեության պատճառով 2012 թ. բանտարկվել է*) համոզմամբ՝ Իրանը պետք է հաշվի առնի այն իրողությունը, որ անկախ Իսրայելի նկատմամբ ԻԻՀ վերաբերմունքից, Իսրայելը ՄԱԿ-ի կողմից ճանաչված է որպես անկախ երկիր, և այն ոչ միայն գոյություն ունի, այլև Իրանի հարևան երկրներից շատերի հետ լավ հարաբերություններ ունի, որոնց հետ Թեհրանն էլ իր հերթին լավ հարաբերություններ ունի:

Ներկայումս, եթե Մերձավոր Արևելքում Իրանին քիչ թե շատ հաջողվում է կառավարել Իսրայելի հետ պրոքսի պատերազմից բխող սպառնալիքները, ապա իր անմիջական սահմանին Իրանն ամեն կերպ փորձում է խուսափել Իսրայելի հետ ուղիղ բախումից: Արցախյան երկրորդ պատերազմի ընթացքում իսրայելական ԱԹՍ-ների անցումն Իրանի տարածք և այդ առնչությամբ Իրանի զգուշավոր հայտարարությունները դրա վկայությունն են: