

HARUTYUNYAN AGHAVNI

## CHINESE POLICY OF SOFT POWER AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

*"If the state does not have enough material "hard power,"  
then it may be defeated with a single stroke.  
But if the state lacked cultural "soft power,"  
it will be defeated without any stroke."*

*Zhang Guoji*

### **Theoretical basis for “soft power” based on a combination of modern Marxist and ancient Confucian thoughts**

Even though more than 30 years have passed since the “socialism with Chinese characteristics” reforms of 1978 began, Western criticism of China regarding its political system, human rights issues, its treatment of Tibet, and so forth continues unabated today<sup>1</sup>. Until the middle of the 1990s, as it emerged from the shadow of the Tiananmen events, China’s communist leaders designed new state-craft to revitalize economic reform and improve its national image. They have continued to view soft power as indispensable for the country’s efforts to increase comprehensive national strength and regain its status as a great power<sup>2</sup>.

China’s interest in soft power more concretely dates back to as early as 1993, when Wang Huning,\* a current member of the CCP

---

<sup>1</sup> Zhe Ren, The Confucius Institutes and China’s Soft Power, IDE Discussion Paper, No. 330, Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO, Japan, March 2012, p. 17. <http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/330.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> Sheng Ding, Chinese Soft Power and Public Diplomacy: An Analysis of China’s New Diaspora Engagement Policies in the Xi Era, EAI Fellows Program Working Paper Series, No. 43, Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania, April 2014, p. 4. [https://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng\\_report/201404011627122.pdf](https://www.eai.or.kr/data/bbs/eng_report/201404011627122.pdf)

\* Wang Huning - former professor of Fudan University - was handpicked by former president Jiang Zemin to serve as deputy director of the Policy Research Office of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) and under Hu Jintao was promoted

Political Bureau and the concurrent head of the Central Policy Research Office, introduced an American political scientist Joseph Nye's "soft power" theory to China.<sup>3</sup> According to Nye's theory, "soft power" is a directing, attracting and imitating force derived mainly from intangible resources such as national unity or solidarity, culture, ideology and influence on international institutions; it is the "ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion, enforcement or payments"<sup>4</sup>. For Joseph Nye, soft power is when "one country gets other countries to want what it wants." It is about attracting other states to your side by getting them to want the outcomes you want, because they admire your values, culture or foreign policy<sup>5</sup>.

Wang Huning evaluated Nye's theory and focused on culture as the main source of a state's soft power: "if a country has an admirable culture and ideological system, other countries will tend to follow it.... It does not have to use its hard power which is expensive and less efficient"<sup>6</sup>. The

---

to head the office and also appointed to the powerful Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee. He is former professor of Fudan University.

<sup>3</sup> Osamu Sayama, China's Approach to Soft Power Seeking a Balance between Nationalism, Legitimacy and International Influence, Occasional Paper, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI), March 2016, p. 4. [https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201603\\_op\\_chinas\\_soft\\_power.pdf](https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201603_op_chinas_soft_power.pdf)

This was at a time when China needed to counteract 'China Threat' theory, which had gained traction overseas after China introduced its 1992 Territorial Sea Law formally claiming much of the East and South China seas and many of their islands.

<sup>4</sup> Bates Gill, Yanzhong Huang, Sources and Limits of, Chinese 'Soft Power,' Survival, Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer 2006, p. 17. <http://www.comw.org/cmp/fulltext/0606gill.pdf>

<sup>5</sup> Osamu Sayama, China's Approach to Soft Power Seeking a Balance between Nationalism, ..., p. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Bonnie S. Glaser, Melissa E. Murphy, Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics the Ongoing Debate, Chinese Soft Power and its Implications for the United States, Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World, A Report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative, March 2009, p. 12. <https://ru.scribd.com/document/228200901/Chinese-Soft-Power>; Wang Huning,

country has almost reached the limit of growth of its influence in the international arena and further strengthening of "hard power" without the development of "soft power" threatens to lead to negative consequences, as it would have contributed to the spread and consolidation of the myth of the "China threat," rooting of social biases and prejudices regarding China and its politics<sup>7</sup>.

The term "soft power" has found its way not only into China's academic discourse, but it captured the attention of general public, as well as into the speeches and documents of China's highest leaders. At the 16<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in November 2002, the issue of culture, so important in "soft power," was addressed in a political report, when the then China's President Jiang Zemin appealed for cultural development and reform<sup>8</sup>. Active work was developed on this way soon after Hu Jintao held the offices of General Secretary of the Communist Party in 2002. Initially it was about countering foreign concepts, heralding the imminent collapse of China's reform, or pointing to the growth of the "China threat"<sup>9</sup>.

The developing of "cultural soft power" formally proclaimed as a key national initiative at the 17<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 15 to 21 October 2007. CCP Secretary-General Hu Jintao pointed out in his work report to the Congress, "Enhancing cultural soft power is a basic requirement for realizing scientific development and

---

Culture as National Soft Power: Soft Power, Journal of Fudan University, March 1993.

<sup>7</sup> Михневич С. "Панда на службе Дракона: основные направления и механизмы политики «мягкой силы» Китая". Вестник международных организаций. Том 9, № 2, 2014, стр. 96.

[https://iorj.hse.ru/data/2014/06/17/1310003927/%D0%A1%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%86%D1%8B%20%D0%B8%D0%B7%20%D0%92%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA\\_2013\\_2-final-6.pdf](https://iorj.hse.ru/data/2014/06/17/1310003927/%D0%A1%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%86%D1%8B%20%D0%B8%D0%B7%20%D0%92%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA_2013_2-final-6.pdf)

<sup>8</sup> Osamu Sayama, China's Approach to Soft Power Seeking a Balance between Nationalism, ..., p. 4-5.

<sup>9</sup> Борох О., Ломанов А. От «мягкой силы» к «культурному могуществу», Россия в глобальной политике. Фонд исследований мировой политики, 04.09.2012. <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Ot-myagkoi-sily-k-kulturnomu-moguschestvu-15643>

social harmony. It is necessary for satisfying rising demands for spiritual culture and national development strategy.”<sup>10</sup> Various government organizations - such as ministries, the State Council Information Office and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) - were discussing ways to exercise China’s soft power by means of public diplomacy.<sup>11</sup> Departing from Joseph Nye’s original conceptualization, the Chinese usage of soft power is applied to international relations as well as to domestic policies, hence unifying domestic and international considerations into an “organic whole.” Internationally, the overall goals, as outlined by Hu Jintao, are to make the country more influential politically, more competitive economically, more appealing in its image, and more inspiring morally<sup>12</sup>. The China’s economy then continued to grow swiftly, so the country began to play a greater role in the world economy and began to articulate its own theoretical basis for soft power<sup>13</sup>.

More detail about China’s soft-power policy was provided by Liu Yunshan, head of the Publicity Department of the CCP Central Committee, in an article released shortly after the 17<sup>th</sup> National Congress of the CCP. Liu emphasized that China’s soft power policy should be based on a combination of two elements:

1. *the core values of socialism (modern Marxism);*

---

<sup>10</sup> Jian Wang, Introduction: China’s Search of Soft Power, *Soft Power in China Public Diplomacy through Communication*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2011, p. 8. <http://www.palgraveconnect.com/pc/doifinder/view/10.1057/9780230116375>

<sup>11</sup> Ingrid d’ Hooghe, The Limits of China’s Soft power in Europe. Beijing’s Diplomatic Puzzle, *Netherlands Clingendael Diplomacy Papers*, No. 25, Institute of International Relations, Clingendael, January 2010, p. 3. [https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20100100\\_cdsp\\_paper\\_dhooghe\\_china.pdf](https://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20100100_cdsp_paper_dhooghe_china.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> Jian Wang, Introduction: China’s Search of Soft Power ..., p. 8.

<sup>13</sup> Osamu Sayama, China’s Approach to Soft Power Seeking a Balance between Nationalism, ..., p. 1.

China began to play a greater role in the world economy most notably by helping to mitigate the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis through the introduction of a 4 trillion RMB economic stimulus package (equivalent to 14 % of China’s GDP in 2008) to stabilize domestic markets.

2. *the values of traditional Chinese culture, especially ancient Confucianism*<sup>14</sup>.

Liu Yunshan noted that 6<sup>th</sup> Plenum of the 17<sup>th</sup> Party Congress has made constructing a socialist core value system a basic task in cultural construction, has conducted systematic elaboration and complete deployment, has clearly answered with which ideology and spirit China's Party will lead the progress of the people under new historical conditions, and with which spiritual bearing the Chinese nation will tower over the forest of the nations of the world. Mao Zedong put forward that Chinese Party must have a "common language," and Chinese Socialist country must have a "uniform determination"<sup>15</sup>.

Actually, ever since the CPC's 17<sup>th</sup> Congress, Chinese normative interpretation of soft power became the "culture-centric." And the main goal of soft power at that time was the desire to avoid "frontal confrontation" with the US, as China's leadership believed that Beijing could not offer ideological and values narratives, which could make a global competition to the ideas of American version of democracy and freedoms of man. Thus China has emphasized the possibility of different development paths based on different values systems<sup>16</sup>. Chinese analysts believe that China's modern-day emphasis on development, stability, and harmony has universal appeal and could supplement, though not replace US values. Some scholars go even further and hold that traditional Chinese values such as giving priority to human beings, harmony between humankind and nature, and harmony but difference - repackaged by the CPC as the concepts of harmonious society and harmonious world - could provide an alternative to Western values. Some of them maintain that global problems such as poverty, environmental degradation, and regional conflict might be better addressed by the adoption of a Chinese rather than Western

---

<sup>14</sup> Նույն տեղում, էջ 5:

<sup>15</sup> Liu Yunshan Makes Clear what CCP Cultural Policy is about, China Copyright and Media, 03.03.2012.

<https://chinacopyrightandmedia.wordpress.com/2012/03/03/liu-yunshan-makes-clear-what-ccp-cultural-policy-is-about/>

<sup>16</sup> Михневич С. "Панда на службе Дракона: основные направления ...", стр. 98.

approach<sup>17</sup>. In fact, cultural interpretation of soft power was Beijing's conscious choice. While America brings to the world of its own political values, China relies on the culture, so that their soft powers are in different intellectual dimensions<sup>18</sup>.

According to Liu Yunshan, Deng Xiaoping emphasized to "rely on ideals, rely on strong convictions, and all difficulties can be overcome." Jiang Zemin stressed that "one nation, one country, if there is no spiritual pillar, that's as if there is no spirit, and it may lose cohesion and vitality." Hu Jintao put forward that "the Socialist core value system is the essential embodiment of the Socialist ideology and is the lead and guidance for Chinese Socialist culture"<sup>19</sup>. President Xi Jinping has vowed to promote China's cultural soft power by disseminating modern Chinese values and showing the charm of Chinese culture to the world that it was important to accommodate Chinese cultural inheritance with contemporary culture and a modern society. China should be portrayed as a civilized country featuring rich history and cultural diversity and as an oriental power with good government, developed economy, national unity and beautiful mountains and rivers. Xi Jinping said that China should also be marked as a responsible country that advocates peaceful and common development, safeguards international justice and makes contributions to humanity. To strengthen China's soft power, mass media, groups and individuals should play their roles in displaying the charm to the world. The country needs to build its capacity in international communication, construct a communication system, better use the new media and increase the creativity, appeal and credibility of China's publicity. President also said, "The stories of China should be well told, voices of China well spread, and characteristics of China well explained"<sup>20</sup>.

---

<sup>17</sup> Bonnie S. Glaser, Melissa E. Murphy, *Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics the Ongoing Debate*, ..., p. 14.

<sup>18</sup> Борох О., Ломанов А. От «мягкой силы» к «культурному могуществу», ..., стр. 1.

<sup>19</sup> Liu Yunshan Makes Clear what CCP Cultural Policy is about, ..., p. 1.

<sup>20</sup> Xi: China to Promote Cultural Soft Power, *English.news.cn*, 01.01.2014. [https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/xinhua\\_xi-](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/xinhua_xi-)

Worth to note that China's ancient history and traditional culture are viewed by most scholars as a valuable source of soft power for attracting not only East Asian neighbors with whom China shares a Confucian heritage but also the wider international community<sup>21</sup>. China sees its culture fundamentally as a world culture. In the words of Hu Jintao: "The Chinese culture belongs not only to the Chinese but also to the whole world ... We stand ready to step up cultural exchanges with the rest of the world in a joint promotion of cultural prosperity"<sup>22</sup>. China's culture also has a long history of holding great attraction to the West. In imperial times, China's high civilization and accompanying values were not imposed in any way on the outside world, but wherever foreign traders and envoys told their stories about the Middle Kingdom, people felt attracted<sup>23</sup>. China has some unique advantages in expanding nation's civilization influence. For more than 3,000 years, the splendors of China drew a continuous stream of traders, emissaries, scholars and holy men in quest of riches, power, guidance and inspiration<sup>24</sup>. Loosely defined as mixture of Confucian social and political values, folk and high customs and art, and the Chinese language, "culture" is widely considered to be a core component of China's soft power<sup>25</sup>.

Thereby China's aim is to strengthen its voice and influence in the world, and, above all, to encourage a sense of pride in the country-a sense of nationalism- within Chinese living in China and overseas, in order to

---

[china to promote cultural soft power article 0. pdf](#)

<sup>21</sup> Bonnie S. Glaser, Melissa E. Murphy, ʘ2ʘ. ʘ2ʘ., ʘ2 13:

<sup>22</sup> Bates Gill, Yanzhong Huang, Sources and Limits of, Chinese 'Soft Power,' Survival, ..., p. 19.

<sup>23</sup> Ingrid d' Hooghe, The Limits of China's Soft power in Europe. Beijing's Diplomatic Puzzle, ..., p. 5.

<sup>24</sup> Bates Gill, Yanzhong Huang, ʘ2ʘ. ʘ2ʘ., ʘ2 17:

<sup>25</sup> Joel Wuthnow, The Concept of Soft Power in China's Strategic Discourse, Issues & Studies 44, No. 2, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, June 2008, p. 9-10.

<http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/Concept%20of%20Soft%20Power%20in.pdf>

strengthen the CPC's control<sup>26</sup>. Against the background of the rapid development of China's comprehensive national strength, the public's sense of national pride will surely increase and nationalist sentiment will inevitably rise.

### **"Soft" or "hard" power - "Beijing consensus"**

Chinese theorists have extended Nye's original conceptual framework to formulate own concept of "soft power with Chinese characteristics"<sup>27</sup>. They have come to see soft power as a fundamental component of China's comprehensive national power, which includes economic, military and political power<sup>28</sup>. They are interested in the fundamental issues such as the relationship of hard and soft power, and the more specific questions, such as the development and use of various forms of soft power to achieve foreign policy objectives<sup>29</sup>. Interest in soft power likely derived from the notion that hard power resources alone would be insufficient for China to reach the level of a global power. Men Honghua, a researcher at the Central Party School, notes that the question of the possible rise of China depends not only on hard power, but requires reliance on soft power; hence the present rise of China is considered to be possible only with complementarity of the two kinds of powers<sup>30</sup>.

Worth to note, that Chinese thinking behind the concept of soft power, traced back to more than two thousand of years. In ancient China, soft power was perceived stronger and more powerful than hard power, as suggested by proverbial wisdoms: to use soft and gentle means to overcome the hard and strong; and drips of water can penetrate a stone.

---

<sup>26</sup> Osamu Sayama, China's Approach to Soft Power Seeking a Balance between Nationalism, ..., p. 1.

<sup>27</sup> Bonnie S. Glaser, Melissa E. Murphy, նշվ. աշխ., էջ 12:

<sup>28</sup> Ingrid d' Hooghe, The Limits of China's Soft power in Europe. Beijing's Diplomatic Puzzle, ..., p. 4.

<sup>29</sup> Joel Wuthnow, The Concept of Soft Power in China's Strategic Discourse, ..., p. 1-2.

<sup>30</sup> Նույն տեղում, էջ 6:



Sun Tse (544-496 BC), a military strategist of 2500 years ago, advocates winning a battle without a fight. The Chinese philosopher Confucius (551-479 BCE) believes that the ruler should win the allegiance of people with virtue (soft power) not by force (hard power). Mencius (372-289 BC) advocates rule in kingly way rather than the tyrant way. The kingly way refers to governing by moral example whereas the tyrant way involves governing by brutal force. Lao Tze, a contemporary of Confucius, says in Tao Te Ching, "I know the benefit of wuwei (do nothing); the softest can win the hardest. Invisible force can pass through the intangible"<sup>31</sup>.

In China, there has been a trend recently to use Sun Tzu\* and "*The Art of War*" as a source of soft power for China's peaceful development strategy. In his book "*The Power to Lead*," Joseph Nye describes Sun Tzu as a smart warrior who understood the importance of the soft power of attraction. Sun Tzu's "*The Art of War*" shows us that seeking safety through development, cooperation and win-win growth is the right way toward world peace. China has the deterrence and wisdom to win without fighting, but if needed, China has the courage and capability to win through fighting. This is the essence of "The Art of War" and the soul of China's military strategy today." Perhaps it is this image Hu Jintao had in mind when he gave President George W. Bush a silk copy of "*The Art of War*" in 2006<sup>32</sup>.

The most vivid reflection of China's nowadays experience in creating effective ideological product that combines elements of "soft" and "hard"

---

<sup>31</sup> Ying Fan, *Soft Power: Power of Attraction or Confusion? Place Branding and Public Diplomacy* 4:2, Brunel Business School, Brunel University, England, 2008, p. 3-4. <http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/1594/3/FullText.pdf>

\* Sun Tzu was a Chinese general, military strategist, and philosopher who lived in the Spring and Autumn period of ancient China. Sun Tzu is traditionally credited as the author of *The Art of War*, a widely influential work of military strategy that has affected both Western and Eastern philosophy.

<sup>32</sup> Leon Whyte, *Sun Tzu and the Art of Soft Power? The Diplomat*, 31.03.2015. [http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/sun-tzu-and-the-art-of-soft-power/?utm\\_content=buffer22ca6&utm\\_medium=social&utm\\_source=facebook.com&utm\\_campaign=buffer](http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/sun-tzu-and-the-art-of-soft-power/?utm_content=buffer22ca6&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer)

power served the term "Beijing Consensus," introduced by former journalist Joshua Cooper Ramo. It symbolizes an alternative development model, in which combined liberal or market economy and authoritarian political system. According to Ramo, the "Beijing Consensus" can be seen as antithesis of the "Washington Consensus"- it does not believe in a uniform solution for each specific situation, nor a great leap of "shock therapy;" it emphasizes development based on own characteristics of the country with the "ruthless willingness to innovate and experiment"<sup>33</sup>.

Many developing countries refer China's economic development model as viable alternative to the western model<sup>34</sup>, and the political analysts speak about the "Beijing Consensus" popularity in developing countries against the background of decline in the authority of the liberal "Washington consensus"<sup>35</sup>. The role and place of Chinese soft power in the international arena began to be viewed as an integral part of the concept of "harmonious world" and carried out by applying the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and respecting state sovereignty. Therefore it is attractive especially to the authoritarian governments in developing countries<sup>36</sup>.

However, while the developing countries welcome China's influence, many in the West see the rise of China's soft power along with its economic power and military power as China threat or Asia's Sinoization<sup>37</sup>. Beijing's ability to represent an alternative political-economic model even is seen by one prominent foreign-policy specialist in Britain as "the biggest

---

<sup>33</sup> Bates Gill, Yanzhong Huang, Sources and Limits of, Chinese 'Soft Power,' Survival, ..., p. 20.

<sup>34</sup> Ying Fan, Soft Power: Power of Attraction or Confusion? ..., p. 7.

<sup>35</sup> Борох О., Ломанов А., От «мягкой силы» к «культурному могуществу», ..., стр. 1.

<sup>36</sup> Ким В., Бохан Я., Трансформация стратегии «мягкой силы» КНР в современных условиях, Вестник Челябинского государственного университета, N 12 (266), *Политические науки*. Востоковедение, Вып. 12, 2012, стр. 18. [http://www.lib.csu.ru/vch/266/vcsu12\\_12.pdf](http://www.lib.csu.ru/vch/266/vcsu12_12.pdf)

<sup>37</sup> Ying Fan, Soft Power: Power of Attraction or Confusion? ..., p. 17.

ideological threat the West has felt since the end of the Cold War”<sup>38</sup>. And while for Beijing it is important to allow diverse concepts to operate harmoniously in the world, its theory of soft power entails strong opposition to US-led globalization<sup>39</sup>. Nye pointed out that "it would be foolish to ignore the achievements" of China, therefore it is time for the US to pay more attention to the balance of soft power in Asia<sup>40</sup>. In the mid-2000s, before the transformation of the soft power in the CCP's official slogan, Nye regards the rise of China's soft power at America's expense as an urgent issue to be addressed, since the positive assessment of the China's global role growing faster than the praise in the US address<sup>41</sup>.

Many foreign experts and journalists even argue that China cannot be a soft power, because there is no civil society, and the government violates human rights. However some Russian experts find there is no reason to talk about the failure of the Chinese policy of soft power, since China learns to fight for the "right of words" in the global arena, create channels of communication and influence foreign public opinion. Moreover, the USSR experience has shown that the surge of the international popularity of the country in connection with the "perestroika" proved to be short-lived and ended with the country itself. Chinese supporters of the accelerated build-up of cultural and ideological soft power believed that the Soviet Union defeated by the West not because of economic weakness, but due to inability to counter external propaganda pressure with its own values<sup>42</sup>.

According to Zhu Majie, a scholar at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS), a key reason for the collapse of the Soviet

---

<sup>38</sup> Bates Gill, Yanzhong Huang, Ы2ҫ. ա2ҫ., է2 21:

<sup>39</sup> Osamu Sayama, China's Approach to Soft Power Seeking a Balance between Nationalism, ..., p. 1.

<sup>40</sup> Борох О., Ломанов А., Ы2ҫ. ա2ҫ., է2 1:

<sup>41</sup> Ying Fan, Soft Power: Power of Attraction or Confusion? ..., p. 8. A recent example is several hundred Confucius Institutes China has opened worldwide in the past few years to promote the Chinese language and culture.

<sup>42</sup> Борох О., Ломанов А., Ы2ҫ. ա2ҫ., է2 1:

Union was its "failure in the competition for soft power"<sup>43</sup>. Thus China does not want to repeat path like this by following the advice of Western "liberate civil society" to increase the "soft power"<sup>44</sup>. Scholars like Shen Jiru from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), also concluded that the Soviet Union, which was equal to the US for a time, "lost the whole game due to a flaw in its soft power." Chinese intellectuals and the party leadership were persuaded that in order to achieve - or indeed recover - great-power status, China needed to build both hard and soft power. Furthermore, the value of hard power, particularly military strength, as an effective means of securing national interests was judged to be on the decline, while the value of soft power was on the rise. And it is not accidental that Nye's theory was introduced into China as the country was undertaking an in-depth investigation into the rise and fall of great nations, seeking not only to escape the fate of the Soviet Union but to transform China into a great power<sup>45</sup>.

Some analysts consider that soft power is as seductive as it is elusive, which makes it irresistible; it is also costly and ephemeral, which makes it undesirable and unaffordable; and it is nearly impossible to separate the effects of soft power from those of hard power. However among Chinese experts there is doubt that soft power can be a trap of American analysts, and rising China cannot withstand the race for soft power in the same way as the USSR could not stand the competition and lost in the race for the US hard power<sup>46</sup>.

It appears Beijing fully aware of this threat, and not by chance, that the choice of Chinese intellectuals and leaders focused on the "Beijing Consensus." The Party was convinced that in order to achieve - or even

---

<sup>43</sup> Joel Wuthnow, *The Concept of Soft Power in China's Strategic Discourse*, ..., p. 6-7.

<sup>44</sup> Борох О., Ломанов А., Ызүл. уэту., 1: 1:

<sup>45</sup> Bonnie S. Glaser Melissa E. Murphy, *Soft Power with Chinese Characteristics the Ongoing Debate*, ..., p. 12-13.

<sup>46</sup> Xie Tao, *China's Soft Power Obsession*, *The Diplomat*, 14.04.2015.  
<http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinas-soft-power-obsession/>

recover - the status of a great power, China needs to develop and strengthen both hard and soft power.

### **The policy of soft power” carried out by investment attractiveness and foreign aid**

Aware of the benefits of a sophisticated soft-power portfolio, Chinese leaders are aiming to deepen relationships with all regions of the world. The recipients of China’s foreign aid are mainly low-income developing countries, about two-thirds of Chinese aid goes to the least developed countries and other low-income countries. The geographical distribution of China’s foreign aid covers most developing countries in Asia, Middle East (ME), Africa, Latin America, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, Oceania and Eastern Europe<sup>47</sup>. Beijing uses a variety of tools to increase its influence in the developing world that include economic incentives and military cooperation. Although the nature of China’s relationships with the regions is largely economic, Beijing has also sought to strengthen these relationships by promoting regional economic integration and security mechanisms, emphasizing the role of the United Nations (UN), participating in humanitarian missions, providing concessionary loans and debt relief, increasing cultural and academic exchange programs, and engaging local communities through skilled diplomats<sup>48</sup>.

---

<sup>47</sup> China’s Foreign Aid, Information Office of the State Council, The People’s Republic of China, Beijing, April 2011, p. 18.

By the end of 2009, China had aided 161 countries and more than 30 international and regional organizations, including 123 developing countries that receive aid from China regularly. Of them, 30 are in Asia, 51 in Africa, 18 in Latin America and the Caribbean, 12 in Oceania and 12 in Eastern Europe. Asia and Africa, home to the largest poor population, have got about 80% of China’s foreign aid.

<sup>48</sup> Denise E. Zheng, Chinese Soft Power and Its Implications for the United States. Competition and Cooperation in the Developing World, A Report of the CSIS Smart Power Initiative, N.W., March 2009, p. 2.

<https://myweb.rollins.edu/tlairson/china/chisofpower.pdf>

The China' policy of soft power carried out by investment attractiveness and foreign aid<sup>49</sup>. China's investment strategy is heavily influenced by the need to acquire stable and sustainable supply flows of energy and raw materials to maintain a high level of economic growth. China's need for energy resources and raw materials underpins its economic gestures in the ME, Africa, and Latin America. Chinese money is particularly attractive to many developing countries because it does not come with the "human rights conditions, good governance requirements, approved-project restrictions, and environmental quality regulations that are tied to money from Western governments"<sup>50</sup>.

Being a developing country itself, China has gained, through its own growth and practice of cooperation, a better understanding of the challenge impeding development. In its long cooperation with developing countries, Beijing has charted out a model of common development with Chinese characteristics, which refuses the Western aid model with attached conditions, but rather seeks mutual cooperation based on equality and consultation, making effective use of aid, investment, and trade with a view to realizing win-win development<sup>51</sup>.

More and more, China is seen as a country that does not need massive aid and can pay its own bills. Thanks to its economic growth, China increasingly transitions from aid recipient to donor: its 2006 budget will expand China's outbound foreign aid by 14% to US \$1.1 billion. In 2002, Beijing pledged US \$150 million in aid to Afghanistan for its reconstruction efforts, and in 2005 offered US \$83 million to the countries hit by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. After Hurricane Katrina hit the southern US, the Chinese government offered US \$5.1 million in aid to the US<sup>52</sup>.

---

<sup>49</sup> China's Foreign Aid, Information Office of the State Council, ..., p. 18.

<sup>50</sup> Denise E. Zheng, 王正, 王正 3:

<sup>51</sup> Jin Ling, The "New Silk Road" Initiative: China's Marshall Plan? China International Studies, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS), Beijing, January/February, 2015, p. 75.

<sup>52</sup> Bates Gill, Yanzhong Huang, Sources and Limits of, Chinese 'Soft Power,' Survival, ..., p. 23.

Regarding the distribution of its foreign aid, China sets great store by people's living conditions and economic development of recipient countries, making great efforts to ensure its aid benefits as many needy people as possible<sup>53</sup>.

China offers foreign aid in eight forms:

1. *complete projects,*
2. *goods and materials,*
3. *technical cooperation,*
4. *human resource development cooperation,*
5. *medical teams sent abroad,*
6. *emergency humanitarian aid,*
7. *volunteer programs in foreign,*
8. *debt relief*<sup>54</sup>.

Financial resources provided by China for foreign aid mainly fall into three types:

1. *grants (aid gratis),*
2. *interest-free loans,*
3. *concessional loans.*

The first two come from China's state finances, while concessional loans are provided by the Export-Import Bank of China as designed by the Chinese government<sup>55</sup>. At the UN summit of 2015 on sustainable development President Xi announced about the creation of a fund to support developing countries, initial investment of which will amount to US \$ 2 billion. Xi Jinping said, that China will continue to increase investment in the least developed countries to rise up to US \$ 12 billion by 2030 and that China will assist developing countries, as well as completely

---

<sup>53</sup> China's Foreign Aid, Information Office of the State Council, ..., p. 18.

<sup>54</sup> Նույն տեղում, էջ 10:

<sup>55</sup> Նույն տեղում, էջ 7: By the end of 2009, China had provided a total of 256.29 billion yuan in aid to foreign countries, including 106.2 billion yuan in grants, 76.54 billion yuan in interest-free loans and 73.55 billion yuan in concessional loans.

landlocked or small island states<sup>56</sup>. China should increase foreign aid and improve the way Beijing offers it, as well should provide more counsel and training, free of charge, to other developing countries in areas such as human resources, developing planning, and economic policy. Beijing should expand foreign cooperation and aid in the areas of science and technology, education, health and medical care, disaster prevention and mitigation, environmental governance, the protection of wild fauna and flora, and poverty reduction, and step up the provision of humanitarian aid. China should take an active part in the 2030 Agenda for sustainable Development<sup>57</sup>.

However, Chinese investment in developing countries has one condition: acceptance of the “one-China” policy that requires recipient governments to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan and recognize Taiwan as part of China’s sovereign territory<sup>58</sup>.

Chinese experts consider that Beijing’s priority should be to cooperate with developing countries, to use this “rare historical opportunity” and take on its responsibilities as the largest developing country so as to push for a partial reform of global governance and international cooperation. This reform would not be aimed at weakening the US, but simply at empowering developing countries<sup>59</sup>.

Hence, the discussion about soft power is often linked to the issue of public diplomacy. For projecting the impact of soft power in the international environment and in order to form a positive image, China fulfils public diplomacy - activities contributing to the achievement of the

---

<sup>56</sup> Китай планирует выделить \$12 млрд развивающимся странам к 2030 году. Газета. Ру, 26.09.2015.

[http://m.gazeta.ru/business/news/2015/09/26/n\\_7637363.shtml](http://m.gazeta.ru/business/news/2015/09/26/n_7637363.shtml)

<sup>57</sup> Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Recommendations for the 13<sup>th</sup> Five-Year Plan for Economic and Social Development, Central Compilation and Translation Press, Beijing, 2015, p. 65.

<sup>58</sup> Denise E. Zheng, ʘ2ʘ. ʘ2ʘ., ʘ2 3:

<sup>59</sup> Godement F., "One Belt, One Road": China's Great Leap Outward, China Analysis, The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), June 2015, p. 7. [http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/China\\_analysis\\_belt\\_road.pdf](http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/China_analysis_belt_road.pdf)



interests and goals of Beijing<sup>60</sup>.

### **China's public diplomacy and activity of Confucius institutes**

Public diplomacy is a diplomatic method that seeks to achieve a country's interests by improving that country's image and influence. It allows a country to better understand the diverse situations of foreign publics and therefore to influence them through cultural communication and through making accurate information about itself readily available<sup>61</sup>. Public diplomacy is defined as the diplomacy of a national government influencing other country's audience. Its methods of activity include cultural exchange programs, state-supported international broadcasting services to foreign audiences, scholarly exchanges, and with information and language as its main expression<sup>62</sup>. Over the past decade, however, a new public diplomacy perspective has developed, which refers to activities that are beyond state actors. It has become a more fluid concept in the context of the new media and Internet environment<sup>63</sup>.

From the ideological origin perspective, the embryo of public

---

<sup>60</sup> Публичная дипломатия как инструмент внешней политики Китая. Вековой путь Китая к прогрессу и модернизации. К 100-летию Синхайской революции. Тезисы XIX Международной научной конференции «Китай, китайская цивилизация и мир. История, современность, перспективы (Москва, 19-21 октября 2011 г.), ИДВ РАН, Москва, 2011, стр. 72. [http://www.ifes-ras.ru/images/abook\\_file/konf6.pdf](http://www.ifes-ras.ru/images/abook_file/konf6.pdf)

<sup>61</sup> Тан Сяосун, The Confucius Institutes and China's Public Diplomacy Strategy, Пленарные доклады, Уральский федеральный университет (УрФУ), 2012. p. 9. [http://elar.urfu.ru/bitstream/10995/43432/1/kis\\_2012\\_003.pdf](http://elar.urfu.ru/bitstream/10995/43432/1/kis_2012_003.pdf)

<sup>62</sup> 唐小松, 王义桅公共外交与国家软实力, 《欧洲研究》, 4期, 复旦大学美国研究中心, 2003年第, 页3-71.

<http://www.cas.fudan.edu.cn/picture/1489.pdf>; Tang Xiaosong, Wang Yiwei, Public Diplomacy and Its Impact on the Theories of International Relations: A Framework of Analysis, European Studies, No. 4, Center for American Studies, Fudan University, 2003, p. 63-71. <http://www.cas.fudan.edu.cn/view.en.php?id=647>

<sup>63</sup> Jan Servaes, Xi Jinping's Chinese Dream and Soft Power, Cpianalysis, 18.03.2016. <https://cpianalysis.org/2016/03/18/88952/>

diplomacy's idea appeared in traditional Chinese culture two thousands of years ago. The widely praised old behavior rule contain plenty of ideas about public diplomacy, such as "A just cause enjoys full support while an unjust cause finds little; only with the advocacy of the just can one gain support from others; the support of the people among the three elements for the victory of war; dispatching troops with just cause; success is assured by right titles and proper words"<sup>64</sup>.

China's international image is a key anchor of contemporary Chinese national identity, therefore Chinese public is paying greater attention to how their country is perceived and judged overseas; and for them, it is a question of collective identity, prestige, and arguably, China's "face". How the Chinese leadership handles China's image abroad has serious consequences for its credibility and legitimacy at home<sup>65</sup>.

Public diplomacy is a foreign concept in China, since Chinese more usually use the term "external propaganda" and emphasize advertising Chinese achievements and boosting the country's image overseas. In Chinese, propaganda has a positive connotation associated with such essentially benign activities as the release of news, general shaping of ideology, or even advertisement. Chinese propaganda has two levels: internal propaganda and external propaganda, which means the promotion of the Chinese image abroad<sup>66</sup>. Contrary to assumptions sometimes held in the West, China does not insist that its public diplomacy should necessarily be conducted by the government<sup>67</sup>.

---

<sup>64</sup> Тан Сяосун, Ызц. шзџ., էջ 11:

<sup>65</sup> Jian (Jay) Wang, *Rising Soft Powers*. China, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, Los Angeles, 2015, p. 5.

[http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u31086/China\\_ebook.pdf](http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u31086/China_ebook.pdf)

<sup>66</sup> Wang Yiwei, *Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power*, ANNALS, AAPSS, 616, The ANNALS of the American Academy, March 2008, p. 259.

[http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/jaechun/courses/Lists/b7/Attachments/13/public%20diplomacy%20and%20the%20rise%20of%20chinese%20soft%20power\\_YIWEI%20WANG.pdf](http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/jaechun/courses/Lists/b7/Attachments/13/public%20diplomacy%20and%20the%20rise%20of%20chinese%20soft%20power_YIWEI%20WANG.pdf)

<sup>67</sup> Smirnova L., *Eurasian Students in China: A New Angle in Understanding China's*

While the state propaganda system is very strong and influential in China, Chinese public diplomacy is relatively weak because of Chinese government's practice of mixing external and internal propaganda and because the Chinese understand public diplomacy by emphasizing the importance of people-to-people diplomacy<sup>68</sup>. Public diplomacy is realized through building relationships between individuals and groups, the dialogue and communication, the publication of information as the ideological and political propaganda<sup>69</sup>. Chinese public diplomacy has tried to transform China's rise from a hard rise to a soft rise. In other words, China hopes to rise in peace, by peace, and for peace<sup>70</sup>. China's diplomatic and development schemes form just one part of a much broader agenda aimed at enhancing its soft power in media, publishing, education, the arts, sports, and other domains<sup>71</sup>. To contribute the China's soft power, Chinese government has spent hundreds of billions of dollars improving the communication capabilities of its media outlets like *CCTV*, organizing mega events such as the Olympic Games and Shanghai Expo, hosting summits attended by dozens of world leaders (e.g. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)), and sponsoring forums on regional security and prosperity (e.g. the Boao Forum), funding Confucius

---

Public Diplomacy, *Intersections between Public Diplomacy and International Development: Case Studies in Converging Fields*, Paper 2, The USC Center on Public Diplomacy (CPD), Figueroa Press, Los Angeles, February 2016, p. 55. [http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u35361/Intersections%20Between%20PD%20International%20Development\\_final.pdf](http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u35361/Intersections%20Between%20PD%20International%20Development_final.pdf)

<sup>68</sup> Wang Yiwei, 王毅, 页 259:

<sup>69</sup> Шарко С. Публичная дипломатия как инструмент внешней политики Китая. Вековой путь Китая к прогрессу и модернизации. К 100-летию Синхайской революции. Тезисы XIX Международной научной конференции «Китай, китайская цивилизация и мир. История, современность, перспективы (19–21 октября 2011 г.)», ИДВ РАН, Москва, 2011, стр. 71. [http://www.ifes-ras.ru/images/abook\\_file/konf6.pdf](http://www.ifes-ras.ru/images/abook_file/konf6.pdf)

<sup>70</sup> Wang Yiwei, 王毅, 页 258:

<sup>71</sup> Shambaugh D., *China's Soft-Power Push*, *Foreign Affairs*, Issue July/August 2015. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-06-16/china-s-soft-power-push>

Institutes (CI)<sup>72</sup>. China's rapidly expanding Confucius Institutes (CI) program, as one of the nation's central mechanisms for the constitution of soft power, can be seen as a form of cultural diplomacy.

According to Confucius Institute Headquarters - Hanban, the Confucius Institutes (CIs) are nonprofit organizations designed "to satisfy the need of people who are interested in Chinese learning all around the world, promoting the understanding of Chinese language culture, enhancing the educational and cultural cooperation between China and the world, developing the friendship between China and other countries, to help developing a multicultural environment and building up a harmonious world"<sup>73</sup>. The CIs are university-piloted, based on the project's overall rationale, its close ties to the state, diplomatic concerns over the name given the institutes, the use of CIs to showcase the PRC's diplomacy and foreign policy and the use of Chinese universities to link the CI network around the world<sup>74</sup>. They are unique in that they are located within existing schools and universities, rather than as stand-alone organizations, and are directly managed by a branch of the central government<sup>75</sup>. Within the past years, 353 Confucius Institutes and 473

---

<sup>72</sup> Xie Tao, *China's Soft Power Obsession*, ..., p. 1

<sup>73</sup> Shryll Whittaker, *China's Rise and the Confucius Institutes: Chinese and American Perspectives*, Seton Hall University Dissertations and Theses (ETDs), Paper 1922, December 2013, p. 10.

<http://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2931&context=dissertations>

<sup>74</sup> Su-Yan Pan, *Confucius Institute Project: China's Cultural Diplomacy and Soft Power Projection*, *Asian Education and Development Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2013, p. 25.

<http://europa2020.spiruharet.ro/fisiere/Diplomatie%20publica/Marketing%20international/Marketing%20pentru%20Diplomatie%20publica/China%20cultural%20diplomacy.pdf>

<sup>75</sup> Jennifer Hubbert, *Rising Soft Powers. China*, USC Center on Public Diplomacy, Los Angeles, 2015, p. 11.

[http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u31086/China\\_ebook.pdf](http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u31086/China_ebook.pdf)

Confucius Classrooms have been established in 104 countries and regions<sup>76</sup>.

Many view the rapid growth of these institutes as an increase in China's soft power. Joseph Nye cites Beijing's creation of CIs around the world as one example of this soft power<sup>77</sup>. Furthermore, the CI has received its share of criticism in host countries, as well as within China. There are many who warn that the rising numbers of CIs overseas represent a type of "Chinese cultural coercion." Some even criticize the Chinese culture being taught at CIs as ideological propaganda for the China's Communist Party (CCP)<sup>78</sup>. Some critics contend that the CIs reflect the Chinese government's agenda and that their operation on university campuses interferes with academic freedom. Others find the teaching materials and pedagogy less than adequate<sup>79</sup>. The program also suffers from a shortage of professional language teachers as a result of its rapid growth. To solve this problem, the Chinese government has launched a volunteer project to train language teachers quickly, but it remains very difficult to send qualified teachers to every CI<sup>80</sup>. The biggest

---

Support for the programs includes salaries for the teaching staff from China, curricular materials for students and reference materials for libraries, and cultural exchanges such as kung fu masters and song and dance troupes.

<sup>76</sup> Zhe Ren, *The Confucius Institutes and China's Soft Power*, IDE Discussion Paper, No. 330, Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO, Japan, March 2012, p. 0. <http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/Dp/pdf/330.pdf>

<sup>77</sup> Նույն տեղում, էջ 17:

<sup>78</sup> Նույն տեղում, էջ 2:

<sup>79</sup> Zaharna R. S., Jennifer Hubbert, Falk Hartig, *De-Americanizing Soft Power Discourse? Confucius Institutes and the Globalization of China's Soft Power*, CPD Perspectives on Public Diplomacy, Paper 3, USC Center on Public Diplomacy at the Annenberg School University, Southern California, September 2014, p. 7. <http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u25044/Confucius%20Institutes%20v2%20%281%29.pdf>

<sup>80</sup> *Confucius Institutes: China's Soft Power?* Sigur Center for Asian Studies Policy Commentary, The Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University, June 2010, p. 2. [http://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/policycommentary\\_jun2010\\_confuciusinstitute.pdf](http://www.risingpowersinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/policycommentary_jun2010_confuciusinstitute.pdf)

issue the institutes face overseas is that of wariness and concern since many see them as constituting a Chinese cultural invasion and as being permeated with ideology, and moves are being made to resist them<sup>81</sup>.

Domestic criticism has ranged from accusing the government of misplacing educational resources for overseas institutions rather than allocating them to poor school districts in China, to questioning the use of “Confucius” as the official name of the entity, as it doesn’t teach anything related to Confucian philosophy<sup>82</sup>. They worry that the government’s support for the CIs’ budgets detracts from domestic spending and the budget for domestic compulsory education remains inadequate. Another area some observers comment on is the appearance of corruption or at least a conflict of interest within the Hanban itself. Critics argue that these and numerous other problems require priority financial support from the government over the CI program<sup>83</sup>.

Some scholars find that China’s pursuit of soft power has been driven by a desire to gain and reclaim respectability for the country as an equal to the West, rather than to become, a “hegemony or standard bearer” on the world stage. Indeed, China’s return to global prominence puts the country and the world in an unprecedented historical situation. Its outcome depends as much on how China charts a course of development and engagement as on the response of other countries to its re-emergence<sup>84</sup>.

Since the third plenum of the 18<sup>th</sup> Party’s Congress in 2013 the Chinese government called for a new approach to soft power and emphasized the unique role of largely independent think tanks, who represent different groups of interests in Chinese society, in generating new ideas and enhance China’s soft power. They can help to showcase

---

<sup>81</sup> Zhe Ren, ʻ2ʻ. ʻ2ʻ., ʻ2ʻ 15:

<sup>82</sup> Zaharna R.S., Jennifer Hubbert, Falk Hartig, De-Americanizing Soft Power Discourse? ..., ..., p. 7.

<sup>83</sup> Confucius Institutes: China’s Soft Power? Sigur Center for Asian Studies Policy Commentary, ..., p. 2.

<sup>84</sup> Jian (Jay) Wang, Rising Soft Powers. China, ..., p. 5.

Chinese thought, positions and voices at the international arena, as well as to make big contributions to the realization of the Chinese Dream<sup>85</sup>.

### **Conclusion**

In recent years, China has sought to supplement its traditional use of hard power with soft power, and thus the Chinese government has paid more and more attention to public diplomacy. The peaceful rise/peaceful development policy in Chinese grand strategy has sought to integrate Chinese hard power and soft power to create a soft rise for China. Rising to play a more substantial role in world politics and economics, and often feeling misjudged by the international community, the Chinese leadership is increasingly making effective use of public diplomacy tools to project an image of China that in their view does more justice to reality: China as a trustworthy, cooperative, peace-loving, developing country that takes good care of its enormous population. China has placed special emphasis on the soft-power aspects of its foreign engagement, playing both to regional audiences and to a broader global gallery to whom it seeks to portray itself as a nonthreatening and responsible international power. China appears as well to be promoting the Chinese language and culture in an effort to increase its soft power in the international arena. The dramatic rise of Confucius Institutes has garnered much attention from public diplomacy scholars and policy makers alike.

## **ՀԱՐՈՒԹՅՈՒՆՅԱՆ ԱՂԱՎՆԻ**

### **ՉԻՆԱՍՏԱՆԻ ՓԱՓՈՒԿ ՈՒԺԻ ՔԱՂԱՔԱԿԱՆՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ ԵՎ ՀԱՆՐԱՅԻՆ ԴԻՎԱՆԱԳԻՏՈՒԹՅՈՒՆԸ**

2000-ականների կեսերին Չինաստանի իշխանություններն ազգային մշակույթի և երկրի նպատակային երկարաժամկետ քաղաքա-

---

<sup>85</sup> Dingding Chen, The Rise of China's New Soft Power, The Diplomat, 09.06.2015. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-rise-of-chinas-new-soft-power/>

կանության զարգացման համատեքստում կարևորեցին փափուկ ուժի կիրառումը: Պեկինը ձևակերպեց փափուկ ուժի սեփական հայեցակարգը՝ չինական հատկանիշներով: Այն հիմնված էր սոցիալիզմի հիմնական արժեքների (Ժամանակակից մարքսիզմ) և չինական ավանդական մշակույթի, հատկապես հին կոնֆուցիականության վրա: Չին գիտնականների և ղեկավարության ուշադրության կենտրոնում հայտնվեցին նաև կոշտ և փափուկ ուժերի միջև փոխհարաբերության, ինչպես նաև արտաքին քաղաքականության նպատակներին հասնելու համար փափուկ ուժի տարբեր ձևերի զարգացման ու կիրառման հետ կապված հիմնահարցեր:

Միջազգային հանրության շրջանում փափուկ ուժի ազդեցության տարածման և դրական կերպարի ձևավորման գործին Չինաստանը ծառայեցնում է հանրային դիվանագիտությունը: Այն օգնում է Պեկինին հասնել իր շահերին և նպատակներին, ինչպես նաև բարձրացնել երկրի դերն ու հեղինակությունը միջազգային ասպարեզում: Չինական հանրային դիվանագիտությունն իրականացվում է գաղափարական և քաղաքական քարոզչության հետ կապված տեղեկատվական հրապարակումների, միջազգային հեռարձակումների, միջազգային մշակութային փոխանակումների, կրթամշակութային կենտրոնների գլոբալ ցանցի՝ Կոնֆուցիուսի ինստիտուտների միջոցով: Վերջիններիս առաքելությունն է չինարենի ուսուցման միջոցով չինական արվեստը, կրթությունը, գիտությունը և մշակույթն արտասահմանում հասու դարձնելը և տարածելը: